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OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #3011/01 3181528
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141528Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3278
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003011 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AF/SE, AND IO/PSC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU CD AU UN
SUBJECT: DARFUR: UN A/SYG FOR PEACE-KEEPING DISCUSSES UN 
ASSISTANCE TO AMIS WITH SUDAN AND AU 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  UN A/SYG for Peace-keeping Operations 
Annabi said November 11-12 meetings with President Bashir, FM 
Lam Akol and other GOS principals resulted in an affirmation 
that the GOS would accept UN packages of "light" and "heavy" 
assistance to the AU Mission in Sudan, despite Sudan's 
continued rejection of UNSCR 1706 and its call for UN 
transition as infringement on Sudanese sovereignty.  The GOS 
also reversed its previous insistence on the establishment of 
a tripartite (UN-AU-GOS) committee that would review AU 
needs.  Bashir and other GOS principals continued to reject 
UN personnel wearing UN insignia (i.e., blue berets or 
helmets), while Annabi underscored the need to distinguish UN 
from AU peace-keepers in order to promote transparency.  In 
tripartite discussions on November 13, the GOS reiterated its 
rejection of UN transition, but not of UN support to AMIS. 
The UN and AU expect to conclude a MOU on technical aspects 
of how to account for UN personnel and equipment provided to 
assist AMIS.  UN U/SYG Guehenno will participate in November 
16 ministerial-level talks in Addis Ababa, which he expects 
will allow the UN to strengthen AMIS while promoting 
confidence-building with the GOS in the long term.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On November 14, DCM and deputy pol-econ counselor 
attended briefing of P-5 representatives given by UN 
Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations Hedi 
Annabi and UNMIS Officer-in-Charge Taye-Brook Zerihoun. 
Annabi provided a readout of November 11 and 12 meetings with 
Government of Sudan officials in Khartoum, and of November 13 
tripartite talks in Addis among the UN, AU, and the GOS. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
SUDAN'S FM ACCEPTS UN ASSISTANCE TO AMIS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Annabi explained said his visit to Khartoum was 
intended to dissuade the GOS from requiring the adoption of a 
draft tripartite (UN-AU-GOS) protocol that placed "a number 
of caveats" and restrictions on the status of UN forces in 
Sudan, and that proposed establishing a tripartite committee 
to determine the AU's needs.  Sudan had sought to embroil the 
UN deployment in bureaucracy, Annabi said, by proposing such 
a protocol on November 3, six weeks after September 22 
correspondence from the UN and the AU had provided details of 
the package of "light" UN assistance (i.e., comprising 105 UN 
military officers, 33 police, 48 international staff, and 
equipment) to Sudan's President Bashir.  The GOS had accepted 
the "light" package of assistance and proposed a protocol on 
modalities on October 3; on October 7, UN SYG Annan replied 
that the existing status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) between 
the GOS and UNMIS should apply. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Annabi said Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol 
ultimately agreed to a tripartite mechanism that would 
facilitate the implementation of the UN's support package to 
the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and that would promote 
transparency through the exchange of information.  The FM 
also agreed that the current SOFA between the GOS and UNMIS 
would apply to incoming UN personnel assisting AMIS.  Annabi 
said that when MFA advisors objected, the FM said he had 
discussed these issues with President Bashir. 
 
¶5. (SBU) FM Lam Akol reiterated GOS opposition to AMIS 
transitioning to a UN peace-keeping operation, but welcomed 
both the "light" and "heavy" support packages described in 
the UN SYG's July 28 report (S/2006/591), Annabi said.  The 
GOS said it would accept UN "enabling units" (logistics, 
communications, etc.) to help strengthen AMIS operations and 
effectiveness, Annabi added, so long as they were under the 
AU's command and control.  Annabi said he underscored that UN 
military forces deployed through the assistance packages 
would fall under the operational control of the AU, but not 
UN police or civilian staff (such as administration or 
finance).  The UN affirmed its commitment to deploying with 
"full transparency," he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
WEARING BLUE BERETS REMAINS POINT OF CONTENTION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Whether UN peace-keepers would wear UN insignia 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00003011  002 OF 003 
 
 
(i.e., blue berets or blue helmets) remains a key point of 
contention for GOS and some AU officials.  Working-level AU 
officials oppose the wearing of UN insignia, believing it 
would signal a separate chain of command, Annabi said. 
Annabi said he told Sudanese Defense Minister Abdul-Rahim 
Mohammed that UN personnel would be embedded within the AU, 
have no parallel agenda, but be administered (recruited, 
paid, and disciplined, if necessary) by the UN.  As UN 
personnel, they would wear UN insignia.  The defense minister 
said this was "unacceptable," and that the UN's 105 officers 
would metamorphose into 300, then 3,000 -- marking the 
"beginning of the UN invasion."  Annabi said he responded 
that the UN's blue beret was a symbol of peace, having 
received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, and was needed for 
full transparency: to distinguish UN from AU personnel.  MFA 
advisors sought to calm the defense minister down, Annabi 
noted. 
 
¶7. (SBU) President Bashir also objected to the wearing of UN 
insignia, but reiterated GOS acceptance of the UN light and 
heavy support packages, Annabi said.  The GOS was "painting 
itself into a corner" with "irrational concerns," Annabi 
said.  Annabi cited propaganda statements, including from 
Bashir himself, that there would never be UN blue berets in 
Sudan, and that, if they appeared, Bashir would be the first 
to oppose such "invaders."  Annabi said that when Sudanese 
intelligence chief Salah Abdallah Gosh threatened to expel 
any individuals with blue berets, Annabi responded that it 
would be difficult to continue working with the GOS if they 
continued to expulsions.  Presidential advisor and former FM 
Mustapha Ismail offered to help address the insignia issue, 
Annabi said. 
 
¶8. (SBU) While Annabi deferred to UN member states to decide 
the issue, his comments suggested opposition to abandoning UN 
insignia:  Annabi raised concern about legal liability, and 
said he lacked the authority to let this principle "go down 
the drain."  He noted that the UN's humanitarian operation in 
Sudan was the world's largest; UN staff in Sudan were already 
wearing blue berets, but faced harassment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
SUDANESE FM REJECTS UNSCR 1706 AS INFRINGEMENT ON SOVEREIGNTY 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Annabi said November 13 tripartite talks in Addis 
Ababa, which the September 20 AU PSC communique had called 
for, had been productive.  Participants included Republic of 
Congo FM Rodolphe Adada (November chair of the AU PSC); AU 
Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit, officials from 
AMIS and the AU Darfur Integrated Task Force; FM Lam Akol and 
Sudan's new permrep to the UN. 
-- According to Annabi, Adada reviewed PSC communiques and 
the history of the conflict.  Adada noted that the UNSC 
Presidency (Peru) had not accepted the invitation to 
participate in the meeting, but "did not make an issue of it." 
-- Djinnit discussed how issues raised by the AU PSC in its 
communiques, such as retaining the "African character" of the 
mission, had not been fully incorporated into UNSCR 1706. 
Annabi said he also discussed with Djinnit "hesitation, if 
not resentment" by some AU officials of accepting embedded UN 
personnel.  AU Commission, AMIS, and AU DITF officials 
required a day of internal consultations to harmonize their 
own varying positions, Annabi said. 
-- Nevertheless, Djinnit and Annabi expected to conclude a 
bilateral UN-AU MOU that would address technical aspects of 
how to handle UN personnel and equipment assigned to AMIS. 
While the GOS may have some concerns about the MOU, "the UN 
can't write off 50 years of rules and regulations just 
because the GOS doesn't like it," Annabi said. 
-- FM Lam Akol confirmed GOS agreement that the UN provide 
assistance to AMIS, but said that UNSCR 1706 was "yesterday's 
story," as it was unacceptable and infringed on Sudan's 
sovereignty.  Annabi said he responded that UNSCR 1706 made 
clear that deployment was subject to GOS consent; while 
others imposed peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, a UN force would conduct peace-keeping.  Annabi said 
that over three visits to Sudan, the UN had consistently 
stated, both publicly and privately, that it would not impose 
itself.  Annabi said he refrained from a detailed discussion 
of UNSCR 1706 with the GOS, as it would not be productive to 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00003011  003 OF 003 
 
 
debate the GOS's rejection. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
UN SYG CONSIDERING POSSIBLE UN FUNDING FOR AMIS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Annabi reported that he informed the AU and GOS 
that the UN SYG was prepared to go before the UN General 
Assembly to request funding by the UN for AMIS.  While the 
cost of light and heavy support packages was USD 21-22 
million and at least USD 55 million respectively, this 
assistance would not solve "fundamental logistical and 
financial problems of the African Union."  Annabi noted, 
however, that UN funding of AMIS would require the deployment 
of a civilian UN element to control and disperse funds.  He 
added that the UN would also expect to play a stronger 
political role in Sudan:  "Peace-keeping can never be a 
substitute for a political process." 
 
------------------------------------------- 
UN ASSESSMENT TEAM TO VISIT CHAD AND C.A.R. 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Annabi said he informed GOS interlocutors in 
Khartoum, and others at the November 13 tripartite meeting, 
that the UN would send an assessment mission to Chad and the 
Central African Republic to determine what could be done to 
improve security in border areas and IDP camps.  The UNSC had 
been briefed on light and heavy options for UN deployment, 
which could occur soon, subject to security conditions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
NOV. 16 MINISTERIAL TO DISCUSS STRENGTHENING AMIS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶12. (SBU) UN U/SYG for Peace-keeping Operations Jean Marie 
Guehenno would brief the UNSC today on these meetings, as 
well as discuss the UN's non-paper on options for AMIS: 
ranging from light and heavy support packages, to "hybrid" 
deployment with "various degrees of integration," Annabi 
said.  The non-paper also highlighted the issue of funding. 
 
¶13. (SBU) While Annabi would return to UNHQ, Guehenno would 
attend the November 16 AU-EU-UN-League of Arab States meeting 
in Addis with P-5 representatives.  Guehenno expected the 
meeting to discuss with stakeholders, "in the presence of 
Sudan, possible steps to make the AU mission more effective, 
as we continue to work with the GOS to get them to agree to a 
UN operation," Annabi said.  In the long-term, such 
consultations could serve as a confidence-building measure, 
while strengthening AMIS in the short-term.  Annabi noted 
that there was currently no alternative to AMIS, and that its 
withdrawal would precipitate a humanitarian disaster.  The 
November 16 meeting was also expected to help shape 
consultations leading up to the November 24 summit-level AU 
PSC, which was expected to extend the mandate of AMIS beyond 
December 31 to at least July 2007, Annabi said. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The AU sought to discuss the proposed "heavy" 
assistance to AMIS, Annabi said, which would comprise at 
least 1,000 additional UN military personnel, 700 police, 
support units, more significant equipment, and some 
navigation assets.  Annabi expressed concern about force 
generation:  "We can only deploy the people we get." 
Concerns about force protection and the conditions of 
deployment had deterred potential troop-contributing 
countries from offering many personnel; even the light 
package required some positions to be filled by recruitment, 
he said. 
HUDDLESTON