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Viewing cable 06ANKARA6457, CSI IN TURKEY PRESENTS A "BINDING" IMPASSE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA6457 2006-11-20 13:41 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
null
Dianne Wampler  11/21/2006 12:36:04 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Dianne Wampler

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
UNCLAS    SENSITIVE     ANKARA 06457

SIPDIS
CX:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   CONS PA RAO FAS MGT PMA FCS POL DCM AMB

DISSEMINATION: ECON /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: ECON:TGOLDBERGER
DRAFTED: ECON:RKIMBRELL
CLEARED: ROME:BSTIRITI

VZCZCAYI899
PP RUEHC RUEHRO RUEAHLC RUEHIT RUEHDA
DE RUEHAK #6457/01 3241341
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201341Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9996
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 6601
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 1657
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 1354
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006457 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ROME FOR ICE ROBERT STIRITI 
DHS FOR CSI - TODD HORTON, KRISTIN DUBELIER 
DEPT PASS TRANSPORTATION DEPT 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EWWT PTER ETRD KTIA TU
SUBJECT:  CSI IN TURKEY PRESENTS A "BINDING" IMPASSE 
 
Ref: Ankara 4622 and previous 
 
1. (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect 
accordingly. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary:  Two days of meeting with Foreign Trade 
Undersecretariat (FTU) officials in Ankara failed to find a solution 
to contradicting views about the legal nature of an agreement that 
would implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in Turkey. 
The FTU insists it needs a "binding" international agreement, while 
DHS has been given the authority to only negotiate "non-binding" 
arrangements.  The diplomatic status of the CSI officials stationed 
in Izmir also continues as a problematic issue.  At the end of the 
meetings, the option of modifying the existing Customs Mutual 
Assistance Agreement (CMAA) to incorporate CSI activities was 
discussed as a potential solution that might avoid an extensive 
ratification process on the Turkish side.  Turkey's foreign trade 
officials remain very interested in CSI and seem intent on finding a 
solution, although they seem to lack expertise on the legalities of 
international agreements.  One of the reasons why they may be so 
intent on turning CSI into law is to oblige other GOT agencies 
opposed to the program (including many in Turkish Customs) to 
implement it.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
LEGAL NATURE OF AGREEMENT 
------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Two days of meetings (November 15 and 16) with Turkish 
Foreign Trade (FTU) officials failed to resolve Turkey's claimed 
inability to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
program without a "binding international agreement."  According to 
FTU Deputy Director General for the Americas, Yuksel Akca, they 
consider a binding agreement to be "an international agreement," 
meaning one that must be approved by either the Council of Ministers 
or the Parliament and published in the Official Gazette.  (They were 
not clear as to what the differences in the document would be to 
allow Council of Ministers versus full Parliamentary approval.)  In 
either case, an agreement must therefore contain an "entry into 
force" notification procedure. 
 
4. (SBU) Meanwhile, we understand from the DHS CSI General Counsel 
that all 32 existing CSI agreements are non-binding in that they are 
statements of intent to cooperate and therefore do not require 
subsequent ratification.  CSI would apparently have to seek Circular 
175 authority to negotiate the "binding" agreement sought by FTU. 
 
----------------- 
DIPLOMATIC STATUS 
----------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Another difficult issue is the diplomatic status of U.S. 
Customs officials stationed that would be assigned to Turkey under 
CSI.  Initially, FTU officials told us that the GOT "will not" 
afford any privileges and immunities to the CSI officials.  However, 
when we explained that we sought limited immunities that would 
protect the officials while performing their official duties, they 
conceded that this was not an unreasonable request and agreed to 
present this to the next inter-agency meeting they convene to 
discuss the program.  The CMAA also provides for waiver of 
immunities on the request of other parties.  FTU suggested that it 
could be possible to overcome this problem if the officials were 
assigned to the U.S. Consulate in Izmir, if such an entity still 
exists. 
 
---------------- 
DRAFTING CHANGES 
---------------- 
 
6. (SBU) In addition to these two main issues, FTU raised eight less 
fundamental textual points that would seem easier to address: 
 
     A.  FTU officials want the language to reflect that 
reexamination in the U.S. will only occur because of additional 
information. 
 
     B.  FTU officials want the implementation procedures referred 
to within the text of the agreement as an "Annex" or supporting 
document. 
 
     C.  To provide complete reciprocity, at least on paper, FTU 
officials asked that the text of the agreement include the name of a 
U.S. port to which the GOT will have the reciprocal ability to 
assign personnel.  They stressed that this should be a port, such as 
"Port Elizabeth" rather than the U.S. Customs National Targeting 
Center (NTC). 
 
     D.  FTU officials want the U.S. CSI officials to share with 
Turkish Customs copies of regular reporting back to the United 
States. 
     E.  FTU officials want a stipulation in the implementation 
procedures that neither party to the agreement will be responsible 
for the fees incurred in the event of a physical examination of a 
container.  They explained that in Turkey this fee is an additional 
expense that is not clearly borne by the freight handler or 
exporter. 
 
     F.  FTU officials want a clarification in the introduction of 
the implementation procedures that the risk for terrorism comes from 
the containerized cargo, not from the port. 
 
     G.  FTU officials want us to specify what will be photographed 
in the case of a physical inspection and to remove the requirement 
that such action first be approved by the appropriate Turkish 
government official or office. 
 
     H.  FTU officials want it to be kept in the agreement and in 
the implementing procedures that the GOT shall not bear any 
functional or personal costs of the CSI officers. 
 
----------------- 
CMAA MODIFICATION 
----------------- 
 
7. (SBU) At the end of the meetings, we discussed the notion of 
modifying the existing Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) as 
a possible way around the binding/non-binding impasse.  CSI 
implementation principles could be included in the text of the CMAA, 
appended to it, or included in a side-letter.  The FTU officials 
agreed to present this option at their next inter-agency meeting, 
and examination of the CMAA indicated that much of the language in 
the CSI proposed implementation procedures is already included in 
the CMAA. 
 
---------------------- 
COMMENT AND NEXT STEPS 
---------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Comment:  FTU officials emphasized that the GOT wants and 
continues to make preparations for CSI, but they must find a legal 
formula that allows them to ratify the document and put it into law. 
 It is apparent that the FTU officials have little legal expertise 
regarding international treaties.  Therefore, it is not abundantly 
clear that both sides mean the same thing when they reference a 
"binding" document or assert such a document is the only option 
available to the GOT.  They are similarly uninformed about Vienna 
Convention related issues.  At the same time, FTU officials 
repeatedly assert their desire to implement CSI in Turkey.  One of 
the reasons for their insistence on such a legal agreement may to 
oblige other GOT agencies who are opposed to CSI (including many in 
Turkish Customs) to implement it.  It is important that we continue 
the momentum created by these meetings and continue the dialogue 
about a solution during the coming months.  Post sees the next step 
as being for DHS and State Department legal experts to determine the 
viability of either incorporating CSI into the CMAA or agreeing to a 
process that would allow for "entry into force" of a stand-alone CSI 
agreement with the Government of Turkey. 
Wilson