VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #2044/01 2990005
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260005Z OCT 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0575
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0877
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0768
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1345
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0202
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1058
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0910
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1503
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0687
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0817
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0987
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0721
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0496
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 8851
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8227

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 002044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL ASEAN UNSC BM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WOLFF'S MEETING WITH UN A/SYG ANGELA 
KANE REGARDING U/SYG GAMBARI'S VISIT TO BURMA 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY:  On October 22nd, Ambassador Wolff  met with 
UN A/SYG Angela Kane to discuss U/SYG Gambari's scheduled 
visit to Burma on November 9th through 12th.  Viewing his 
first visit as a success, the UN believes the second trip is 
an important confidence building dialogue.  Gambari will not 
set specific parameters with the regime for his next visit, 
and A/SYG Kane admitted that there has been little or no 
change in Myanmar since Gambari's visit.  However, she noted 
that it is very clear to the Burmese that "changes are 
expected".  Ambassador Wolff strongly urged the UN to set 
clear parameters for Gambari's visit, emphasized that it is 
essential for the regime to receive a firm and clear message 
from the UN regarding what changes the international 
community wants.  He reviewed in detail the critical and 
longstanding benchmarks for progress laid out in reftel 
(STATE 176990). For Gambari's visit to be viewed as a 
success, the U.S. is expecting tangible results.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) A/SYG Kane advised that although Aung San Suu Kyi 
(ASSK) was not released and, indeed most disappointingly her 
detention was extended shortly after, the UN thinks U/SYG 
Gambari's previous visit to Burma should be viewed as a 
success.  It was at least the start of a process and testing 
period for the regime.  The SYG thinks that Gambari's level 
of access to all parties was excellent, and that his visit 
was an important first step in establishing trust and a 
dialogue to build confidence with the junta.  Kane noted that 
the Burmese are interested in a return visit for Gambari, and 
have assured Gambari that he will be afforded a high level 
access.  Although Gambari does not intend to establish 
specific parameters or conditions for the trip, the Burmese 
"know they must give something" for a dialogue to continue 
any further.  Kane emphasized that Gambari wouldn't be in the 
process of engaging with the junta if there were doubts of 
any resultant progress. 
 
¶3. (U) Although she understands the high level political 
interest in the U.S. in ASSK, Kane did not, however, believe 
it is helpful to only focus too exclusively on the release of 
ASSK, and thinks if Gambari did, the regime would withdraw 
its cooperation completely.  She did admit, however, that if 
Gambari did not have at least the same access to ASSK this 
time, his trip would be regarded as a failure.   Ambassador 
Wolff made the point that it was not just in the U.S. 
Administration that ASSK was regarded as the principal symbol 
of reform in Burma.  Kane believed it is extremely important 
that Gambari be viewed as an emissary of the SYG's good 
offices mandate, and not as an envoy of the Security Council. 
 A/SYG Kane confirmed that UN Resident Coordinator Charles 
Petrie is independently arranging the details of Gambari's 
schedule and meetings, and will keep USUN apprised of the 
situation as it develops.  Kane emphasized that Gambari would 
be delivering a strong and clear message about reform and the 
need for genuine political dialogue both in private meetings 
and public settings. 
 
¶4. (U) Ambassador Wolf noted that while Gambari was able to 
meet with all relevant parties during his previous visit, 
after his return the junta extended the detention of ASSK, 
there was no movement in the sham reconciliation process, and 
little or no change in the treatment of minorities or the 
military repression of ethnic groups.   From the U.S. point 
of view, in fact, the situation in Burma if anything had 
worsened and Gambari needed to avoid giving the impression 
that progress was being made on the ground.  Ambassador Wolff 
urged Gambari to set clear parameters for his next visit, and 
emphasized that it is essential for the regime to receive a 
firm and clear message from the UN regarding what changes the 
international community wants.  Specifically, Gambari should 
emphasize the release of ASSK and other political prisoners, 
the need for an all-inclusive constitution-writing process, a 
halt in the military offensives in the Kayin State, and safe 
and unhindered access for humanitarian actors.  Kane 
emphasized that all of these demands were part of Gambari's 
brief and the UN and U.S. prescriptions for reform in Burma 
 
 
almost completely coincided.  In answer to a question, she 
confirmed that Gambari did not plan in any way to endorse the 
National Convention, which the UN also viewed as fatally 
flawed in its current form. 
 
¶5. (U) Ambassador Wolff agreed that it was critical for 
Gambari to meet with ASSK, ethnic groups, and opposition 
leaders- he must have as much or better access to these 
reform actors.  He reiterated that for Gambari's visit to be 
viewed as a success, the Burmese must understand improvements 
in the country have to be ensured.  If Gambari comes back and 
there are no advances in the human rights situation or 
national reconciliation, it will be difficult for the U.S. to 
see the merits of this process or to sustain its support.  We 
would instead expect the Council to make an appropriate 
response. The U.S. is expecting tangible results, and Gambari 
should reconsider his trip if none are expected.  Kane 
confirmed that Gambari would not proceed absent prospects for 
concrete progress. 
 
BOLTON