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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002315 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TSA FOR VICKI REEDER, SUSAN HASMAN 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PASS TSA ATTACHE JOCHOA 
FAA FOR C. TERE FRANCESCHI 
CA FOR OVERSEAS CITIZENS SERVICES 
DOD FOR OSD 
NTSB FOR JOHN CLARK, BOB MACINTOSH 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR OTRA CASC BR
SUBJECT:  BRAZIL: CHAOS IN AIRPORTS NATIONWIDE AS AIR TRAFFIC 
CONTROLLERS ENGAGE IN WORK SLOWDOWN 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Wednesday and Thursday, Nov. 1 and 2, were two 
particularly bad days to be an airline worker or passenger in 
Brazil.  The national holiday on Nov. 2, start of a long weekend for 
many travelers, saw frayed tempers and more than one fracas in 
airports throughout the country as flights were cancelled or 
severely delayed, sometimes by more than 20 hours.  According to 
several media accounts, air traffic controllers (ATCs), frustrated 
by ongoing human resource issues that have percolated to the surface 
since the Gol flight 1907 crash in September, have slowed work rates 
even further in protest of what they see as egregious hours and 
overall "inhumane" working conditions.  The Gol crash has caused 10 
Brazilian Air Force (FAB) ATCs who were on duty at the Air Defense 
and Air Traffic Control Center (CINDACTA-I) in Brasilia at the time 
to be put on administrative leave, initially stated for 
psychological evaluation.  Indeed, ATCs' workload has increased in 
quantity over the past few years without commensurate increase in 
staffing.  The situation has been complicated by a police 
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the Gol crash, 
which could in theory put these suspended ATCs in jeopardy of 
criminal charges should they be shown to have been grossly negligent 
in executing their duties.  The FAB currently is blocking the police 
from taking depositions from the suspended ATC staff.  The potential 
criminal investigation by federal police of these suspended ATCs--an 
investigation that is currently being blocked by the Air Force--is a 
likely contributing factor to the crisis.  Military sources tell us, 
however, that FAB controllers, while working slower, are merely 
sticking to the 14-aircraft-per-ATC, International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) standard. The Embassy has issued a warden 
message for all U.S. citizens in country advising them of potential 
travel delays, and regional travelers should be made aware of the 
situation.  End Summary. 
 
BY THE NUMBERS 
 
¶2.  (U) More than 600 flights on Thursday, November 2 were delayed, 
or canceled altogether, as airports around Brazil grappled with the 
ATCs'"work-to-rule" campaign.  The Brazilian Air Force, which 
oversees the controllers, intervened after confirming at around 3 AM 
that the ATCs, most of whom are active duty Air Force personnel, had 
increased the time between takeoffs from the normal interval of 
three minutes between flights to 30 minutes.  This created a cascade 
effect as flight after flight was delayed; chaos ensued after the 
normal shift change for controllers, the hour at which air traffic 
intensity increases.  The Air Force called in 149 controllers to 
work as an emergency measure, and under penalty of prison for 
insubordination.  Of the 149 controllers called in at 5:30 AM, some 
were allowed to depart at 10:00 a.m., after replacements were 
confirmed.  112 worked in shifts of eight hours to try to regularize 
flights in the CINDACTA-I air traffic control region, which monitors 
the areas of Brasilia, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais, 
through which 85 percent of air traffic passes. 
 
SHIFTING THE BLAME 
 
¶3.  (U) According to the press, Commander of the Air Force General 
Luiz Carlos Bueno said that by the afternoon, air traffic control 
was back to normal, and any further delays could not be attributed 
to the system.  "There is now not a single restriction.  If there is 
a delay, it is not because of air traffic control, it must be a 
problem with the airlines," he affirmed.  Nonetheless, the Brazilian 
media reported that the chaotic situation continued throughout the 
day.  Air traffic was, in effect, paralyzed.  As an example, a 
flight from Aracaju airport in Sao Paulo, which was supposed to have 
 
BRASILIA 00002315  002 OF 003 
 
 
landed at 8:30 PM on Wednesday, only landed at 5:00 PM on Thursday. 
 
PASSENGERS REACH THE LIMITS OF THEIR PATIENCE . . . 
 
¶4.  (U) Passengers physically revolted, in some instances, against 
the delays and lack of communication by the airports and airlines. 
In Confins Airport in the state of Mato Grosso, about 35 passengers 
tried to invade a plane, and were only contained through Federal 
Police action.  In Rio, clients partially destroyed a Gol Airlines 
counter at Tom Jobim airport.  In Porto Alegre's airport in the 
state of Rio Grande do Sul, police officers were called to control 
interactions between passengers and airline employees.  At least 100 
flights were late an average of three hours in Cumbica Airport, in 
the state of Sao Paulo.  Television and print news coverage at each 
airport showed long lines, crowds of angry passengers at the 
counters dealing with harried airline employees, and the more 
passive passengers endeavoring to wait out the situation by sleeping 
on the floor. 
 
. . .IN RESPONSE TO BRAZILIAN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL'S OWN LIMITS 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Air Force Brigadier Bueno insisted on attributing the air 
traffic control crisis, which yesterday marked its seventh day, to 
unforeseen psychological problems suffered by the controllers after 
the Gol Flight 1907 crash.  "The big problem that happened is that a 
very large quantity [of controllers] felt bad," said Bueno.  "People 
have to overcome psychologically, and not let themselves get down to 
the point of not working," criticized the general, denying that the 
threat of penalty of prison could aggravate the situation.  "There 
is no threat whatsoever to anyone, all is being done in according 
with regulation," he said.  Ex-controllers interviewed in Brasilia 
claimed the contrary, saying there was, indeed, intimidation. 
Privately, some sources familiar with the system indicate that 
flight delays have often been blamed on weather or other factors 
when in fact they are due to air traffic control capacity. 
 
GOL FLIGHT 1907, OR ENDEMIC PROBLEMS? 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The impact of the crash of Gol Flight 1907 cannot be 
overestimated, but neither can the fact that the crash may have 
resulted, at least partially, due to already existing problems in 
the air traffic control system in Brazil.  Air traffic within the 
country has increased greatly in the last several years, but the air 
traffic control system has remained both undermanned and overworked. 
 As per ICAO regulations, ATCs are not supposed to control more than 
14 aircraft each, but sources within the system indicate that they 
are often asked to do more, and work longer hours, due to the lack 
of human resources.  In addition, according to the November 1 press, 
the Brazilian Ministry of Defense has known since 2003 about the 
risk that the air traffic control system might collapse, and had 
recommended shifting some of the air traffic out of CINDACTA I to 
the other CINDACTAs.  No one in an official capacity is publicly 
saying that the air traffic control system had a role in the Gol 
crash, but to date, the FAB has not allowed federal police 
investigators to talk to the suspended ATCs, and privately some 
theorize that air traffic control was at fault.  In addition, focus 
on the criminal investigation of the Legacy pilots involved in the 
crash is hampering, or at least complicating, the safety 
investigation. 
 
TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE? 
 
¶7.  (SBU) And, while the FAB is now implementing changes, the 
 
BRASILIA 00002315  003 OF 003 
 
 
workload increase has been escalating for at least a few years and 
its reaction seems more reactive than proactive.  For example, only 
at the end of October, 15 ATCs from other Air Force locations 
already familiar with the air traffic control center in Brasilia 
(CINDACTA I) were called to begin a 90-hour requalifying course. 
They are to supplement the CINDACTA I controller workforce.  On 
November 1, major organizations involved with air traffic issues 
such as the Airports Authority (INFRAERO), the National Civil 
Aviation Authority (ANAC), and the National Syndicate of Air 
Carriers (SNEA), met to discuss rearrangement of commercial air 
traffic routes to relieve pressure on controllers, airports, and the 
entire Brazilian air traffic system.  On November 6, the FAB is 
expected to publish requirements for a public exam with the goal to 
contract more civilian air controllers.  If an applicant passes the 
exam, he/she would then take a course given by the Institute of 
Aerospace Control (ICEA) in Sao Jose dos Campos, to fill 64 
vacancies in Brazil.  How long these vacancies have been on the 
books remains unclear.  The FAB has already recalled military ATCs 
from its retired reserves to supplement CINDACTA I; they are to 
report to duty after undergoing a requalifying course.  All of these 
efforts, while positive steps, may be too little, too late. 
 
SYSTEMIC CHANGE AFOOT 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Another complicating factor is that these changes will 
actually require a complete overhaul in the system, down to the 
basic structure.  The four regulatory air defense and air traffic 
control centers, CINDACTAS I, II, III, and IV, which together cover 
the entire country, have only been manned to date by Air Force 
active duty personnel.  Civilian controllers are very few in number 
and are in some airport towers, but not in the CINDACTAS, and the 
military is in charge even at the airport towers.  However, the 
reservists and others being called to re-qualify or newly qualify as 
ATCs will be considered civilian employees.  What kind of internal 
tensions will be exacerbated or revealed by these shifts is not yet 
known, or even if civilian controllers will be allowed to work in 
the CINDACTAs. 
 
THE VARIG ISSUE 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Another potential factor includes the collapse of Varig 
airlines and to date, the lack of full assumption of the former 
Varig routes, particularly the international ones.  Current flights 
are stretched to full passenger capacity and often overbooked; but 
increasing the number of flights back up to full frequency would 
only add further stress to the system.  This factor may or may not 
be being taken into sufficient account along with the deficiencies 
in the current air traffic control system. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Comment:  How all of the proposed changes and new 
staffing will impact the future of Brazilian air traffic control, 
and what potential problems will occur along the way, remain to be 
seen.  For the moment, the crisis has seemingly been alleviated, due 
to a negotiated settlement reached this morning between the FAB and 
the ATCs.  However, the settlement will take time to implement, and 
overall this is likely a case of postponement rather than true 
resolution. End comment. 
 
SOBEL