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FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3541
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 1517
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 2842
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6539
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UNCLAS MANILA 004396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR F, PM/HILLEN, S/CT, EAP, AND EAP/MTS 
USPACOM ALSO FOR FPA HUSO 
SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AP (LAWLESS/TOOLAN/BAILEY) 
SECDEF OSD/SOLIC FOR NADANER 
JOINT STAFF/J5 (WILKES/ROBINSON/CLEMMONS) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER MARR MOPS MCAP PREL RP
SUBJECT: BOLSTERING THE CT FIGHT IN THE PHILIPPINES: 
1206/1207/1208 PROPOSALS 
 
REF: A. MANILA 4150 
     ¶B. MANILA 1396 
     ¶C. MANILA 2427 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  The Philippines is the easternmost front 
line of the Global War on Terrorism.  It faces multiple 
threats, ranging from the al-Qaida-linked Jemaah Islamiyah to 
the local terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group and Rajah Solaiman 
Movement.  Quick-disbursing 1206, 1207, and 1208 funds that 
provide a bridge to our longer-term Foreign Military 
Financing and USAID assistance could help us fight terrorists 
more effectively here. Our 1206 (train and equip) proposals 
aim at improving maritime security in the Sulu and Celebes 
Seas and at training local forces needed to ensure 
post-conflict stability.  Our 1207 (development) proposal 
attacks the poverty and underdevelopment that provide fertile 
ground for terrorism in the Sulu Archipelago.  The 
Australians have already committed to stand up one company of 
the Philippine Army's planned Riverine Battalion.  Our 1208 
(surrogate force) proposal would stand up a second company to 
help control the brown water areas of central Mindanao.  Our 
targeted and cost-effective proposals in all total a little 
under $39 million, while offering potentially significant 
gains to both regional and U.S. national security. End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) With over 7,000 islands and porous borders, the 
Philippines faces multiple challenges in combating terrorism. 
   Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
terrorists regularly transit Philippine waters with impunity, 
exploiting the country's poor surveillance and weak maritime 
interdiction capabilities.  The Rajah Solaiman Movement, 
which we and the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines (GRP) are seeking to include on the UN Security 
Council's 1267 list, also remains active.  Poverty and 
government neglect have created fertile ground for the JI and 
ASG, allowing them to create safe havens from which they can 
recruit, train, plan, and conduct operations. 
Quick-disbursing 1206 (train and equip), 1207 (development), 
and 1208 (proxy force) funds will have an immediate, positive 
impact on efforts to win control of the Sulu Archipelago and 
the Sulu and Celebes Seas, and provide a bridge to 
longer-term Foreign Military Financing and USAID assistance. 
 
1206 - BUILDING THE CAPACITY TO DEFEAT THE TERRORISTS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3.  (U) Our FY07 1206 proposals, which we shared with U.S. 
Pacific Command and other Southeast Asian Embassies during 
the recent 1206 Regional Planning Conference in Manila (ref 
a), would -- in rank order: 
 
- establish a Naval Special Operations Maritime Security 
Force; 
- supply HF radios to help operationalize the proposed "Coast 
Watch South" initiative; 
- establish a military bomb dog unit. 
- train and equip National Guard-type units on Jolo island; 
- train and equip civil military operations teams; 
- upgrade Philippine Navy patrol aircraft; and, 
- improve the capabilities of the Philippine Air Force's 
helicopter fleet. 
 
MARITIME SECURITY FORCE (MSF) 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Due to inadequate equipment and uneven training, 
the Philippine Navy's existing Special Operations units 
cannot control the principal terrorist transit routes among 
Sabah and Palawan, the Sulu Archipelago, and Sulawesi and 
southern Mindanao.  However, given the right equipment, 
infrastructure, resources, a consolidated maintenance 
program, and hand-picked officers and sailors, the Philippine 
Navy could establish a credible coastal maritime interdiction 
capability. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Our proposed six-boat Maritime Security Force would 
be based in Zamboanga and draw on existing personnel.  It 
 
would be built around a simple, dependable, relatively low 
cost shallow draft craft, such as a 24-foot rigid inflatable 
boat (RIB).  Each boat would be equipped with simple, 
reliable, off-the-shelf outboard engines, communications, 
navigation, night vision, personal protective, and refueling 
equipment, and have two 7.62 and one .50 caliber machine 
guns.  Boat facilities in the Sulu Archipelago would extend 
the operational range of the unit, which would consist of 
three two-boat detachments. 
 
Estimated costs: 
-- boats                                 $1.515 million 
-- boat equipment                        $0.273 million 
-- training                              $0.611 million 
-- boat facilities                       $0.431 million 
-- transportation                        $0.100 million 
-- FMS surcharge                         $0.095 million 
 
Total estimated program cost:            $3.025 million 
 
 
HIGH FREQUENCY RADIOS FOR COAST WATCH SYSTEM 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Philippines, with the help of the Australian 
government, is developing the "Coast Watch South" initiative, 
which is aimed at improving maritime security in the Sulu and 
Celebes Seas, and consists of an integrated system of coast 
watch stations, maritime intelligence fusion and command and 
control centers, and interdiction units.  U.S. assistance 
could prove key to making this concept operational. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The current Joint Interagency Task Force-West 
(JIATF-West) funded Maritime Interagency Coordination Center 
in Zamboanga and future centers in Palawan, General Santos 
City, Cotobato, and Davao -- with their all-source, 
interagency approach to intelligence fusion -- are natural 
command, control, communications, and intelligence centers 
that fit neatly into the Coast Watch South system.  What they 
need to make them operational are HF radios.  The proposed HF 
communications network would consist of the Manila 
Headquarters, five base stations at the JIATF-West 
Interagency Coordination Centers, and two smaller 
sub-stations located on Balabac Island at the southern tip of 
Palawan and Tawi Tawi island on the southern tip of the Sulu 
 
Archipelago.  Smaller hand-held radios would tie intercept 
vessels into the system. 
 
Estimated costs: 
-- system installation          $1.223 million 
-- training                     $0.200 million 
-- initial spare parts package  $0.200 million 
-- transportation               $0.100 million 
-- FMS surcharge                $0.061 million 
 
Total estimated program cost:   $1.784 million 
 
BOMB DOG PROGRAM 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Improvised explosive devices are a constant threat 
in the Philippines.  Cheaply produced and easily hidden, they 
represent an ever-present danger to U.S. personnel, as well 
as to innocent Philippine civilians and Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) troops.  Bomb dogs, because of their 
accuracy, mobility, and ease of employment, provide a 
significant countermeasure; however, the AFP lacks even a 
basic canine explosive detection program. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) 1206 funds could radically improve security at 
ports and ferry terminals by detecting either precursors or 
explosive devices.  Three separate bomb dog training 
facilities and kennels in the high-threat areas of Zamboanga, 
General Santos City, and Davao, each housing 36 fully trained 
deployable working dogs, would represent a significant 
deterrent to terrorists and improve protection for U.S. 
forces.  Costs would include the initial purchase of 108 
fully trained dogs, the equipment to sustain them, facility 
 
construction, and train-the-trainer training by U.S. dog 
handlers. 
 
Estimated costs: 
-- dog procurement                  $1.130 million 
-- kennel construction              $0.450 million 
-- training                         $0.050 million 
-- transportation                   $0.116 million 
-- FMS surcharge                    $0.066 million 
 
Total estimated program cost:       $1.802 million 
 
POST-CONFLICT STABILITY FORCE FOR JOLO 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Philippine National Police is almost totally 
ineffective on Jolo and incapable of providing post-conflict 
stability.  Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) 
are a locally recruited militia, essentially the Philippine 
version of the U.S. Army National Guard.  After the 
anticipated successful conclusion of its counterterrorism 
operations on Jolo, the AFP plans to reduce the number of its 
active duty battalions on the island and rely on the CAFGUs 
as a stability force to hold and secure territory cleared by 
regular troops.  Philippine Army forces on Jolo include Moro 
National Liberation Front integrees, who under the 1996 peace 
agreement are only allowed to serve in their home province. 
Successfully incorporating these integrees into well trained 
CAFGUs would help ensure post-conflict stability, as well as 
allow the AFP to offer a suitable place to proven soldiers 
who have served honorably. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The program would train and equip an AFP officered 
battalion-sized CAFGU force to maintain a secure environment 
and conduct limited counterterrorism and law enforcement 
operations.  Training would include instruction in police 
procedures, rule of law, fixed point protection, convoy 
security, anti-corruption, and respect for human rights. 
 
Estimated costs: 
-- training                      $0.500 million 
-- equipment                     $4.000 million 
-- transportation                $0.200 million 
-- FMS surcharge                 $0.179 million 
 
Total estimated program cost:    $4.879 million 
 
BUILDING SALA'AM TEAM CAPACITY 
------------------------------ 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The AFP's "Special Advocacy for 
Literacy/Livelihood and Advancement for Muslims" (Sala,am) 
civil military teams provide the link between military units 
and the local Muslim population during military operations in 
Mindanao.  They help establish and strengthen territorial 
defense systems (e.g., Civilian Armed Forces Geographical 
Units and Coastal Watch Programs) and facilitate the 
implementation and delivery of government projects and 
services, including those of USAID.  They are currently 
limited in number, irregularly trained, and inadequately 
equipped. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Facilities, training, and equipment improvements 
could make a real difference in ensuring Sala'am team 
effectiveness.  Our proposal would upgrade Sala'am training 
facilities at Camp Malagutay near Zamboanga.  A tailored 
training program would focus on counterinsurgency doctrine, 
the rule of law, human rights, and dispute 
mitigation/resolution.  Each Sala'am team would be equipped 
with basic hand-held construction equipment to conduct civil 
military operations, as well as equipment to produce 
information operations material. 
 
Estimated costs: 
-- training                      $0.500 million 
-- basic construction equipment  $0.350 million 
-- transportation                $0.050 million 
-- FMS surcharge                 $0.035 million 
 
 
Total estimated program cost:    $0.935 million 
 
ISLANDER AIRCRAFT UPGRADE 
------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  The Philippine Navy presently uses seven Islander 
aircraft to conduct maritime patrols in the southern 
Philippines.  It plans to add an additional seven aircraft to 
its inventory in the next two years.  Patrol aircraft 
personnel currently only use binoculars to detect possible 
hostile vessels.  Installing forward looking infrared 
radar/intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissanc e (FLIR/ISR) 
pods and upgraded communications equipment on the Islanders 
would vastly improve the Navy's ability to find, track, and 
fix potential targets, allowing interdiction by the Maritime 
Security Force or upgraded UH-1H helicopters. 
 
Estimated costs: 
-- FLIR/ISR pods                          $5.600 million 
-- avionics and communications upgrades   $0.045 million 
-- initial spare parts package            $0.175 million 
-- training                               $0.140 million 
-- transportation                         $0.110 million 
-- FMS surcharge                          $0.231 million 
 
Total estimated program cost:             $6.301 million 
 
UH-1H UPGRADES 
-------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The UH-1H is the workhorse of the Philippine Air 
Force (PAF).  It is the principal aircraft used to support 
counterterrorism operations, and the only one with night 
vision goggle-trained pilots.  There are currently 41 
operational UH-1Hs in the PAF inventory.  Five other newly 
refurbished aircraft have just arrived and are undergoing 
test flights.  Another 21 refurbished aircraft will arrive 
during the next year, and the AFP intends to procure an 
additional 27 aircraft during the next two years through its 
Capability Upgrade Program. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Upgraded armament (M240 machines guns), additional 
night vision goggles, and insertion/extraction equipment 
would vastly improve the ability of PAF UH-1H units to 
support counterterrorism operations, including maritime 
interdiction.  Based in Zamboanga, upgraded UH-1Hs could 
provide close-in surveillance of and interdiction in the Sulu 
and Celebes Seas and the coastal region of central Mindanao, 
the main areas of terrorist infiltration and operation. 
 
Estimated costs: 
-- insertion/extraction equipment   $0.283 million 
-- armament                         $3.052 million 
-- night vision goggles             $0.802 million 
-- transportation                   $0.100 million 
-- training                         $0.750 million 
-- FMS surcharge                    $0.145 million 
 
Total estimated program cost:       $5.132 million 
 
1207 - ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF STABILITY 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶17.  (U) Muslim Mindanao is the poorest region in the 
Philippines.  Our 1207 (development) proposal aims to address 
the underlying causes of instability that provide fertile 
ground for terrorism by: 
 
- integrating security and development to improve local 
livelihoods and foster stability; 
- ameliorating the conditions -- poverty, neglect, and weak 
law enforcement -- that extremists seek to exploit; and, 
- targeting populations who are most vulnerable to extremist 
influences, reinforcing structures that can counter and 
discourage terrorists' efforts, and lessen their ability to 
gain recruits. 
 
¶18.  (U) Our focus is on the three main island groups of the 
Sulu Archipelago -- Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi Tawi.  Based 
largely on USAID,s highly successful Growth with Equity in 
Mindanao (GEM) program, our 1207 program would be conducted 
in close coordination with Joint Special Operations Task 
Force-Philippines' civil-military operations planners and 
substantially augment ongoing longer-term USAID development 
projects.  The focus would be on short-term interventions 
designed to have maximum impact.  Activities would consist 
of: targeted small and medium infrastructure improvements 
(farm-to-market roads, bridges, ports, wharves, community 
centers, water and sanitation services); accelerated economic 
and business development; micro-finance services; livelihood 
training that would move farmers toward higher-value export 
crops like fish or asparagus; education and health programs; 
and, small scale solar and micro-hydro electrification 
projects. 
 
¶19.  (U) We would hope to link this effort in following years 
to similar programs targeting Palawan and the area around 
General Santos City -- the other sea lines of communication 
terrorists use -- and work with Embassies Kuala Lumpur and 
Jakarta on an integrated approach that would develop 
complementary programs in the respective adjoining areas of 
Sabah, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. 
 
Estimated costs: 
 
-- infrastructure improvements        $4.3 million 
-- economic and business development  $2.0 million 
-- livelihood programs                $2.0 million 
-- education programs                 $2.0 million 
-- rural electrification programs     $1.0 million 
-- health programs                    $0.7 million 
 
Total estimated program costs:       $12 million 
 
 
1208 - RIVERINE SECURITY FORCE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶20.  (SBU)  1208 funds are designed for "surrogate" forces, 
i.e., foreign forces that can support or facilitate 
operations by United States Special Operations Forces. 
Control of the littoral area of central Mindanao and the 
Liguasan Marsh has been a perennial problem for the AFP. 
Given the right equipment, infrastructure, resources, and 
maintenance program, sufficient personnel exist to establish 
quickly a brown water interdiction capability.  General 
Generoso Esperon, the AFP Chief of Staff, intends to 
establish a Philippine Army Riverine Battalion composed of 
three companies.  Australia has undertaken to train and equip 
one of these companies.  Standing up a second company would 
allow the AFP to deny the Liguasan Marsh to the terrorists, 
control transit areas, and create a capable counterterrorism 
partner for U.S. forces. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Our proposal would train and equip a six boat 
company-sized Riverine Security Force (RSF) using a simple, 
dependable, relatively low cost shallow draft craft, such as 
a rigid inflatable boats (RIB).  Each boat would require 
simple, off-the-shelf outboard engines, communications, 
navigation, night vision, personal protective and refueling 
equipment, weapons, and spare parts. 
 
Estimated costs: 
-- boats                                 $1.515 million 
-- boat equipment                        $0.273 million 
-- training                              $0.611 million 
-- boat facilities                       $0.431 million 
-- transportation                        $0.100 million 
-- FMS surcharge                         $0.095 million 
 
Total estimated program costs:           $3.025 million 
 
TARGETED, AND COST-EFFECTIVE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Our proposals are targeted and cost-effective. 
They represent an integrated concept of how to combat the 
terrorist threat in the southern Philippines.  At a rough 
total cost of just under $39 million, this is a reasonable 
investment that offers potentially significant gains to both 
regional and U.S. national security. 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
KENNEY