VZCZCXRO0664
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2948/01 3101426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061426Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3171
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002948 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO/PSC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: AMIS FORCE COMMANDER ARGUES FOR UP TO NINE 
ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2936 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2610 
     ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 2523 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  In a November 2 briefing to major AU 
partners, officers from the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
highlighted two areas of continued fighting in Darfur:  North 
Darfur, where GOS aerial reconnaissance and bombardment of 
suspected NRF strongholds continues; and the Darfur-Chad 
border, where NRF/JEM forces (with Chadian support) seek to 
defeat GOS fighters.  AMIS fears an attack by rebels on its 
Tine and Kulbus Military Group Sites, near the border, one 
the few flashpoints in AMIS's area of operations.  New AMIS 
Force Commander, Major General L.K.F. Aprezi, appealed for up 
to 9 additional battalions:  one for each of AMIS's current 
sectors, and an additional battalion to serve as a rapid 
reaction force.  Aprezi aims to realign AMIS into three 
sectors, and to establish checkpoints and observation posts 
throughout them in order to "dominate the ground."  AU 
officials noted that AMIS's current troop strength of 
approximately 5,000 may be adequate for an observer mission, 
but is only half that needed for a more robust peace-keeping 
operation, and far less that the 20,000 troops sought by the 
UN for Darfur.  Aprezi rejects calls to establish a Forward 
Joint Mission Headquarters under civilian control (ref A), 
and asserts that more military officers are needed in the 
field, than at any joint headquarters.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On November 2, the African Union Darfur Integrated 
Task Force (DITF) briefed selected AU partners (US, UK, 
Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical, and 
security developments of AMIS.  In addition to updates from 
DITF military planners (ref A), visiting AMIS Force Commander 
Major General L.K.F. Aprezi and SO2 OPS Major Mohammed 
Mustapha briefed partners on the current security situation 
in Darfur, and on the Force Commander's need for up to 9 
additional battalions "to restore a secure environment 
throughout Darfur." 
 
------------------------------------ 
BRIEFING ON STATUS OF AMIS OPERATION 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) Mustapha began with a diagram of parties to the 
conflict in Darfur, divided into those supporting or opposing 
the May 5, 2006 DPA. 
 
Pro-DPA groups included: 
-- Signatories:  the Government of Sudan (GOS); and the SLM/A 
(M) (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, Minni Minawi faction), 
which previously controlled Sector 6 (North Darfur) but had 
now lost that area to the NRF. 
-- Parties that had signed declarations of commitment to the 
DPA:  SLM/A (FWM) (Free Will Movement that had split from the 
SLM/A (W) ), and JEM. 
 
Anti-DPA groups included: 
-- SLM/A (W) (SLM faction led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed el-Nur), 
which now controlled Jebel Marra; 
-- G-19 (splinter group of SLM/A (W)); 
-- SLM/A (S) (splinter group of SLM/A (W)); 
-- SLM/A (AK) (sub-splinter group, of SLM/A (S)); 
-- SLM/A (U) (splinter group of pro-DPA SLM/A (M)) 
-- JEM (Justice and Equality Movement, led by Khalil Ibrahim); 
-- Arab militias. 
 
Elements comprising the anti-DPA National Redemption Front 
(NRF) included: SLM/A (U), G-19, and JEM.  JEM forces 
controlled the border area with Chad; JEM Abu Resha forces 
controlled Sector 2 (South Darfur), he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
SECURITY TENSE IN NORTH DARFUR AND NEAR CHAD BORDER 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) According to Mustapha, AMIS assessed that the 
security situation was now tense, but that there was not any 
widespread fighting or loss of lives.  Most of the region was 
free of fighting, except North Darfur, where AMIS faced 
restrictions of freedom of movement (5 no-fly zones).  NGOs 
were also unable to access parts of North Darfur, leading to 
decreased humanitarian activities.  GOS setbacks in Um Sidir 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002948  002 OF 004 
 
 
and Kariari had led to heavy retaliatory attacks on suspected 
NRF strongholds.  Nearly 10,000 IDPs were moving to the 
safety of IDP camps at El Fasher and Tawilla.  The security 
situation had been generally calm except in North Darfur 
(Sectors 5-6), where GOS aerial reconnaissance and 
bombardment of suspected NRF strongholds continued. 
-- Factional fighting continued in parts of Sectors 1,2,8 
(South Darfur) and Sector 7 (West Darfur).  For example, from 
October 2-23, SLM/A (M) clashed with SLM/A (FWM) forces at 
Muhajariyya in Sector 8, although both factions technically 
supported the DPA. 
-- The Janjaweed were continuing attacks in Sector 1 (e.g., 
Tawilla), Sector 2, and Sector 6. 
-- Meanwhile, banditry continued as well, with NGOs losing 
vehicles along the Kabkabiya-El Fasher-Nyala road. 
 
¶5. (SBU) At the Chad-Darfur border, the situation had been 
"very tense" since an October 7 JEM/NRF attack on GOS 
positions at Kariari, in which 150 GOS soldiers were captured 
before GOS forces withdrew to Kornoi.  Mustapha reported a 
heavy Chadian military presence along the border, along with 
NRF reinforcements.  On October 21, some 82 vehicles had been 
seen moving toward the border from Darfur; on October 22, 
Chadian rebels and Janjaweed attacked 3 villages, including 
Gos Beina, 40 km within Chad. 
-- NRF/JEM were operating with Chadian support, and aimed to 
defeat the GOS at Kutum to gain access to El Fasher.  The NRF 
was reinforcing forces at Kutum; opposing the NRF were GOS, 
Arab militia, and Janjaweed reinforcements. 
-- Chadian rebels and Janjaweed were supporting the GOS.  The 
GOS intended to use Chadian rebels to open another front, to 
draw Chadian support from the north; the GOS also intended to 
use Janjaweed to attack refugee camps loyal to the rebel 
movements. 
-- The rebel movements, according to AMIS, sought to attack 
AMIS Military Group Sites (MGS) at Tine and Kulbus (along the 
border with Chad) in order to seize AMIS armored personnel 
carriers (APCs). 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
REVISED CONOPS:  UP TO 9 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS NEEDED 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Force Commander Aprezi said there were few 
flashpoints in AMIS's AOR, apart from the Chadian border. 
With adequate personnel, AMIS could address these security 
challenges, Mustapha said.  Current force levels, and long 
distances between AMIS sites, made it impossible for AMIS to 
be effective.  Three hours between consecutive AMIS sites did 
not allow for rapid reaction.  Significant areas of Sector 6 
(North Darfur) were without coverage.  AMIS now had a 
protection force numbering 5,107 for an area of operations 
(AOR) of 503,000 sq kilometers.  As that total included 
logistics and medical personnel, the actual number of armed 
troops was even lower.  Mustapha noted that armed only with 
AK-47 rifles, AMIS troops could cover a 600 km radius; but 
with the small number of troops, each soldier was responsible 
for 2,000 sq kilometers. 
 
¶7. (SBU) As discussed in background documents for the July 18 
pledging conference in Brussels (emailed to AF/SPG), AMIS 
sought to shift from an observer mission with an authorized 
strength of 6,171 (AMIS 2e) to a more robust peacekeeping 
operation with an authorized strength of 10,500 (AMIS 3).  In 
actuality, however, AMIS had a current strength of only 
5,454: which was 95 per cent of its authorized strength as an 
observer mission, but only half the strength it needed to 
serve as a more robust peacekeeping operation.  AMIS assessed 
its combat efficiency to be 46 per cent under AMIS 2e, but 
only 30 per cent under the AMIS 3 concept, Mustapha said. 
The AMIS Force Commander therefore needed additional 
battalions; if the UN needed 20,000 more troops, AMIS, with 
less than 6,000 troops, would need them as well.   Additional 
troops would significantly increase areas of coverage within 
each sector, he added. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Force Commander sought 9 additional battalions: 
one extra battalion for each of the current 8 sectors, and an 
additional battalion to serve as a rapid reaction force. 
AMIS envisioned deploying these additional battalions 
incrementally, to establish checkpoints and observation posts 
in an AOR that would be revised into three sectors:  North, 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002948  003 OF 004 
 
 
South, and East.  As SLM/A (M) was seeking to withdraw from 
Graida if AMIS could assure security for IDPs there, the 
first battalion would be deployed at Graida.  Thereafter, 
additional battalions would be deployed in this sequence: 
Tawilla, Kutum, Um Barro, Forobaranga, reserve battalion, 
Golo, and Kabbkabiya. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
INITIATIVES BY THE NEW FORCE COMMANDER 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Mustapha said initiatives by Force Commander Aprezi 
included calling for aggressive patrolling (i.e., each patrol 
being escorted by 2 armored personnel carriers, or APCs). 
Lack of spare parts and tires rendered many APCs inoperable; 
with those remaining, AMIS could conduct a maximum of 30 
patrols daily.  One APC had been lost in the August 19 ambush 
on an AMIS fuel convoy, when the AMIS driver discovered that 
the APC's weapons had jammed, and therefore decided to drive 
the APC into a rebel vehicle, killing 6 attackers. 
 
¶10. (SBU) To complement aggressive patrols, the Force 
Commander was also calling for quick impact projects "to win 
hearts and minds", as well as information operations to 
publicize the DPA. 
 
¶11. (SBU) As Chairman of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC), the 
Force Commander sought to strengthen the CFC through 
verification of parties' current area of control vs. areas 
controlled in May, as well as by "reinvigorating" the GOS 
plan for disarmament of the Janjaweed.  Attempting to clear 
the backlog of 94 ceasefire violations, AMIS had determined 
that 48 could not be investigated, due to the changing 
identity of parties.  Of the remainder, 8 had been 
investigated, and 38 had been sent to the CFC.  Aprezi 
underscored the need for enhancement of AMIS "to dominate the 
ground": there was no point in simply verifying ceasefire 
violations, he said, if one could not apportion blame. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Aprezi explained that information on Janjaweed 
positions had been distributed upon the signing of the DPA, 
and had now been given to all CFC parties.  AU DITF POLAD Dr. 
Solomon Gomes observed that the AU Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) had decided in January 2005 to call for the disarmament 
of the Janjaweed, and that parties were to inform AMIS of 
their locations.  The GOS plan was the first step, Gomes said. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Asked whether the issue of DPA non-signatories 
participating in the CFC had been addressed, Aprezi said, 
"for me, I require everyone to be on hand, to be successful." 
 The issue had not been resolved, however, as the GOS and 
SLM/A (M) continued to object to participation by 
non-signatories.  Dr. Gomes noted that AU Commission 
Chairperson Konare had decided to engage non-signatories, but 
did not elaborate on how this was being implemented.  Gomes 
had no information on AU involvement in recently reported 
Eritrean attempts to convene non-signatories. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
FJMHQ: COMPARISON WITH NATO AND UN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Mustapha noted that under the UN light assistance 
package to AMIS, the UN would contribute 105 UN to AMIS:  29 
to the AMIS Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (FJMHQ), 16 to 
the CFC, and 60 as staff officers.  However, as such UN 
officers were to be "under the operational control of AMIS, 
but administrative control of the UN," the Force Commander 
proposed realigning the additional UN officers as follows: 
20 to Force Headquarters (FHQ) , 10 to the CFC, 36 staff 
officers to FHQ and 38 to the sectors. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Mustapha's presentation concluded with analyses of 
NATO and UNMIS organizational structures, and an explanation 
of why the AMIS Force Commander did not see the need for a 
FJMHQ under civilian control.  In NATO, the JOC was under the 
command of CJ-3 (OPS).  In UNMIS,  the JMOC included CIMIC, 
UNMO, G2, LO, LOG, and COMMS, and was under the command of 
the COO (J3), who in turn reported to the Force Commander. 
As AMIS had a protection force of only 5,107, a force of less 
than 6,000 did not require a JOC of over 200 staff.  (NOTE: 
Force Commander Aprezi's explicit rejection of the FJMHQ 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002948  004 OF 004 
 
 
concept, and its implications for strengthening command and 
control of AMIS in preparation for UN transition, has been 
reported septel.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶16. (SBU) COMMENT: The jury is still out on whether Major 
General Aprezi is a more effective Force Commander than his 
predecessor, fellow Nigerian general C.R.U. Ihekire.  During 
his first month on the job, AMIS has been beset by crippling 
operational failures, such as having to postpone rotation of 
the Senegalese battalion due to lack of aviation fuel, and 
failing to introduce new security arrangements that would let 
it resume ground convoys suspended since the August 19 ambush 
that killed two Rwandan peacekeepers.  His decision to reject 
the Forward Joint Mission Headquarters also causes concern 
among Western donors.  However, it also highlights the vacuum 
in civilian leadership of AMIS, following the recent 
resignation of Baba Gana Kingibe as head of mission.  The 
AU's presentation clearly outlines the significant security 
challenges facing international peacekeepers in Darfur, 
whether they hail from the AU or the UN.  END COMMENT. 
HUDDLESTON