VZCZCXRO3692
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #2703/01 3121801
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081801Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6828
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0133

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 002703 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR CA A/S HARTY FROM AMBASSADOR 
STATE ALSO FOR CA/P - DEBRA HEIEN AND PAMELA KOKAL AND AF/W 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OVIP CMGT SMIG ECON EAID PGOV PREL KMCA SG
SUBJECT: SENEGAL SCENESETTER FOR A/S HARTY 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (SBU) As the Mission and the Government of Senegal (GOS) 
prepare to host you, Senegal is preparing for presidential 
and parliamentary elections in February 2007.  The Senegalese 
are proud to have a predominantly Muslim democracy that 
preaches tolerance and visibly supports the United States in 
promoting peace and combating terrorism.  The GOS is seeking 
to enhance economic growth to reinforce its prospects at the 
polls.  Growth has remained steady at five percent over the 
last decade, though there are signs of a slowdown in 2006. 
Despite high rates of poverty and illiteracy, Senegal retains 
a high degree of political stability and coherence thus 
enabling GOS to be a diplomatic player on a continent replete 
with conflicts.  With U.S. training and assistance, Senegal 
has also become one of the world,s top ten contributors of 
peacekeepers. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Senegal aspires to become a more significant 
trading partner, but internal barriers to export-driven 
growth and continuing reliance upon foreign assistance have 
greatly retarded these hopes.  This has resulted in mass 
illegal migration of Senegalese to the Canary Islands, a 
thorny issue for the GOS.  The prospect of a successful 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Compact offers a realistic 
potential for breaking with the past.  Senegal must improve 
the investment climate and push forward more vigorously with 
reforms to strengthen its fragile judiciary that is lacking 
sufficient resources and often subject to external 
influences.  In fact, the investigation and prosecution of 
leading politicians and journalists in 2005 and 2006 has 
tarnished Senegal,s impressive human rights record.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
AN IMPERFECT DEMOCRACY 
---------------------- 
¶3.  (SBU) Senegal is at an interesting juncture in its 
post-independence history, six years through the seven-year 
tenure of President Abdoulaye Wade (pronounced &wahd8) and 
a few months away from presidential and parliamentary 
elections.  He won an open, peaceful and highly competitive 
election in March 2000 due to a strong Senegalese national 
desire for change after nearly 40 years of Socialist Party 
governments.  In fact, having raised expectations somewhat 
unrealistically, Wade has come under tough scrutiny and 
criticism for not having realized many of his campaign 
promises.  He has recently undertaken major public works 
projects that he hopes will benefit him politically. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Wade and his party, the Senegalese Democratic Party 
(PDS), have benefited from Senegal,s institutionalization of 
democratic values, respect for human rights, expansion of 
tolerance, advancement of women,s rights, and freedom of 
expression in all its forms.  As a consequence, the standards 
by which the performance of his government is being measured 
are admittedly higher than those of his predecessors, a 
healthy sign that the large majority of Senegalese expect and 
demand democratic behavior from this government. 
 
SENEGAL'S UNIQUE BRAND OF ISLAM 
------------------------------- 
¶5.  (SBU) Senegal is 95 percent Muslim, and it is 
instinctively resistant to religious extremism in general and 
Islamic fundamentalism in particular.  One reason for this 
moderation is Senegal,s distinctive and flexible 
interpretation of Islam.  Another may be its geographic 
position at the western edge of the Islamic world.  But 
perhaps the principal reason is the pervasive influence of 
the Sufi brotherhoods, homegrown societies that are hostile 
to external influences that they perceive as undercutting 
their own stature.  The majority of Senegalese identify 
themselves with one of the four principal Brotherhoods 
(Tidjane, Mouride, Qu,adria and Layenne).  Religious chiefs 
are called marabouts.  Followers or talibes are expected to 
attach themselves to a marabout, and this allegiance is like 
a feeling for a father.  In many ways the marabouts have 
replaced the traditional village chiefs.  Politicians use 
these affiliations to advance their policies. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issues 
diplomatic and official passports to marabouts as a courtesy. 
 When President Wade won elections in 2000, he initially 
required all marabouts to turn in their diplomatic and 
official passports and declared that he would restrict 
issuance of such passport in the future.  Such attempts have 
failed and he has now approved issuance of far more 
diplomatic and official passports than the previous 
Presidents.  As a result, Italy started requiring visas for 
 
DAKAR 00002703  002 OF 004 
 
 
diplomatic and official passports in December 2004, bringing 
it into alignment with most other European countries.  In 
addition to issuing passports, the MFA also routinely issues 
diplomatic notes to marabouts, regardless of their status in 
the community.  The issue of undocumented Senegalese in the 
U.S. is an important issue for khalifs who have talibes 
living there illegally.  Even President Wade has raised the 
issue of undocumented Senegalese in the U.S. 
 
SENEGAL'S ECONOMY: AN ACHILLES HEEL 
----------------------------------- 
¶7.  (SBU) There is general economic stability, and GDP growth 
has averaged five percent annually for the last ten years, 
but is likely to fall to three percent in 2006.  More than 
half the population lives in poverty; one-third to one-half 
have no reliable employment; the agricultural sector, which 
employs 60 percent of the population, is weak and unreliable; 
and most youth see emigration as a panacea, as shown by the 
recent flight of thousands of Senegalese to the Canary 
Islands.  On a more positive note, Senegal graduated from the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries program.  In 2005 and 2006, 
the IMF and the World Bank forgave over USD 1 billion in 
multilateral debt, potentially freeing up over USD 80 million 
per year for poverty reduction.  Despite these successes, the 
business environment remains difficult.  Corruption is an 
issue, and while Wade has said the right things about 
combating it, members of his own family are often rumored to 
demand bribes and percentages of investments. 
 
CLANDESTINE MIGRATION: SOCIAL ISSUE OF THE DAY 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶8.  (U) Starting in mid-May, the flow of illegal African 
migrants landing on the shores of Spain's Canary Islands 
reached alarming levels.  According to October press reports, 
over 27,000 illegal migrants, more than half of whom are 
Senegalese, have been detained by Spanish authorities.  Of 
the 27,000, more than 4,000 migrants have been repatriated to 
Senegal.  This has generated extensive press coverage by the 
local and international media and has become a priority for 
the Government.  On October 10, Senegalese Foreign Minister 
Cheikh Tidiane Gadio and his Spanish counterpart, Miguel 
Angel Moratinos, signed a framework agreement paving the way 
for legal immigration based on Spanish job market needs. 
Based on the agreement, Spain will provide Senegal with up to 
USD 19 million annually over five years. 
 
¶9.  Several other European countries and the European 
Commission have also donated funds and equipment to improve 
surveillance of the Senegalese coast and improve border 
enforcement.  However, there is concern that repatriated and 
disgruntled Senegalese coupled with increased border 
enforcement could become a liability for President Wade 
during the February 2007 elections.  There are reports that 
Wade's advisors are pushing to bring a halt to flights 
returning illegal Senegalese migrants from the Canaries. 
 
SENEGAL'S FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES START IN NEIGHBORHOOD 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
¶10.  (SBU) Senegal devotes major efforts to maintaining a 
modicum of stability on its borders.  While politically Wade 
has worked hard to expand Senegal,s role on the continent 
and in world affairs, his government actually expends real 
resources (financial, material and humanitarian) to its near 
neighbors.  For example, Wade has been engaged in 
Guinea-Bissau since the September 2003 coup d,etat. 
Characteristic of Senegal,s regional anxieties, Wade and his 
government continue to express great concern over the 
eventual transition in nearby Guinea in light of the failing 
health of its leader and the potential for disruptions there 
and a resulting influx of refugees to Senegal.  Also, the 
sometimes erratic behavior of the recently re-elected Gambian 
President Jammeh, who rules the strategically located strip 
of land that juts into Senegal, raises Senegalese concerns 
over The Gambia,s stability. 
 
CASAMANCE CONFLICT 
------------------ 
¶11.  (SBU) Internal conflict in Senegal,s southernmost 
region of the Casamance has regional security implications 
because it borders The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.  Good 
progress has been made to lower the level of conflict thus 
easing border tensions; however, in the last several months, 
there has been an increase in fighting between factions of 
the Casamance separatist movement in southern Senegal and the 
Senegalese military, particularly in the northern part of the 
Ziguinchor region.  Reports of banditry in the area have also 
increased.  On September 1, an American was killed when her 
vehicle hit a newly placed mine on an unpaved road in this 
 
DAKAR 00002703  003 OF 004 
 
 
area.  Senegal's Consular Information Sheet reflects this 
security problem.  We continue to use our influence with GOS 
civilian and military institutions as well as with community 
representatives in the Casamance to achieve reconciliation 
and a lasting resolution to the conflict. 
 
U.S. ASSISTANCE 
--------------- 
¶12.  (SBU) In addition to supporting the Casamance peace 
process, U.S. assistance to Senegal has focused on Muslim 
outreach, health, education, export promotion, promotion of 
women,s rights, good governance and decentralization. 
Approximately 150 Peace Corps Volunteers are involved in 
health, education, natural resource management and 
micro-enterprise programs.  Our model Muslim outreach program 
consists of assisting daaras (koranic schools), sending imams 
to the United States on International Visitor programs and 
donating Arabic- and English-language materials to Islamic 
schools and libraries.  The proposed MCA Compact would more 
than double annual U.S. aid, building an industrial platform 
25 miles east of Dakar to decongest the capital, create 
thousands of jobs in agro-industry and other sectors, and 
help GDP growth to reach eight percent per annum. 
 
COMMITMENT TO REGIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION WITH U.S. 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
¶13.  (SBU) Senegal has been a loyal partner and has served as 
an operational base for every U.S. deployment to the region. 
The GOS has supported the United States by deploying troops 
to the Gulf War, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, the Central African 
Republic, Cote d,Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and, most recently, 
Sudan.  Senegal was the first African nation to sign up for 
the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) (now the 
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 
(ACOTA)) program that provides military assistance and 
training to African militaries with the capability of 
participating in peacekeeping operations, principally in 
Africa.  ACOTA complements what remains the largest 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This has paid major dividends through 
the engagement of Senegalese troops in their traditional 
areas of interest (Cote d,Ivoire) and in areas of 
traditional interest to us (Liberia). 
 
THE U.S.-SENEGAL AGENDA 
----------------------- 
¶14.  (SBU) For the U.S., Senegal represents our most 
important francophone partner in Africa.  Perhaps not 
coincidentally, President Wade perceives himself as a good 
friend of President Bush.  He basked in the glow of the 
President,s visit in July 2003, his December 2004 visit to 
the White House, Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of 
Agriculture Johanns, July 2005 visits and invitations to two 
G-8 summits.  For Senegal, the U.S. represents an attractive 
alternative to complete dependence on France.  We also embody 
values that Wade would like to establish in Senegal, 
particularly economic ones.  However, there is a realistic 
appreciation among knowledgeable Senegalese that the U.S. is 
not likely to supplant France as its principal partner any 
time in the foreseeable future. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) On terrorism, Senegal has been among the first 
African states to recognize the dangers posed to its own 
security by international terrorism.  It has cooperated 
actively with the U.S. in the global war on terrorism, and 
Senegal has ratified 12 of the 13 key anti-terrorist 
conventions and protocols identified by the U.S.  President 
Wade has also sent a set of draft laws to the Ministry of 
Interior that would expand the definition of terrorist acts 
and increase punishments for these acts.  Senegal is also 
leading regional efforts to combat terrorist financing. 
Intelligence sharing and vigilance along Senegal,s borders 
is good and continues to improve through well-established 
channels.  We have raised our concerns with Senegal,s 
leaders over the potential for unwanted influences from 
radical Muslim states, such as Iran. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) We continue to scrutinize Senegal,s relationship 
with Iran, Libya, Venezuela and Cuba.  Thus far, Senegal has 
done a good job in compartmentalizing and managing those 
relationships to ensure that they do not act to undermine 
Senegal,s stability.  We also continue to remind Senegal,s 
leaders that too close an embrace will not be well understood 
nor well appreciated in Washington.  Thus far, Wade has 
gotten the message.  With respect to the situation in Iraq, 
Senegal has been more neutral than during the first Gulf War. 
 (Senegal proudly provided troops to help evict Saddam from 
 
DAKAR 00002703  004 OF 004 
 
 
Kuwait.)  Senegal resisted French pressure to take a more 
critical posture, and in fact Wade publicly noted his 
satisfaction that Saddam had been removed from power. 
 
BOTTOM LINE 
----------- 
¶17.  (SBU) Senegal under Wade is a good partner, very 
sympathetic to U.S. interests, and regularly seeking ways to 
deepen the relationship.  Senegal is eager to receive 
critical Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funding, and 
the GOS is eager to conclude its Compact in 2007. 
Economically, Senegal continues to seek U.S. partners and 
participants to improve its economy, especially in 
agro-industry and transport.  Bilateral relations are very 
warm and continue to deepen as we expand our areas of 
cooperation and seek additional sectors of mutual benefit. 
Senegal also carefully considers potential U.S. reactions to 
its particular foreign policy decisions, often responding 
favorably when we express our concerns, or when we seek GOS 
support.  In sum, Senegal enjoys a close identification with 
the United States and many of our policies and values. 
JACOBS