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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 005876 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KNNP PGOV KN JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S INITITAL MEDIA RESPONSE TO ANNOUNCED DPRK 
NUCLEAR TEST 
 
TOKYO 00005876  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
 ¶1. Summary.  The public and media reaction to the DPRK's 
October 9 announcement of a nuclear test was universally 
condemnatory.  Press coverage throughout the day highlighted 
the cool, unflappable responses of Prime Minister Abe and his 
aides, the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the 
counterproductive nature of Kim Jong-il's efforts to gain 
U.S. attention.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  The public response to North Korea's announced nuclear 
test, predictably, was one of universal outrage and 
condemnation.  Because the test occurred on one of Japan's 
press holidays, the immediate media response was limited to 
television and the internet.  (Note: No newspaper reports 
will appear until late Tuesday afternoon.)  Japanese 
television featured special news reports throughout the day, 
with the NHK evening news extending from 30 minutes to an 
hour to accommodate intense interest in the story.  The news 
broadcasts were filled with Japanese and international 
reaction, including what was portrayed as the cool, 
unflappable responses of Prime Minister Abe and his aides. 
 
¶3. The intense discussion and analysis presented on 
televisions news and talk shows included speculation on Kim 
Jong-il's motive, the nature of the underground explosion and 
its international consequences.  NHK, for example, featured 
military affairs analyst Kensuke Ebata explaining the 
technical aspects of the test.  He stated that, based on 
available information, the explosion appeared to be small, 
much smaller than the bomb which was detonated over 
Hiroshima, and speculated that the test may have been a 
failure.  On one talk show, most participants expressed faith 
in the Japan-U.S. alliance and the UN Security Council.  Talk 
show guests also called for further toughening of sanctions 
against the DPRK.  No one argued for Japan to go it alone: 
i.e., the nuclear option.  Reactions of the people on the 
street interviewed by NHK and TV-Asahi reflected anger, 
dismay and disgust.  Like the talk show "experts," ordinary 
Japanese citizens saw the solution in Japan's alliance with 
the United States, the UN and Japan's postwar peace record. 
No one called for Japan to react to the nuclear threat by 
developing its own nuclear capability. 
 
¶4. The media coverage of the international response to test 
featured assurances by Ambassador Schieffer that the U.S. 
would honor its security commitments to Japan.  News reports 
also highlighted the responses of Beijing and Seoul, where 
Abe was just going into his summit meeting with ROK President 
Roh when the news hit the street.  Commentators noted that, 
with the push of a button, Kim had managed not only to add 
even more epoxy glue to the already solid U.S.-Japan 
alliance, he had also contributed greatly to Japan's 
rapprochement with China and the ROK.  Television coverage 
suggested that President Roh, who was viewed here as "soft" 
on Pyongyang, had finally seen the light, based on the joint 
statement issued with Prime Minister Abe that used the word 
"threat" repeatedly.  Commentators also noted that China's 
spokesman used some of the strongest words ever in protesting 
the purported test, reflecting official anger and 
embarrassment, particularly for the country that shepherded 
the 6-party talks and had placed itself out on a limb 
defending Kim in past actions. 
 
¶5. Keio University Professor Masao Okonogi, one of Japan's 
foremost experts on North Korea, argued that North Korea's 
intention all along in its missile and nuclear programs has 
been "survival" and not necessarily to use the weapons 
against Japan or the United States.  Okonogi insisted that 
 
TOKYO 00005876  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Kim Jong-il believes that possessing nuclear weapons will 
allow North Korea to be recognized as a nuclear power 
internationally and that this will buy it protection. The 
timing of the nuclear test had been carefully calculated to 
occur just when Abe was visiting Seoul, he said.  Kim 
apparently judged that the time was right, in that the United 
States had its hands full with such major issues as Iraq's 
security, Iran's nuclear obstinacy, and the upcoming U.S. 
congressional election. 
 
¶6. Okonogi further insisted that Kim is already resolved to 
accept more sanctions from the international community.  The 
DPRK leader thinks that ultimately his nuclear card will 
force other countries to seek dialogue with him since he has 
a strong hand. Kim may even believe that this move will help 
him tighten his own domestic authority and control and place 
more confidence in him by the military.  He did not think 
China and Russia would cooperate in a Chapter VII resolution 
in the UNSC and believes the United States' only recourse now 
is to contain North Korea through political and economic 
measures.  Okonogi also expected more nuclear tests before 
the North's first round of testing was complete. 
SCHIEFFER