VZCZCXRO5166
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHHE #1173/01 3251426
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211426Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2765
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0023
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0730
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0992
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4714

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 001173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG RU FI EUN BO MD PL UP
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER AND FINNISH DG ESKELINEN DISCUSS 
RUSSIAN AND UMB AFFAIRS 
 
REF: STATE 181103 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF Gregory Thome for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer on 
15 November met with Finnish Director General Eskelinen and 
other foreign ministry staff to discuss U.S. consultations 
around the G-8 Political Directors' meeting in Moscow and 
Finnish preparations for the upcoming EU-Russia summit on 24 
November.  In addition, the group spoke informally about 
current developments in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus and 
ideas for possible cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On 15 November, Charge hosted a dinner for DAS David 
Kramer and Finnish Director General Kristi Eskelinen.  Also 
in attendance from the Finnish foreign ministry were Director 
for Russian Affairs Olli Perheentupa, Counsellor for Russian 
Affairs Paivi Laine, Director for Eastern Europe and Central 
Asian Affairs Antti Turunen, Counsellor for Eastern Europe 
and Central Asian Affairs Tuula Yrjola, and EMBOFFs.  The 
discussion covered a wide range of regional and international 
issues. 
 
RUSSIA 
------ 
¶3. (C) Perheentupa and Laine openly discussed their concerns 
regarding the proposed EU-Russia PCA mandate, a key 
deliverable the Finns had hoped to present at the EU-Russia 
summit on 24 November.  Laine stressed that Poland alone was 
blocking the proposed language.  When questioned about media 
reports that France was sympathetic to the Polish position, 
Laine clarified that France had agreed with Poland on a 
certain technical aspect (Comment: No further information on 
what this technical aspect was.  End Comment.) but that 
France had given its support to the document.  When pressed 
further on whether other states might be quietly supportive 
of the Polish position, Perheentupa and Laine stated with 
confidence that the mandate had the support of the other 24 
member states including the Baltics. 
 
¶4. (C) On Russian energy policy in Central Asia, Turunen 
stated that he would not be surprised by a gas cut-off this 
winter to Georgia but was interested to see how Russia would 
handle supply downstream to Armenia, as Turkey was unlikely 
to reverse a pipeline to supply it.  Turunen described it as 
Russia "shooting itself in the foot" with regard to Armenia. 
 
UKRAINE, MOLDOVA, AND BELARUS 
----------------------------- 
¶5. (C) DAS Kramer and Eskelinen agreed that Ukrainian 
President Yushchenko, whether for health or other reasons, 
has not been fully engaged as President of Ukraine, leaving a 
power void at the highest level of government.  Prime 
Minister Yanukovych is stepping in to fill this void and is 
eager to prove he isn't a Kremlin puppet.  While the Finns 
were concerned about the pace of government reform and lack 
of transparency in the energy sector, they were cautiously 
optimistic about Yanukovych's abilities.  Eskelinen also 
stated that the Ukrainian government has faced a great deal 
of Russian pressure since the customs union with Moldova came 
into force and that perhaps Kyiv has not received the Western 
recognition for resisting this pressure that it should have. 
 
¶6. (C) Turunen and Yrjola stated that the recent Russian 
suspension of the only passenger train from Chisinau to 
Moscow (see reftel) was an attempt to force de facto 
recognition of Transnistria on Moldova.  Both stated that 
they believed this frozen conflict could be resolved if 
Moscow chose to act constructively.  However, Moscow seemed 
satisfied with the status quo and unlikely to help resolve 
the current impasse.  DAS Kramer made a pitch for moving 
forward on creating an alternative, internationalized 
peacekeeping force (PKF) to replace the existing Russian PKF. 
 The Finns were cautious, arguing the need to pursue a 
political solution in parallel. 
 
¶7. (C) DAS Kramer solicited ideas from the Finns on how best 
to "stir up" Belarus again, as President Lukashenko appears 
to be settling into his new term in office and strengthening 
his hold on domestic politics.  The Finns lamented the 
apparent splintering of the opposition and stated that noted 
academic Aleksandr Milinkevich, while popular and respected 
abroad, is not a viable option to lead a united opposition at 
this time.  That said, Eskelinen also opined that the Kremlin 
lacked a post-Lukashenko candidate and that this was driving 
its current strategy of pressuring Lukashenko while not 
attempting to depose him.  DAS Kramer noted that there is no 
love lost between the Kremlin and Minsk.  He suggested that 
 
HELSINKI 00001173  002 OF 002 
 
 
if Moscow continued to take a tough line, Europe and the U.S. 
might be faced with the dilemma of a Lukashenko turn to the 
West as a means of alleviating pressure from Moscow. 
Eskelinen and her colleagues allowed that this was possible 
but agreed that, rather than engaging Lukashenko, Finland 
(and possibly the EU as a whole) would prefer to deal with 
Prime Minister Sidorskiy.  Kramer added that his inclination 
was not to afford Lukashenko an easy out of the squeeze from 
east and west unless he took concrete steps such as releasing 
political prisoners. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: On the immediate issues of the EU-Russia 
Summit, the Finns' frustration with Warsaw was evident. 
Eskelinen and her colleagues also expressed their sense that 
Germany is already "feeling the burden" of the next 
Presidency, probably exacerbated by Poland's opposition to 
the PCA mandate.  They welcomed and clearly took on board 
several of DAS Kramer's ideas on Russia and Belarus.  On 
Belarus in particular, Finland has begun engaging opposition 
figures and civil society -- including Prime Minister 
Vanhanen's recent hosting of Milinkevich and a generous 
bilateral grant to the International Humanitarian University 
for Belarusian exiles in Lithuania.  We will continue to 
brainstorm with the Finns and look for areas for cooperation 
in advancing democracy in Belarus and the rest of the region. 
 
¶9. (U) DAS Kramer has cleared this message. 
HYATT