VZCZCXRO8157
OO RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5487/01 3181015
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141015Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4095
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3250

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005487 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
RELS NATO/AUS/NZ 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMETT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD 
 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT/LASHKAR GAH - GOVERNOR DEFENDS DEAL WITH MUSA QALA 
SHURA 
 
REF: (A) KABUL 4369 
 
KABUL 00005487  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  In a recent meeting with PRTOff, Helmand 
Governor Daud defended the Afghan government's deal with the leaders 
of Musa Qala district, wherein the government recognizes the 
leaders' right to administer the district in return for recognition 
of the central government's authority.  Daud worried about public 
comments critical of the agreement that could provide fodder to 
those who wish to subvert the deal for their own private interests. 
He defended the arrangement, citing three points: the agreement was 
not a 'provincial agreement,' but one approved by President Karzai; 
the unsustainable status quo demanded change; and there was a 
pressing need to recognize tribal authority.  Daud hoped to see 
public U.S. support for the arrangement.  He continues to pursue 
arrangements with other district leaders, and is near to a deal with 
those of Sangin.  See paragraph 12 for a summary of the Musa Qala 
agreement's points.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In an October 30 meeting with PRTOff, Helmand Governor 
Daud expressed concern about the Ambassador's published comments in 
the local press on the deal between the Government of Afghanistan 
(GOA) and the leaders of Musa Qala, a district in the conflict-weary 
north Helmand.  (NOTE: Under the deal, the GOA recognizes the local 
shura's authority and accepts its assurances to secure the district 
center, while the shura recognizes the GOA's authority (REF); it was 
followed by ISAF's withdrawal from the district center. END NOTE.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Informed that the comments did not constitute a rejection 
of the deal but a caution about the need to monitor it, Daud agreed 
with the need to closely watch the district, but worried that 
'negative' comments lend support to those opposed to the agreement. 
Daud hoped the Embassy would issue a statement in support of the 
agreement, identifying it as a national-level agreement, and stating 
that all parties are concerned that it be watched closely.  He then 
launched into a defense of the arrangement, citing (1) the fact that 
the it was not a "provincial agreement," but one approved by 
President Karzai, (2) the unsustainable status quo, and (3) the need 
to recognize tribal authority. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Daud rhetorically asked, "How much longer can we keep 
platoon houses there (i.e., in northern districts like Musa Qala), 
with ISAF and the Taliban firing on each other?"  He said the GOA 
had to consider alternatives, ones that strengthened local 
communities.  (NOTE: In a prior meeting at the Embassy, Daud 
indicated that recognizing local authority was the only available 
option, given the limited GOA resources, especially related to 
security.  END NOTE.)  Daud said, "We had to accept a deal," 
describing one high-level meeting wherein district leaders said that 
accepting their proposal would mean support for the GOA, otherwise, 
"Where should we go?  On what other door should we knock?" 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The agreement that emerged was the product of considerable 
negotiation (see paragraph 12 for a summary of its points).  As Daud 
described it, the local leaders told the Taliban not to fire.  The 
leaders having delivered on the cease fire, it was important to 
recognize their success and "show them respect"; ISAF's withdrawal 
was the quid-pro-quo that also removed the "provocation" of ISAF's 
presence from the district center. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) With ISAF's withdrawal, Daud says that the Afghan flag is 
now flying in the district center, a local administration approved 
by the GOA is in place, and local security forces are keeping the 
peace.  He dismissed those who might complain about the use of local 
militia for security, saying, "Forget that they are not wearing 
uniforms, there is peace." 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Daud alluded to unspecified 'others,' presumably warlords 
at odds with both the GOA and the Taliban, who wish to undermine the 
agreement 'for their own private interests.'  He said those others 
had organized a group to travel to Kabul to complain about the 
agreement, claiming that Musa Qala was now under Taliban control. 
"This is not true," Daud said, adding that he sent President Karzai 
footage showing the Afghan flag flying in Musa Qala and interviews 
with locals, and that the film was shown on Afghan state television. 
 
KABUL 00005487  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 (NOTE: There is anecdotal information at odds with the Governor's 
assertion: while people and commerce have returned to the district 
center, so reportedly have Taliban, albeit (possibly) unarmed. 
Reports from the Governor indicate the ANP has also withdrawn from 
the district.  Also, in a meeting on October 31 with PRT 
representatives, one local asked whether there was truth to the 
rumor that the Taliban demanded that the Afghan flag be removed from 
the district center.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Governor is close to securing an agreement with the 
shura of Sangin district, located in the north.  Daud has sent the 
agreement to Kabul, along with a list of district officials proposed 
by the shura.  The shura has agreed to guarantee security for the 
road leading to adjacent Kajaki district and the dam (though it 
could not provide a complete guarantee for other stretches of 
road). 
 
¶9.  (SBU) EMBASSY COMMENT:  Daud was firm in his defense of the 
agreement and determined to move forward, with this and similar 
arrangements with leaders in other districts (Nawzad has been 
mentioned).  The agreement he secured in Helmand appears to require 
much from the local shura, though not always with great specificity. 
 Putting aside for the moment different characterizations and thus 
uncertainty about the current situation on the ground, and local 
leaders' alleged sympathies for one side or another, one salient 
point is emerging: the cessation of violence has come at the cost of 
at least a temporary lessening of central government authority in 
the region.  Reconstruction assistance might swing sympathies 
towards the flag the Governor says is flying in the district center, 
but only if it is clearly connected to an expression/acknowledgement 
of state authority. 
 
¶10. (SBU) EMBASSY COMMENT (CSTC-A concurring): We do not support 
reliance on local militia, as it would call into question USG 
strategy on police reform and ANAP development.  During a recent 
Policy Advisory Group (PAG) meeting, both NSA Rassoul and Minister 
of Defense Wardak stated in their agreement with Ambassador Neumann 
that there must be independent confirmation of the security 
situation in Musa Qala.  The proposal discussed involved sending 150 
ANAP (training in Helmand started on Nov. 4, with the first group 
coming from Lashkar Gah and Nahri Sarraj districts) once the ANAP 
are trained, Minister Wardak stated that they should be sent to Musa 
Qala to judge whether the people accept newly recruited and trained 
police.  This force will also be able to judge the situation within 
Musa Qala.  However, in a subsequent PAG on Nov. 8, it sounded like 
all of ANAP would be recruited in Musa Qala, although they would 
receive two weeks training and equipment from national forces. 
 
¶11. (SBU) EMBASSY/CFC-A COMMENT CONTINUED:  The situation within 
Musa Qala must be told to the people of Afghanistan.  The press must 
portray the situation that the GOA is using innovative solutions to 
provide for the safety and security of the people and furthermore 
that the GOA is using Afghan solutions to provide for the security 
of the people.  This will demonstrate the GOA's concern and the 
development of greater capability within the government.  Such 
information operations should be undertaken, however, only when the 
GOA and ISAF are assured of the results of this agreement. 
Ambassador Neumann has been pushing this point actively (septel). 
END COMMENT. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Summary of points in Musa Qala agreement: 
- "Local Administration" (LA) will work to serve the public, under 
the Afghan national flag. 
- Uphold the constitution and avoid illegal activity. 
- Maintain security in district, help stabilize region. 
- Facilitate development and rehabilitation projects. 
- Collect taxes and consult with provincial authorities on spending 
them on welfare activities. 
- The LA will support children going to schools and keep doors open 
to the public.  (NOTE: The government would tolerate the curriculum 
being limited to the Koran if that was the shura's choice; no 
explicit direction to permit girls' attendance.) 
- Facilitate government missions and NGO activities. 
- Cooperate on keeping roads open. 
 
KABUL 00005487  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
- Guarantee the movement and security of international and national 
security forces while relocating; protect government property. 
- LA committed to not supporting any insurgency in other districts 
and to not letting the district to again become a haven for 
terrorists. 
- LA will cooperate with Ulemas to try yo bring "Islamic unity and 
fraternity" to all people in the region, bring peace and remove 
enmity. 
- Ban and control illegal arms. 
- Facilitate the return of IDPs. 
- Approved LA will commence activites only after Governor's 
approval. 
- Adjust arrangements only in agreement with the Governor. 
NEUMANN