VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDK #2789/01 3251558
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211558Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6922
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS DAKAR 002789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (RETRANS OF MESSAGE) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL, AF, AF/RSA, AF/W, EB/ESC/TFS AND INR/AA 
JUSTICE FOR AFMLS, OIA AND OPDAT 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN KCRM KTFN PTER SNAR SG
SUBJECT: 2006-2007 SENEGAL INCSR PART II: FINANCIAL 
CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING (FIRST OF TWO CABLES) 
 
REF: STATE 157136 
 
OVERVIEW 
-------- 
¶1.  This cable is Part II of the 2006 National 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Financial 
Crimes and Money Laundering report for Senegal. 
Included is a narrative overview (paras 2-12).  Para 
13 contains responses keyed to the numbered questions 
beginning with Reftel paragraph 17. 
 
¶2.  Senegal is vulnerable to money laundering.  There 
is some evidence of increasing criminal activity by 
foreigners, such as drug trafficking by Latin American 
groups and illegal immigrant trafficking involving 
Pakistanis, however there is little evidence of 
laundering by foreign criminal groups.  Rather, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that most laundering 
involves domestically-generated proceeds from 
corruption and embezzlement.  Dakar?s hot real-estate 
market is largely financed by cash and ownership of 
properties is non-transparent.  The building boom and 
high property prices suggest that an increasing amount 
of funds with an uncertain provenance is available for 
property speculation.  Other areas of concern include: 
cash, gold and gems transiting Senegal?s airport and 
porous borders, real estate investment in the Petite 
Cote south of Dakar, and money/trade centered in the 
region of Touba, a largely autonomous and unregulated 
?free-trade zone? under the jurisdiction of the 
Mouride religious authority.  This latter region 
reportedly receives between 550 and 800 million 
dollars per year in funds repatriated by networks of 
Senegalese vendors abroad. 
 
¶3.  Seventeen commercial banks operate alongside a 
thriving micro-credit sector.  Western Union, 
MoneyGram and MoneyExpress, associated with banks, are 
ubiquitous, suggesting that, while informal remittance 
systems exist, they are not a large threat to the 
business of the licensed remitters.  The Central Bank 
of West African States (BCEAO), based in Dakar, is the 
Central Bank for the countries in the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU or UEMOA):  Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d?Ivoire, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal and Togo, all of which use the French- 
backed CFA franc (CFAF) currency, which is pegged to 
the euro.  The Commission Bancaire, responsible for 
bank inspections, is based in Abidjan. 
 
¶4.  On February 6, 2004, Senegal became the first 
WAEMU country to enact the WAEMU Uniform Law on Money 
Laundering (the Uniform Law).  The new legislation 
largely meets international standards with respect to 
money laundering; it does not comply with all 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations 
concerning politically-exposed persons, and lacks 
certain compliance provisions for non-financial 
institutions.  The law does not deal with terrorist 
financing. 
 
¶5.  Senegal?s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) became 
operational in August 2005.  Since that date it has 
received 59 (11 in 2005 and 48 in 2006) suspicious 
declarations and has referred nine cases (three in 
2005, six in 2006) to the Prosecutor General.  All but 
two of the declarations have been made by banks.  The 
other two came from Customs.  Of the referrals, one 
concerns drug trafficking, one diamond trafficking, 
one relates to tax fraud, and three are corruption 
related.  No cases have concluded, although one arrest 
has been made.  The FIU currently has a staff of 23, 
including six appointed members:  the President, who 
by law is chosen from the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, and five others detailed from the Customs 
Service, the BCEAO, the Judicial Police, and the 
judiciary.  The FIU also relies on ?correspondents? in 
the relevant governmental institutions, who can be 
asked to provide information relevant to the FIU?s 
investigations.  With French sponsorship, Senegal?s 
FIU is a candidate for membership in the Egmont Group. 
Its candidacy is on hold pending the adoption of a 
terrorist financing law. 
 
¶6.  Official statistics regarding the prosecution of 
financial crimes are unavailable.  There has been one 
known conviction for money laundering since January 1, 
2005, which resulted in the confiscation of a private 
villa. 
 
¶7.  The BCEAO is working on a ?Directive against 
Terrorist Financing.?  The directive is expected to be 
presented to the WAEMU Council of Ministers in 
December 2006.  If adopted, the member states would be 
directed to enact a law against terrorist financing, 
which most likely would be presented as a Uniform Law 
in the same manner as the AML law.  Because, like the 
AML law, it is a penal law, each national assembly 
must then enact enabling legislation to adopt the law. 
(NOTE:  Since the uniform AML law was adopted by WAEMU 
in 2002, four of the eight member countries have 
enacted it.  END NOTE.)  In addition, the FATF-style 
regional body for the 15-member Economic Community of 
Western African States (ECOWAS), GIABA (African Anti- 
Money Laundering Inter-governmental Group) has drafted 
a uniform law, which it hopes to have enacted in all 
of its member states, not just the WAEMU states. 
GIABA will present is draft at a conference November 
21-23 in Niamey. 
 
¶8.  The UN 1267 Sanctions Committee consolidated list 
is circulated both by the GOS through the FIU and by 
the BCEAO to commercial financial institutions.  To 
date, no assets relating to terrorist entities have 
been identified.  The WAEMU Council of Ministers 
issued a directive in September 2002 requiring banks 
to freeze assets of entities designated by the 
Sanctions Committee. 
 
¶9.  Senegal has entered into bilateral criminal mutual 
assistance agreements with France, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Mali, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Cape Verde. 
Multilateral ECOWAS treaties deal with extradition and 
legal assistance.  Under the Uniform Law, the FIU may 
share information freely with other FIUs in WAEMU, 
however, at present, only Senegal and Niger have 
operational FIUs.  The FIU has signed an MOU to 
exchange information with the FIUs of Belgium and 
Lebanon, and is working on other accords.  In general, 
the GOS has demonstrated its commitment and 
willingness to cooperate with United States law 
enforcement agencies.  In the past the GOS has worked 
with INTERPOL, Spanish, and Italian authorities on 
international anticrime operations. 
 
¶10.  Senegal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention, the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, the 1999 UN International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and 
the Convention against Corruption.  Senegal also is a 
signatory to the African Union Convention on Terrorism 
Finance. 
 
¶11.  Senegal has made considerable progress in 
establishing an operational FIU.  However, a 
complicated political climate in advance of the 2007 
elections, a generally non-transparent police and 
judiciary, and governmental interests in the banking 
sector threaten to retard any efforts to take this 
progress to the next level of actual prosecutions and 
convictions.  Recent arrests of opposition 
politicians, journalists, and a corruption scandal 
that resulted in the early retirement, rather than 
prosecution, of the implicated judges, illustrate the 
weakness in the rule of law in Senegal. 
 
¶12.  The Government of Senegal should continue to work 
with its partners in WAEMU and ECOWAS to establish a 
comprehensive anti-money laundering and counter- 
terrorist financing regime.  Senegal should work on 
achieving transparency in its judicial, financial and 
real estate sectors; however, to the extent the money 
laundering risks in these sectors stem from 
governmental actors, this task will be difficult. 
Senegal and the region should establish better control 
of cross-border currency transfers. 
 
RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC REFTEL QUESTIONS 
 
-------------------------------------- 
¶13.  The following responses are to specific Reftel 
paragraphs/questions: 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS 
----------------- 
Question 17: Is the country (or territory or 
dependency) considered an important regional financial 
center (such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Panama, 
Switzerland, etc.)?  What is its significance in terms 
of money laundering? 
 
-- Senegal is not considered an important regional 
financial center, although the financial sector is 
growing.  Senegal?s banking sector is governed by the 
BCEAO, which issues the euro-pegged CFAF.  Along with 
the BCEAO, which is headquartered in Dakar, Senegal, 
the ?Commission bancaire? is a supranational 
supervisory entity created in April 1990 to control 
and oversee financial institution operations.  There 
are 17 banks, several of which have opened in the last 
few years, despite the estimate that fewer than 10 
percent of Senegalese have accounts. 
 
-- The largest (by investment and earnings) commercial 
banks (2005 figures) are dominated by French banks: 
Societe generale de Banques au Senegal (SGBS), Banque 
Internationale pour le Commerce et l?Industrie au 
Senegal (BICIS), Compagnie Bancaire de l?Afrique de 
l?Ouest (CBAO) and Credit Lyonnais (CL).  As of FY 
2005, SGBS provided CFAF 300 billion (USD 600 million) 
in loans for private investment projects and its after 
tax earnings reached CFAF 7 billion (USD 14 million). 
Citibank, the only U.S. bank, is active in corporate 
financing.  Bank of Africa and Ecobank have an 
impressive network spread throughout West and part of 
Central Africa.  Moroccans (Attijariwafa), Libyans 
(Banque Sahelo-Sahelienne pour le Commerce et 
l?Industrie) and Saudis (Banque Islamique) are also 
present in the banking sector.  One bank, the Banque 
de l?Habitat du Senegal (BHS), has affiliates licensed 
as money remitters in the United States.  BHS New York 
was recently the subject of an enforcement action by 
New York state authorities for failing to comply with 
anti-money laundering regulations. 
 
-- Other financial institutions, including insurance 
companies, a venture capital firm, and a leasing 
company, are also present.  The West African Regional 
stock exchange (BRVM) is headquartered in Abidjan with 
local offices in each of the WAEMU member countries. 
A few Senegalese firms are listed on the BRVM.  There 
is free convertibility of the CFA franc via the 
banking system for commercial transactions. 
 
-- The significance of money laundering in Senegal is 
hard to gauge.  The most likely source of money 
laundering is corruption and embezzlement, and grand 
corruption is unlikely to turn up in governmental 
reporting.  That said, three of the six referrals made 
by the FIU to the Public Prosecutor reportedly concern 
corruption, but none of these cases has become public. 
Money laundering risks include large cash transfers 
through the airport; large remittances from overseas 
Senegalese, particularly through the regions of 
Diourbel (including the city of Touba) and Louga; and 
real estate investment in Dakar and the Petite Cote. 
Customs sources report that large amounts of currency 
in dollars, euros and sterling routinely transit the 
airport, and there have been significant seizures of 
cash entering Senegal from The Gambia.  As noted 
above, some reports estimate that between USD 550 and 
800 million is repatriated to the Diourbel and Louga 
regions annually by networks of overseas Senegalese 
vendors.  The buoyant real estate market creates 
opportunities to recycle funds, and the strong market 
in luxury properties does not appear, in a cursory 
analysis, to match local capital availability.  Given 
the small customer pool, the number of casinos in 
Senegal (reportedly over 15) is striking. 
 
Question 18: To the extent it is known, is money 
laundering/terrorist financing primarily related to 
narcotics proceeds?  (If applicable, specify drug.) 
 
If not, what is the major source(s) of the proceeds? 
Also to the extent known, do the criminal proceeds 
laundered in the jurisdiction derive primarily from 
domestic or foreign criminal activity?  Are the money 
laundering proceeds controlled by local drug- 
trafficking organizations, organized crime, or 
terrorist groups? 
 
-- As noted above, one FIU referral reportedly 
involves drug trafficking.  The most common source of 
proceeds, however, is probably corruption.  With 
respect to drugs, there is substantial cultivation of 
marijuana in Senegal for the European market, and 
there appears to be a growing traffic in cocaine from 
South America through West Africa to Europe.  The 
quantity of drugs seized in Senegal is quite low, 
however.  There is some sense that some remittance 
money, invested in luxury property and vehicles, comes 
from drug dealing by Senegalese in Europe and the 
United States.  In 2005, the Senegalese confiscated 
several properties of a drug dealer convicted in the 
United States. 
 
-- To the extent that the Senegalese vendor networks 
in the U.S. and Europe deal largely in counterfeit 
goods, remittance of these proceeds could be viewed as 
laundering.  Most of these networks and proceeds are 
reportedly controlled by the religious authorities of 
the Mouride Brotherhood. 
 
Question 19: Is there a significant black market for 
smuggled goods in the country?  If so, do you believe 
it is significantly funded by narcotic proceeds or 
other illicit proceeds?  Does contraband smuggling 
generate funds that are laundered through the banking 
system? 
 
-- There is a significant informal (grey) market in 
just about everything.  Government intellectual 
property experts report a growing problem with 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals, building supplies and 
other goods.  Piracy of movies, music and software is 
widespread.  It does not appear to be narcotics-funded 
or to involve laundering through the banking system. 
A high proportion of smuggling is conventional 
economic activity conducted by traders seeking to 
avoid duties and taxes, and by foreign exporters 
taking advantage of lax or nonexistent quality control 
standards and consumer protection laws to sell goods 
that are unmarketable elsewhere. 
 
Question 20: Does money laundering/terrorist financing 
occur in the banking system, within an offshore 
financial center or free trade zone, or in the non- 
bank financial system (e.g., exchange houses) or via 
alternative remittance systems such as hawala, or all 
areas?  Is the country experiencing an increase in 
financial crimes, not limited to money laundering or 
terrorist financing, such as bank fraud and 
counterfeit currency?  Please explain. 
 
-- The potential for significant involvement in money 
laundering by all sectors exists.  As discussed above, 
the banking sector is becoming more compliant on paper 
with international standards, but the potential for 
corruption and insider-based money laundering is still 
strong.  The area around Touba has been compared to a 
free-trade zone, and the lack of transparency in trade 
transactions generally creates a risk of money 
laundering.  Senegal is not obviously linked to any 
offshore financial center. 
 
-- In addition to remittances via Western Union and 
other formal systems, there are also some informal 
money transfer systems, similar to hawala systems. 
 
-- It is unclear whether Senegal is experiencing an 
increase in financial crimes.  Anecdotal evidence from 
the foreign business community indicates a worsening 
climate for foreign investment due to non-transparent 
decision-making within the judiciary and government, 
an indication of increasing corruption.  Official 
statistics regarding prosecution of financial crimes 
are unavailable. 
 
 
 
Question 21: To the post?s knowledge, do the country?s 
financial institutions engage in currency transactions 
involving international narcotics trafficking proceeds 
that include significant amounts of United States 
currency or currency derived from illegal drug sales 
in the United States or that otherwise significantly 
affect the United States? 
 
-- Because of Senegal?s historically close ties to 
France, the majority of Senegal?s international 
currency transactions are denominated in euros. 
Senegal?s financial institutions do not appear to have 
a significant role in laundering drug proceeds. 
 
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS 
-------------------------- 
Questions 22 to 24: These questions are not 
applicable, and are not reproduced, as Senegal has no 
offshore banking or other institutions. 
 
FREE TRADE ZONES 
---------------- 
Question 25: Are there free trade zones operating in 
the jurisdiction?  If so, please give the number and 
briefly describe operations, capability and function. 
 
-- The Dakar Industrial Free Trade Zone (ZFID) was 
established in 1974 to encourage foreign investors to 
set up intensive export-oriented companies.  Its 
enabling statute has been extended until 2016, but 
only for companies already established within the 
zone.  The U.S. pharmaceutical company, Pfizer, has a 
manufacturing plant in the ZFID.  The ZFID is largely 
inactive with few companies present. 
 
-- As stated above, the city of Touba is by statute an 
autonomous territory within Senegal.  It is the 
headquarters of the Mouride Brotherhood, and the city 
is governed by the Mouride khalife.  The city has seen 
enormous economic growth, which one commentator 
attributes almost entirely to the transnational 
trafficking in contraband. 
 
Question 26: Is there any indication that these free 
trade zones are being used in trade-based money 
laundering schemes or by the financiers of terrorism? 
 
-- There is no indication that the ZFID is being used 
by financiers of terrorism or in trade-based money 
laundering schemes.  There is no evidence that Touba 
is used for terrorist-financing; trade-based 
laundering certainly occurs if one considers the sale 
of counterfeit goods on the streets of New York, for 
example, to be a predicate crime. 
 
Question 27: What type of supervisory programs and/or 
due diligence procedures is in place to monitor 
activities in the free zone?  Are there identification 
requirements for companies and individuals who use the 
zone? 
 
-- Police forces and customs officials monitor 
activities in the ZFID.  Companies and individuals 
that use the zone are identified and registered.  With 
respect to Touba, there have been recent improvements 
that have allowed the gendarmerie to begin policing 
Touba, and reportedly trafficking in arms has 
diminished.  The FIU has not yet grappled with AML 
enforcement issues in Touba, although it has 
recognized the need to do so. 
 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS TO PREVENT MONEY LAUNDERING 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Question 28: Is money laundering a criminal offense in 
this country? 
 
-- Yes, in 2004, Senegal became the first WAEMU 
country to pass WAEMU harmonized legislation 
establishing a uniform law on money laundering. 
 
Question 28 (continued):  Does the law apply only to 
drug-related money laundering?  Does the country list 
specific crimes or take an all serious crimes 
 
approach?  Note: In some jurisdictions, anti-money 
laundering laws cover ?all serious crimes? which are 
defined as crimes that carry a threshold minimum 
sentence in the jurisdiction?s penal code.  If the 
country lists specific crimes, what offenses are 
covered?  If there is a threshold minimum, what is 
that threshold? 
 
-- Previously, criminal prosecution of money 
laundering had been tied to Senegal?s anti-narcotics 
legal code.  Under the new legislation, the source of 
the proceeds can be any crime. 
 
Question 29: Has the country enacted secrecy laws that 
prevent disclosure of client and ownership information 
by domestic and offshore financial services companies 
to bank supervisors and law enforcement authorities? 
 
-- The uniform law on money laundering enables banking 
information to be shared with law enforcement 
authorities.  The law states:  ?Notwithstanding all 
contrary legal provisions or rules, professional 
secrecy may not be invoked . . . to refuse providing 
information to the control authorities.? 
 
QUESTION 30: Do current laws provide for the 
establishment and funding of a financial intelligence 
unit (FIU)? 
 
-- Yes, Senegal was the first WAEMU country to 
establish a functioning FIU. 
 
FINANCIAL SECTOR 
---------------- 
Question 31: Who supervises and examines financial 
institutions for compliance with anti-money 
laundering/counter-terrorist financing laws and 
regulations? 
 
-- The Banking Commission has the responsibility to 
supervise financial institution compliance with 
AML/CTF laws and regulations.  The Commission 
reportedly has conducted some AML compliance 
examinations; however, due to the fact that half of 
the member states have not adopted the uniform law, 
its efforts have been limited. 
 
Question 32: Are banks and other financial 
institutions required to know, record, and report the 
identity of customers engaging in significant 
transactions, including the recording of large 
currency transaction at thresholds appropriate to the 
country?s economic situation?  What is the statutory 
threshold? 
 
-- Yes, banks and other financial institutions are 
required to know, record, and report the identity of 
any customers engaged in significant transactions, 
including the recording of large currency transaction 
at thresholds appropriate to the country?s economic 
situation.  Banking regulations state that to open a 
personal account a customer must provide appropriate 
ID, two photos, and a permanent address through the 
presentation of a telephone, water, or electricity 
bill.  The bank monitors and record the origin of any 
deposit higher than CFAF 5 million for a single 
individual account (USD 10,000) and CFAF 20 to 50 
million for any business account. 
 
Question 33: Are banks and other financial 
institutions required to maintain for an adequate time 
records necessary to reconstruct significant 
transactions through financial institutions in order 
to be able to respond quickly to information requests 
from appropriate government authorities in narcotics- 
related or other money laundering or terrorist finance 
cases?  For how long? 
 
-- The law requires financial institutions to preserve 
records for at least ten years. 
 
Question 34: Are the money laundering controls applied 
to non-banking financial institutions, such as 
exchange houses, stock brokerages, cash couriers, 
 
casinos, insurance companies, etc., and to 
intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, or 
brokers/dealers?  Who supervises such entities for 
compliance? 
 
-- The law applies to a host of sectors, including all 
of those listed above and others.  Some entities have 
government regulatory authorities; others (such as 
attorneys and accountants) have professional 
supervisory authorities, while others have no 
effective regulator.  The FIU is considering the issue 
of how to handle compliance in the sectors lacking a 
functional regulator. 
 
Question 35: Do financial institutions report 
suspicious transactions?  Is such reporting mandatory 
or voluntary?  Is reporting required for all 
suspicious transaction, or is there a threshold amount 
below which suspicious transaction reports are not 
required?  Are non-bank financial institutions 
required to report such transactions? 
 
-- The law requires financial institutions to report 
suspicious transactions to the FIU; in 2005, the 
CENTIF received 11 declarations and to date in 2006 it 
has received 48.  There is no minimum threshold.  Non- 
bank financial institutions are also required to 
report. 
 
Question 36: Are reporting individuals (bankers and 
others) protected by law with respect to their 
cooperation with law enforcement entities? 
 
-- Reporting individuals and their supervisors are 
accorded full civil and criminal immunity (as well as 
protection from professional sanctions) for 
information provided to the FIU in good faith. 
 
Question 37: Are there statutory requirements for 
limiting or monitoring the international 
transportation of currency and monetary instruments? 
 
-- In general, all incoming currency and monetary 
instruments must be deposited in a bank, the post 
office, or changed at an authorized foreign exchange 
bureau within 30 days.  There is no limit on the 
amount.  The entities report receipts monthly to the 
BCEAO.  Outgoing transfers must be handled by banks, 
the post office, or, in the case of cash or travel 
checks for travelers, by authorized change bureaus. 
Regulations provide a long laundry list of 
justifications for transfers; such transfers can be 
done by the financial institutions without 
authorization as long as the transferor provides 
documentation of the purpose of the transfer (and, in 
the case of the Post and change bureaus, is within a 
certain amount).  A notable exception is transfers for 
the purpose of foreign investment, which, as with any 
other purpose not on the list, must be approved by the 
Minister of Finance.  Financial institutions report 
outgoing transfers monthly to the BCEAO. 
 
Question 38: Please describe cross-border currency 
reporting requirements, including those that apply to 
cash couriers? 
 
-- On entry, non-residents must declare in writing any 
currency from outside the ?zone franc? in the amount 
of CFAF one million (approximately USD 2,000) or more, 
as well as monetary instruments denominated in cash in 
any amount.  On exit, non-residents must declare in 
writing any non-franc-zone currency above 
approximately USD 1,000 as well as all monetary 
instruments from foreign entities.  Residents are not 
required to declare currency on entry; on exit, they 
must declare in writing amounts any foreign currency 
and any monetary instruments greater than 
approximately USD 4,000.  These requirements are for 
the purpose of currency control and are not well 
enforced. 
 
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT/INVESTIGATION 
----------------------------------------- 
Question 39: Has the country established and 
 
adequately staffed a financial intelligence unit 
(FIU)?  Where in the Government is it housed; e.g., 
within the finance or national police ministry, as an 
independent agency, etc. 
 
-- Senegal has established an FIU with 23 employees, 
12 of whom are professional staff and 11 
administrative support staff.  The FIU is within the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, although its staff is 
drawn from several ministries. 
 
Question 40: Describe the authorities and functions of 
the FIU.  Is it an administrative body that performs 
analytical duties or does it also have criminal 
investigative responsibilities?  Does it have 
regulatory responsibilities? 
 
-- A senior Treasury Inspector administers the FIU. 
Its mission, among other things, is to receive and 
analyze suspicious activity declarations, and, where 
appropriate, to refer files to the Prosecutor General. 
It is an administrative-type FIU, but has the 
authority to obtain information through 
?correspondents? within police entities (as well as 
within other government entities).  It also has two 
senior police inspectors and a customs officer on 
staff.  Some of its functions could be viewed as 
investigative, but it is not clear where the limits of 
its investigative authority lie.  It does not, at 
present, have regulatory responsibilities. 
 
Question 41: Does the FIU have access to the records 
or databanks of other government entities?  Financial 
Institutions?  Does it have formal mechanisms in place 
to share information domestically or with other FIUs? 
 
-- The FIU has the authority to request information 
from any government entity through its 
?correspondents? as well as from any reporting entity 
(i.e., financial and designated non-financial 
entities).  Under the uniform law, information can be 
shared freely among the FIUs in WAEMU; at present, 
however, there is only one other operational FIU 
(Niger).  The FIU has signed an accord with the FIUs 
in Belgium, Lebanon, and Nigeria, and is in the 
process of negotiating additional accords. 
 
Question 42: How many suspicious transaction reports 
(STRs) were received in 2006?  How many were the 
subject of investigation or resulted in referrals to 
law enforcement for investigation? 
 
-- In 2006 to date, the FIU has received 48 STRs and 
has made 6 referrals to the Prosecutor General. 
 
Question 43: Which government bodies are responsible 
for investigating financial crimes, including money 
laundering and terrorist financing?  Are they 
adequately staffed and trained to fulfill their 
responsibilities? 
 
-- Apart from the FIU, the police, gendarmerie and 
judiciary, through the judicial police, are 
responsible for investigating money laundering and 
terrorist financing.  The U.S. Department of Treasury 
presented a two-week financial investigations training 
course in early 2006, which was directed towards 
personnel who are involved in investigating matters 
referred by the FIU.  In addition, the French 
government is sponsoring a project to create 
specialized services to handle economic and financial 
crimes within the judicial police, the prosecutors? 
office and among the investigating judges. 
 
Question 44: Have there been arrests and/or 
prosecutions for money laundering or terrorist 
financing since January 1, 2006.  How many?  Please 
report highlights of any major cases not previously 
reported. 
 
-- One suspect is known to have been arrested and 
interviewed but the details of the case have not been 
provided as it is still before the investigating 
judge. 
 
 
Question 45: Has the jurisdiction criminalized the 
financing of terrorism as required by the United 
Nations Security Council resolution 1373?  If so, 
please provide title of act, date of enactment, and 
pertinent details.  If the jurisdiction has an ?all 
serious crimes? anti-money laundering law, please 
indicate if terrorism and terrorist financing are 
considered ?serious crimes.? 
 
-- As happened with the uniform law against money 
laundering, the BCEAO has taken the lead in drafting a 
directive against terrorist financing, which it 
expects to present to the WAEMU Ministers? meeting for 
consideration in December 2006.  Once adopted by the 
Ministers, a Uniform law will be drafted and be 
available for adoption by the parliaments of member 
states.  GIABA has a draft uniform law for all ECOWAS 
states that will be discussed at a seminar in Niamey 
in November 2006. 
 
Question 46: Has the jurisdiction circulated to its 
financial institutions the list of individuals and 
entities that have been included on the UN 1267 
sanctions committee?s consolidated list as being 
linked to Usama bin Ladin, members of the Al Qa?ida 
organization or the Taliban, or that the USG or the EU 
have designated under relevant authorities.  If so, 
did the jurisdiction identify, freeze, seize, and/or 
forfeit related assets in 2005?  If so, please provide 
dollar amount. 
 
-- The list is circulated both by the FIU and by the 
BCEAO to commercial financial institutions.  To date 
no assets relating to terrorist entities have been 
identified. 
 
Question 47: Does the jurisdiction acknowledge the 
existence and use of indigenous alternative remittance 
systems that by-pass, in whole or part, financial 
institutions?  Describe the steps the jurisdiction has 
taken regarding regulating alternative remittance 
systems, such as hawala, black market exchanges, money 
remitters, trade-based money laundering, cross border 
cash smuggling, or the misuse of gold, precious metals 
and gems. 
 
-- Senegalese authorities acknowledge the existence 
and use of indigenous alternative remittance systems 
that by-pass, in whole or part, financial 
institutions.  Such entities are illegal; however, 
there is little effort at present to enforce the law. 
The banks complain about this sector; at the same 
time, however, the prevalence of bank-affiliated 
services such as Western Union, and the presence of 
money remitters abroad opened by Senegalese banks 
(such as BHS New York) indicate that banks are 
competitive in this arena.  Banks have also expanded 
into Touba, showing that the economy is open to the 
formal, as well as informal, sector.  All financial 
institutions must report suspicious transactions to 
the FIU.  With respect to trade-based laundering, 
Customs is fairly well-automated and does share trade 
information, which it uses in part to spot fraud, with 
a few states including Mali, and, previously, Cote 
d?Ivoire.  In theory, this could be expanded to look 
for trade-based laundering, but the quality of data is 
suspect.  Dealers in high value goods are required to 
file suspicious activity reports to the FIU although 
to date none have done so.  By law, the import and 
export of gold in commercial quantities must have the 
authorization of the Minister of Economy and Finance, 
but it is not clear that this requirement is enforced 
or even known by Customs agents.  Cross-border 
currency, gold and gem smuggling is common; however, 
Customs? ability to investigate quickly is low, and 
therefore most goods are released.  Similarly, large 
and suspicious cash shipments go through unchecked 
because there is no ability to investigate or hold the 
money.  Customs also is required to report suspicious 
transactions to the FIU and has done so on two 
occasions to date. 
 
Question 48: Discuss the efforts the jurisdiction has 
 
taken to thwart the misuse of charitable and/or non- 
profit entities that can be used as conduits for the 
financing of terrorism? 
 
-- Regulation of charities is shared between the 
Ministry of Family and Social Development and the 
Ministry of Interior.  In theory, NGOs are subject to 
certain transparency and audit requirements; due to 
lack of means, however, in practice the regulation is 
administrative only.  Reportedly, the police do watch 
certain NGOs, including those thought to present a 
risk of terrorism, and believe the sector to be high 
risk and badly regulated.  The WAEMU uniform AML law 
adopted by Senegal covers charitable and non-profit 
entities, which are required to file suspicious 
transaction reports.  There is no terrorist financing 
law. 
 
CASH SMUGGLING 
-------------- 
Question 49: Bulk cash smuggling and the use of cash 
couriers to move the proceeds of crime and terrorist 
funding are of significant concern to the USG.  Are 
there laws criminalizing smuggling cash into and out 
of the country?  If so are Customs officials aware of 
cash courier problems and capable of dealing with the 
issue? 
 
-- See Response to Question 47. 
 
Question 50: Are cash smuggling reports shared between 
host government entities (in particular with an 
existing FIU)? 
 
-- Currency declarations are not shared, although 
there is an informal agreement to do so.  Customs is 
required and has filed Suspicious Activity 
Declarations with the FIU.  See Response to Question 
¶47. 
 
JACOBS