VZCZCXRO1095
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1272/01 2991540
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261540Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4508
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0860
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0913

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: UNSC PREL PHUM PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD DIMENSIONS OF UNSC 1706 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary. There is an acute need for an 
international presence on the Chadian side of the 
border, according to United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) N'Djamena.  UNHCR reports a 
fledgling collaboration with the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in implementing 
operative paragraph 9(d) of Security Council resolution 
1706 (2006), calling for the establishment of an UN 
"multidimensional presence" in refugee and internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camps of eastern Chad and, if 
necessary, in northern Central African Republic (CAR). 
According to UNHCR, DPKO will seek Council endorsement 
during October 27 consultations for an assessment team 
to be dispatched to eastern Chad, envisioned for the 
end of October but likely to be delayed, given the 
recent political unrest in Chad.  Meanwhile, public 
opinion among Sudanese refugees, AMIS and local Chadian 
officials favor UN Darfur deployment as the only way to 
stem the misery that the crisis there perpetuates in 
Chad.  END SUMMARY. 
 
OP9 (d) of UNSCR 1706 
---------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) UNHCR N'Djamena Senior External Relations 
Officer told Poloff October 25 that UNHCR and DPKO had 
begun a partnership earlier this month to address 
implementation of operative paragraph 9(d) of UNSCR 
1706 (2006), which envisioned the eventual dispatching 
of a "multidimensional presence" charged with 
monitoring the security situation around the refugee 
and IDP camps in eastern Chad and possibly CAR.  The 
UNHCR representative argued such a presence was needed 
to protect refugees, IDPs, local populations and the 
humanitarian community from spillover effects of the 
Darfur crisis, since the Government of Chad (GOC) was 
patently unable to provide this level of protection. 
She dismissed arguments that such a presence would 
enable President Deby to focus on combating the Chadian 
rebellion rather than securing the Darfur-affected 
populations.  She also objected to claims that a UN 
focus on the Chadian consequences of the Darfur crisis 
would draw international attention and energy away from 
the root of the problem on the other side of the border 
and provide a "back-door" for UN troops to Darfur.  The 
Darfur trend of Arab against black African persecution 
was playing out now in Chad, the UNHCR rep insisted, 
and it had to be addressed while there was still 
political room to do so. 
 
¶3.  (U) Two weeks earlier, on October 14, UNHCR Abeche 
Field Office convened a partners meeting to discuss the 
impending arrival (then envisioned for late October but 
now expected for late November) of a DPKO assessment 
team to conduct logistical analyses for the eventual 
deployment of UN forces to eastern Chad.  UNHCR Chad 
Representative Serge Male alluded to an October 6 
letter [NOTE: No text of such a letter was made 
available.  END NOTE] from the GOC to the UNSC 
requesting an "initiative" for securing eastern Chad, 
specifying that any measure taken be civilian only 
(although, he corrected, this could include Chadian 
gendarmes, who already guard the refugee camps in 
limited numbers). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Partners' greatest concern at that meeting 
related to the authority for any envisioned UN force 
and how such a presence would fit into existing 
security mechanisms at the camps.  UNHCR was emphatic 
that any force be completely equipped logistically when 
it arrives, something that another UNHCR representative 
privately feared would serve only to make the UN forces 
a target of the vandalism now suffered by the NGO 
community.  UNHCR and its partners were also deeply 
concerned that the UN presence would not address 
immediate protection concerns of the next six to eight 
months.  UNHCR Protection Officer advised against UN 
forces conducting gendarme police work in the camps, 
recommending instead that two or three police teams 
oversee the training and supervision of gendarmes while 
maintaining their own chain of command. 
 
Refugee Leaders Express Broad Support for UN Presence 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5.  (U) Refugees in the camps along Chad's eastern 
border widely favor a UN presence, although most 
specify that it should be on the Darfur side of the 
border.  The chief sultan at an October 4 meeting in 
Kounoungo refugee camp was explicit in proclaiming that 
there would never be peace in Darfur until UN troops 
 
NDJAMENA 00001272  002 OF 003 
 
 
arrived.  Sheikhs in the Oure Cassoni refugee camp, 
however, were not optimistic that Sudanese President al- 
Bashir would change his mind about consenting to a UN 
deployment in Darfur and asserted that force was the 
only way to provoke an affirmative response from him. 
Refugee leaders in Iridimi refugee camp noted that camp 
inhabitants were increasingly unsettled by frequent 
violations by the Government of National Unity (GNU) of 
the Tripoli Accords, which Iridimi residents 
emphatically supported. 
 
¶6.  (U) The President of the Bredjing Camp Refugee 
Committee warned Poloff on October 12 that even with 
the presence of UN troops to disarm rebels, peace would 
elude Darfur until all groups in Sudan were represented 
in the GNU.  He said that AMIS, even if expanded in 
number, lacked the resources and experience to handle 
Darfur's long-term problems.  The Refugee Committee 
President noted that the janjaweed were better armed 
now than in the past year on account of GNU 
reinforcements.  He regarded the GNU's disregard for 
the provisions of the Tripoli Accords as that 
agreement's undoing, despite GOC efforts to expel 
Sudanese rebels from its territory. 
 
¶7.  (U) The leader of the Djabal camp Refugee Committee 
expressed similar disillusionment with the prospects 
for success of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), which 
he contended only about ten percent of the camp's 
inhabitants supported.  Refugees turned instead to the 
Sudan Liberation Army for "protection" and were only 
too willing to join rebel ranks against the GNU to 
fight for Darfur independence, which he saw as the only 
solution to the ongoing crisis in western Sudan.   He 
assured Poloff that refugees needed only to be given 
arms, that they were ready and willing to "fight 
alongside the UN" against the GNU in Darfur. 
 
Local Chadian Authorities Blame the Sudanese 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8.  (U) Local Chadian authorities have harsh words for 
the Sudanese, whom they blame entirely for the 
instability in the refugee camps.  In an October 5 
meeting, the Bahai Prefet accused Khartoum of launching 
a plan to destabilize the "black" countries across sub- 
Saharan Africa, beginning with eastern Chad before 
spreading to the Central African Republic and Cameroon. 
The Prefet added that Sudan's recent offensives in 
Darfur violated the provisions of good neighborliness 
of the Tripoli Accords.  Iriba's Sous-Prefet did not 
mince words in declaring that Sudanese authorities were 
behind all acts of vandalism, theft and destabilization 
in eastern Chad.  Gendarmes at Iridimi refugee camp 
claimed that all hijacked humanitarian vehicles (almost 
50 to date) were headed for Sudan (despite an 
explanation from UNHCR that as of June, most were going 
to Libya, and an explanation from ICRC that many stolen 
vehicles were held by the Chadian military in Tine). 
 
¶9. (U) The Prefet of Adre attributed all instability 
existing on Chadian soil to the actions of Sudan, 
adding that incursions by the janjaweed were constant 
and that Chadian stability would ultimately come only 
as a result of Darfur stability.  He dismissed the DPA 
as ineffective, despite the GOC's mediating role in the 
peace process.  He argued for a U.S. presence in Darfur 
in order to stem janjaweed activity and impose some 
semblance of order. 
 
AMIS views 
---------- 
¶10.  (U) A Senegalese military observer (MO) with the 
ten-person AMIS office in Abeche identified the 
permeability of the Chad-Sudan border as the most 
pressing issue in eastern Chad, especially now that the 
rainy season had ended and the wadis along the border 
were low.  The MO confirmed GOC assertions that it 
lacked the capacity to control border incursions due to 
the presence of Chadian rebels with whom it was 
fighting.  He alluded to the Libyan suggestion under 
the Tripoli Accords that the border be closed 
completely to prevent incursions by rebels from both 
sides using the other's territory to stabilize their 
respective governments, such as the crossing of 
approximately 1,500 Chadian rebels north of Guereda 
since the beginning of October.  He was anxious for the 
UN, with a robust Chapter VII mandate, to take over for 
AMIS, despite what he called "Chinese interference" in 
implementing UNSCR 1706. 
 
NDJAMENA 00001272  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
COMMENT 
-------- 
¶11. (SBU) While there is no contesting that almost 
250,000 refugees constitutes a major humanitarian 
crisis in eastern Chad, it is important to bear in mind 
that the cause of this crisis was not Chad-made.  As 
such, the need to get UN troops into Darfur should not 
be eclipsed by a potential shift in DPKO focus to 
eastern Chad or northern CAR, where the ruling 
authorities might be more amenable to an international 
presence.  Similarly, although public opinion among 
refugees here opposes the DPA and even the presence of 
AMIS, the hard fact remains that both entities are the 
only foundations on which the eventual UN Darfur force 
will be built.  Wall