VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #2220/01 2851112
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121112Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7091
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002220 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING OCTOBER 6 
 
This is CWC-91-06. 
 
----- 
CHINA 
----- 
 
¶1.  (U) PRC Amb. Xue Hanqin asked to meet with Amb. Javits on 
Oct. 6, and began by raising the issue of the Taiwan Chemical 
Industry Association requesting observer status at the 
December Conference of States Parties.  She noted that 
Beijing still objects to the TCIA receiving observer status. 
She asked for support from the U.S. on the PRC position and 
said she would raise it with other delegations.  Amb. Xue 
added that she wanted to make sure there was a consensus on 
how to proceed to ensure this did not become "an issue." 
 
¶2.  (U) In the past, it had come up just before the CSP, 
which had generated a last-minute flurry of activity.  The 
PRC wanted to avoid that this year.  She then expressed a 
concern about statements that indicated a forward-leaning 
approach by some delegations toward observers from chemical 
industry associations over applications from NGOs.  (Note: 
Those sentiments had been expressed at the recent meeting of 
the Second RevCon Working Group.)  Amb. Javits simply noted 
that there has as yet been no formal application by the TCIA, 
but that we would convey PRC views to Washington. 
 
¶3.  (U) Amb. Xue then said she wanted to discuss industry 
inspections, and had a particular concern about why the PRC 
has so many declarations on file in comparison to other 
member states.  (Note: The PRC delegation had recently raised 
this issue separately with del rep.)  The Ambassador noted 
that her staff had informed her this was due to the fact that 
the PRC has so many small facilities, such as fertilizer 
plants.  However, she was wondering whether there was 
something "wrong" with the methodology.  The underlying 
message was clearly that China is being treated unfairly. 
She commented that this was not an issue of the PRC in 
comparison to the West; the PRC has many more declarations 
than India, which is in a similar state of development.  Amb. 
Xue wondered if this is due to criteria in the CWC or the 
Technical Secretariat methodology.  She added that China is 
looking to "right-size" its chemical industry. 
 
¶4.  (U) Amb. Javits noted that it would be best if she asked 
the TS directly, putting her questions to Bill Kane, the head 
of the Industry Verification Branch.  Amb. Xue said that she 
would do so, commenting that this has an impact on the issue 
of productive use of OPCW resources, since targeting small 
fertilizer plants for inspections is a questionable use of 
money and inspector time.  She went on to note that it is 
important that SPs not be passive about questionable 
facilities.  Indeed, they should look at their own chemical 
industry activities. 
 
¶5.  (U) Amb. Javits used the opportunity of the meeting to 
deliver the U.S. response to China's proposal of new dates 
for consultations (State 166807), noting that the points 
would also be delivered in Beijing.  Amb. Xue expressed 
appreciation for the response and said that she would check 
with Beijing.  She took the point made by Amb. Javits that it 
would be good to continue to have the technical consultations 
Nov. 13-15 to take advantage of the presence of U.S. 
technical experts in The Hague, but declined to provide any 
further comments. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶6.  (U) Del reps, with UK rep Mark Matthews, met with Ahmed 
Jewad, Counselor at the Iraqi Embassy, on Oct. 6 to reiterate 
proposed dates for the December follow-up to the February 
2006 Amman workshop.  Jewad displayed some confusion 
regarding both the dates and the purpose of the workshop; 
U.S. and UK reps explained the importance of a declaration 
workshop and the effort that had gone into coming up with 
dates that would be acceptable to the TS, U.S., UK and 
Jordan.  Del reps also inquired as to whether any progress 
 
had been made toward Iraqi accession to the CWC; Jewad seemed 
unsure, but also expressed a desire to see the formation of a 
special council within the government that would specifically 
track accession. 
 
¶7.  (U) Del reps assured Jewad that a December meeting would 
be beneficial regardless of the eventual timing of accession, 
and requested that he encourage colleagues in Baghdad to 
communicate the status of the Iraqi declaration to the TS, 
and to continue their own work prior to any follow-up 
meeting.  Delegation recommends Washington also convey 
proposed dates (11-15 December 2006) to Embassy Baghdad to 
facilitate GOI receipt of accurate information and provision 
of feedback as to the feasibility of the dates as soon as 
possible. 
 
------------------------------------ 
DIRECTOR GENERAL'S MEETING ON TENURE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (U) The Director General held a meeting on October 5 to 
discuss the future of tenure implementation.  The basis of 
the discussion was the DG's proposal to be granted additional 
flexibility in implementing tenure until 2012 as outlined in 
EC-47/DG.2, dated August 30, 2006.  The DG noted that one of 
the reasons he decided to hold the meeting now was that 
delegations had received adequate time to study his proposal 
and refer it to capitals.  The DG said his proposal was an 
attempt to strike a balance between the original tenure 
decision, which he wholeheartedly supports, and the 
operational needs of the organization.  The DG emphasized 
that he supported tenure, as it had brought new blood into 
the organization and increased geographical representation, 
and that all he was asking for was a two year and four month 
extension in his flexibility. 
 
¶9.  (U) The DG noted that when the original decision on 
tenure implementation had been made it had not been foreseen 
that the level of destruction activity would be at its peak 
between 2009 and 2012.  He also asserted that the original 
decision to give him flexibility had been made in 1999, and 
the 2009 date had been arbitrary and only based on the fact 
that it was ten years after the decision was made.  The 
decision was not made based on operational considerations. 
 
¶10.  (U) The DG said he did not want to open a debate on 
tenure itself and that if delegates could not easily agree on 
his proposal he would withdraw it and continue to implement 
the 1999 decision, though he asserted that this could be 
catastrophic for TS operations.  He added that he hoped to 
see a decision on his proposal by the next EC, as many of the 
personnel decisions he would have to make in the near-future 
would be impacted by the proposal on tenure. 
 
¶11.  (U) Del rep raised the points sent by Washington with 
the DG's chief of cabinet, Rafael Grossi, privately the day 
before the consultation.  Grossi said the DG continues to 
strongly support the tenure policy, and was only seeking a 
short extension in the period of time he was granted 
flexibility in administering tenure in order to more 
effectively manage the organization and ensure operational 
effectiveness.  Grossi pushed back on our suggestion that the 
DG retain some percentage targets in his proposal saying that 
adhering to percentage targets could be problematic if, for 
example, a larger than expected number of individuals in a 
certain division left because of natural attrition before 
they faced tenure.  This could require the DG to retain a 
greater number of people who should have left because of 
tenure and make adhering to a specific percentage target 
problematic. 
 
¶12.  (U) Grossi took the U.S. point that the extended 
flexibility for the DG on tenure would be particularly 
important in the Inspectorate and Verification, but he said 
that the lawyers in the TS had cautioned that stating this 
explicitly in the decision text could be problematic as it 
could result in litigation by employees who are separated 
from other divisions.  Grossi was willing to assure us that 
the DG would be focusing his use of tenure extensions in the 
 
Inspectorate and Verification and would also very strongly 
consider including the laboratory.  Grossi said that the DG 
would continue to report to the EC on at least an annual 
basis on the implementation of tenure and would include 
language to that effect in the draft decision text to be 
prepared. 
 
¶13.  (U) In the consultation itself, Colombia, Austria, Peru, 
Kenya, Canada, Belgium, Pakistan, South Korea, Argentina, The 
Netherlands, Sudan, Malaysia, and Vietnam all strongly 
supported the DG's initiative.  Mexico strongly supported the 
proposal, but noted they had initially considered asking the 
DG to retain percentage targets as had existed in the 
original proposal from 1999.  In the end though, Mexico had 
decided it would be better to keep the decision as simple as 
possible.  Japan, China, the UK, Australia, and Germany said 
they were waiting for guidance from their capitals, but would 
recommend that their capitals support the proposal.  Russia 
and India said they were still awaiting guidance but spoke in 
a generally positive way about the initiative. 
 
¶14.  (U) Only Iran said that they had problems with the DG's 
proposal.  Iran said that the issue was a complex one and 
implied that many consultations would be needed before 
consensus could be reached thereby making resolution of the 
issue before EC-47 problematic.  Iran also challenged the 
reference to the OPCW being a "watchdog" in paragraph 54 of 
the DG's proposal.  The DG responded strongly that if the 
issue was going to be problematic and consensus could not 
easily be found, he would withdraw his proposal. He agreed to 
have at least one more consultation on the matter, but not an 
extended series of consultations. 
 
¶15.  (U) Kenya cautioned that delegations should not seek to 
micromanage the TS.  Iran again said they would need more 
consultations before being able to join consensus. 
 
¶16.  (U) The DG agreed at the end of the session to work on 
creating a draft decision text for delegates to examine at 
the next consultation.  Iran, clearly isolated, reiterated 
that this was a political issue that would bear further 
examination.  Grossi told del rep privately at the end of the 
consultation that he believed Iran would yield on this issue 
once the Iranians realized that all seven of their nationals 
who work at the TS are facing tenure in the next year or two 
and would have a lesser chance of being extended if the DG's 
proposal were blocked. 
 
-------------------- 
BUDGET CONSULTATIONS 
-------------------- 
 
¶17.  (U) Budget consultations were held on October 6. 
Co-facilitator Walter Lion (Belgium) said that the main point 
of the meeting was to help him compile a list of problem 
areas so that he could prepare a roadmap for future 
consultations.  He suggested proceeding through each budget 
program so that delegations could indicate if there were 
problem areas that would require additional attention.  He 
began with the Inspectorate and Verification. 
 
¶18.  (U) South Africa said they would like additional 
information on the 5,000 inspector days allotted for 
preparing for challenge inspections.  India said they were 
opposed to the reduction in Schedule 1 and 2 inspections and 
asserted, once again, that the budget forum was not the 
appropriate forum to discuss the change in the allocation of 
Article VI inspections.  Iran asked what the status was of 
the numerous changes in the text that they had requested. 
Pakistan said that the OCPF site selection methodology would 
have to be resolved before they could support an increase in 
OCPF inspections.  China suggested that it was up to the TS 
to propose a compromise on Article VI inspections that would 
be acceptable to all delegations. 
 
¶19.  (U) Switzerland was very supportive of the budget 
proposal and was especially pleased with the increase in OCPF 
inspections.  Del rep asserted that the budget consultation 
was the appropriate forum to discuss the levels of Article VI 
 
inspections, as it was required in the CWC.  Del rep also 
said that the U.S. was very supportive of the inspections 
levels proposed by the TS in the budget and in fact would 
have liked to have seen the OCPF numbers even higher.  Del 
rep countered the Chinese suggestion that the TS should 
propose a compromise solution as it was up to delegates to 
engage in a thorough discussion of the issue and arrive at 
consensus.  Australia supported the U.S. and suggested that 
the Verification division provide another presentation to 
address the concerns of those opposed to the increase in OCPF 
inspections. 
 
¶20.  (U) Ian Mundell (Canada) said that this was the eighth 
budget that he had negotiated and the level of and allocation 
on industry inspections had always been discussed and agreed 
upon in the budget consultations, so Canada saw no reason to 
do things differently this year.  Canada also rejected the 
assertion by some delegations in previous consultations that 
the schedule of chemicals constituted a hierarchy of risk. 
France supported the increase in OCPF inspections. 
 
¶21.  (U) Iran opposed the increase in OCPF inspections and 
added that they did not feel it would be useful for another 
factual presentation from the TS on the issue as the decision 
to be made was essentially a political decision.  South 
Africa, on the other hand, said they would like more 
information in order to make am informed decision on the 
issue.  Pakistan said that they were not opposed in principle 
to increasing the number of OCPF inspections but they were 
concerned about the size of the increase.  China in a more 
assertive intervention said that the TS had put forward the 
increased number of OCPF inspections without consulting SPs 
like China who were most affected, so it made sense to them 
that the TS propose a solution. 
 
¶22.  (U) On the Office of Special Projects (OSP), South 
Africa asked if any progress had been made on the "office in 
Africa" issue.  France said they supported the work of the 
OSP and would again seek to lead the discussions in the 
Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism.  The Head of the OSP 
told delegates that he was waiting for consultations on the 
"office in Africa" to move forward before taking any actions 
on the issue.  Iran said they would like a reference to the 
EC included in paragraph 4.63 of the budget and the reference 
to non-proliferation removed from paragraph 4.64.  Germany 
opposed the removal of the reference to non-proliferation as 
suggested by Iran. 
 
¶23.  (U) Co-facilitator Hela Lahmar (Tunisia) said the 
facilitators would continue to seek the views of delegations 
on problem areas in the budget at the next consultation 
scheduled for October 10. 
 
--------------------- 
SEQUENTIAL INSPECTION 
--------------------- 
 
¶24.  (U) At the September 5 WEOG meeting, Australia had 
raised some concerns expressed by their NA regarding 
sequential industry inspections.  In the same meeting, New 
Zealand also had expressed some concerns, stated that they 
had four sequential inspections to date, and stated that they 
were considering withdrawing their consent to these types of 
inspections. 
 
¶25.  (U) Del Rep met with Sonya Koppe (Australia) to get more 
details.  She said that the concerns coming from her NA had 
to do with how notifications were done for sequential 
inspections and whether this gave additional preparation time 
for the second facility, particularly for potential sites in 
countries of concern.  They have since met with Horst Reeps, 
Director of Verification, and been able to resolve most of 
their concerns.  She also explained that New Zealand's 
concern centers around sequential inspections that start in 
Australia and end in New Zealand.  They think that being 
next-door to a country with a bigger industry is resulting in 
more inspections in New Zealand, to which they take 
exception.  (This has since been verified with the New 
Zealand delegation.) 
 
 
¶26.  (U) By way of background, the U.S. consented to 
sequential inspections early on.  However, during the TS's 
first attempt to do this in the U.S. (during two initial 
Schedule 1 inspections), the TS made some mistakes that 
brought into question their ability to adequately protect 
confidential business information.  Recently, the TS has been 
 
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in consultations with the U.S. delegation to demonstrate that 
they have resolved the earlier problems, asking the U.S. to 
reconsider a consent to sequential inspections.  Delegation 
understands Washington is considering this request and 
whether earlier concerns have been adequately addressed. 
 
------------------------------------- 
TS MEETING ON PREPAREDNESS TO CONDUCT 
 
SIPDIS 
AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED USE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶27.  (U) The Joint Assistance 2005 exercise in the Ukraine in 
October 2005 revealed that the TS needed more work to be 
prepared to receive a request for an investigation of alleged 
use (IAU). This was of concern as IAUs, along with challenge 
inspections, are important tools to provide data upon which 
States Parties can base compliance judgments.  Consultations 
with the TS during the week of September 25 showed a 
much-improved TS posture in relation to IAU since 2005.  The 
TS, having prepared encompassing SOPs and work instructions, 
 
SIPDIS 
and having launched a continuing training program, sees 
itself as ready to receive a real request for IAU with the 
caveat that an IAU done under Article X, in which the 
investigation is requested by a State Party on its territory, 
will likely have less political issues that one conducted 
under Article IX on the territory of one State Party at the 
request of another. 
 
¶28.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL