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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 013289 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
Embassy Jakarta Medan Affairs Office # 34, 2006 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ASEC ID
SUBJECT: ACEH: MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN GAM REINTEGRATION 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: After refusing for more than a year, GAM 
finally provided a list of ex-combatants to the government, 
paving the way for some reintegration payments to be made 
before the end of the year.  GAM's providing names breaks 
the impasse, but persisting differences on land 
compensation, a major part of a settlement consistent with 
the MOU, will take longer to resolve.  End summary. 
 
Stalemate 
--------- 
¶2. (SBU) Finding a way to overcome GAM's refusal to provide 
the names of the 3,000 ex-combatants eligible for 
compensation has been the bane of Yusni Saby's existence. 
Saby, a respected intellectual and Muslim scholar, heads the 
Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA) that oversees reintegration 
payments to persons affected by the conflict.  Yusni 
recently confessed to being discouraged that previous BRA 
attempts to solve this problem did not work, and he opined 
there was no guarantee that the latest scheme would 
accomplish more than simply "spend the reintegration 
budget."  The possibility either side would compromise no 
longer entered into his calculus. 
 
¶3. (U) GAM's continued refusal to provide a list of names 
was rooted in several factors, including fear and 
pragmatism.  Based on their experience in 2003, GAM leaders 
feared the military might us the list to target the ex- 
combatants if the peace process faltered.  There was a 
practical problem as well: how to choose the names for the 
 
list. 
 
¶4. (U) The Helsinki MOU used the GAM-supplied number of 
3,000 combatants to calculate reintegration payments. 
According to GAM leaders now, however, the real number of ex- 
combatants is substantially higher, with some leaders 
claiming the total may be as high as 20,000.  If the 
government made paymen*ts directly to the 3,000, GAM leaders 
feared, GAM would have nothing for the thousands of others. 
 
Breakthrough 
------------ 
¶5. (SBU) At a Joint Forum meeting in October, however, GAM 
and GOI reached a compromise solution. GAM agreed to supply 
3,000 verifiable names and BRA agreed to make payments to 
the individuals listed, but in a way that enabled local GAM 
commanders to gain control of the funds and redistribute 
them more widely. The key to the compromise: payment by 
check. 
 
¶6. (SBU) If the deal holds, BRA will prepare a check for 
each of the ex-combatants and distribute them at public 
ceremonies throughout Aceh.  At the ceremony, each person 
receiving a check will endorse it and hand it over to the 
local GAM Commander for deposit into a central account.  GAM 
leaders told us commanders plan to distribute 90 percent of 
the funds to ex-combatants in their districts and set aside 
10 percent for future projects. 
 
State of Play - Deal Mostly on Track 
------------------------------------ 
¶7. (SBU) Early in November, GAM provided the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission (AMM) and BRA with a list of nearly 3,450 ex- 
combatants.  BRA checked the names and determined that 
approximately 2,500 of them qualified for payment.  Although 
a final schedule has yet to be established, BRA aims to 
distribute the funds by mid-December. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Sources in AMM, the provincial government, GAM and 
BRA told us that although the breakthrough was significant, 
it did not bring the issue to closure.  Instead, it reopened 
disputes about the size and composition o  the payments. 
BRA planned to pay IDR 25 million((USD 2,750)per combatant 
(IDR 10 million plus IDR 15 million in lieu of land).  GAM 
representativeZ 
akaria Salman argues that each ex-combatant 
is entitled to two hectares of "functional plantation" and 
that IDR 15 million is only enough to buy a small plot. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Aceh Governor Mustafa threatened to block payments 
if GAM does not drop its demand for land.  Former acting 
governor and current gubernatorial candidate Azwar Abu Bakar 
claims that GAM and the BRA previously agreed on 
 
JAKARTA 00013289  002 OF 002 
 
 
compensation payments and that both GAM and the BRA are 
deliberately misinterpreting the agreement.  The government, 
he said, did promise ex-combatants two hectares of land, but 
no one ever said it had to be two hectares of "palm oil 
ready to harvest."  Abu Bbakar believed Jakarta would not 
provide additional funding to meet this promise, leaving the 
problem for the provincial government to solve.  (NOTE:  The 
Helsinki MOU, section 3.2.5, states, "GOI will allocate 
suitable farming land as well as funds to the authorities of 
Aceh for the purpose of facilitating the reintegration to 
society of the former combatants."  Section 3.2.5 a) says, 
"All former combatants will receive an allocation of 
suitable farming land, employment or, in the case of 
incapacity to work, adequate social security."  END NOTE.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) Officials in BRA and the provincial government 
told us despite the disagreements, a significant portion of 
the payments will likely be made in the coming weeks as part 
of a compromise plan.  Under the compromise plan, each ex- 
combatant will be given a choice between IDR 25 million now 
or IDR 10 million now and a plot of land at some unspecified 
future date.  The pressure for local GAM leaders to deliver 
something to supporters in their region is simply too strong 
for GAM to reject the deal outright, said one contact. 
Although they had not yet decided on their final course of 
action, GAM leaders acknowledged to us that they need to 
deliver something to their supporters in the field, and they 
need to do it quickly. 
 
Further complications 
--------------------- 
¶11. (SBU) While GAM's providing the names of its ex- 
combatants is a substantial breakthrough, GAM has undermined 
its credibility by listing hundreds more names than the 
3,000 they claimed in the Helsinki MOU.  Ever since the MOU 
was signed, skeptics inside and outside of Aceh have voiced 
suspicions that GAM lowballed the number of weapons and 
personnel during negotiations in Helsinki to mask its 
strength and make it easier to rearm should the peace 
process break down. While those complaints have subsided 
somewhat as the peace process progressed, by formally 
admitting to having more combatants than acknowledged in 
Helsinki, GAM's has re-opened the door for groups to reopen 
these allegations. 
Pascoe