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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 006301 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/31/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Analysis of North Korea's nuclear test by David Straub, 
associate professor at Johns Hopkins University: US needs to review 
North Korea policy 
 
(2) My view of North Korea situation by David Straub, professor at 
Johns Hopkins University and former country director for Korean 
Affairs at the US Department of State:  Direct negotiations well 
worth a try 
 
(3) What promoted North Korea to hurry nuclear test? 
 
(4) View of reporter assigned to Prime Minister Abe on his one month 
in office: He should speak his own words while listening to diverse 
opinions 
 
(5) Editorial -- Kono statement on military comfort women: The heart 
of dispute is whether there was "transportation of women for forced 
labor as sex slaves" 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Analysis of North Korea's nuclear test by David Straub, 
associate professor at Johns Hopkins University: US needs to review 
North Korea policy 
 
YOMIURI (Page 9) (Full) 
October 28, 2006 
 
Question: What was the significance of Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice's Asia trip? 
 
Straub: I think the Secretary's Asia visit produced a certain level 
of good results, for example, six-party talks member nations 
(excluding North Korea) were able to move closer together and that 
Japan and South Korea, allies of the United States, reaffirmed that 
they were under the US nuclear umbrella. It was regrettable that 
what the US was considering as sanctions against North Korea was 
misunderstood, and the Secretary had to explain to Asian leaders 
that the United States had no intention to take such measures as a 
naval blockage that it imposed when the Cuban missile crisis 
occurred. 
 
Question: Is there a possibility that ship inspections might develop 
into a military clash? 
 
Straub: I think the US government bears in mind that cargo 
inspections will be conducted when ships enter ports. There is an 
increased risk, however. There is a possibility that tensions might 
grow over an accidental exercise of force during a ship inspection. 
 
Question: China has remained reluctant about ship inspections. 
 
Straub: I don't think China will cooperate in carrying out 
large-scale inspections of cargo ships. China neither wants North 
Korea to possess nuclear weapons nor the Korean Peninsula to become 
unstable. China has its limits when it comes to putting pressure on 
North Korea. 
 
Question: What will happen next? 
 
Straub: It is unlikely that North Korea will return to the six-party 
 
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talks unconditionally. There seems to be no doubt that the North 
will conduct a second nuclear test. Neighboring countries must 
cooperate in implementing the UN Security Council resolution. It is 
necessary for them to review their policies through discussions. 
 
Question: What should the United States do? 
 
Straub: It's better for the United States to review its approach 
toward North Korea. The president should appoint a policy 
coordinator and present a roadmap containing a carrot-and-stick 
policy to Pyongyang. If the United States fails or does not make 
efforts, it will not be able to gain the full cooperation of other 
countries. 
 
Question: Do you think if the Democratic Party wins the mid-term 
elections, there will be an impact on the US policy toward North 
Korea? 
 
Straub: The Bush administration will probably encounter increasing 
criticism, but the president has strong foreign policy power. 
President Bush has a strong personal view that North Korea is an 
evil regime. He might have an even stronger conviction now that his 
administration's hard-line policy toward the North was correct. 
 
(2) My view of North Korea situation by David Straub, professor at 
Johns Hopkins University and former country director for Korean 
Affairs at the US Department of State:  Direct negotiations well 
worth a try 
 
MAINICHI (Page 9) (Full) 
October 31, 2006 
 
Interviewer: Toshihiko Kawahara, Washington 
 
President Bush actually detests (General Secretary) Kim Jong Il and 
regards his regime as "evil." He thinks it is immoral for the United 
States to deal with evil and that it is useless to hold talks with 
an unreliable sort like him. Mr. Bush would think his righteousness 
has now been proved by (the North's) nuclear test. 
 
The Bush administration's pendulum has tilted even further toward 
hardliners. They believe that financial sanctions against a Macao 
bank, for instance, would deal a sizable blow to the North Korean 
leadership and help put pressure on it to give up its nuclear 
programs. Regime change is not on the US government's policy agenda, 
but the fact is that a number of senior administration officials are 
hoping such would happen. The US will likely step up its sanctions. 
 
The US had no intention of holding talks with North Korea in a 
serious manner even before the nuclear test. All the US has done to 
date has been to attend the six-party talks and declare its policy 
there. This stance will not change. If North Korea were to return to 
the six-party talks, the US would accept that, because Washington 
expects the forum to give an opportunity to other participating 
countries to pressure the North. 
 
(General Secretary) Kim Jong Il in pushing for nuclear development 
feels three threats: 1) from the North Korea people themselves, who 
are isolated by him from the international community; 2) from South 
Korea, which has defeated him in political and economic competition; 
and 3) the US. It seems to me that the Bush administration's tough 
line has made it instead easier for North Korea to decide to explode 
a nuclear device. 
 
TOKYO 00006301  003 OF 007 
 
 
 
If my reasoning proves to be correct, it would be extremely 
difficult to persuade the North to abandon its nuclear programs. But 
Pyongyang still hopes to have a direct dialogue with Washington. 
Such talks are well worth a try for the US. In order to obtain 
sufficient endorsement to sanctions measures against North Korea and 
America's policy toward it, Washington needs to show flexibility 
when it tries to persuade North Korea. 
 
With no concessions expected from North Korea and given that the 
Bush administration's term of office expires in two years, it is 
highly probable that the North will conduct another nuclear test. 
The most desirable scenario would be for Pyongyang not to conduct a 
second nuclear test before a new US administration, which is more 
likely to assume a pragmatic approach to the issue, will come into 
office, and the possibility of military conflict on the Korean 
Peninsula is minimized. 
 
Will North Korea explode another nuclear device and continue 
developing nuclear weapons? What will happen to the issues of 
nuclear weapons and missiles? The Mainichi Shimbun in this series 
interviews experts on the Korean Peninsula situation from a number 
of countries. 
 
(3) What promoted North Korea to hurry nuclear test? 
 
SANKEI (Page 15) (Abridged slightly) 
October 28, 2006 
 
By Toshiyuki Shikata 
 
Three viewpoints to fathom North Korea's aim 
 
The series of ballistic missile launches by North Korea was linked 
to its nuclear test. The North has been pushing ahead with two 
projects simultaneously: One is to develop ballistic missiles 
(Taepodong) capable of reaching the United States, and the other is 
to develop warheads small enough to fit onto ballistic missiles. The 
two projects are intended to realize Pyongyang's political goal of 
dragging the United States to direct bilateral talks with North 
Korea. 
 
But the test launches of ballistic missiles capable of reaching the 
United States failed, and the underground nuclear test, too, seemed 
short of total success. Why did North Korea rush to test missiles 
and a nuclear device still in the development stage with low 
credibility? 
 
That can be explained by three reasons. First, the North was 
gradually suffering from America's economic sanctions and a lack of 
hard currency under the international community's watchful eye on 
the country's weapons exports to the Middle East. 
 
Second, although the six-party talks have been an opportune arena 
for the North to buy time, the framework made it difficult to elicit 
direct bilateral talks from the United States. 
 
The United States has been preoccupied with blocking Iran from 
possessing nuclear weapons, while leaving North Korean affairs to 
China, which cannot let that country fall. North Korea needed to 
acquire a nuclear capability ahead of Iran. 
 
Power struggle in North Korea 
 
TOKYO 00006301  004 OF 007 
 
 
 
Third, a power struggle dividing North Korea has been out of 
control, a factor often overlooked. 
 
There is a struggle between the Korean Workers Party "open-door" 
civilian group urging General Secretary Kim Jong Il to take a 
Chinese-style open-door policy and the military xenophobic group 
(upholding Juche), which opposes the former for fence sitting. 
 
The Korean People's Army fears that once the country adopts a 
Chinese-style open-door policy, the North will become a satellite of 
China, with its all areas -- from politics to economics to diplomacy 
to the military -- under China's influence. 
 
Exchanges between the People's Liberation Army and the Korean 
People's Army have not been active. China has conducted large-scale 
joint drills with Russia but not with North Korea. In terms of 
equipment, North Korea's dependence on China is also limited. The 
North's equipment is overwhelmingly connected with weaponry made in 
the former Soviet Union. 
 
The Korean People's Army, which prioritizes Juche and the 
military-first policy, apparently wants to keep its distance from 
China at least on the military front. 
 
In the wake of North Korea's announcement on its nuclear test, the 
United Nations has adopted a sanctions resolution under Chapter 7 of 
the UN Charter. Top diplomats of Japan, the United States, China, 
Russia, and South Korea also discussed how to deal with the 
situation, crisscrossing the globe. 
 
North Korea going nuclear would be followed by Iran, a major 
anti-Western Islamic state with tremendous oil reserves, bringing a 
sea change to the strategic environment surrounding the Middle East. 
Such anxiety prompted the international community to take concerted 
action. 
 
Unlike North Korea's case, Iran going nuclear might spill over to 
Europe, where there is no non-nuclear zone treaty. 
 
Even if North Korea becomes a nuclear power, Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan are unlikely to follow suit. Chances are extremely slim that 
Pyongyang would use nuclear weapons against China and Russia. South 
Korea is also convinced that the North will not use them on their 
fellow Koreans. The North could aim them at the United States to 
send out a political message, not a militarily signal. This means 
that Japan will be the only country directly exposed to the nuclear 
threat from North Korea. 
 
Nuclear debate in Japan 
 
There are calls for a nuclear debate in Japan. They are not for 
arming Japan with nuclear weapons but for an active debate on what 
kind of "power" other than nuclear weapons Japan should possess in 
order to have a strong voice in the international community. 
 
They are asking how Japan can secure "power" in a future 
international community where neither checkbook diplomacy nor being 
friendly will work. 
 
Clinging to America's nuclear deterrent must not be the only answer. 
Is having the ability to collect, analyze, and send out intelligence 
by utilizing a large number of reconnaissance satellites and 
 
TOKYO 00006301  005 OF 007 
 
 
monitoring signals an answer? Does Japan need to have cutting-edge 
technology? Or Japan perhaps needs to have the moral power to 
convince major powers that often rely on double standards. 
 
As the only victim of atomic bombings, Japan has opted to remain a 
nonnuclear power although it has the technical ability to go 
nuclear, and that in itself is the largest deterrent, in my view. 
 
Caution must be practiced so that Japan will not be regarded as a 
threat simply because there are calls for a nuclear debate in the 
country. 
 
(4) View of reporter assigned to Prime Minister Abe on his one month 
in office: He should speak his own words while listening to diverse 
opinions 
 
By Haruka Osugi 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 20) (Full) 
October 31, 2006 
 
On the night of Sept. 27 soon after his administration was 
inaugurated, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with reporters attached 
to the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) and said 
nervously: 
 
"I keenly sense the grave responsibility I now have. Since it is 
important for politicians to achieve results, I will devote my 
energies to making results so that the public will laud my 
efforts." 
 
One month has passed since then. Prime Minister Abe has handled his 
job in a steady fashion. However, I sense now once in a while that 
he has lost the modesty that he had immediately after assuming 
office. 
 
I compared the number of visitors to Prime Minister Abe had in the 
first month to that of Junichiro Koizumi during his first month as 
premier. Koizumi had 24 meetings all told with administrative 
vice-ministers, the top officials of the ministries and agencies, 
but Abe held only five meetings with such officials. He has 
apparently been trying to demonstrate his policy stance of 
distancing himself from the bureaucracy by indirectly receiving 
their reports through the chief cabinet secretary. I am concerned 
about whether he can make appropriate decisions by not getting 
information firsthand, but relying on an aide most of the time. 
 
The only chance for us as reporters to sense his character is at 
meetings. Reporters questioned Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and his 
predecessors while walking alongside them. Koizumi, however, set up 
a place for the reporters to question him. Abe has taken over the 
Koizumi style. However, his secretary often breaks off our meetings. 
We understand that the prime minister is very busy, but he should 
not ignore our questions. We see him as cold to us. 
 
Prime Minister Koizumi responded to our questions twice a day. Abe 
intends to reduce the press meetings to once a day. When asked about 
his reason for the reduction, he just said: "I will always responded 
to questions by reporters covering me once a day, speaking before 
the public." 
 
One high government official said: "Jumping to conclusions is not 
good." The prime minister is not the only person to produce 
 
TOKYO 00006301  006 OF 007 
 
 
achievements. I would like Prime Minister Abe to speak to the public 
in his own words, while listening to a variety of views. I would 
like him to produce better results that way. 
 
(5) Editorial -- Kono statement on military comfort women: The heart 
of dispute is whether there was "transportation of women for forced 
labor as sex slaves" 
 
YOMIURI (Page 3) (Slightly abridged) 
October 31, 2006 
 
We wonder why those remarks are problematic? 
 
The remarks in question are the ones recently made by Deputy Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Hakubun Shimomura, in which he indicated the need 
to study the so-called "Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono's statement on 
military comfort women." 
 
The opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Japan 
(Minshuto), cite a contradiction between Shimomura's remarks and 
Prime Minister Abe's Diet replies, in which Abe stated he would 
follow the Kono statement, to criticize the government as there 
being a discord in the cabinet. 
 
Shimomura's remarks were specifically something like: "Personally, 
there is a need to study the facts more carefully, and we should 
take time to collect objective and scientific knowledge and consider 
the results (of the studies)." 
 
The Kono statement offered an apology and expressed remorse to 
former military comfort women. The premise for the statement was the 
acknowledgment of the fact that the former Imperial Japanese Army 
and police authorities "transported women for forced labor." This 
acknowledgment was approved at a cabinet meeting without conducting 
a thorough investigation because the Japanese government was under 
pressure from the South Korean government to admit that there had 
been transportation of women for forced labor as sex slaves. 
 
A threshold of the comfort-women issue was some nationwide dailies' 
false reports describing the women volunteer corps organized under 
the labor mobilization system as a means to "hunt military comfort 
women." To add to that, even a Japanese who "confessed" that he 
gathered comfort women emerged, but this confession, too, was a 
fabricated story. No direct materials showing transportation of 
women for forced labor as sex slaves have been found so far even in 
the government's investigation. 
 
Obviously, the Kono statement was not a product generated from a 
social, scientific approach in line with objective data. Rather, it 
was the result of giving excessive diplomatic consideration to South 
Korea, whose public was filled with anti-Japanese sentiment. Heeding 
these circumstances, Shimomura indicated the need to study the 
statement. 
 
Nonetheless, if Minshuto and other parties challenge Shimomura's 
remarks, they should first show what is their view about the 
question of whether there was transportation of women for forced 
labor, the crux of the Kono statement, and then should pursue the 
government. 
 
Prime Minister Abe stated he abides by the Kono statement, but at 
the same time he commented that "No data supporting" transportation 
of women for forced labor as sex slaves "have been found even now," 
 
TOKYO 00006301  007 OF 007 
 
 
by employing the expression of "enforcement in a narrow sense." 
Shimomura's remarks are not contradictory to Abe's replies. 
 
The government's view is not necessarily the golden rule. It is only 
natural to correct it if there is something wrong with it. 
 
The point is the facts. 
 
Namely, was there the fact of transportation of people by the 
military or police authorities for forced labor? Aside from 
political calculations or excessive diplomatic consideration, this 
question should be considered; for that reason, it should be 
entrusted to historians and other experts' research. 
 
As a result of the research, if no facts demonstrating 
transportation for forced labor are found, the Kono statement must 
be revised 
 
SCHIEFFER