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Viewing cable 06ANKARA6508, PKK Issue: Update on Violence and Political Developments

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA6508 2006-11-27 15:40 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO9226
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHAK #6508/01 3311540
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271540Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0075
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKDAI/DIA WASHDC
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC//
RHMFIUU/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006508 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: PKK Issue: Update on Violence and Political Developments 
(November 1-15, 2006) 
 
REF: ANKARA 6300 and previous 
 
(U) Sensitive but unclassified - please protect accordingly. 
 
1. (SBU) This is another in a series of periodic reports on PKK 
violence in Turkey.  Our primary sources for these reports are 
mainstream Turkish press services, such as the Anatolian News 
Agency, and international wire services.  While these are more 
reliable than most Turkish press sources, they are not necessarily 
unimpeachable.  Another source is the Turkish Armed Forces General 
Staff (TGS) website which documents contacts/clashes with the PKK. 
Press services sympathetic to the PKK, such as Neu-Isenburg People's 
Defense Forces and Firat News Agency, tend to report higher numbers 
of the Turkish Security Forces casualties and are often otherwise 
unreliable. 
 
2. (U) During the November 1-15 period, three Turkish security 
personnel were injured when they stepped on a PKK mine.  During the 
same period, Turkish security forces killed three PKK terrorists in 
clashes in Sirnak province.  14 PKK members were arrested, including 
three who were turned over to security officers by the Iraqi KDP and 
two who were turned over by Syrian authorities.  Security forces 
detonated or seized landmines, hand-grenades, RPGs, rifles, RPG-7 
rocket ammunition, electrical fuses, bullets and C4 and A4 plastic 
explosives in different locations. 
 
3. (U) "Milliyet" on November 3 quoted eight PKKers, who surrendered 
to security officials and subsequently released, as testifying to 
authorities that the PKK banned their communication with their 
families when the number of those who fled the terrorist 
organization went up.  They said that the PKK was planning more 
assassination attacks in Turkey.  They also alleged that recently 
Americans went to Qandil Mountain and met with PKK leaders Murat 
Karayilan. 
4. (U) Following are political comments by Turkish and Kurdish 
officials: 
-- TURKISH OFFICIALS: 
- In an exclusive interview in "Hurriyet" on November 5, FM Abdullah 
Gul warned that Iraqi Kurdish leaders -- specifically Barzani and 
Talabani -- were on the verge of an historic mistake.  He listed his 
warnings as: 
 
-- Do not pursue an independent Kurdistan; 
 
-- Give up your illusion to take over Kirkuk; 
 
-- Do not protect the PKK. 
 
Gul went on, "Talabani and Barzani, by trusting the U.S. presence in 
Iraq, should not be too ambitious.  They should not forget that the 
Republic of Turkey will survive in this region forever.  The U.S. 
will leave after some time."  Gul asserted that the Iraqi Kurdish 
leaders were hurting their friendship ties with Turkey and added, 
"If they are clever and if they think about the territorial 
integrity of Iraq, they should try to win Turkey's friendship." 
 
On the establishment of a special envoy position, Gul told "Sabah" 
in its Nov. 6 edition, "To tell the truth, we initially were not in 
favor of the special envoy position introduced by the U.S., but the 
U.S. wanted to coordinate the issue internally.  The PKK is one of 
thousands of issues for the U.S.  But it is our number one issue." 
 
 
- At a Nov. 3 meeting of European Interior Ministers in Antalya, 
Turkish Interior Minister Aksu claimed that to this point more than 
35,000 people had been killed and more than $100 billion spent in 
the fight against the PKK. 
 
- November 4, papers quoted Turkish National Police Spokesman Ismail 
Caliskan as saying that the police were releasing PKKers who had not 
otherwise committed a crime.  Caliskan stressed that those who were 
not involved in a crime were immediately released after providing 
testimony under the "effective repentance" clause of the Turkish 
Penal Code. 
 
- Dailies on November 10 quoted CHOD Gen. Yasar Buyukanit as saying, 
 
ANKARA 00006508  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
"Americans say that we should talk to he Iraqi Government [about 
the PKK] but nothing changes.  They say that there has been a 
legitimate government in Iraq.  Then they should come and protect 
the border." 
 
5. (U) Following are selected columns on the topic: 
 
- "Radikal" columnist Murat Yetkin ran a three-part column starting 
on Nov. 13 which recorded the events of this past summer, when the 
GOT threatened to carry out a cross-border operation into northern 
Iraq. 
 
Yetkin recounted the July 15 PKK ambush in Siirt province, which 
left seven soldiers and one village guard dead.  The following day, 
FM Gul called for an extraordinary meeting of the Anti-Terror High 
Council, and on July 17, the Turkish cabinet convened.  During the 
same hours, Yetkin wrote, the Turkish MFA summoned the U.S. and 
Iraqi ambassadors and stressed that unless they took steps against 
the PKK, Turkey would take all necessary measures, implying that it 
would enter Iraq.  The U.S. reportedly realized how determined 
Turkey was. 
 
During this period, PM Erdogan instructed then-CHOD Gen. Ozkok to do 
whatever was necessary to secure the border region.  Yetkin wrote 
that the U.S. further learned of this mobilization from satellite 
imagery and from the Iraqi Kurds. 
 
Yetkin wrote that the military began to hit villages inhabited by 
the PKK in northern Iraq with artillery fire and special forces 
began operations.  When the Iraqi Kurdish leaders realized that the 
situation was serious, they began to pressure the PKK.  Later the 
U.S. and Turkey assigned special envoys. 
 
Yetkin wrote that on September 27, Special Envoys Ralston and Baser 
talked on the phone through a TGS secure line.  Ralston reportedly 
asked Baser how the U.S. should react to the PKK's floating of a 
ceasefire.  Baser responded by stressing that accepting the PKK as 
an interlocutor would be a grave mistake.  The same day, Yetkin 
asserted, Ralston told the press that the PKK should lay down its 
arms and renounce violence.  Meanwhile, Ankara heard that Ralston 
declined Barzani's appeal to persuade Turkey to offer an amnesty for 
the PKK. 
 
Yetkin claimed these developments led the GOT to believe that the 
appointment of a U.S. special envoy was bringing results in its 
fight against the PKK.  Yetkin commented that U.S.-Turkish relations 
remain tense because of the PKK's presence in Iraq but that Turkey 
was somewhat reassured about U.S. intentions in this issue. 
 
WILSON