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Viewing cable 06ANKARA6394, SCENESETTER FOR NOVEMBER 11-19 VISIT TO TURKEY OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA6394 2006-11-09 17:32 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO4977
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAK #6394/01 3131732
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 091732Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9906
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 1327
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
FOR USCIRF DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NOVEMBER 11-19 VISIT TO TURKEY OF 
THE U.S. COMMISSION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
REF: A. STATE 178504 
     B. ANAKRA 5735 
     C. ANARA 5723 
     D. ISTANBUL 1669 
     E. ISTANBUL 1818 
 
ANKARA 00006394  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (U) This is a joint ConGen Istanbul-Embassy Ankara message. 
 
2. (SBU) Introduction: Mission Turkey welcomes the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) to 
Turkey.  We have arranged meetings for the delegation in both 
Ankara and Istanbul with Government officials, religious 
community leaders, academics, journalists, and NGO and 
business leaders in order to provide access to a wide variety 
of perceptions and opinions related to religious freedom in 
Turkey.  This is a particularly interesting, potentially 
pivotal period in Turkey on these issues. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Tradition of Tolerance, Era of Change 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Turks pride themselves on what they describe as 
their country's long history of religious tolerance.  They 
point to the 500  year history of Jews in Turkey, where they 
were welcomed after their expulsion from Spain, as well as to 
Greek, Armenian, and other Christian minorities who have 
historically been free to practice their faiths.  Istanbul in 
particular has, for centuries, been a city where one can hear 
church bells or the call to prayer, or attend Friday evening 
services, all within a few hundred yards of one another. 
Today's Turkey is, however, about 99% Muslim.  While legal 
structures and physical edifices reflecting Turkey's 
religious diversity remain, the reality is that the diversity 
-- and in some circles, tolerance for that diversity -- has 
waned. 
 
4.  (SBU) Pressure to reverse that trend is one key aspect of 
Turkey's EU accession process.  Even before the formal launch 
of accession negotiations in October 2005, the EU had focused 
on how minorities, including religious minorities, were 
treated.  As a result, over the past four years, Turkey has 
undertaken serious reforms to bring its legal structures into 
line with those of the EU and to meet the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria, which include general human rights 
benchmarks.  However, over the past year, one of the EU's 
critiques has been that the pace of reforms in Turkey has 
slowed noticeably.  And one specific area on which the EU has 
focused is the need for Turkey to show progress on improving 
the rights of religious minorities and women. 
 
5. (SBU) These are not popular issues here at a time when 
Turks have been dealing with a spike in terrorism at home and 
instability and conflict on their borders.  In addition, 
Turkish pride causes them to bristle when faced with 
continued demands from Brussels.  With a public increasingly 
soured on the EU process -- and uncertain as to whether 
Europe really wants them -- Turkish politicians have been 
reluctant to push through major EU-related reforms before 
parliamentary elections which must take place by November 
2007.  To help advance Turkey's candidacy, the government 
here has, however, pressed forward with a smaller package of 
14 new laws. 
 
6. (SBU) This package includes two laws with the potential to 
have an important impact on minority rights -- the 
Foundations Law, and the Law on Private Education 
Institutions.  Parliament is in the process of passing a new 
Foundations Law, which would enable non-Muslim communities to 
reclaim some of the properties expropriated by the state over 
the years.  Parliament adopted the Education Institutions Law 
in a watered-down form that failed to achieve the original 
goal of allowing non-Turkish citizens to attend religious 
school in Turkey, a key issue for all minority religious 
communities in Turkey and one that is at the heart of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki Seminary dispute.  If, as a 
result of a separate issue (Turkey's obligations related to 
Cyprus), the EU partially suspends accession negotiations 
with Turkey in December, this would effectively stall any 
further reforms until after the 2007 elections. 
 
7.  (SBU) In many ways, Turkey is a country in flux.  Today, 
less than 1% of the approximately 74 million Turks adhere to 
a non-Muslim faith.  The predominant form of Islam in Turkey 
is Sunni.  There are also an estimated 15-16 million Alevi, 
or heterodox Muslims.  Officially a secular state, the 
government's Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet -- 
Dee-ah-NET) nonetheless trains and employs all imams. 
 
ANKARA 00006394  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
8.  (SBU) Islam itself is undergoing a transformation within 
Turkey as forces of orthodoxy, modernity and Ataturkist 
traditions tug believers in different directions.  Many 
Turkish Muslims, for example, belong to a variety of 
religious organizations such as the mystical Sufi 
organizations called "tarikats".  While technically illegal, 
they attract many adherents and generally focus on one 
charismatic leader.  One example is the Nakshibendis.  In a 
recent headline-grabbing event, an Imam reportedly in line to 
succeed the current head of the Nakshibendi tarikat was 
stabbed to death in a mosque in a conservative district of 
Istanbul (ref d).  His attacker was immediately killed by the 
Imam's fellow worshippers.  Another example is the Gulenists. 
 Large numbers of mainstream business leaders, civil servants 
and others follow the teachings of Fetullah Gulen, a 
charismatic Muslim leader and educator who has lived in the 
U.S. for some years.  Gulen espouses interfaith dialogue, 
heads an international network of schools, and has strong 
ties to established media groups in Turkey. 
 
9.  (SBU) Generally, most religious Turks reflect a 
traditional Ataturkist attitude favoring secularism.  A 
devout couple in a conservative Istanbul neighborhood was 
representative of mainstream believers when they told us all 
they sought was to worship God according to their own 
conscience and avoid anyone dictating the modalities of 
religious practice, while voicing concern that Islam might 
become too prominent a feature in Turkish politics. 
 
10. (SBU) Religion and its appropriate role in society have 
become a lively topic of debate throughout Turkish society. 
Senior Turkish military leaders (who see themselves as the 
ultimate defender of Ataturk's modernist and secularist 
principles), in a series of recent speeches, stressed their 
concern about what they see as the threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  Newly appointed chief of the Turkish General 
Staff (TGS) General Yasar Buyukanit declared that Ataturk's 
principles were under "serious attack" and warned against 
those who want to "redefine secularism" as well as those who 
seek to tarnish the image of the Turkish military (ref b). 
President Sezer used similar words at the October 1 official 
opening of Parliament (ref c).  This discourse is as much 
about the upcoming May 2007 presidential election (and 
whether Prime Minister Erdogan, whose wife wears a headscarf, 
should serve as the President of the secular Republic) as 
about the role of religion in public life.  It is emblematic, 
though, of the shifts Turkey is undergoing and an opening of 
political debate on many issues, that presidents, generals, 
and prime ministers feel a need to speak openly on the topic. 
 
11.  (SBU) Tensions between the staunch secularists -- who 
see themselves as the defenders of the Ataturkist revolution 
-- and pro-Islam forces who want to see greater room for 
religious expression in public life were roiled in May when a 
gunman opened fire in the court that had ruled in favor of 
expanding the public sphere in which the headscarf may not be 
worn.  One judge was killed and four were injured in the 
shooting.  Thousands attended the funeral of the murdered 
judge, which subsequently turned into a massive pro-secular 
demonstration. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Effects of Conflict, Broadcast Live 
----------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) The events in Lebanon and Israel this past summer 
reverberated in Turkey, in part due to very one-sided media 
coverage and political comment that focused on Israel's 
actions and largely excluded Hezbollah from responsibility. 
In Istanbul, thousands gathered to protest against Israeli 
actions, and anti-Semitic media and other attacks worried the 
city's Jewish community.  The situation has since normalized. 
 Recent violence in Gaza will likely inflame public anger 
again and could lead to another revival of pressures on 
Turkish Jews. 
 
13. (SBU) The public response to Pope Benedict XVI's speech 
delivered at the University of Regensburg on September 12 was 
similarly negative.  A popular view regarded the speech as a 
call for revival of the Christian empire once shared by Rome 
and Constantinople.   Nonetheless, the Pope is set to visit 
Turkey later this month and will be received by President 
Sezer as a head of state. 
 
14. (SBU) Turkey portrays itself as a bridge between 
civilizations.  Prime Minister Erdogan, together with Spanish 
Prime Minister Zapatero, is co-chair of the UN-sponsored 
 
ANKARA 00006394  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Alliance of Civilizations Initiative.  Early this year, when 
the controversy was raging over cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammed that had appeared in a Danish newspaper and violent 
crowds were in the streets in many Muslim countries, Turkey 
remained quiet, its demonstrations peaceful.  Erdogan and 
Zapatero issued a joint call for tolerance and calm; Erdogan 
was the only leader of a majority Muslim country to do so. 
 
15. (SBU) The USCIRF visit coincides with a meeting of the 
High Level Group of the Alliance of Civilizations, led by 
Rabbi Arthur Schneier, in Istanbul at which the Group will 
present its report to UN Secretary General Annan.  Both 
Erdogan and Zapatero are slated to attend.  The Pope's visit 
at the end of the month adds an extra dimension to the 
perspectives the Commission is likely to receive. 
 
16. (SBU) We look forward to discussing these issues and 
others with the Commission upon its arrival in Turkey.  The 
Commission's program should elicit a broad array of opinions 
and, consequently, a better understanding of the religious 
freedom situation in this country.  For a more comprehensive 
view of the status of religious freedom in Turkey and how 
various communities are affected, please visit the State 
Department's International Religious Freedom Report on Turkey 
at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71413 .htm. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON