VZCZCXRO0052
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2936/01 3100558
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060558Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3152
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002936 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO/PSC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: AMIS FORCE COMMANDER REJECTS FJMHQ CONCEPT 
AT NOVEMBER 2 AU DITF BRIEFING 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1736 
 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 1581 
     ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 2610 
     ¶D. ADDIS ABABA 2523 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  African Union civilian and military 
officials, including the new AMIS Force Commander, had few 
conclusions to share from a recently concluded internal 
"brainstorming" session on operational challenges facing the 
AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur.  Sudan's recent acceptance 
of 105 UN personnel to augment AMIS may signal its 
willingness to tolerate additional UN resources and staff, AU 
officials said, if they are "co-deployed" rather than placed 
strictly under UN command and control.  AU officials 
highlight that, in any case, no additional forces may be 
deployed to enhance AMIS unless the United States fulfills 
its USD 116 million pledge made in July and agrees to the 
construction of additional camps.  The construction of 
additional civilian police (CIVPOL) stations is also on hold, 
due to lack of promised funds from primarily European donors. 
 To date, the AU has only received one-fifth of the cash 
pledges promised in May and is still struggling with 
logistical constraints, such as having only a 10-day supply 
of aviation fuel.  Compounding these challenges is the AMIS 
Force Commander's recent announcement that he is rejecting 
the AU Commission's call to establish a Forward Joint Mission 
Headquarters (FJMHQ) under the civilian control of the AMIS 
Deputy Head of Mission.  Such a structure had been approved 
in May (refs A-B), and was intended to strengthen command and 
control of AMIS, as well as to lay the groundwork for 
transition to a UN operation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On November 2, the African Union Commission's Darfur 
Integrated Task Force (DITF) briefed selected AU partners 
(US, UK, Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical, 
and security developments of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). 
New AMIS Force Commander Major General Luke K.F. Aprezi, in 
Addis Ababa for consultations with AU DITF, after nearly one 
month in Darfur, also attended. 
 
--------------------------------- 
"CO-DEPLOYMENT" vs. UN TRANSITION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes began by noting that 
AU Commission officials, the AMIS Force Commander, and AMIS 
personnel from the field, had met at AU Headquarters in Addis 
on October 30 for an internal "brainstorming" session.  The 
session provided a comprehensive view of problems faced by 
AMIS, he said, including management, financial 
accountability, and the failure of computer systems. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Gomes asserted that Sudan's recent acceptance of 
"light" UN assistance to AMIS, through the provision of 
equipment and 105 UN personnel, provided a mechanism for 
further strengthening of AMIS with UN resources.  He noted 
that a June 1995 UN paper on peace-keeping discussed two 
concepts:  joint operations, and "co-deployment."  UN support 
did not end at 105 personnel; one needed to "keep the door 
open," he said, although adding 20,000 in this manner may be 
unrealistic.  Instead of insisting only on transition to a UN 
operation, the international community needed to think of 
ways to circumvent Bashir's opposition, Gomes said.  Noting 
the appointment of U.K. and U.S. envoys to Sudan, Gomes said 
he had proposed the appointment of additional envoys from 
both the AU and partners to push Sudan's President Bashir to 
reconsider his position.  Gomes noted that transition had 
begun with a decision by the AU Peace and Security Council 
(PSC); the problem lay in Khartoum.  The focus had to be on 
enhancing the capabilities of AMIS.  He noted that either 
UNSCR 1706 or the relevant UN Secretary-General's report 
provided for AMIS to be assisted with 4 attack helicopters; 
the UN could provide such items, not just personnel. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
AMIS ENHANCEMENT AWAITING USG RESPONSE ON CAMP CONSTRUCTION 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Enhancement of AMIS continued to be frustrated by 
political considerations, Gomes said.  He noted that 
contractor PAE had informed the AU that it had not been given 
instructions to construct accommodations for additional 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002936  002 OF 004 
 
 
battalions; this was an important matter for the enhancement 
of AMIS and of significant concern to the AU Commission. 
Deputy pol-econ counselor acknowledged receipt of the AU's 
October 10 note verbale requesting the USG to instruct PAE to 
construct such camps (emailed to AF/SPG and NSC), noted it 
was still under review in Washington, and cited budgetary 
constraints that could influence the U.S. decision. 
 
¶6. (SBU) AU DITF Administration Control and Management Center 
(ACMC) Chief, Commodore Binega Mesfin, clarified that a 
contract for the upgrade and maintenance of CIVPOL stations 
was ready for signature; however, the contract would not 
cover the construction of an additional 35 stations, due to 
lack of available funds. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
FINANCES:  ONLY ONE-FIFTH OF CASH PLEDGES RECEIVED TO DATE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) AU Budget Analyst Biscut Tessema reviewed AMIS 
finances.  If all donors honored pledges made, then the 
mission could be sustained through December.  If the League 
of Arab States did not deliver its pledge, then AMIS would 
experience a shortfall of USD 27-30 million.  AMIS required 
USD 329 million from April to December 2006 (USD 198 million 
of which was cash requirements).  Expenditures from April to 
August 2006 totalled USD 69 million.  A total of USD 322 
million had been pledged at the July 18 Brussels pledging 
conference, including USD 33 million pledged by the League of 
Arab States (LAS).  Other pledges from the LAS combined to 
total USD 50 million.  Of the total pledges made at Brussels, 
cash pledges (including USD 50 million from the LAS) totalled 
USD 217 million.  To date, however, the AU had received only 
USD 44 million in cash, primarily from the EU, Ireland, and 
China. 
 
¶8. (SBU) A contribution from the UK would cover personnel 
costs (salaries and allowances) after October 18. 
Discussions were also underway with the Netherlands on 
additional contributions.  However, as funds from a 
contribution agreement with the EU to cover those costs 
through October 17 had not yet been received, the AU had 
reprogrammed USD 15 million that was to have gone to troop 
contributing countries.  Biscut explained that the AU was 
recruiting additional financial staff to complete outstanding 
financial reports.  The AU had only reported to the EU on its 
second contribution agreement (the sixth is now being 
finalized), or up to November 2005; some USD 70 million was 
thus being held by the EU pending the submission of financial 
reports from the AU. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Mesfin reported that USD 7.5 million had been paid 
to contractor PAE on November 1 (presumably for food 
services).  The AU had signed a new contract with PAE calling 
for payments to be made within 15 days of invoices, and thus 
needed funds from the UK, he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
GROUND CONVOYS TO DELIVER AVIATION FUEL WILL RESUME 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) Mesfin reported that AMIS now had 10 days stock of 
aviation fuel, but required a 15-day minimum; AMIS was still 
seeking to obtain fuel bladders to establish a reserve under 
its control. Asked when ground convoys to deliver aviation 
fuel would resume, AMIS Force Commander Aprezi said small 
convoys had resumed but not large ones, for which he would 
recommend accompanying helicopters and APCs.   Some 22 
vehicles awaited escort to El Fasher; their movement awaited 
his return to Darfur on November 4.  "Don't worry about it; I 
will do it," he said. 
 
¶11. (SBU) DITF J4 Movements Officer Lieutenant Colonel Roger 
Kuitche reviewed rotations:  2 Nigerian battalions had 
rotated, as had Nigerian and Ugandan CIVPOL; the Rwandan 
battalion had not.  The rotation of the Senegalese battalion 
had been put on hold (due to the lack of aviation fuel 
several weeks earlier).  The repatriation of Ghanaian CIVPOL 
was underway today.  Germany was seeking to rotate the 
Senegalese and Gambian battalions together, after November 
27, due to the unavailability of German aircraft from 
November 12-16, and of French aircraft after November 16. 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002936  003 OF 004 
 
 
Malian CIVPOL would have to rotate later.  Dr. Gomes said 
Rwanda had formally asked the AU for aircraft to support 
additional supplies for its troops (who had not rotated). 
 
------------------------------------- 
AMIS FC REJECTS FJMHQ, TIGHTENS OPSEC 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander MG Luke K.F. Aprezi, in Addis 
to attend internal AU Commission "brainstorming" sessions on 
challenges facing AMIS and due to return to Khartoum on 
November 3 before proceeding to El Fasher, outlined his 
strong opposition to the formation of a Forward Joint Mission 
Headquarters (FJMHQ) to be headed by the civilian Deputy Head 
of Mission (DHOM) of AMIS, calling the concept of a joint 
headquarters "over-bloated" and redundant.   As "decisions 
have to come back to me for implementation," having decisions 
made first at the political level would simply waste time and 
impede AMIS operations, he said.  The (civilian) head of 
mission had a headquarters at Khartoum; "my headquarters," 
Aprezi explained, was at El Fasher.  Immediately upon his 
arrival in Darfur one month ago, Aprezi received a briefing 
on the AMIS Joint Operations Center (JOC), which he said had 
not met his expectations.   Aprezi criticized the need for 
having up to 200 officers man a joint headquarters for a 
mission of only 5,000 troops.  Coordination could be done 
under the direction of the Chief of Staff in Khartoum; the 
JOC needed to be under "my control" at El Fasher, Aprezi 
said.  Asked if he was therefore proposing the cancellation 
of the FJMHQ, Aprezi replied in the affirmative, and 
questioned the need for a large body under the DHOM.  All 
operational control should be under the Force Commander, he 
said. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Coordination among the elements that were to be 
part of the FJMHQ (including CIVPOL, CIMIC or 
civilian-military cooperation, and the protection force) 
could now be done at the daily briefings held at 
headquarters, Aprezi asserted, particularly since such 
briefings were now restricted to AMIS personnel only.  He 
explained that previously AU partners, signatories to the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), and Government of Sudan (GOS) 
representatives had all attended the AMIS briefings, which 
was not conducive to coordination and gave parties access to 
operational details affecting AMIS effectiveness.  For 
example, GOS and DPA signatories were present when AMIS 
discussed reinforcing its presence at Tine; on another 
occasion, an AMIS helicopter conducting reconnaissance of the 
border with Chad was immediately followed by a GOS 
helicopter, as the reconnaissance had been discussed at an 
open AMIS briefing. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The retired Zambian general originally named in 
August to serve as the Joint Chief of Staff (JCOS) and to 
lead partner advisor/experts assigned to the FJMHQ, was 
introduced.  Asked what the JCOS's role would be in AMIS 
(given Aprezi's opposition to establishing a FJMHQ), Aprezi 
said it would be up to the political leadership of AMIS. 
Gomes noted that the UN Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea 
(UNMEE) had two Deputy Special Representatives of the UN 
Secretary-General (DSRSGs), but that its JOC was under 
 
SIPDIS 
UNMEE's Force Commander in Asmara. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Saying he had "no problem" with the UN assistance 
package (whereby 105 UN officers, military and civilian, 
augment AMIS), Aprezi said additional officers from the UN or 
other partners would be "used properly":  they were not 
needed at joint headquarters, but rather on the ground to 
verify disarmament of the Janjaweed.  MILOBs now served as 
staff officers, he noted.  Lieutenant Colonel Jim Burke, 
deputy military advisor to the EU Special Representative for 
Sudan, noted that the EU was providing 3 experts to the FJMHQ 
in response to a formal request by the AU; the FJMHQ had been 
proposed by the AU, not imposed by partners. Burke requested 
clarification on the future of the Force Headquarters and the 
FJMHQ.  Canadian poloff noted that all partners shared with 
AMIS the common goal of peace in Darfur.  (NOTE:  The AU 
formally announced the formation of the FJMHQ and requested 
advisor/experts from the U.S., NATO, and European partners on 
May 18.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶16. (SBU) Following the Force Commander's remarks, AMIS 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002936  004 OF 004 
 
 
officers briefed partners on the current security situation 
in Darfur, outlined the need for 9 additional battalions for 
AMIS to cover its large area of operations, and discussed 
progress in clearing the backlog of ceasefire violations 
being addressed by the Ceasefire Commission (septel).  AMIS 
officers also discussed how joint operating structures in 
NATO and UNMIS (JOC and JMOC respectively) were under 
military command, raising the question of why AMIS required a 
different structure under civilian control. 
 
¶17. (SBU) COMMENT:  In recent weeks, AU military planners 
have managed to address several significant logistical 
challenges that threatened to scuttle the AU's peacekeeping 
mission in Darfur:  from running out of aviation fuel and 
having to postpone the rotation of troops, to not being able 
to pay for the extension of food services (refs C-D). 
Through a combination of ad hoc measures and last-minute 
intervention by donors (e.g., Canada and the UK, 
respectively, on aviation fuel and food), AMIS has continued 
to limp on.  The future of AMIS beyond December, however, 
remains uncertain.  The AU PSC will meet at the head of state 
level on November 24 to consider Darfur, but it is unclear 
whether the PSC will continue to push for AMIS transition to 
a UN peacekeeping operation, or will simply acknowledge 
Sudan's lack of consent and extend AMIS again, as it did at 
its previous summit-level meeting on September 20.  Allied 
partners note that while cumbersome in the Force Commander's 
eyes, the establishment of a Forward Joint Mission 
Headquarters would be a key element in any transition to UN 
command and control.  The United States is currently 
providing two military officers to assist the AMIS FJMHQ with 
intelligence and civil-military cooperation (J2 and J9).  END 
COMMENT. 
HUDDLESTON