Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BELGRADE1809, SERBIA: COALITION SCENARIOS COALESCING

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BELGRADE1809.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BELGRADE1809 2006-11-02 14:04 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Belgrade
VZCZCXRO7621
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #1809/01 3061404
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021404Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9686
INFO RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 3562
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1234
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: COALITION SCENARIOS COALESCING 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.  (SBU) The current trend in polling data suggests that 
the three major parties (DS, DSS, and SRS) are currently 
the only parties that will definitively jump the 5 percent 
threshold for participation in the parliament.  The 
Socialists are on the verge of threshold, and most 
pollsters agree that they will probably exceed it.  The 
main pollsters also agree that the chances of an SRS-led 
government are slim, even if the SPS qualifies.  The DSS 
(which may choose to run with its current coalition partner 
NS) and DS will probably be able to form a parliamentary 
majority on their own.  However, if coalitions of smaller 
democratic parties, such as Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
"Plus" (which consists of LDP, Civic Alliance of Serbia 
(GSS), League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV), and 
Social Democratic Union (SDU)), were also able to make the 
threshold, then it would ensure a democratic majority in 
Parliament.  These smaller progressive parties could keep a 
DS/DSS-led government on a forward track.  End Summary. 
 
Boost in Radical Support Deceiving 
---------------------------------- 
2.  (SBU) Local media has reported that the latest polls 
show the SRS increasing in support by as much as six 
percent. What the media fail to explain, and what the 
leading pollsters in Serbia have confirmed to us, is that 
this increase in support is in direct correlation to the 
decrease in support to the SPS over the same period. 
Support for the SRS and the SPS comes from the same section 
of the Serbian electorate.  When this pool of voters 
becomes disgruntled with the SRS for being too harsh in its 
rhetoric, they swing toward the SPS.  Over the past month, 
the SRS has profited from the passing of the constitution, 
and courted some of its voting bloc back into the fold by 
portraying itself as the force behind the constitution. 
The shift does not, however, imply a significant increase 
in the overall support for the Radical/Socialist bloc. 
 
3.  (SBU) The constitution and the show of party unity that 
created and supported it, appears to have re-legitimized 
the SRS in the eyes of some of its supporters, especially 
those who support Kosovo remaining part of Serbia and 
raised lingering questions about the future of the 
struggling SPS.  According to the hard data, the SRS has 
gained about 100,000 more supporters over the past month, 
but, at the same time, the SPS has lost approximately 
100,000 voters.  Overall, the support of both the SRS and 
SPS has remained consistent over the past year, at about 
one-third of the electorate.  But the SRS continues to face 
some challenges at the local level; it has lost several 
Mayoral elections either to the DS or to DSS-led coalitions 
with populists.  According to one respected pollster, these 
losses are likely to encourage the party to refocus more of 
its energy at the local level. We continue to hear reports 
that one big reason for SRS interest in changing the local 
election law is to allow indirect elections for Mayors to 
reverse these losses and to possibly gain control of the 
big budget Mayor's office in Belgrade (Radical candidate 
Aleksandar Vucic was runner up in the last local elections.) 
 
The Democrats: A Mixed Bag 
-------------------------- 
4.  (SBU) Some local media reported that the DS was losing 
strength, which latest polls confirm.  However, this 
support is not going to any other party, but rather into 
the void of apathetic non-voters.  The DS is still the 
largest democratic party, and should take in anywhere 
between 24 and 28 percent of the vote, but this percent is 
down from earlier numbers this year. Part of the DS problem 
stems from Tadic's dual role as president and head of the 
DS.  Tadic is still quite popular, but this does not seem 
to be translating into votes for the DS.  In strongholds, 
like Vojvodina and Belgrade, the DS continues to lose - 
most recently, many say, over feelings that the DS "sold 
out" on autonomy protections for Vojvodina in the 
constitutional horse-trading.  The popularity of Tadic will 
help the DS the most if presidential and parliamentary 
elections are held simultaneously.  Although the DS is 
still likely to win a significant number of seats, it will 
need a coalition partner, which is most likely the DSS. 
 
5. (SBU) The DSS, on the other hand, appears to be gaining 
support as voters correlate the increase in daily standard 
of living with the current Government.  Recent polls show 
that Serbs are more optimistic about the economy then they 
were six months ago.  In addition, Kostunica, like the 
SRS, has successfully profited from the constitution, of 
 
BELGRADE 00001809  002 OF 002 
 
 
which he has taken personal ownership and has portrayed the 
DSS as a nation building party.  This, combined with his 
tough stance on Kosovo, appear to be helping increase his 
numbers. 
 
6.  (SBU) While some polls show the smaller democratic 
parties, such as the LDP Plus and G17 Plus, as meeting or 
surpassing threshold, most pollsters agree that it will be 
difficult and could be extremely close.  SPO, in all cases 
and without a coalition partner, will not pass the threshold. 
G17 Plus leader Dinkic inexplicably dashed hopes of an SPO- 
G17 Plus pre-election coalition recently with public 
criticism of SPO leader Draskovic.  While Dinkic's personal 
popularity is increasing in polling data, this does not 
seem to be translating into votes for G17 Plus.  Dinkic, 
however, appears overconfident, believing that his 
popularity can take G17 Plus over the threshold without a 
partner.  COMMENT: Our GOTV campaign plans to focus on all 
of these parties, regardless of size, in order to have as 
many democratic voices in the next Parliament as possible. 
 
Realistic Scenarios for Forming Government 
------------------------------------------ 
7. (SBU) Even if the SPS crosses the threshold, polls 
predict SRS and SPS would not be able to form a government 
on their own.  At maximum, an SRS/SPS coalition could 
command 115 seats, well short of the 126 minimum needed to 
form a majority.  The most likely scenario would be a 
DS/DSS coalition that also included NS and minority parties 
(which are not subject to the 5 percent threshold).  It is 
possible that the DSS could choose to join the SRS and SPS 
to form a government, but this scenario is highly unlikely. 
Kostunica, despite all of his choices in the past year that 
have catered to the SPS, has definitively told us he would 
never work with the SRS.  Similarly, however, Tadic has 
reacted very negatively to our inclusion of the LDP, a 
party made up of disenchanted former DS members, in our 
GOTV efforts and vowed never to work with the LDP. 
 
8.  (SBU) The key to curbing the number of SRS seats in 
Parliament is turnout--higher is better for the democrats. 
All major pollsters are currently reporting turnout at 
between 46 and 52 percent, a drop from the 58.7 percent 
registered in the 2003 parliamentary elections.  Our 
polling sources tell us that the Serbian electorate's 
turnout on election-day always tends to be greater than the 
participation rate suggested by polls.  Mobilizing the 
million-plus disaffected voters will be key to ensuring 
Serbia's next democratic government has a solid enough base 
to take more aggressive measures on things like Hague 
cooperation, defense reform, judicial reform, and the like. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Many here believe an optimum scenario from the 
standpoint of the Serbian democratic progress would be one 
in which smaller progressive parties cross the threshold. 
An LDP-led mini coalition has the potential to qualify, and 
its inclusion in Parliament would both bolster a democratic 
majority (they attract support mainly from first time 
voters and from "never-go-back" disillusioned DS drop 
outs.) and serve as a "watchdog" to ensure democratic 
reforms and vigorous debate replace the backroom deals and 
co-habitation that has plagued the current minority 
government from the outset.  We are devoting much of our 
attention and resources in the coming weeks and months to 
our "get out the vote" strategy (reftel) that we hope will 
help maximize turnout by energizing the frustrated and 
increasingly apathetic demoratic part of the electorate.