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Viewing cable 06TOKYO5904, ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM JAPAN REGARDING THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO5904 2006-10-11 08:33 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #5904/01 2840833
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110833Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7304
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1282
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5064
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0408
UNCLAS TOKYO 005904 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP MCAP PINR PINS IAEA FR
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM JAPAN REGARDING THE 
GLOBAL INITIATIVE 
 
REF: SECSTATE 164535 
 
1.  THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARAGRAPHS 4-6. 
 
2.  SUMMARY: Russian Embassy Political Officer Sergey I. 
Kuznetsov and American Embassy Science and Technology Officer 
Ayanna Hobbs met with Japanese counterparts at MOFA on 2 
October, and hand-delivered answers provided by Washington 
(reftel) on Japan's initial questions. Russian Embassy 
Officer read off similar answers provided by Russian 
authorities.  MOFA reiterated Japan's continued support of 
the Initiative.  However, MOFA made clear that any statement 
the GOJ endorses will have to be reviewed by other agencies, 
and this will take time.  If such a review is not possible, 
Japan will attend the first meeting in Morocco, but may only 
participate as an observer It will not be able to endorse the 
documents until further review by all participating Japanese 
government agencies. 
END SUMMARY 
 
 
3.BEGIN TEXT of MOFA COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS.  We understand 
that the Russian Federation and the United States expect that 
the Initial Partners will endorse Statement of Principles and 
possibly Terms of Reference, but not Explanatory Notes to 
Statement of Principles, at the meetings on 30-31 October 
2006. Given the importance and concreteness of their 
contents, coordination and elaboration might be required to 
come up with agreed explanatory notes. Japan will continue to 
cooperate with Russia and the US in this regard. 
 
4.  Statement of Principles: 
 
A. Description on National Laws and Regulations Throughout 
the text of Statement of Principles slightly different 
wording is used in referring to national legal framework. For 
the sake of consistency and greater clarity, we would suggest 
that relevant parts of the text read as follows: 
 
Introductory Part (3rd line): consistent with their relevant 
laws and regulations (instead of consistent with national 
legal authorities) 
 
4th bullet (3rd line): consistent with their relevant laws 
and regulations (instead of consistent with relevant laws) 
 
8th bullet (3rd and 4th lines): consistent with their 
relevant laws and regulations (instead of consistent with 
their national law) 
 
(In the 7th bullet, the phrase national legal and regulatory 
frameworks could remain as is now, if it refers to frameworks 
as a whole rather than to individual laws or regulations.) 
 
B. 3rd Objective 
With regard to the phrase prevent illicit trafficking in 
them, we would appreciate clarification on what in them 
refers to. Could this part read: prevent their illicit 
trafficking?  With respect to the phrase to include 
cooperation...in this initiative, could we understand that it 
means as follows: (in order) to research and develop, in a 
cooperative manner, an interoperable detection capability 
open to all who participate in this initiative. 
 
 
 
5. Terms of Reference for Implementation and Assessment: 
 
A. Use of Shall 
Japan proposes that the word shall throughout the text be 
replaced by other appropriate words (such as will) so as to 
clarify the non-legally binding nature of the document. 
 
B. Scope of Activities, 2nd bullet 
What is the point to refer to evaluate requests (to fill 
capability gaps)? Reference to the possibility to provide 
assistance seems to cover the main point on this matter. 
 
C. Responsibilities of Initiative   Participants, paragraph 2 
With regard to the phrase will ensure that appropriate 
personnel and resources are dedicated..., we would appreciate 
your clarification on whether this part requests 
participating states to establish an organizational unit or 
task-force consisting of experts from various ministries and 
departments to be involved in GI activities or to take 
measures so that each relevant ministries and departments 
duly dedicate their personnel and resources for GI 
activities. We understand that the latter is the intention of 
this paragraph and propose that this paragraph be slightly 
modified to read as follows: 
 
 
Participants will strive to ensure that appropriate personnel 
and resources are dedicated to the implementation of the 
Initiative and that operational and technical experts from 
ministries and departments with     appropriate operational 
and technical expertise (e.g. Defense, Energy, 
Interior/Homeland Security, 
Finance, Justice, etc.) participate in Initiative activities 
identified in the Plan of Work, in consultation with  the 
host nation. 
 
D. Responsibilities of Initiative Participants, paragraph 3 
Given that a schedule of technical meetings and operational 
training exercises in the future is unknown at this stage, it 
is difficult for many countries, including Japan, to make a 
statement to ensure adequate provision of resources to 
support such activities. Therefore, Japan would propose that 
this paragraph be slightly modified read as follows: 
 
Participants will provide political support within their 
governments to the activities of the operational and 
technical experts, and strive to provide appropriate 
resources to support an active schedule of technical meetings 
and operational training exercises. 
 
E. Responsibilities of Initiative Participants. Paragraph 4 
How many contact points are expected to be designated? Do you 
expect a single contact point (e.g. an official of the 
Foreign Ministry) who will coordinate all of the work within 
his/her country? Alternatively, do you envisage eight contact 
points who will take care of the eight objectives mentioned 
in the Statement of Principles? 
 
6.  Explanatory notes to Statement of Principles: 
 
A. Objective 1 
8.1 Activities 
To make recommendations to other partner nations regarding 
best practices is regarded as one of the main activities 
under this objective.  While best practices of a country 
might be useful for others, it is not appropriate to directly 
apply practices of a country in other countries, because 
appropriate physical    protection systems should differ 
depending on the assumptions of threats, specificity of 
facilities and other conditions. We would like to know your 
views on this point. 
 
8.2. Authorities 
In this paragraph, partner states are requested to maintain 
capabilities in a manner that meets or exceeds any legal 
requirements. However, the phrase exceeds any legal 
requirements sounds too strong and may not be necessarily 
appropriate given the intention of this paragraph. We propose 
that this part read as follows: 
 
All partner nations will maintain these capabilities in a 
manner that meets the legal requirements established by... 
and will strive to strengthen such capabilities further. 
 
B. Objective 2 
9.1. Activities 
(same comments as mentioned in 8.1. above) 
 
9.2. Authorities 
(same comments as mentioned in 8.2. above) 
 
C. Objective 3 
10.1. Goal 
In this paragraph, partner nations are requested to maintain 
a capability to detect the illicit movement of nuclear 
material and radioactive substances, across all borders, 
ports, and airports. Does this capability purport only to 
technical capability within the present domestic legal 
framework or include legal capabilities beyond the existing 
domestic legal framework to detect and prevent illicit 
movement of nuclear material (for example, granting 
additional power to regulate it to Authority or even 
establishing new punishment clause to assure its enforcement)? 
 
1 0.2. Authorities 
(same comments as mentioned in 8.2. above) 
 
D. Objective 4 
11.1. Title 
The title of this objective reads: improve capabilities of 
partner nations to search for, seize.  Does the word improve 
capabilities mean the improvement only of technical 
capabilities of search and seizure within the present 
domestic legal framework or include the establishment of new 
legal framework of search and seizure beyond the existing 
 
domestic legal framework (for example, amending the domestic 
legal framework to give a special power to authorities 
regarding search and seizure or to change the requirements of 
court issuance of warrant for search and seizure)? 
 
11.2. Authorities 
(same comments as mentioned in 8.2. above) 
 
E. Objective 5 
12.1 Title 
The title of this objective reads: improve capabilities for 
--- investigation. Does the word improve capabilities mean 
the improvement of technical capabilities within the present 
domestic legal framework or include the improvement of legal 
capabilities (for example, introducing new methods of 
investigation including sting operation)? 
 
12.2 Goal 
In this paragraph, partner nations that receive requests for 
assistance are requested to provide appropriate operational 
and technical assistance to ---- ensure just punishment of 
those responsible.  In this context, does the word assistance 
mean the practice of seminars and workshops to improve the 
technical capabilities of investigators regardless of the 
ongoing investigation of concrete cases, or include mutual 
legal assistance in criminal matters related to the ongoing 
investigation of concrete cases. 
 
Partner nations are also requested to maintain capability --- 
to identify all perpetrators and facilitators.  In this 
connection, does this capability include a legal capability 
to identify perpetrators and facilitators (for example, 
introducing new legal methods of investigation beyond the 
present domestic legal framework)? 
 
Partner nations are also requested to maintain a means to 
share operational and technical information.  What kind of 
concrete information is supposed to be shared?  Does this 
include information on the ongoing investigation? 
 
12.3. Authorities 
(same comments as mentioned in 8.2. above) 
 
F. Objective 6 
13.1. Goal 
In this paragraph, partner nations are requested to maintain 
capability to deny financial and economic resources to 
persons and entities reasonably believed to be seeking to 
carry out or facilitate a terrorist attack involving nuclear 
materials or radioactive substances as well as to maintain a 
capability to identify all suspicious activity related to 
terrorist efforts to acquire or use nuclear materials, or 
carry out acts of sabotage.  What kind of concrete 
capabilities are envisaged here?  Would they include the 
establishment of such legal measures that authorities 
maintain the power to grant permission on the matter in order 
to prohibit or prevent the provision of funds to terrorists, 
or of the additional legal power for authorities, or of the 
new legal instrument for punishment to assure effective 
enforcement? 
 
13.2. Authorities 
(same comments as mentioned in 8.2. above) 
 
G. Objective 7 
14.1. Goal 
In this paragraph partner nations are requested to establish 
a firm basis for operational, technical, law enforcement, and 
other forms of concrete cooperation with partner nations on 
all aspects of the Statement of Principles. In this 
connection, we would like to know whether (a) you assume a 
new legal framework beyond existing one including the 
Convention on the Physical Protection for Nuclear Material 
and Facilities, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 and 1540, or (b) you 
expect those countries who have not met the existing legal 
obligations to establish such legal framework to enhance 
their capacity building and expect those countries with such 
framework to assist those countries without such framework to 
implement this initiative in a smooth manner within the 
existing legal framework. We would like you to clarify your 
intention regarding these points. 
 
If you have option (a) above in mind, we would like you to 
explain the new   legal framework that is to be established, 
so that we can consider it. In relation to the wording of the 
explanatory notes, at this stage we would like this part to 
read: establish, if appropriate (or necessary), a firm basis. 
 
In case you have option (b) above in mind, we would propose 
 
that this part    read: like to ask you to change the phrase 
establish a firm basis for operational, technical, law 
enforcement, and other forms of concrete cooperation with 
partner nations on all aspects of the Statement of 
Principles, a firm legal basis consistent with the Convention 
on the Physical Protection for Nuclear Material and 
Facilities, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, and United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373       and 1540. 
 
We would like to know your views on the arrangements for the 
proper handling of evidence. If you think that participating 
countries should provide evidence beyond the existing legal 
frameworks, such as the Treaty between Japan and the United 
States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters, we need to consider carefully, in terms of its 
necessity and rationality, whether such arrangements could be 
accepted.  Therefore, at this stage, we propose that this 
part read: including, if      appropriate (or necessary), the 
arrangements for the proper handling of evidence or including 
the arrangements for the proper handling of evidence 
consistent with the existing international legal frameworks 
including the Convention on the Physical Protection for 
Nuclear Material and Facilities, the Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
1373 and 1540. 
 
In relation to the phrase through long jail terms, we would 
like to point out that long jail terms is a relative concept 
and heavily depends on domestic law of each country. For 
example, Article 6 of the Nuclear   Terrorism Convention 
stipulates that criminal acts shall be punished by penalties 
consistent with their grave nature, but does not specify jail 
terms. Moreover, in criminal cases, a court has its own 
exclusive authority to determine a reasonable sentencing 
within the statutory penalty. We doubt    whether court's 
decisions will be subject to long jail terms in all cases. 
Therefore we would propose that this part read, for example: 
through criminal penalties consistent with grave nature, 
according to the article 6 on the Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention. 
 
In relation to the phrase and civil or administrative 
penalties following long jail terms, we would like you to 
know that in Japan the person imposed on a criminal penalty 
shall be imposed on neither a civil nor an administrative 
penalty without specific provisions such as disqualification 
causes in other individual laws.  We would therefore request 
that this part    read: and, if possible, civil or 
administrative penalties. 
 
14.2. Activities 
In this paragraph, partner nations are requested to review, 
ensure the effectiveness of, and strengthen on a continuous 
basis national legal and regulatory frameworks necessary to 
implement the Statement of Principles. While we understand 
your point, we think that the following formulation would 
sound more appropriate: will review, ensure the effectiveness 
of, and, if necessary, strengthen on a continuous basis the 
national legal and regulatory frameworks... 
 
14.3. Authorities 
(same comments as mentioned in 8.2. above) 
 
H. Objective 8 
15.1. Goal 
In this paragraph, partner nations are requested to maintain 
points of contact for sharing operational, technical, law 
enforcement information.  However, in the paragraph under 
Activities, the rapid exchange only of technical and 
operational information is referred to and there is no 
mention of law enforcement information.  We would like to 
know the reason of this inconsistency.  We would also like to 
know the contents of operational information, technical 
information and law enforcement information and whether such 
information includes that related to ongoing investigation. 
 
15.2. Authorities 
(same comments as mentioned in 8.2. above) END TEXT 
 
7. Japanese participants included members MOFA's 
International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division: 
 
1) Principal Deputy Director Zentaro Naganuma 
2) Deputy Director Takayuki Kitagawa (NOTE: Mr. Kitagawa has 
been re-assigned as of 2 October) 
3) Officer Toshio Kaneko 
 
SCHIEFFER 
SCHIEFFER