VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #2289/01 2961024
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231024Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7183
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002289 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR 
47TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, NOVEMBER 7-10 
 
This is CWC-96-06. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (U) If Iran elects to be reasonable and not block 
consensus, it should be possible to get agreement on three 
critical issues at EC-47: the U.S. extension request, the 
2007 OPCW budget and the Director General's proposal for 
tenure reform.  It will also be possible to approve a 
mechanism for payment of arrears and restoration of voting 
rights.  While Iran's behavior up to this point on these (and 
other) issues has been typically unreasonable, their past 
practice has been to wait until the end of the EC to finally 
do a deal.  That is entirely probable for this EC, especially 
on the budget.  On Article VII, there is little indication 
that Iran, India and other NAM delegations will accept more 
than a bare-bones decision that will put off any serious 
discussion of national implementation to the December 
Conference of States Parties.  End Summary. 
 
----------------- 
EXTENSION REQUEST 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) There have been no overtly critical statements 
regarding the U.S. request for an extension of the 100% 
destruction deadline, aside from the occasional Russian 
return to the argument that the U.S. has not submitted an 
"acceptable" destruction plan (read: which completes 
destruction by 2012).  However, even the Russian delegation, 
when pressed on the issue, is not ready to say that this 
issue will cause it to object to the U.S. extension request. 
 
¶3.  (U) There has been general murmuring, however, among a 
large number of delegations that there needs to be a 
"discussion" of some type regarding the U.S. and Russian 
extension requests.  Iran has flatly stated that "a lot of 
delegations" want to have an opportunity to thoroughly go 
over these requests before the EC.  While we doubt that any 
other delegation would request deferral of the U.S. request, 
it is very likely that Iran would cite the excuse of 
insufficient discussion to defer the issue to a special EC to 
be held on the margins of the CSP.  For that reason, the U.S. 
delegation is working with the EC Chair (South Africa) to 
ensure some type of open discussion is held so that Iran in 
particular is deprived of this excuse.  Delegation will be 
prepared to simply reiterate points on the U.S. destruction 
program, and provide clarification on the U.S. position on 
site visits and the draft decision language, but not/not 
enter into a drafting exercise. 
 
¶4.  (U) Del has been bilaterally engaging other delegations 
(primarily EC members) to gauge the level of concern going 
into, and possible outcome at, EC-47.  Among WEOG 
delegations, comments regarding the U.S. request have been of 
the "what are we doing with the extension requests?" nature 
referenced above.  WEOG and Eastern European concern tends to 
focus more on the Russian destruction program and extension 
request.  There is a general, slightly paradoxical 
expectation that the U.S. is "read in" on Russia's position 
-- paradoxical because although WEOG seems to expect the U.S. 
to take the lead in engaging Russia, delegations are also 
extremely sensitive about a U.S./Russia bilateral deal forced 
upon the EC at the eleventh hour.  Del has repeatedly made 
the case for other delegations engaging Russia on this topic, 
particularly regarding site visits. 
 
¶5.  (U) Outside of WEOG, other groups are generally 
supportive, but slightly more adamant that member states 
should devote more time to discussing CW destruction, and 
that there is currently an imbalance in the Organization's 
focus (i.e. too much time spent on more "administrative" 
issues).  Mexico in particular has noted that more discussion 
on CW destruction would be useful, not only prior to EC-47, 
but also in general.  (Del comment:  This could be 
significant, and gain support, if NAM delegations decide to 
press for additional transparency measures beyond site 
 
visits.)  Although delegations are also supportive of U.S. 
transparency, questions still remain (even in WEOG) as to why 
the U.S. made its announcement so early, and whether 
additional funding could not make a difference.  Del 
recommends EC del members be prepared to reiterate answers 
previously provided to these questions.  Non-WEOG delegations 
have also made it fairly clear that if the U.S. expects the 
EC to take a balanced approach on CW destruction, it will 
have to give careful thought to its approach on Article VII. 
 
¶6.  (U) Above all, regardless of stated positions, 
delegations across the regional groups are concerned with the 
implications the U.S. possible inability to meet 2012 might 
have for the credibility of the Convention.  Del has pointed 
to draft decision "caveat" language to assure delegations 
that approving the extension request in no way indicates 
approval of U.S. CW destruction beyond 2012.  However, it 
will be critical at EC-47 for all delegation members to 
emphasize the continuing U.S. commitment not only to CW 
destruction at the earliest possible date, but also to 
upholding the credibility of the CWC and preserving the 
OPCW's reputation as a "multilateral success story." 
 
¶7.  (U) With regard to the Russian extension request, there 
is no evidence that any delegation believes the Russian plan 
that completes destruction by 2012.  However, with the 
exception of the UK and a few WEOG delegations, there is also 
little stomach on the part of any delegation to challenge the 
Russian assertions.  Even in the informal discussion noted 
above (which the U.S. delegation will ensure is only held 
under the condition that both the U.S. and Russian requests 
are discussed), it is questionable whether the Russians will 
come in for a real grilling.  Russia has recently exhibited 
greater flexibility regarding site visits, although Moscow is 
still standing firm in its refusal to refer to visits in its 
draft decision text.  An advance copy of Russia's national 
paper on site visits has been provided to Washington.  Of 
note is Russia's recommendation that site visits be imposed 
on all possessor states requesting an extension beyond April 
2007, and its insistence that visits be prompted by limited 
"triggers," as opposed to a set frequency (a concept unlikely 
to see much support among advocates of site visits as an 
effective transparency measure). 
 
----------- 
2007 BUDGET 
----------- 
 
¶8.  (U) With a proposed zero nominal growth budget, there has 
been little for delegates to discuss.  That, however, has not 
stopped delegates from focusing in on two issues.  The first 
is the DG's proposed increase of OCPF inspections from 90 to 
¶130.  A handful of NAM delegations, led by Iran and India, 
have objected to the proposal, even calling for this "policy 
change" to be considered in a separate facilitation.  With 
WEOG delegations showing exceptional solidarity, the majority 
of delegations have held firm to the 130 proposal.  Iran has 
already informally floated the idea that a restoration of 
some Schedule 1 and 2 inspections with a commensurate 
reduction in OCPF inspections down from 130 would probably be 
the compromise.  In all likelihood, this will become the main 
negotiating issue at a widely-anticipated budget discussion 
on the evening of Nov. 9. 
 
¶9.  (U) The second issue is the NAM push for a greater 
increase in international cooperation and assistance.  They 
have highlighted the fact that the bulk of the currently 
proposed increase comes from two P-2 positions in ICA that 
are focused on Article VII and actually fall under the 
authority of the Legal Advisor.  Delegations have noted that 
the DG's proposed budget is actually less than ZNG, and that 
there are an additional few hundred thousand Euros that could 
be added to ICA and still keep the budget at ZNG.  Again, 
this would be a card that could be played at the Nov. 9 
evening budget discussion, although WEOG delegations have 
stressed that any additional funds must clearly be targeted 
for specific ICA programs (universality, Article VII). 
Finally, there has been the customary word-smithing from 
Iran, India and other delegations, all of which can be 
 
resolved in what is clearly going to be a long evening 
session on Nov. 9. 
 
------------- 
TENURE REFORM 
------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) There has been overwhelming support for the DG's 
proposal for modifying implementation of the tenure policy. 
Only Iran has explicitly stated that it has doubts about the 
initiative and may not be able to join consensus at the EC. 
(Note: The DG's response has been to inform Iran that if it 
vetoes the proposal, continuation of current policy will 
result in the departure of some 20 Iranian staff members of 
the Technical Secretariat.  We do not interpret this to mean 
that the DG has promised not/not to separate any Iranians if 
Iran concurs on the proposal.  It was simply intended by the 
DG to "clarify" what existing policy would mean for Iranian 
TS members.) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶11.  (U) With regard to U.S. questions on the tenure 
proposal, the DG has made every effort to address those 
concerns.  Chief of cabinet Rafael Grossi told us the DG has 
no problem agreeing to an annual report to the EC on the 
status of tenure implementation.  Grossi also confirmed that 
the DG would also include OPCW laboratory experts along with 
the inspectorate and verification divisions as specific areas 
in which greater flexibility is needed to retain technical 
expertise.  The DG has also sought to provide extensive data 
on the status of TS staff subject to tenure.  Should 
Washington have additional questions regarding details of the 
DG's proposal, delegation urges that they be submitted 
expeditiously so that they can be answered.  The goal is to 
have Iran isolated as soon as possible so that maximum 
pressure is exerted for them not to block consensus. 
 
--------------------- 
ARREARS/VOTING RIGHTS 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) The co-facilitators will likely put forward an ad 
ref decision document on payment of arrears to the OPCW which 
addresses U.S. objectives.  Iran again is the remaining 
hold-out.  If Iran intends to block every issue at the EC, 
then this will also fall victim to that policy.  However, the 
arrears issue does not have the significance of the other 
items noted above, so if the Iranians want to pick an item on 
which to be "reasonable," this may be the most likely 
candidate. 
 
----------- 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶13.  (U) At the opposite end of the scale, national 
implementation has long been the issue on which NAM 
delegations have been least likely to be reasonable. 
Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) has put forward 
decision language that the U.S., UK and other WEOG 
delegations have tried to fatten up so that there is some 
negotiating leverage for end-game discussions with Iran, 
India and others in the NAM.  To be frank, it is questionable 
whether there is a chance for consensus on anything but a 
lowest common denominator text noting the submission of the 
DG's report. 
 
¶14.  (U) At the Oct. 19 consultation, Iran highlighted the 
fact that the decision text addresses the issue of extending 
to 2007 the CSP-10 decision on Article VII.  The Iranian 
delegate made clear that there is no decision in Tehran on 
this matter, and said that his personal view is that there 
should be no/no extension.  All of which indicates that Iran 
and other NAM delegations want to keep Article VII on hold 
for a final decision at the December CSP, and the end result 
at EC-47 will be a bare-bones statement that punts the issue 
to the Conference. 
 
------------------- 
OCPF SITE SELECTION 
 
------------------- 
 
¶15.  (U) There is no/no prospect of a decision on a new 
mechanism for OCPF site selection to be considered at the EC. 
 The facilitator has distributed a proposal that still falls 
short of meeting U.S. requirements.  However, it is important 
to highlight for Washington the movement that is taking place 
on this issue.  Specifically, it appears at this point that 
only the U.S. and UK are wedded to the need for political 
nomination points.  The EC may well be the venue at which 
delegations will press the U.S. and UK to reconsider the need 
for such points. 
 
------------------ 
OTHER AGENDA ITEMS 
------------------ 
 
¶16.  (U) The following are the items on the annotated agenda 
(EC-47/INF.1, Oct. 18, 2006) using the internal numbering 
system in that document. 
 
Item 3: DG's Opening Statement.  Del will provide the text to 
Washington when it becomes available. 
 
Item 4: General debate.  Del has E-mailed to Washington a 
proposed statement by Amb. Javits. 
 
Item 5: Status of implementation. 
 
5.1: Verification Plan for Indian CWDF.  As noted at 5.8 
below, the facility agreement for the Indian CWDF has finally 
been completed and submitted for EC approval. 
 
5.2: Amendments to the Verification Plan for Pine Bluff 
disposal facility. 
 
5.3: Combined plan for the HD facility at Aberdeen.  Combined 
plan for verification and destruction of the former CWPF at 
Aberdeen is submitted to the EC more as a matter of 
procedure, as destruction of the one remaining building is 
complete and will be notified to the TS shortly. 
 
5.4: U.S. Extension Request (discussed above). 
 
5.5: Russian Extension Request (discussed above). 
 
5.6: Albanian intermediate deadline extension request.  After 
working to overcome significant confusion (caused in part by 
subsequent revisions of dates submitted in September) on both 
the extension request and draft decision, del has given the 
TS approval to distribute both documents as soon as possible. 
 
SIPDIS 
 It has not escaped the notice of some delegations (Russia, 
Germany) that this request is being distributed after the 
expiration of Albania's original Phase 1 deadline of October 
15, 2006.  Del will work with the Albanian delegation to 
ensure GOA representatives are adequately prepared to answer 
questions at EC-47, and recommends preparing talking points 
for GOA delivery at the destruction informals.  Despite some 
questions locally, del doubts the GOA will encounter 
significant obstacles to approval of its extension request, 
as any delays in its own program will likely be overshadowed 
by those in the U.S. and Russia. 
 
5.7: Facility Agreement on the HD facility at Aberdeen.  See 
5.3 above. 
 
5.8: Facility Agreement for Indian CWDF.  Del has forwarded 
the Indian FA to Washington for review and comment. 
Expectation from discussions with the TS is that the FA 
tracks closely with the Model FA, with the exception of 
Attachment 2:  Health and Safety Requirements and Procedures 
(details provided separately). 
 
5.9-5.10: TS Note on amendments to the FA on Pine Bluff, 
submitted to the EC for approval. 
 
5.11: Article VII (discussed above). 
 
5.12: Universality.  The EC is asked to note the TS report on 
 
the implementation of the Universality action plan.  The 
facilitator may report orally on recent consultations. 
 
5.13: Optimization of Verification.  The EC is asked to note 
the TS note, which has not yet been distributed.  Del has 
forwarded an advance copy of the sections pertaining to 
optimization at U.S. sites to Washington for review, but in 
general anticipates this will be a useful overview for 
delegations, many of whom lack the technical background to 
understand the implications of optimization simply through 
changes to facility agreements and verification plans. 
Unlike the VIR, this document will apparently go into greater 
detail on optimization efforts in all possessor states (with 
the exception of Libya). 
 
5.14: DG's Note on Readiness of the TS to conduct a Challenge 
Inspection.  The document was distributed shortly before the 
July EC and delegations had deferred the item in order to 
have more time to consider it. 
 
5.15: Schedule 3 Transfers.  At EC-46, the EC was asked to 
approve a draft decision.  This was done based on the 
negotiations of a small group of delegations and as an 
attempt to conclude this issue before the anticipated 
departure of the facilitator.  This move by the facilitator 
was resented by some delegations and not likely to be 
repeated unless consensus is achieved in advance.  The U.S. 
remains isolated in insisting that additional changes need to 
be made in the draft text.  Iran opposed U.S.-proposed 
changes during the September Industry Cluster meetings, and 
this is expected to happen again in the next round of 
meetings.  Given that U.S. guidance has not changed on this 
issue, no progress is expected at this EC. 
 
5.16: Steve Wade (UK) will brief the EC on progress made on 
Schedule 2A/2A*. 
 
5.17: DG's Note on Two Items of Approved Inspection 
Equipment.  The DG issued the note (EC-47/DG.3, 6 September 
2006) and if there are no comments, received within 60 days, 
the EC will be asked to approve the proposed revisions. 
 
5.18: 2005 Verification Implementation Report.  The EC is 
asked to consider the 2005 VIR and supplement, and note the 
comments received on the document as well as the Chair's 
summary of the consultations (the document has yet to be 
issued).  Del has already noted U.S. appreciation for the 
accuracy and consistency of the 2005 VIR in informal 
consultations.  An initial review of the Corrigendum and TS 
Response to U.S. Written Comments indicates almost all issues 
have been addressed, with the exception of several numerical 
discrepancies on which the U.S. and TS may in the end agree 
to disagree. 
 
Item 6: Lists of New Validated Data.  This document has been 
out since August 2005 and continuously deferred by Iran and 
India.  Delegation will continue pressing both to finally 
join consensus. 
 
Item 7: OPCW Office in Africa.  Facilitator Andres Rugeles 
(Colombia) held discussions on his new proposal for a 
non-permanent presence that piggy-backs onto a UN or African 
Union office in Africa.  African delegations have held firm 
on the request for a permanent office.  Rugeles has said he 
will continue assessing his options and looking at other UN 
or AU offices.  He will provide an oral report to the EC. 
 
Item 8 - Administrative and Financial Matters. 
 
8.1: 2007 Budget (discussed above). 
 
8.2: Medium-Term Plan.  Should be noted by the EC, but Iran 
has indicated that they will ask that it be received as they 
were not able to push through any of the many editorial 
changes they would like. 
 
8.3-8.5: Arrears (discussed above). 
 
8.6: DG's Note on Implementation of the Office of Internal 
 
Oversight Recommendations.  Because Iran has not been willing 
to name a facilitator on this issue, no consultations were 
held on the report.  Some delegations may, therefore, push 
for deferral of the item. 
 
8.7: DG's note on Implementation of External Auditor's 
Recommendations.  As it has not been distributed yet or 
discussed in consultations, this may be deferred. 
 
8.8: Tenure Policy Modification (discussed above). 
 
8.9: Report of Security Audit Team IV.  The DG's note on the 
report of SAT IV has yet to be distributed, so there once 
again may be deferral of this item. 
 
8.10: The DG's Report on Income and Expenditure for the 
period up to June 30.  Will likely be noted by the EC. 
 
8.11: The DG's report on Income and Expenditure for the 
period up to September 30 and use of the Working Capital 
Fund.  The document has yet to be distributed, but could be 
noted if distribution is not too close to the EC. 
 
Item 9: Host Country Committee.  The DG's draft decision with 
a recommendation (required under the decision at CSP-10) to 
the CSP on whether to establish a Host Country Committee has 
yet to be distributed.  The DG has given Deputy DG Freeman 
responsibility for this issue, and del will stay in touch 
with the DDG's office on what he intends to recommend.  The 
anger of delegations with the Dutch as host country has 
diminished substantially, and meetings of the working group 
with the Dutch MFA have become more infrequent.  However, a 
number of points of friction remain (particularly treatment 
by Dutch police and security officials at Schiphol).  As a 
result, while the DDG probably does not want to establish a 
committee, he certainly will need some mechanism to channel 
the discontent of a small, but influential group of 
Ambassadors. 
 
Item 10: Privileges and Immunities. 
 
10.1: Agreement with Burkina Faso. 
 
10.2: Agreement with Uruguay. 
 
Item 11: Report by the EC on performance of its activities 
from July 2005 to July 2006.  Should be approved by the EC. 
 
Item 12: EC Sessions in 2007.  The DG submitted his work plan 
for 2007 (EC-47/DG.6, October 4, 2006) and the EC is asked 
simply to review the number and length of EC sessions in 
light of this plan.  This agenda item will also be the 
opportunity to raise from the floor the proposal to hold the 
2008 CSP in December.  (The World Forum/Congress Center is 
unavailable in December 2007.)  Ambassador Khodakov, the head 
of the Policy-Making Organs, has stressed that only the CSP 
can make a decision about CSP dates, so it would be necessary 
to raise this issue at EC-47 so that it could be considered 
at CSP-11.  At present, the TS has a reservation for the week 
of November 3-7, 2008 for the CSP.  It has an alternate 
booking, constituting a second option, for December 2-5.  As 
with CSP-11, it would entail a four-day Conference due to an 
ICC event held the preceding week.  If Washington wishes to 
have a sequence in 2008 of four EC sessions followed by a 
December CSP (not forgetting a Second RevCon in April), it 
will be necessary for the U.S. to raise this issue from the 
floor under this agenda item. 
 
Item 13: Any other business.  Del knows of no items at this 
time that will be raised under this agenda item. 
 
¶17.  (U) Javits sends. 
SCHOFER