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DE RUEHTC #2299/01 2971433
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O 241433Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7199
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING OCTOBER 20 
 
This is CWC-97-06. 
 
----------- 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶1.  (U) Facilitator Marten Lak (Netherlands) held two 
consultations on his draft EC-47 report language.  The first 
session on October 5 introduced the draft and invited general 
comments.  Other than Sudan, all delegations that spoke 
supported the basic thrust of the draft.  Sudan asked that 
the facilitator gut the language in paragraph 4, the meat of 
the document, but other attendees requested that the draft 
remain as presented for now.  Japan requested that language 
be inserted that referred to the UN Security Council or the 
1540 Committee.  The UK noted that several elements needed to 
be strengthened.  Neither India nor Iran presented informal 
views on the document, saying that as it had only been 
received that morning, they had not had time to review it. 
 
¶2.  (U) After Onate presented the final version of the 
Article VII Progress Report on October 19, facilitator Lak 
opened the floor for a paragraph by paragraph review of the 
draft decision language.  Delegations began with the first 
three paragraphs, with Germany commenting that the phrase 
"all States parties concerned had now provided information on 
the steps they are taking, on the difficulties they are 
encountering, and on any assistance they might need" was 
misleading and the word "and" should be changed to "and/or." 
 
¶3. (U) With respect to paragraph 4, several delegations noted 
that elements of paragraph 2 were duplicated in 4a and 
advised the facilitator that the intent was fine, but the 
draft should not repeat elements.  Mexico noted that it would 
be difficult for the Executive Branch to influence the work 
processes of the Legislative Branch, so that the phrase "to 
seek to expedite" was not acceptable.  Several delegations 
suggested alternative language -- Turkey: "to seek to explore 
legislative measures to assist implementation of the 
Convention," and the UK: "to seek to expedite, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes,..." 
 
¶4.  (U) Iran noted that the centerpiece of the draft was the 
extension of the follow-on plan for another year.  Although 
without instructions, Shahrokh Shakerian, supported by India 
and South Africa, noted that his personal view was the plan 
should not/not be extended.  If it were to be renewed, the 
proposed recommendations for CSP-11 could not include any new 
elements (such as the new reporting designations for the 
status of legislation: draft, in Parliament, enacted). 
Shakerian also noted indirectly that the Japanese request for 
a reference to 1540 was not successful last year and would 
not make the cut again this year.  Finally paragraph 4 goes 
beyond the follow-on plan elements and is unacceptable as it 
stands.  South Africa added that if the plan is to be 
extended, the decision should consist of one simple paragraph 
stating that it is to be extended.  Nothing more. 
 
¶5. (U) Finally, delegations commented briefly on paragraphs 5 
to 8, with Legal Advisor Onate noting that it would be too 
difficult for the Technical Secretariat to prepare progress 
reports for every EC session.  Status changes slowly, so the 
reports would not change substantially.  Japan noted that it 
would welcome more frequent reports, but that if it were too 
difficult for the TS, Japan could accept reports in June and 
in October.  The facilitator noted that he would make a few 
changes to his draft that would next be considered on 
November 2. 
 
------ 
BUDGET 
------ 
 
¶6.  (U) Budget consultations were held on October 17 to 
discuss the core objectives of the proposed 2007 budget and 
the Medium-Term Plan (MTP), EC-46/S/4 dated 3 July 2006.  The 
first intervention was made by Iran, who stated that their 
position on the core objectives has already been addressed in 
prior consultations.  With regard to the MTP, Iran asked that 
 
references to international organizations, such as the UN, be 
omitted from the text, arguing that the OPCW does not define 
its role as a result of UN policies.  Iran said that they had 
little information on the 2005 assistance and protection 
exercise organized by NATO in Ukraine, therefore text 
referring to the exercise should be deleted.  Curiously Iran 
also asked that the reference to compliance with CW 
destruction deadlines being a topic for discussion at the 
Second Review Conference be omitted because the destruction 
deadline is too far away.  India supported all of Iran's 
proposed changes to the text. 
 
¶7.  (U) With regard to OCPF inspections, India stated that 
the issue is still being discussed, and asked the TS delete 
all text in the MTP referring to an increase in OCPF 
inspections.  Iran asked that the MTP focus on risk 
assessment regarding inspectable Schedule 3 and OCPF sites. 
India commented that the MTP includes many conclusions made 
by the TS that have not yet been decided among SPs. 
 
¶8.  (U) Co-facilitator, Walter Leon (Belgium), noted that the 
MTP is a background paper prepared by the TS and used to 
develop the budget. The UK commented that the text of the MTP 
document has not been negotiated in previous years, as it is 
not intended to represent the view of SPs.  Italy and Japan 
supported the UK's statement, drawing attention to the first 
paragraph of the MTP, which clearly states the purpose and 
limitations of the document as it relates to the budget. The 
TS explained that during the EC, States Parties are asked to 
 
SIPDIS 
either "receive" or "note" the document. 
 
¶9.  (U) Germany asked the TS to define the parameters of 
"voluntary contributions," which is repeated several times in 
the text. 
 
¶10.  (U) No further comments were made on the core objectives 
of the proposed 2007 budget. The next consultation will be 
held on October 20 and will focus on ICA funding levels.  As 
a result of significant pushing from the del, the 
co-facilitator circulated at the end of the meeting draft 
decision text (e-mailed to ISN/CB on 10/19/06) on the budget. 
 Del believes that all of Washington's objectives are met in 
the draft decision text, but that Iran and India will seek 
significant changes to the decision. 
 
¶11.  (U) Budget consultations were held on 20 October to 
discuss concerns about the level of funding for the 
International Cooperation and Assistance (ICA) Program in the 
2007 proposed budget.  John Makhubalo, Director of ICA, was 
present answer questions regarding the ICA division. 
Makhubalo began by outlining the function of the ICA 
division, which offers support to SPs in implementing Article 
VII obligations, supports measures to improve assistance and 
protection against chemical weapons, and promotes programs 
related to the peaceful use of chemistry.  Co-facilitator, 
Hela Lahmar (Tunisia) noted that in prior consultations, some 
delegations expressed concern with the low level of ICA 
funding, and asked that those delegations with concerns 
provide tangible proposals for the TS to consider. 
 
¶12.  (U) India was the first delegation to intervene noting a 
major reduction in support for capacity building since 2005, 
and asked the TS to return funding levels to that of the 2005 
budget.  Budget chief Rick Martin pointed out that the 
significant increase in the capacity building budget in 2005 
was not budgeted but rather the result of transferring money 
from other parts of the ICA budget to capacity building. 
The TS also noted that the proposed budget for capacity 
building is a 4.8% increase from 2006.  India said that they 
still would like to see an increase of 70,000 euros in the 
capacity building budget. 
 
¶13.  South Africa stated that they were also in favor of 
increasing funding for ICA, noting that the overall current 
OPCW budget was lower than that of 2006.  South Africa asked 
the TS how many requests were made for assistance compared to 
how many were actually accommodated.  Iran supported the 
Indian and South African comments, and declared that the TS 
should be responsible for proposing an alternative budget, 
 
taking into consideration the NAM position. 
 
¶14.  (U) The UK asked delegations to keep perspective on the 
zero nominal growth budget, commenting that funding levels 
should not be dramatically increased in any division.  The UK 
stated that ICA funding levels had, in fact, increased for 
¶2007.  Canada further noted that prior to 2005, the funding 
level for ICA was always around 5% of the total budget, and 
for 2007, the proposed ICA funding level is 7%, showing a 
moderate increase.  Canada also stated that the focus of ICA 
should be on the quality of programs, not on the quantity, 
and expressed full support for the proposed budget. 
 
¶15.  (U) Germany, China, and Switzerland agreed that the 
focus should be on the quality of ICA programs, not on the 
quantity.  China asked the TS to produce a document assessing 
the quality of ICA programs.   Iran pushed back stating that 
quality and quantity are not contradictory, and increasing 
the quality of programs can be achieved through increasing 
the quantity.  India supported the Iranian comment. 
 
¶16.  (U) Australia stated that their delegation fully 
accepted the ICA budget.  Australia said that they would 
consider alternative proposals, provided they are presented 
in the near term, noting that EC-47 is quickly approaching. 
Australia also argued that it would not be appropriate for 
the TS to prepare another proposal because support for the 
current budget was clearly divided.  South Africa countered 
Australia's comment noting that SPs did not propose the 
current budget, therefore, they should not prepare an 
alternative, and the TS should be responsible.   Germany, in 
a heated intervention, stated that the TS must have some 
indication from those SPs concerned on what to change in 
order to prepare a counter-proposal. 
 
¶17.  (U) South Africa responded by requesting that funding 
levels for several ICA programs be increased: the Equipment 
Exchange Program, the Associate Program, the Laboratory 
Assistance Program, and the Program for Support of Research 
Projects.  The South African delegate suggested that the 
budget surplus be used to fund these programs.  Iran stated 
that the TS has given some indication that manpower in the 
ICA division is a problem and suggested that manpower be 
increased, which would theoretically increase the number of 
programs that ICA would be able support. 
 
¶18.  (U) The TS responded to the South African proposals by 
explaining that the Equipment Exchange Program is primarily 
funded by the EU.  With regard to the Associate Program, the 
TS stated that it is not an issue of manpower as facilities 
 
SIPDIS 
are unable to accommodate more than twelve people.  The TS 
noted that the ICA division has yet to reject assistance to 
any laboratory request under the Laboratory Assistance 
Program, and if applications increase funding could be an 
issue.  However, to date the program was funded 
appropriately.  In addressing the Internship Support Program, 
the TS responded that some laboratories have an intense 
workload and can just not accommodate interns.  The TS also 
noted interns must find accommodations on their own, which is 
difficult, and often reduces a potential intern's interest in 
the program. 
 
¶19.  (U) As major contributors to the OPCW budget, the UK, 
Japan and Germany stated that they were in favor of retaining 
a zero nominal growth budget.  Germany stated that because 
the budget is zero nominal growth, in order to increase 
funding in the ICA division, a decrease must occur within 
another division.  Germany suggested that all SPs return to 
the priorities of the Convention, CW destruction and 
non-proliferation. 
 
¶20.  (U) The co-facilitators stated that they would prepare a 
draft decision on the 2007 Program and Budget, which has 
since been placed on the external server.  The next 
consultation will be held on October 26 to review the draft 
decision.  At that consultation, the NAM will likely continue 
to push for increased ICA funding and a reduction in OCPF 
inspections.  WEOG is likely to remain united in opposing any 
increase in ICA, at least until it becomes clear that that 
 
there will be no reduction in OCPF inspections. 
 
--------------------- 
OPCW OFFICE IN AFRICA 
--------------------- 
 
¶21. (U) The Open Ended Working Group on establishing an OPCW 
Office in Africa met on October 17.  It was a widely attended 
meeting, however only four or five countries from Africa 
attended (most notably, Algeria, South Africa, Cameroon, 
Sudan), which was unusual in that this consultation usually 
generates a large number of African delegations. 
 
¶22. (U) The Director General opened the meeting by 
reaffirming his commitment to toward a thorough consideration 
of an OPCW Office in Africa.  He asked delegations to bear in 
mind the financial commitment in their deliberations on the 
subject.  The facilitator, Andres Rugeles (Colombia), 
reviewed his statement at EC-46 and noted the meetings he had 
held since then, with the UN, the Africa Group Ambassadors 
and their alternates.  He presented his paper, which proposes 
setting up an office within the UN Regional Center for Peace 
and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), which is based in Lome. 
He noted there is a political benefit to the OPCW of such an 
arrangement, through the use of UNREC's network of contacts. 
Legally, all OPCW mission personnel would be covered under 
previously established UN privileges and immunities. 
 
¶23. (U) Financially, beyond actual costs (gas, phones, etc. 
there would be no additional costs.  The TS personnel 
involved would be already hired staff taking on this new 
responsibility.  There would be no/no new TS positions for 
this specific task.  He also noted that UNREC would benefit 
by gaining a higher profile with OPCW activities.  Further, 
his paper indicates an office in Africa would not be a 
permanent office, but would be staffed for short term visits 
by a "Rolling Liaison Office." 
 
¶24. (U) The facilitator went over his paper, which had three 
key proposals.  First, there would be within the TS a 
representative for Africa who would coordinate OPCW 
activities in Africa.  Second, there would be an OPCW African 
Task Force (again, drawn from existing staff) to further 
enhance OPCW activities in Africa.  Finally, there would be a 
TS "Rolling Liaison Office" which would be activated for 
 
SIPDIS 
fixed periods of time to implement the programs of the Task 
Force and TS, work with the AU and/or UN and promote 
cooperation and joint activities. 
 
¶25. (U) The U.S. requested further information on the UNREC 
office, logistical information related to current staffing, 
size of office, and location.  The facilitator said he would 
find that information.  The U.S. also asked to see UNREC's 
calendar of events for the past two years in order to 
ascertain the current profile of the UNREC.  Delegations were 
generally supportive of the facilitator's idea.  However Iran 
did not agree and initially was especially concerned about 
the Africa office effort becoming involved with the UN. 
(Note: They struck the same chord during discussions of NATO 
involvement in the Joint Assistance Exercise 2005 in Kiev 
last year and recently during discussions of report language 
which noted NATO's involvement in JAE 2005.) 
 
¶26. (U) Sudan, on behalf of the Africa Group, noted their 
dissatisfaction with the facilitator's idea.  They were 
concerned that Lome was too remote, and requested that the 
facilitator explore Addis Ababa in the same manner as he did 
Lome.  They further suggested if Addis would not work to look 
at other countries in the region.  They were not supportive 
of the facilitator's proposal of a "rolling liaison office" 
which would not have a permanent location.  They were clear 
in their determination to have a permanent office in Africa. 
South Africa echoed these sentiments, further noting that 
some basic issues need to be decided before going into the 
weeds on the details.  Constantly looking at various 
alternatives and then generating numbers would lead to an 
endless process of churning with no progress. 
 
¶27.  (U) Iran then proposed that the facilitator return to 
 
the one concrete proposal on the table: the African Group's 
request for a permanent office in Addis.  The facilitator 
replied that he had put forth his proposal for how to 
proceed.  Avoiding a direct conflict with the African 
delegations, he did say that he would continue to explore the 
Addis option as well as other options.  However, he added, it 
would be with little support from the African Union, which 
gave lip service to offering assistance, but could give no 
substantive help. 
 
¶28. (U) All delegations noted the need for more time for 
capitals to review the facilitator's proposal.  It was clear 
to delegations that the facilitator plans to use the basic 
framework of his proposal as the basis for further work.  The 
facilitator said he will look at Addis, get more 
clarification for his current proposal and will obtain the 
information requested by the U.S. on the UNREC office in 
Lome.  All documents referenced above were faxed to ISN-CB on 
October 18. 
 
------------ 
UNIVERSALITY 
------------ 
 
¶29.  (U) Consultations were held on universality on October 
¶19.  The consultation was almost as interesting for what was 
not mentioned as what was discussed.  Facilitator Said Moussi 
(Algeria) did not ask the TS to provide delegates a rundown 
of recent universality-related activities, as is usually 
done, before beginning a discussion of draft decision 
language on universality for CSP-11.  This may have been 
because Algeria had asked the TS just a day earlier to cancel 
the universality workshop scheduled to take place in Algiers 
on November 13-14.  Apparently Algeria asked to cancel the 
workshop after the TS refused to fund large numbers of 
African delegates to attend the workshop.  Many within the TS 
told del rep privately that they were frustrated with 
Algeria's decision, especially after Algeria had aggressively 
pushed the TS to hold the workshop in the first place. 
 
¶30.  (U) The discussion of the draft universality began with 
Iran questioning if there was a need for CSP decision 
language and any reference to the action plan given that the 
action plan approved at the CSP-10 runs until CSP-12.  The UK 
and Japan said that they still favored language that made a 
specific reference the universality action plan.  Mexico and 
Colombia called for dramatically shortening the text.  Del 
rep said that we could consider shortening the text, but 
would need to ensure that the text retained its balance, 
especially as last years text was carefully negotiated. 
Italy supported the U.S.  The Netherlands said that since the 
number of SPs was now at 180, the goal should be increased. 
The TS suggested that 184 would be a more realistic target. 
 
¶31.  (U) France, Germany, Russia, and Iran said that they 
would be satisfied with report language and did not see a 
compelling need for decision text, as report language would 
suffice.  Only Iran seemed to have a strong view on the 
 
matter.  The U.S., Mexico and Italy asked if simply drafting 
report language would demonstrate the same commitment to 
universality as decision text. 
 
¶32.  (U) In the end, all delegations indicated that they 
could go along with decision language and Malik Ellahi, 
Government Relations and Political Affairs Branch chief, was 
tasked with redrafting a more concise draft that would 
include all of the key elements present in the current draft. 
 The facilitator said that he would hold another consultation 
on the matter after the EC, noting that delegations still had 
a fair amount of time before the CSP. 
 
--------------- 
REPAYMENT PLANS 
--------------- 
 
¶33.  (U) Consultations were held on October 18 to review the 
revised draft decision document (dated 9 October 2006) on 
creating a repayment mechanism for those SPs in arrears. 
Approximately, 10 delegations were present for the 
 
consultation.  The UK was the first to intervene noting that 
the draft decision still links voting rights to the payment 
plan.  The UK stated that they would prefer no reference at 
all to voting rights in the document, but if others insisted 
on retaining OP 6 (c), the reverse must also be noted - that 
those SP who default in the repayment plan should have their 
voting rights suspended.  Germany and Japan supported the UK 
comment, noting that a link between voting rights and the 
payment plan should not exist.  The facilitator proposed 
doing a paragraph-by-paragraph review, beginning with the 
pre-ambular text, in order to address all concerns in a 
structured approach. 
 
¶34.  (U) Iran stated that "Article VIII, paragraph 8" is 
mentioned twice in the pre-ambular text (PP2 and PP6), making 
it very repetitive, and requested one of the references be 
deleted. 
 
¶35.  (U) The UK asked the TS to clarify OP 2 so that it reads 
"all SPs", not just those in arrears as of CSP-11.  The UK 
stated that OP4 essentially repeats OP2 and suggested 
combining the two.  Iran said that OP2 needs some 
"streamlining" to retain the element of encouragement, but 
they consider it to be an introduction for OP4 and see no 
benefit in combining the two.   The UK asked that OP 4(a) 
read, "submit a request that includes an explanation of the 
reasons for the arrears and the reasons for a multi-year 
payment plan."  Iran commented that a SP should not need to 
give an outline or explanation.  The UK stated that this was 
a red-line for them because they must know why a SP fell into 
arrears in order to justify to their capital that repayment 
plans and the eventual return of voting rights be approved. 
The U.S., Japan, France and Turkey supported the UK's 
proposed changes and rationale.  Iran stated that they would 
prefer to delete OP 4(A), but because this text is a red-line 
for others, they would report back to capital for 
consideration of this issue in future consultations. 
 
¶36.  (U) Iran requested that OP9 be deleted, commenting that 
such administrative details should be worked out between the 
OPCW and the SP in arrears.  No delegations offered support 
for this proposal. 
 
¶37.  (U) In working with the current text regarding voting 
rights and the payment plan, Germany proposed inserting 
language into OP 11, which would read, "If a State Party does 
not meet the terms of the agreed multiyear-repayment plan, 
this plan will cease to apply with immediate effect, and if 
applicable, the restoration of voting rights will cease to 
apply with immediate effect in accordance with Article VIII, 
Para 8."  Most delegations generally supported the German 
proposal. 
 
¶38.  (U) The facilitator stated that he would continue with 
bilateral consultations before revising another draft 
decision, and as soon as the new document is drafted, it will 
be placed on the external server.  On October 20, the new 
draft was put on the external server and FAXed to ISN/CB. 
Del would appreciate further guidance in advance of the next 
and final consultation scheduled for October 26. 
 
--------------- 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
SIPDIS 
--------------- 
 
¶39. (U) Consultations were held on October 18 on establishing 
Guidelines for long-term handling of confidential 
information.  This was a lightly attended meeting and only 
three delegations took the floor to speak (Switzerland, 
France and Iran).  Isaac Minta from the Legal Affairs Office 
(LAO) of the TS presented a paper denoting the findings of 
his office on the issue of ownership of information (this 
paper has been FAXed to ISN-CB).  The LAO findings say that, 
 
1) the legal status of confidential information is the same 
for any medium; 
2) ownership of said information is in two parts -- 
information produced by the OPCW is owned by the OPCW,  and 
information produced by States Parties is owned by the states 
 
and subject to their  domestic laws; and 
3) compared with other international organizations -- the 
question of ownership do not feature prominently, if at all, 
in any of the information received from the UN, IAEA, World 
Bank, NATO or the OECD.  There was no discussion of this 
document. 
 
¶40.  (U) Facilitator Betsy Sanders (U.S.), suggested the TS 
prepare draft destruction regulations, which would provide 
structure to the future debate, followed by a draft decision. 
 The facilitator asked delegates for their thoughts and for 
ideas on the way forward.  Switzerland supported her 
proposal; he requested that the wording be simple and to the 
point.  He noted in Switzerland most information is kept 10 
years, though more important documents are kept longer.  The 
French also supported the facilitator's proposal, but asked 
that "classified" be changed to "protected" where it shows up. 
 
¶41. (U) Iran chose to be obstructionist at every turn, noting 
it was too soon to begin debate on any TS draft regulation, 
emphasizing many open questions remained and delegations 
needed to continue open debates on these issues. Iran further 
stated there is no rush; delegations need not continue the 
debate until after the CSP.  Iran also publicly disagreed 
with Minta's assertion that the OPCW Policy on 
Confidentiality gave the DG authority to draft regulations, 
 
SIPDIS 
but that the DG welcomed State Party input on issues such as 
length of retention. The facilitator agreed no further 
meetings would be held until after the CSP when she hoped to 
discuss a TS draft with proposed destruction regulations. 
This was supported by Switzerland, France, and the TS. 
 
¶42. (U) The Netherlands dropped a non-paper with facts about 
how they handle confidential information.  There was no 
discussion of this document (has been FAXed to ISN-CB). 
 
---------------- 
NIL DECLARATIONS 
---------------- 
 
¶43. (U) During the last consultation on late declarations, 
there was strong support for development of a draft decision 
to implement "nil declarations".  Facilitator Larry Denyer 
(U.S.) has prepared draft decision text and forwarded it to 
the TS for distribution to delegations.  (Sent back on 
October 20.)  This will be the focus of the next consultation 
on November 3. 
 
------------------- 
SECURITY AUDIT TEAM 
------------------- 
 
¶44.  (U) SAT IV agreed to recommend provisional authority to 
load electronic declaration data onto the Verification 
Information System (VIS)-Industry once finally placed into 
production.  They currently are in the process of migrating 
Schedule 1 data to the new database, and should be able to 
announce to the EC that the VIS-Industry is open for 
in-processing of electronic files. 
 
¶45.  (U) The team indicated to the DG that because they were 
not able to evaluate the redaction and exportation 
methodologies to be used by the VIS-Industry, they were not 
comfortable in granting permission for the OPCW to export 
electronic data to be exchanged with State Parties.  They 
were however told that they could continue to export data 
from their Secure Critical Network to the inspector's laptops 
as they have in the past in order to continue to perform 
inspections.  The team also had the opportunity to meet with 
the Deputy DG and out-briefed him in the DG's absence. 
 
¶46.  (U) The OPCW and SAT have tentatively scheduled the 
comprehensive and final system-wide audit of the SCN for 
March 2007, at which time the audit scope will include an 
evaluation of the overall health of the SCN environment - 
including import/export of declarations, declaration 
processing, document tracking system with full integration 
with their Electronic Document Management System, Site 
selection module, and, if ready, the Mission Planning module 
 
(still under development).  As a final note, the team will 
evaluate the status on the ISO/IEC 17799 (now 27000) adoption 
and implementation of the (Security Framework). 
 
¶47.  (U) The team anticipates that the March 2007 audit will 
conclude the program of work for SAT IV and a new audit team 
will be constituted - hopefully to include additional 
members.  The SAT has heard that Pakistan had an expert 
interested in joining the team.  The SAT will also select a 
new chairman, and Mr. Harada has indicated that he would like 
to be released from the coordinator's charges.  Finally, the 
SAT indicated that one of the members would be made available 
to answer questions from the EC regarding the audit process, 
should the DG wish. 
 
¶48.  (U) Ito sends. 
SCHOFER