VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #2186/01 2790902
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 060902Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7028
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING SEPTEMBER 29, 2006. 
 
This is CWC-90-06. 
 
-------------- 
CW DESTRUCTION 
-------------- 
 
¶1.  (U) Although there have been relatively few indications 
of renewed interest in the U.S. draft decision, several 
recent conversations are worth noting.  First, Ambassador 
Petri of Germany has, in his role as WEOG Vice Chair of the 
CW Cluster, told Ambassador Javits that he has recently been 
approached by several delegations expressing concern over the 
status of CW destruction in general, and the U.S. and Russian 
extension requests in particular.  Petri continues to 
pressure U.S. del for open discussions (but not formal 
consultations) on the subject.  Although this degree of 
concern has not been readily apparent to U.S. del reps, 
Javits explained that the U.S. stands ready to provide 
clarification on its program at any time, and could in 
principe consider such discussions, but would appreciate a 
more detailed explanation as to how Petri envisined the 
discussions being conducted.  Javits als noted possible 
concerns having a WEOG Qair of hese discussions might 
raise, and recommended Amassador Mkhize be 
consulted in her role as EC Chair.  Del will report on any 
requests for such disussions, and continue to press for 
clarificationof concerns, and of the modalities of 
discussion, prior to final commitment.  Del will also workwith WEOG and others 
to ensure realistic expectations of any 
such session (i.e. no re-drafting of U.. decision text). 
 
¶2. (U) Petri also noted he ha spoken with Russian Ambassador 
Gevorgian, who sated Russia's preference not to participate 
in oen discussions on CW destruction, and particularly not 
in a joint session with the United States.  Hwever, 
Gevorgian said Russia was not rejecting te idea, although he 
didn't see the benefit in suh a meeting, as his delegation 
would merely reitrate the Russian position articulated 
during previous EC sessions.  He also made the now familiar 
oint that Russia does not believe it should be see in the 
same light as the United States, as it frmly believes it 
will complete destruction by th Convention deadline of April 
29, 2012.  On the topic of visits, Gevorgian also reiterated 
the Rusian skepticism in the utility of such visits, but 
said they could be considered on the basis of an vent or 
particular concern, such as missing an itermediate deadline, 
and that Russia might consider including a clause in their 
draft decision to ndicate this.  He noted Russia would be 
willing o discuss specific modalities only in the event tht 
a visit is actually deemed necessary (e.g. if ussia were to 
miss its next intermediate deadline. 
 
¶3. (U) In private discussions with Malaysian mbassador 
Farida Arrafin, Javits was told that agreat deal of concern 
surrounding the status of .S. CW destruction and its 
extension request stil exists in the Non Aligned Movement. 
(Concern alo extends to other possessor states, and 
generaly slow progress toward complete elimination of CW 
stockpiles, but is focused on U.S. and Russia as he two 
major possessors.)  Arrafin implied that oncern will become 
increasingly apparent in the priod leading up to EC-47 and 
the CSP-11.  Mexica Ambassador Sandra Fuentes later 
explained that the NAM is drafting a strongly-worded 
resolution concerning CW destruction, and has requested that 
Mexico, Brazil and China associate themselves with it.  (Del 
comment:  It is unclear whether Fuentes was referring to a 
future UN First Committee resolution, or the recent NAM 
statement in Havana, which was surprisingly mild in its 
exhortations for possessor states to complete destruction "as 
soon as possible."  End comment.)  Del wil 
l work in the coming weeks to ascertain the true level of 
concern among delegations, and in which cases this concern 
(which has remained somewhat constant but low-level since the 
U.S. submitted its extension request in April 2006) may 
translate into blocking consensus on the U.S. draft decision. 
 
 
 
-------- 
 
2005 VIR 
-------- 
 
¶4. (U) Del rep met with Cynthia Echavarria, Policy Review 
Branch, to deliver the U.S. written comments to the 2005 VIR 
for distribution to States Parties.  Del rep expressed 
appreciation for TS efforts on the VIR, and Washington's 
general support for the content and format of the report, but 
also highlighted concerns regarding timely submission 
of the document for States Parties' review.  Del rep also 
reviewed the U.S. requests for further information not 
covered in the written comments).  Results of these 
discussions will be reported separately, and del will query 
delegations bilaterally as appropriate. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS DURING ARTICLE VI INSPECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5. (U) During the WEOG meeting, Switzerland shared that they 
had been the recipient of the first Article VI inspection 
that incorporated sampling and analysis activities, during 
the first week of September.  The plant site inspected was a 
Schedule 2 site, and the facility had been inspected four 
times before under Schedule 2, Schedule 3, and UDOC regimes. 
The inspection team consisted of five members, broken into 
two sub teams, the second team devoted to analytical 
activities.  Although the 96-hour inspection window was not 
exceeded, the inspection team was in-country for seven days. 
 
¶6.  (U) Although the inspection site was not known in 
advance, the NA correctly guessed where it would be, as there 
were only two Schedule 2 production plant sites in 
Switzerland, and the other site was inspected fairly 
recently.  However, the modalities of how sampling and 
analysis would be carried out were agreed to in advance. 
These modalities included transporting samples approximately 
90-minutes (an acceptable time delay to the inspection team) 
to a predetermined location on the Spiez Laboratory (the 
Swiss designated lab).  For purposes of this inspection, this 
remote space was considered part of the inspection site. 
This arrangement was made at the convenience of the NA and 
the inspected site. 
 
¶7.  (U) The plant site produces a Schedule 1 chemical in 
trace amounts as an unwanted byproduct.  Two samples were 
taken within the declared plant, including the "mother 
liquor", where the unwanted byproduct was expected.  (It 
should be noted that the sampling point designated in the 
site's facility agreement - at the waste treatment facility - 
was not used because it was not felt to be appropriate and it 
is located within the site infrastructure, not the declared 
plant.)  The NA reported that the Schedule 1 chemical was 
detected in the analysis in the "expected concentration" of 
about one ppm, although it was not clear whether the 
concentration was demonstrated by the inspection team's 
analysis or the parallel analyses performed by the NA.  The 
inspection team's analyses were run in the "open" mode, which 
the NA felt helped in appropriately identifying the Schedule 
1 chemical. 
 
¶8. (U) Logistically, it is important to note that the 
inspection team arrived via road and that they brought all of 
their own chemicals and gases.  Other Del discussions with 
Germany, Japan, and France indicated that the TS intends to 
do this in their cases, as well.  Switzerland intends to 
prepare a report about their experiences before the November 
meeting of National Authorities. 
 
¶9.  (U) In later meetings, DelRep learned that Japan intends 
to allow analyses in "open" mode (after consideration with 
their industry), while France intends to run in "blinded" 
mode first and then "open" if needed.  Japan is also concerns 
with certain TS chemicals (e.g., hexachlorobenzene, because 
of PIC and POC conventions) and gas cylinders (because of 
safety considerations at airports).  Japan also feels it is 
important to identify chemicals in the PIB that could 
potentially be discovered during an analysis.  Japan, 
 
Germany, and France all intend to modify their POE 
requirements and allow the TS sampling and analysis equipment 
to be shipped directly to the inspection site. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: GENERAL REVIEW 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) The EC Vice-Chair for the Industry Cluster, Amb 
Fernandez de Soto (Colombia), chaired a general session to 
address the current status of the ongoing consultations and 
to try to revitalize the cluster in general.  Each 
facilitator briefly summarized where their consultations 
stand and plans for the future.  There was very little 
intervention from delegations, except for a call from New 
Zealand to see an OCPF site selection decision reached 
quickly, offering a "trial period" of the facilitator's 
latest proposal as an option, if delegations were concerned 
about making a permanent selection of a methodology. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: SCHEDULE 3 TRANSFERS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) The general discussion was fairly limited, with 
delegations either giving support to the current facilitator 
proposal as written or offering very minor editorial 
suggestions.  DelRep deployed the text changes from guidance. 
 Iran went on to argue that the current text had achieved a 
"delicate balance" of opinions and that many delegations had 
demonstrated flexibility and conceded much to achieve this 
and rejected any "last minute" changes like those from the 
U.S.  Silence from all other delegations resulted in our 
isolation.  However, afterward, the facilitator acknowledged 
to DelRep that he had not incorporated all of our July 
comments into this recent draft, hoping to strike a balance, 
but contributing to the isolation created. 
 
¶12.  (U) Subsequent Del discussions with the German 
delegation pointed out some of our concerns, particularly 
with the language of PP 5, which they had not considered 
before; they committed to looking into this further.  The Del 
will work on drafting new suggested edits which we hope will 
gain the support of the Germans before being presented to the 
facilitator for consideration in a future draft. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: TRANSFER DISCREPANCIES 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) This was the second meeting on this topic within the 
industry cluster under its current facilitation.  However, 
the facilitators and TS came in with some specific 
recommendations.  They proposed that we consider changing the 
TS's current procedure for determining whether an 
 
SIPDIS 
import/export difference should be considered a "discrepancy" 
from a percentage (20%) to a quantity.  The proposed new 
definition is - "A discrepancy arises when, for a transferred 
Schedule 2 or 3 chemical, the difference between the 
quantities declared by the importing and exporting SPs is 
more than the relevant threshold specified for the chemical 
in( the Verification Annex."  Although many delegations did 
not as yet have formal guidance, many spoke in support of 
this proposal. 
 
¶14.  (U)  The other topic on the agenda - definitions of 
imports and exports - was considered more carefully.  There 
was a general request that this be given careful 
consideration by the Legal Advisor, which the facilitators 
committed to doing.  One concern was that these definitions 
obviously reach far beyond the Convention.  Caution was also 
expressed about using other multilateral agreements (e.g., 
those on narcotics trafficking) as models. 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: OCPF SITE SELECTION 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (U) Although most delegations indicated that their 
capitals were still studying the latest facilitator proposal, 
many spoke favorably of it, including many delegations that 
were completely opposed to any previous proposal with 
elements of "political nominations".  Belgium was concerned 
about deviating so far from what they felt was the intention 
coming out of early discussions in Geneva, but they were 
willing to compromise, offering the idea of a "trial period" 
for this new methodology.  Canada expressed concerns about 
the A14 algorithm, and many others agreed, particularly as 
this has the potential to impact two of the three components 
of this methodology.  Japan also wondered if the fact that a 
facility has been inspected before could be incorporated into 
this methodology.  Several delegations asked for further 
analyses of the methodology using current year data. 
 
¶16.  (U) Canada, New Zealand, and others were concerned with 
the timing of this Qcision, expressing a strong desire to 
have it considered at the next CSP.  They recommended that 
there be two meetings on this topic during the next industry 
week to ensure progress toward that end. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: SCHEDULE 2A/2A* LOW CONCENTRATION 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶17.  (SBU) In a sidebar prior to the meeting, Martin Rudduck 
(UK) mentioned to DelRep that they had researched an idea 
that other delegations had proposed some time ago, that of 
moving the Schedule 2A chemical Amiton to Schedule 1.  The UK 
now opposes pursuing this idea, as they fear that this would 
mean having to declare new Schedule 1 production and that the 
company that produced this chemical in the UK, ICI (now 
Zeneca), would be subject to increased scrutiny and the 
possible destruction of their previous Amiton facility. 
Rudduck felt certain that other SPs, including India, would 
have similar concerns. 
 
¶18.  (U) Many delegations favor the current facilitator's 
proposal - Colombia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, 
Canada, Sweden, Finland.  DelRep deployed guidance, which was 
supported by Germany, France, Japan.  Iran may have saved the 
day by saying that, although they in principle support the 
concept of low concentrations, they are still concerned about 
the construction of the draft decision and the corresponding 
LAO opinion.  Pakistan shared these concerns and was also 
concerned that 30 percent of the verification threshold for 
Schedule 2 A (300 kg) is higher than the declaration 
threshold for Schedule 2A (100 kg), creating a possible 
declaration loophole that does not exist anywhere else in the 
implementation of the Convention.  Iran, supported by others, 
asked for LAO to give more details about the thought process 
leading to its opinion. 
 
¶19.  (U) India said it is willing to support any level for 
all of these chemicals above one percent, but was concerned 
that the construction of this decision was inconsistent with 
any other such decision.  They asked for more background on 
how the Schedule 2B/3 decision was reached, where low 
concentrations at high volumes avoid declaration.  Many other 
delegations supported receiving this additional background 
information, which the facilitator committed to trying to 
gather. 
 
¶20.  (U) The active discussion and the introduction of new 
delegates who were not familiar with the background of this 
issue prevented the facilitator from reached a final decision 
on this issue, presumably negative, that would allow him to 
refer the issue back to the EC.  In addition, Germany 
proposed that, given the lack of progress on the current 
proposal, the consultation move back to Option C of the 
facilitator's October 2005 proposal as a new start and ask 
LAO for an opinion regarding it. 
 
----------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: LATE DECLARATIONS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (U) The consultation was well-attended.  In response to 
earlier requests from delegates, the TS presented the 
following information: their present schedule for reminders 
to SPs of their Article VI declaration obligations, 2004 and 
2005 actual declaration submissions (before versus after 
deadlines).  The facilitator also presented information about 
the connection between late declarations and factors like SPs 
meeting their Article VII obligations and "nil" initial 
declarations.  These presentations resulted in many questions 
but no new requests for information. 
 
¶22.  (U) The discussion on the concept of "nil" declarations 
was very well-received.  The concept was strongly supported 
by France, Australia, the UK, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland.  No opposition was expressed.  Although there 
were questions about how this would be implemented, there was 
general support for preparation of a draft decision 
implementing "nil" declarations.  The facilitator was careful 
to avoid pursuing discussions on how SPs might implement this 
internally - e.g., "nil" declarations from plant sites - 
stating these internal implementation measures were for 
individual SPs to determine. 
 
-------------- 
VIS discussion 
-------------- 
 
¶23.  (U) Del reps met with the Head of the Policy and Review 
Branch Per Runn on 19 September 2006 to discuss the current 
status of the Verification Information System (VIS) and 
Secretariat plans automating the declarations process.  Runn 
 
SIPDIS 
confirmed that the VIS software development is on track.  The 
migration of the current industrial data into the VIS, all 
the industry data declaration modules, and the 
document-tracking component will be completed by the October 
Security Audit.  Secretariat 2007 VIS development efforts in 
2007 include an inspection planning module (to be ready for 
audit in March), development of a validation tool for states 
to "clean" electronic data, a format tool to support states' 
data entry and electronic declaration submission preparation, 
and an initial design of a module to enable the Secretariat 
to automate management of CW data. 
 
¶24.  (U) Runn also reported the Secretariat's plans for 
reaching out to States Party.  The Secretariat is encouraging 
the states with the largest industries to make electronic 
data declarations of the 2006 ADPA due in March 2007.  These 
states also would be encouraged to share their experiences 
with other States Party.  In order to maintain VIS funding, 
Runn must show widespread states' interest in making 
electronic data declarations.  (Note: The TS launched its 
promotional at the September 2006 Industry Workshop, see 
above for details.)  Runn also plans to hold VIS 
presentations for attendees of the December 2006 National 
Authority Days and to include short presentations during 
Regional and Sub-Regional meetings of National Authorities. 
Runn also plans to arrange VIS training sessions in capitals 
and in The Hague.  He also would like to match interested 
experts with experienced experts from states that have 
submitted electronic declarations.  Finally, the Secretariat 
plans to provide an unclassified website 
 with FAQs regarding electronic data submissions, 
documentation on formats, a letter on secure transmission, a 
dedicated help line for the VIS, and a group email address to 
answer specific VIS-related questions. 
 
¶25.  (U) The Secretariat will not require states to submit 
both paper and electronic data.  The submitting state will be 
responsible for ensuring the original electronic data are 
correct.  The TS prefers only electronic data in the form of 
an original CD, handed over by delegations or 
mailed to the TS.  The Secretariat plans to make redacted 
electronic data available, on request, in either CTFS or XML 
form.  How States Parties will make such a request is still 
under consideration.  Ultimately the Secretariat might decide 
 
not to accept paper copies of declarations to encourage 
remaining states to "go electronic," as long as states are 
provided the necessary tools to automate their declarations. 
Although the VIS will be able to track all 
changes made over time to each data element, the Secretariat 
is not certain whether the Convention would require the 
Secretariat to give states the original declaration, an 
 
SIPDIS 
amended declaration, or the original  declaration plus all 
amendments.  Finally, Sandor Laza, Head of the Information 
Validation/Industry Branch provided del reps a demonstration 
of the VIS. 
 
------------ 
UNIVERSALITY 
------------ 
 
¶26.  (U) The facilitator for universality, Said Moussi 
(Algeria), held a consultation on September 28, 2006.  The 
primary focus of the meetings was the upcoming universality 
meeting for Mediterranean states to be hold in Rome on 
October 25-27, 2006, and the proposed universality - national 
implementation meeting for African states tentatively 
scheduled for November 13-14, 2006 in Algiers.  The 
facilitator began the meeting by noting that with the 
ratification by the Central African Republic, the OPCW's 
membership would be 180 SP's in the coming days. 
 
¶27.  (U) The DG said that with the addition of the Central 
African Republic, there were only approximately 15 countries 
to go before the CWC would be universal.  As the number of 
non-SP's continued to shrink, according to the DG, the 
pressure on those remaining outside the CWC would increase. 
He said he had recently met with the Burmese Ambassador and 
he would continue to put pressure on Burma.  The DG also said 
that he would strengthen the TS's focus in the Caribbean.  On 
Africa, the DG said enormous progress had been made over the 
last few years and he hoped that progress would continue.  He 
attributed the recent success in the CAR to meetings that 
Rafael Grossi, the DG's Chief of Cabinet, had in Bangui with 
the Prime Minister, parliamentarians, and others. 
 
¶28.  (U) In the DG's view, the big problem remains the Middle 
East.  He noted the generous support being provided by the EU 
for the Rome universality meeting (approximately 45k euros) 
and acknowledged the work being done by Italy in organizing 
the meeting.  The DG said that the EU would be sending 
Annelise Gianelli, who is Solana's Special Envoy on WMD, to 
the meeting.  He said the Lebanese Ambassador had just 
informed him that Lebanon would be increasing its level at 
the meeting to possibly include the Lebanese Foreign 
Ministry's Director General as well as the Lebanese 
Ambassadors to The Hague and Rome.  Syria has indicated that 
it will send representatives from the MOD and MFA.  Israel as 
well has told the DG that it will send representatives from 
capital.  The DG believes that Egypt will once again send 
representatives to from its Council on Foreign Relations but 
the DG has not ruled out the possibility that official 
representatives could be sent as well. 
 
¶29.  (U) Finland, speaking on behalf of the EU Presidency, 
said that universality was a key part of the EU Joint Action 
Plan.  The EU Presidency plans on contacting non-SP's in the 
region to encourage their attendance.  The Italians noted 
that they had demarched all of the non-SP's in the region to 
attend and would be following up in the run-up to the 
meeting.  The Netherlands asked if Iraq would be attending 
the Rome meeting and the DG said that he believed that they 
would, as well as at least 18 other SP's, including many from 
the region.  Japan said they would seek to encourage the 
Egyptians to attend the meeting at an official level. 
Germany and China indicated that they would be sending 
representatives from capital. 
 
¶30.  (U) After the consultation, the DG approached the U.S. 
delegation and urged us to send representatives to the Rome 
meeting.  He said that for the U.S. to only send a Third 
Secretary from our embassy in Rome would send the wrong 
 
SIPDIS 
signal in terms of the importance that Washington ascribes to 
universality, especially given the fact that other 
 
delegations were sending more senior ranking officials.  He 
noted that the EU was sending its Special Envoy on WMD issues 
and that several other P-5 countries were sending 
representatives from capitals.  Ambassador Javits said that 
we were continuing to study our options and hoped to have an 
answer soon on the level of U.S. representation. 
 
-------------------- 
REVCON WORKING GROUP 
-------------------- 
 
¶31.  (U) Ambassador Lyn Parker (UK) chaired a meeting of the 
Working Group for the Second Review Conference on September 
29, 2006.  Approximately 50 delegations attended the meeting. 
 The meeting focused on finding a date for the last revcon 
working group meeting of the year, listening to national 
statements on planning for the revcon, and a discussion of 
the modalities of the participation of external bodies in the 
review conference. 
 
¶32.  (U) On the meeting schedule of the working group, 
Ambassador Parker observed that there was a large ICC meeting 
on the 1st of December and the 8th of December would be 
during the week of the CSP.  For these reasons, he proposed 
that the last meeting of the year be held on December 11th. 
There were no objections.  The next meeting of the working 
group will be November 13. 
 
¶33.  (U) The DG introduced the TS background paper concerning 
developments related to issues that were considered at the 
first review conference.  The DG noted that Ralf Trapp had 
prepared the document and that he believed it was a balanced 
and factual account of issues covered at the first review 
conference. 
 
¶34.  (U) Cuba, speaking on behalf of the NAM and China, said 
that the Nam and China would be holding a meeting the 
following week to discuss NAM strategy concerning the review 
conference.  Cuba urged that the revcon working group process 
be transparent.  The Cubans referred to paragraph 103 
concerning the CWC of the NAM declaration that emerged after 
the recent NAM meeting in Havana which highlighted the 
importance technological transfer, universality, the removal 
of all discriminatory restrictions in the trade of chemicals 
used for peaceful purposes, and called on possessor states to 
help other possessor states in need of assistance to carry 
out their destruction programs. 
 
¶35.  (U) USdel delivered the talking points provided in 
Washington guidance concerning the working group.  USDel also 
thanked the TS for the helpful background paper provided to 
delegations by the TS. 
 
¶36.  (U) Mexico said that destruction was the issue that 
should be of paramount importance during the review 
conference.  Other issues that should be addressed during the 
preparations for the review conference include: late 
declarations, OCPF site selections, discrepancies in 
transfers, and a critical assessment of the role to be played 
by external bodies including NGO's based on previous 
experience. 
 
¶37.  (U) The Netherlands said they had no prepared comments 
but would like to discuss preparations for the review 
conference from the perspective of being the facilitator for 
Article VII.  The Dutch said that it was important that the 
OPCW broaden its exposure.  The Dutch also said they were 
working on planning a challenge inspection exercise at an 
active industrial facility in the Netherlands.  (Comment: It 
is unclear what any of this had to do with the review 
conference working group.  End Comment) 
 
¶38.  (U) Sweden said they supported the idea of using the 
First Review Conference report as a starting point for the 
Second Review Conference.  The Swedes also said that it was 
important to focus on recent scientific and technological 
developments and what impact they could have on the CWC. 
Sweden would also be interested in how new technological 
developments could play a role in verification, particularly 
 
in the area of biomedical sampling.  Finally in a clear 
reference to destruction deadlines, Sweden said that the 
review conference should be a review of the past and should 
not focus on possible future events. 
 
¶39.  (U) The Chair reiterated that delegations had agreed at 
the last meeting to use the First Review Conference report as 
the basis for future discussions.  He said that the bureau 
would meet in the near-future and decide how to divide up the 
sections of the report in the order in which they appear.  He 
said that if delegations planned on submitting national 
papers it would be helpful to have them well in advance of 
the meeting in which the given subject would be addressed. 
 
¶40.  (U) On the question of external body's and NGO 
participation, the Chair asked delegations for their thoughts 
on the best way to solicit written contributions from NGO's 
and other external bodies.  The Chair proposed using the OPCW 
website to invite external bodies and NGO's to participate 
and to solicit written submissions. 
 
¶41.  (U) USDel suggested that we generally adhere to the 
system that was used at the First Review Conference.  He 
cautioned, however, that the TS should be careful about 
sending out individual invitations to NGO's as this had been 
viewed as exclusionary by some at the last revcon.  USDel 
noted that at the last revcon the bureau had acted as a 
filter in terms of participation by NGO's and external bodies 
as well as written submissions. 
 
¶42.  (U) The UK said they supported the bureau playing a 
filtering role as well.  The UK also called for NGO 
participation to be as broad based as possible. 
 
¶43.  (U) South Africa supported using the last revcon 
document as a basis for discussions.  South Africa suggested 
discussing the issue of how to invite NGO's and external 
bodies further at the next bureau meeting before issuing an 
invitation on the website. 
 
¶44.  (U) Germany supported the U.S. and suggested that a 
meeting involving industry representatives should happen well 
in advance of the review conference itself. 
 
¶45.  (U) The Chair said that industry and SAB input would be 
important and most useful if received well ahead of the 
review conference.  He said he viewed the issue of soliciting 
written submissions and invitations to attend as two separate 
issues. 
 
¶46.  (U) India associated itself with the NAM statement and 
supported the idea of using the last revcon document as a 
basis for discussion.  India said that NGO's clearly had a 
role to play at the revcon but suggested that discussions 
continue in order to determine best how NGO's could interact 
with the revcon. 
 
¶47.  (U) Belgium called for a more intense dialogue with 
industry in the run-up to the revcon and a more active 
dialogue with the SAB.  China supported the U.S. intervention 
and concurred that same procedures used concerning external 
bodies participation in the revcon should be used again. 
China said they were opposed to sending individual 
invitations to NGO's. 
 
¶48.  (U) Sweden suggested that documents submitted by 
external bodies should be distributed electronically and 
asked if such submissions in the past were distributed as 
OPCW documents.  The Chair responded that they were not. 
Japan supported Sweden's suggestion and the U.S. intervention. 
 
¶49.  (U) Canada said that the revcon should primarily be for 
SP's but that encouraging the active participation of 
external bodies and NGO's could be an effective means to 
raise the OPCW's profile.  Canada suggested that written 
submissions from external bodies should be solicited as soon 
as possible.  Canada also noted the positive role played by 
the International Union for Pure and Applied Chemistry 
(IUPAC)at the first revcon. 
 
 
¶50.  (U) The DG said that he has already asked the SAB to 
look at technological developments including nanotechnology 
and new reactants.  He attended their meeting last week in 
Bologna, Italy. He has also written to IUPAC.  The DG agreed 
that the website could be a useful tool to reach out to NGO's 
but added that SP's could also play a role by contacting 
NGO's in their countries. 
 
¶51.  (U) Bangladesh suggested that a list of criteria should 
be developed to use when considering which NGO's to accept. 
The Bangladeshis also suggested that other relevant 
international organizations should be invited as well.  South 
Africa supported the creation of criteria. 
 
¶52.  (U) In his summary of the meeting the Chair implicitly 
pushed back against the idea of creating formal criteria to 
use in determining which NGO's should be invited to attend 
the revcon or submit written contributions.  He said that he 
would start working in the bureau on how to solicit written 
submissions.  He would also start working on developing a 
process to reach out to industry groups.  The Chair said it 
was important to be clear that the acceptance of a written 
submission would not automatically guarantee the right of an 
external body or NGO to attend the conference; these would be 
two separate processes. 
 
¶53.  (U) He urged any delegation that has strong views on 
this issue to approach him, or if the delegation felt more 
comfortable to approach the regional vice-chairs of the 
bureau.  Ambassador Parker said he would also look at having 
meetings with the SAB and industry groups well in advance of 
the revcon.  He said he would, working with the bureau, 
attempt to draft invitation language that could be used and 
have it ready for the next working group meeting on November 
¶13. 
 
 
 
 
 
JAVITS SENDS. 
BLAKEMAN