VZCZCXRO4495
RR RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1249/01 2921307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191307Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4480
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1243
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0853
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0909

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001249 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV SU CD
SUBJECT: SUDANESE REBELS CALL THE SHOTS IN CHADIAN TOWN OF 
BAHAI 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 1215 
 
NDJAMENA 00001249  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
  ¶1.  (SBU) Summary: The northeastern Chadian town of Bahai 
was revealed to be a JEM-controlled stronghold following the 
clash between the National Redemption Front (NRF) and 
Sudanese Government forces October 7-8.  Following that 
battle, numerous Sudanese soldiers remain in Chadian custody 
and the Government of Chad claims that its interest in the 
matter is purely "humanitarian."  Observers have commented on 
what appears to be a close relationship between Chadian 
military and civil authorities and JEM commanders in Bahai 
and Iriba. JEM troops were reported to be moving south, 
possibly to reinforce GOC forces against possible Chadian 
rebel forays.   End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Reftel reported on the October 7-8 clash between 
the NRF and the Government of Sudan forces (SAF) in Kariari, 
near the northeastern town of Bahai.  Based on subsequent 
conversations with international relief workers who were 
either in Bahai during the clash or had staff members in the 
region, it appears that the warring parties remained on the 
Sudanese side of the border, and did not enter Chadian 
territory. The refugee camps in the Bahai region were not 
affected directly by the fighting, but camp members were 
aware of the clashes and a number of them left the camps to 
observe the fighting from a nearby wadi (seasonal 
watercourse).  It is clear, however, that the aftermath of 
the fight was very much in Chadian territory with numerous 
Sudanese soldiers either deserting into Chad or being taken 
there by JEM forces. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  All reports point to a striking absence of Chadian 
local authorities in Bahai and agree that the JEM was 
effectively in control before and after the battle. 
International Rescue Committee Chad Director informed EmbOffs 
that neither the Prefet nor the Gendarme commander were in 
Bahai during the October 7-8 clash.  The Sous-Prefet was in 
town, but appeared to be collaborating with the JEM 
commanders (he in fact warned the IRC shortly before the 
battle began that there would be a clash).  The IRC Director 
was in direct contact with JEM commanders who brought JEM and 
Sudanese army soldiers into the IRC-assisted hospital in 
Bahai for treatment following the clash.  (According to the 
International Federation of the Red Cross there were 88 
wounded in Bahai -- a mix of JEM and Sudanese soldiers).  JEM 
commanders were described as respectful to humanitarian 
workers.  The IRC Director informed Emboffs that a Chadian 
army battalion arrived in Bahai some three days after the 
clash, following a forced march from the town of Fada.  His 
impression was that the there was quite a cooperative 
relationship between the arriving Chadian army and the JEM 
soldiers.  However, in the ensuing days, the JEM presence 
diminished, and it was believed that JEM soldiers were 
heading south. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On October 9, PolOff visited approximately 60 SAF 
members housed in the Iriba prison who had been handed over 
to the Chadian authorities by the JEM/National Redemption 
Front.  According to their Commander (a member of the 310th 
squadron), up to 500 SAF forces may have been killed in the 
fighting October 7-8 in Bahai. The International Federation 
of the Red Cross (IFRC) representative informed Emboff that, 
as of October 11, there were 87 Sudanese soldiers in Iriba, 
of which 19 were wounded.  The IFRC representative described 
the situation in Iriba as a "breakdown in the chain of 
command" with JEM soldiers fully integrated into the Chadian 
army.  IFRC was prepared to take the Sudanese soldiers home, 
but did not want to simply escort them to the Sudanese side 
of the border -- a flight to Khartoum would be preferable. 
In the meantime, their status was not well defined.  Possibly 
they were deserters, possibly they had been taken by the JEM 
by force. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  At the same time, the Chadian Newspaper "Le 
Progress" (aligned with the Government) reported that 103 
Sudanese soldiers, including three officers, had crossed the 
border "seeking refuge" on the Chadian side of the border. 
According to a Chadian Government communiqu, the clash 
between Sudanese rebels and the Government of Sudan was of no 
concern to Chad; while it was studying (in conjunction with 
the Government of Sudan) the question of the repatriation of 
the Sudanese forces, Chad's involvement in the matter was 
purely humanitarian in nature. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
NDJAMENA 00001249  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The JEM control of Bahai calls into question the 
GOC's ability and/or desire to exert its civil and military 
authority over the border region.  With the approach of the 
dry season, President Deby may find it in his interest to 
have the JEM providing a  buffer zone between the interior 
and Chadian rebels at the frontier. 
TAMLYN