VZCZCXRO8672
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1256/01 2971605
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241605Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4490
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0855

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: EASTERN CHAD REFUGEES: CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
 
REF:  Ndjamena 1255 
 
¶1.  Summary.  UN and NGO contingency planning for new 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 
eastern Chad is significantly constrained by site 
availability.  Sites exist on a permanent or transit 
basis for roughly 35,000 refugees.  If an influx 
exceeds this absorption capacity, UNHCR may transfer 
refugees directly to an undeveloped site at Hadjer 
Ibaid and send Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and Oxfam 
to provide services on an emergency basis.  Food and 
non-food contingency stocks are in place toaccommodate 
50,000 people.    Humanitarians are truggling to 
establish new IDP sites in the Goz eida as IDPs 
increase due to insecurity.  End sumary. 
 
The Nut and Bolts of Refugee Contingency lanning 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2.  From October 1-21, PRM/AFR NeilAhlsten visited the 
twelve refugee camps in easern Chad and three IDP 
camps near Goz Beida and Koukou to evaluate 
humanitarian programs and contingency planning.  Over 
the past year, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and numerous NGOs 
have worked on various contingency plans for the 
arrival of new refugees or IDPs.  UNHCR is the lead for 
refugee contingency planning, while IDP planning 
largely follows the UN cluster-lead approach.  In 
practice, some NGOs in health and shelter have used 
private funding to provide IDP services independent of 
the UN system.  Most of the food and non-food items for 
new refugees and IDPs are incorporated into one plan 
with stocks of most items available for 50,000 people, 
while contingency site planning for the two populations 
are distinct.  Contingency planning must be revised 
frequently because of the multiple, overlapping 
security factors that fluctuate frequently, including 
security in Darfur, volatile relations between Chad and 
Sudan, the movements of Chadian rebels and attacks 
against humanitarian assets. 
 
¶3.  UNHCR's primary strategy for accommodating 50,000 
new refugees is to leverage the existing camp capacity 
to provide temporary space and services.  UNHCR would 
establish reception points in the border areas where 
new refugees arrive, screen them to ensure there are no 
combatants, provide high nutrition energy biscuits and 
transport the most vulnerable back to existing camps. 
The bulk of the refugees would move on foot to secure 
midpoints away from the border from where they would be 
moved by truck to existing camps.  Gaga Camp would be a 
permanent site for up to 15,000 refugees, and Mile Camp 
a site for up to 3,000.  The rest would be transferred 
to new camps once they are developed, though past 
experience in eastern Chad has shown that it is 
extremely difficult to move refugees from temporary 
sites (Am Nabak and Oure Cassoni Camps are clear 
examples where a highly-charged political environment 
has hardened attitudes among refugees against 
relocation). 
 
¶4.  UNHCR has contingency stocks for roughly 36,000 
people in Abeche and 2,000 in each of its field 
offices, though site visits revealed that their field 
offices frequently dipped into these stocks to meet 
immediate shortfalls.  UNHCR has built and maintained 
its contingency stocks by cutting back on distributions 
to the current caseload of refugees.  UNHCR/Chad has 
operated at 80 percent of its original 2006 appeal due 
to the global UNHCR funding shortage, and the original 
country budget did not include the addition of new 
stocks.   Consequently it has freed up resources by 
lowering distribution quantities of items such as soap, 
blankets and jerry cans.  UNHCR has stopped tent 
distributions for all except the new arrivals, and is 
encouraging refugees to construct their own housing. 
WFP is rebuilding its contingency stocks following the 
rainy season, and expects to have a two month food 
stock for the existing refugee and IDP populations 
which would it would draw from in the event of a new 
influx.  In addition to WFP's contingency stock of 
food, IFRC maintains a two month food supply for 20,000 
in Hadjer Hadid. 
 
Rethinking Contingency Planning In the Face of 
Insecurity 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5.  Conflict has either put into question or eliminated 
altogether some of the absorption capacity that was 
originally identified in existing sites.  Goz Amir and 
Djabal Camps, which were slated to host temporarily a 
 
NDJAMENA 00001256  002 OF 003 
 
 
combined 15,000 new arrivals, are near the site Chadian 
rebel incursions and close to attacks against non-Arab 
villages (see reftel A).  Oure Cassoni Camp was also 
slated to be a temporary site for 15,000 new arrivals. 
However, Oure Cassoni Camp in currently in the process 
of being moved following the JEM and SAF confrontations 
within 7km of the camp on October 8 and UNHCR has 
essentially eliminated it from contingency planning. 
 
¶6.  To maintain the 50,000 figure in the face of the 
deterioration in security, UNHCR boosted on paper the 
number of refugees to be temporarily housed in other 
camps even though this may be far beyond their actual 
absorption capacity.  The figure for Iridimi and 
Touloum camps grew from 2,000 to 8,000, which would 
drop the water supply to an abysmal emergency ration of 
5 liters per person per day were the plan to be 
enacted.  These camps are already stretched beyond the 
resource availability and goodwill of local authorities 
with the existing number of refugees and would be 
extremely hard pressed to absorb new refugees for even 
one or two months.  The outgoing head of UNHCR's field 
office in Iriba said that the plan for Iridimi and 
Touloum "is simply not viable."  He noted that UNHCR 
would also face significant resistance from local 
authorities if it were to attempt to bring this many 
new arrivals, especially if they are from non-Zaghawa 
tribes.  The bottom line is that temporary sites are 
realistically available for 35,000 new refugees if Goz 
Amir and Djabal Camps are secure, and 20,000 if they 
are not. 
 
¶7.  In response to this lack of sites, UNHCR is 
developing a complementary emergency plan for 20,000 
new arrivals.  Local and national authorities have 
provisionally accepted the establishment of a new site 
in Hadjer Ibaid, which is halfway between Abeche and 
Goz Beida.  The site is located alongside a wadi that 
appears to have significant water potential.  If 
inflows exceed the 35,000 person capacity of the 
existing camps, UNHCR would directly transfer refugees 
to this undeveloped site.  MSF and Oxfam have already 
agreed that they would provide immediate, though 
rudimentary, assistance in health, nutrition and water, 
which would provide a minimal level of basic assistance 
alongside shelter and non-food items distributions from 
UNHCR and food rations from WFP. 
 
¶8.  Humanitarians generally expect that they will be 
able to maintain at least a minimal amount of access to 
the refugee camps despite the rise in insecurity. 
Armed escorts or six-ton trucks have proven to be 
fairly effective for getting humanitarian workers to 
and from the camps, though by hardening these 
humanitarian targets along the roads they have probably 
hastened the phenomena of carjackers attacking in towns 
and NGO compounds.  If humanitarians are forced to 
evacuate, plans are still in place to have refugees or 
local Chadians run essential services such as primary 
health care, nutrition, food distributions and water 
delivery systems.  A two-week fuel supply is in place 
for water pumps at most camps.  IRC increased the fuel 
stock in Oure Cassoni Camp to one month because of the 
precarious circumstances.  Thus far, no one has 
targeted the water pump fuel supplies in the camps. 
 
Contingencies for Newly Displaced Chadians 
------------------------------------------- 
¶9.  Given the deteriorating security situation in the 
Goz Beida area, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and several NGOs 
continue to revise their contingency planning for new 
IDPs.  Humanitarians and local authorities have agreed 
to find multiple sites for populations of 2,000 to 
3,000 newly displaced on the basis that these smaller 
sites would be more sustainable and have less of an 
impact on surrounding villages in the event that they 
stay more than a few months.  However, persistent 
insecurity around Goz Beida is greatly slowing the 
process of site identification and establishment.  In 
practice, the development of water in existing IDP 
sites has been very slow and will likely remain a 
weakness for the establishment of new camps. 
 
¶10.  Thus far, NGOs such as INTERSOS and MSF have been 
able to use some private funds to support NFI 
distributions.  It is unclear if they will be able to 
continue doing so if there are additional arrivals. 
ICRC maintains a contingency stock in Goz Beida for 
5,000 - 6,000 families, including 2862 plastic sheets, 
1885 jerry cans, 6,106 mats, 6,081 blankets and 996kg 
of soap.  In the event of a major new displacement, 
UNHCR's refugee stocks would likely be drawn upon. 
 
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Wall