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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002411 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SENATOR JOSE 
SARNEY 
 
Classified By: ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1 
.4 (B)(D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Ambassador and A/DCM met on 13 November with 
Senator Jose Sarney -- Brazil's first civilian president 
following the military regime, senior senator, PMDB party 
leader and elder statesman.  Sarney was accompanied by Banco 
Safra President Carlos Alberto Viera and Sarney's diplomatic 
advisor.  Over a friendly lunch at Sarney's residence, 
Ambassador and Sarney discussed prospects for governance in 
Brazil in Lula's second term, bilateral relations, and 
Venezuela.  Sarney was especially adamant in voicing his 
perception of Venezuela as a growing threat to Brazilian 
interests.  End summary. 
 
Governance in Lula's Second Term 
 
¶2. (C) Sarney said the outlook for effective governance in 
Lula's second mandate is stormy.  The political environment 
in the wake of the campaign and a year of scandals and 
exchanges of charges is "very bitter,"  making construction 
of bridges to opponents a challenge.  As one of the senior 
leaders in the pro-Lula wing of the large but fragmented PMDB 
party that will be central to Lula's coalition, Sarney opined 
Lula will try to reach out to the opposition, "as a good-will 
gesture," to seek consensus on vital issues.  But Sarney said 
that he (and also Lula) are skeptical about the chances for 
success, given the opposition's force in the Senate 
especially. Lula will also try to leverage governors, many of 
whom are with him and all of whom need good relations with 
the federal government.  Beyond the poisoned atmosphere, 
Brazil's basic problem is that it has a dysfunctional party 
system that is creating gridlock, Sarney opined.  Since party 
ideology and discipline are almost non-existent, passage of 
legislation becomes chaotic and often stalls.  To fill the 
vacuum, for many years Brazilian presidents have used 
"provisional measures" (Medidas Provisorias), which are 
executive orders that have the force of law for supposedly 
temporary periods, but which are often extended indefinitely. 
 This creates governance by executive fiat, rather than 
legislation.  It is "an exhausted system," Sarney said, and 
there is growing unanimity -- in which Sarney and Lula share 
-- that broad political reform has become a critical priority 
for Brazil. 
 
Bilateral relations 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador asked Sarney for his views on strengthening 
bilateral relations.  Sarney replied the U.S. and Brazil 
should do everything possibl to flesh out bilateral 
relations with more persn-to-person and congressional 
engagement, "not laving matters just to theexecutive 
branch."  Sarney opined that personal elations are key, and 
that he feared that a waning of those contacts had occurred 
since Sarney entered public life, leaving U.S.-Brazil 
relations "in the hands of institutions, not people." 
Ambassador noted concern that, while there is interest among 
many in both countries in improving relations and there is 
little anti-Americanism in Brazil, doubts existed in 
Washington about the anti-U.S. bias among some senior foreign 
ministry officials.  Ambassador noted the recent public 
comments by Foreign Ministry Secretary General Pinheiro 
Guimaraes that Brazil could eventually withdraw from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Sarney dismissed 
Guimaraes' remarks, calling him "a madman, a prominent one, 
but a madman."  Sarney also opined that anti-Americanism does 
not exist on any substantial level in Brazil's public, and 
that Brazil's emergence from international indebtedness and 
assertion of itself in foreign policy had taken away some of 
the banners of Brazil's traditional anti-American left. 
 
Venezuela 
 
¶4. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about Venezuela, Sarney was 
 
BRASILIA 00002411  002 OF 002 
 
 
blunt and vehement, presenting Chavez as a growing and direct 
threat to Brazilian interests.  He said Chavez's arms 
build-up (Sarney used a figure of 60 billion dollars over 12 
years, NFI) would eventually force Brazil into spending money 
on weapons -- money it needs for other priorities -- or 
seeking a protective strategic alliance with a major power 
(by implication, with us) or other regional partners.  Sarney 
noted that NATO is emerging as a valuable international 
response force, and had allowed European governments to pool 
defense resources, since almost no country (except the U.S.) 
could sustain the cost of modern warfare.  Sarney said Chavez 
could not seriously be considering arming for a conflict with 
the U.S., so the question had to be asked, against whom are 
all of his new weapons directed?  Ambassador agreed with 
Sarney's analysis, and in that context, expressed his dismay 
that he had heard more official GOB criticism of the USG 
decision to not support sale of Embraer Super Tucanos to 
Chavez then of Chavez's armaments-buying spree. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment.  Sarney's vociferous views on Chavez are 
remarkable.  Although his political origins are on the right, 
and he is often personally and politically friendly toward 
the U.S., Sarney is also a Brazilian nationalist and sensitive 
to Brazil's independence.  For Sarney to speak in such 
adamant terms of Chavez as a real menace to Brazil, 
one who may need to be countered with new strategic thinking, 
is a powerful indication of broad and spreading concern 
in Brazil's political class. 
 
 
 
 
Sobel