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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2377, NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS: THE SCENE ON THE GROUND TEN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA2377 2006-10-25 22:46 2011-06-01 08:00 SECRET Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2377/01 2982246
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 252246Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8000
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAGUA 002377 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT:  NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS: THE SCENE ON THE GROUND TEN 
DAYS OUT 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 02116 
 
     B. MANAGUA 02044 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: With ten days remaining before 
Nicaragua's November 5 elections, three presidential 
candidates are scrambling to convince voters that they are 
best suited to beat Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN) candidate Daniel Ortega.  Ortega remains the 
frontrunner in all polls, surpassing the 35% mark in a poll 
conducted by a local university, whose predictions regarding 
past elections have been grossly off the mark (septel). 
Although Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) candidate Eduardo 
Montealegre continues in second place, his numbers have 
slipped.  Placing third in reputable polls, Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC) candidate Jose Rizo has gained a 
few points, while Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) 
candidate Edmundo Jarquin places fourth, and Eden Pastora of 
the Alternative for Change (AC) trails with barely 1%.  In 
the most recent Cid Gallup poll, about 18% of the respondents 
were undecided or did not reveal their preferences, and 
according to the latest Borge Asociados poll, Ortega would 
beat Rizo in a runoff, but not Montealegre or Jarquin. 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION CONTINUED:  The campaign period 
has been dominated by the PLC's incessant smear campaign 
against Montealegre to lower his numbers in the polls, while 
Ortega preaches peace and reconciliation and avoids 
confrontation.  The Embassy, along with international and 
domestic observer organizations, continue to press the 
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) to deliver voter IDs and 
temporary voting cards before the election, and concerns 
about vote fraud continue to surface -- namely regarding the 
possibility that vote challenges (impugnaciones) by the 
dominant FSLN and PLC parties could alter the vote outcome. 
While the ALN is well on its way in preparing its party poll 
watchers (fiscales) and voting table (JRV) members, the MRS 
lacks personnel and funds to defend the vote.  As in previous 
elections, Nicaragua's independent/undecided voters will 
likely determine the outcome of the election.  If they rally 
around Montealegre, he could win the election, if not on the 
first round, in a runoff against Ortega.  However, if 
independents split their votes and/or Jarquin's share of the 
Sandinista vote declines, Ortega may win on the first round. 
END SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION. 
 
NEARING THE HOME STRETCH 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (C) With ten days remaining before Nicaragua's November 5 
national elections, three of the five presidential candidates 
are pulling out all the stops, each attempting to convince 
voters that they are best suited to beat Ortega.  Contacts 
tell us that this campaign is the dirtiest in decades, with 
the PLC directing its most scathing attacks against Eduardo 
Montealegre.  Tactics include resorting to bogus polls to 
persuade Nicaraguans that Rizo, not Montealegre, is Ortega's 
closest competitor; attempting to bribe ALN supporters to 
desert Montealegre; maligning female ALN candidates; and, 
securing Oliver North's tacit endorsement of Rizo, including 
North's sudden visit to Managua on October 23.  Jarquin 
struggles with a cash-poor campaign and faces internal 
discord from the Movement to Rescue Sandinismo. Ortega 
continues preaching reconciliation and avoids confrontation, 
parading before the media his most prized "catch" -- ALN 
National Assembly candidate Salvador Talavera.  However, 
Ortega has been less successful in his efforts to downplay 
the denunciation before the OAS Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission against Ortega and a number of other FSLN leaders 
for alleged atrocities against the Miskito population in the 
1980s.  Ortega's efforts to "buy" the Miskitos' charging him 
have failed. 
 
REMAINING CONCERNS: VOTER DOCUMENT DELIVERY, VOTE DEFENSE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (C) OAS and EU observers alike as well as our Embassy and 
the Carter Center have expressed concern over the CSE's 
snail's-paced delivery of national IDs (cedulas) and 
temporary voting documents (documentos supletorios, or SDs), 
as have the leaders of NGO Movimiento por Nicaragua (MpN). 
OAS Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) chief Gustavo 
Fernandez has called on the CSE to ensure delivery of some 
400,000 documents before the elections.  Rebecca Cox, an 
official with the European Union Electoral Observation 
Mission (EU/EOM), discussed EU/EOM concerns with the 
 
Elections Donor Group, informing them that CSE president 
Roberto Rivas recently told EU/EOM leaders that the CSE has 
no plan to distribute cedulas or SDs beyond the CSE's 
municipal (CEM) level.  MpN has issued a public communique in 
the press calling for the CSE to do its utmost to comply with 
the production and delivery before November 5 of all cedulas 
and SDs in accordance with the constitution and on October 24 
sponsored a peaceful demonstration in Managua to call on 
citizens to demand their cedulas or SDs.  In the Ambassador's 
recent meeting with CSE magistrates, he impressed upon them 
that the delivery of cedulas and temporary voter documents is 
required to receive our endorsement of the electoral process. 
 
 
5.  (SBU) While the MRS has not recruited enough party poll 
watchers (fiscales) to defend its vote and is short on cash, 
the ALN appears to possess the manpower and probably will 
obtain the funds required to ensure that all of its 
supporters can deploy.  According to ALN vote defense 
coordinator Zenalia Madrigal, the ALN will have an official 
present at 52% of the JRVs on election day.  She shared with 
polcouns on October 19 the lists of ALN JRV officials and 
fiscales, noting that over 80,000 ALN supporters will be 
involved in the overall vote defense process -- which started 
with helping Nicaraguans obtain their cedulas and SDs. 
Madrigal was concerned, however, because some of these JRVs 
are located in isolated, sparsely populated areas -- while 
the ALN will have JRV officials at only 18% of the tables in 
Leon, a highly populated, potentially contentious department. 
 
 
POWER PRODUCERS AND DISTRIBUTORS GUARANTEE ENERGY SUPPLY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (U) Power producers, distributors, and the Nicaraguan 
government have addressed concerns that Nicaragua's energy 
supply crisis could impede the electoral process on November 
5 -- guaranteeing that supplies will be adequate from 
November 4-11.  According to Rodrigo Barreto, the CSE has 
been performing simulated vote transmission tests to ensure 
that transmission will go smoothly even if there are power 
fluctuations or outages. 
 
POLICE/MILITARY PREPARE TO DEAL WITH ELECTION VIOLENCE 
- - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C) Police Chief Aminta Granera has told us that there 
will be 20,000 electoral police, in addition to 10,000 
regular police deployed on election day.  However, she is 
concerned that Ortega could mobilize thousands to take to the 
streets to declare early victory.  She has warned us that the 
police only have enough equipment (tear gas, rubber bullets, 
etc.) to deal with possible election-related violence for two 
days (six hours total).  According to Granera, she had 
included the items in a budget request, and received 
everything else in the request except the anti-riot 
equipment.  She requested support from the U.S. as the Police 
will hold the front line of defense on election day. 
 
8.  (C) According to DAO, the Nicaraguan military has 
expressed on several occasions that they have plans to ensure 
that demonstrations do not turn violent, but they have not 
shared any details, even when pressed.  They also claim they 
have members "inserted in the FSLN" who will disrupt any 
plans to resort to violence.  The military appear to be 
basing plans on their recent success during the Defense 
Ministerial meetings in Managua (no violence was planned, 
however) and believe their mere presence will suffice as a 
deterrent.  Granera does not believe the military will 
support the Police if violence erupts and while RSO believes 
they have a good plan, they are incapable of handling 
multiple flash points, which could arise on election day. 
(NOTE: We are facilitating a meeting between the military and 
police to discuss coordination.) 
 
CASH FLOW IMPROVES FOR MONTEALEGRE, STILL TIGHT FOR JARQUIN 
- - - - -  - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9.  (S)  With COSEP's October 20 formal endorsement of 
Eduardo Montealegre, following the release of a 
COSEP-sponsored poll (Ortega received 32.5 %; Montealegre 
21.1 %; Rizo 16.8 %; Jarquin 11.8%; and Pastora 1%. 
Undecided/no response was high - around 17%), comes its 
members' commitment to finance a robust publicity campaign in 
favor of Montealegre.  The Taiwanese minister counselor told 
us earlier in the day that following COSEP's blessing, funds 
will pour in for Montealegre, including from Taiwan. 
 
(COMMENT: Montealegre recently told us that the COSEP 
endorsement has convinced more Nicaraguan and foreign 
financiers to contribute.  Thus far, he has received $1 
million from the Taiwanese and hopes to receive an additional 
$1 million - in line with Taiwan's $2 million to Bolanos when 
he ran for office in 2001.) 
 
MORE PLC MILITANTS BACK MONTEALEGRE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
10.  (C) Following Embassy efforts to encourage contact with 
the ALN campaign, 400 members of the PLC publicly declared 
their support for Eduardo Montealegre's candidacy on October 
21 (see 10/2 update and Managua 2097).  PLC municipal officer 
and president of the pro-Montealegre GANARAM movement Eugenio 
Rodriguez stated that he would support Montealegre as the 
only candidate who can defeat Daniel Ortega, even though the 
other candidates (Jose Rizo and Edmundo Jarquin) are trying 
to drag Montealegre down.  Margarita Sequeira, PLC deputy 
candidate in Chinandega, claimed that "Eduardo represents 
true Liberal values, not the authoritarianism of Arnoldo 
Aleman and his cronies."  Montealegre called upon PLC JRV 
members and fiscales to defend the vote against FSLN fraud 
and invited all Liberals to support the ALN campaign. 
 
WHO'S SUPPORTING RIZO AND WHY? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11.  (C) ALN National Assembly deputy/candidate Yamileth 
Bonilla recently shed light on PLC candidate Rizo's apparent 
sudden increase in cash flow, as evidenced by a dramatic 
spike in campaign spots and paraphernalia.  She reported to 
polcouns that Mexican media mogul Angel Gonzalez contributed 
USD 450,000 to Rizo's campaign.  Bonilla believes that this 
donation enabled Rizo and the PLC to ratchet up the smear 
campaign against Montealegre.  (COMMENT: Gonzalez is partial 
owner of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 
slanted channel 4 and holds substantial investment with the 
FSLN in channel 10.  He also holds shares in channel 12.  We 
cannot confirm this allegation, but Gonzalez' support for 
Rizo would make sense in that it helps keep Rizo in the race 
and the Liberals divided, which in turn increases FSLN 
candidate Daniel Ortega's chances to win on the first round. 
Gonzalez also competes with Channel 2, whose owners back 
Montealegre.  Further, more recently, Channel 10 backed the 
Central American University (UCA) poll, whose results favor 
Ortega and Rizo.  According to some students involved in the 
poll, the results were manipulated.  END COMMENT.) 
 
12.  (C) Jordanian-Nicaraguan Ismat Tarek Khatib is another 
reported PLC supporter, who allegedly is supplying the PLC 
with cloth for banners, t-shirts, and hats.  Khatib's U.S. 
visa was recently revoked under 212 (A) (3) (B) for terrorist 
activities, including fundraising.  He has also been 
reportedly involved in customs scams, including paying low 
taxes on undervalued luxury vehicles and textiles, as well as 
in the illegal movement of people and possibly trafficking in 
persons.  He was detained on September 14 while attempting to 
bring in two Indonesian women who told polcouns they believed 
their final destination was the United States. 
 
ARCHBISHOP REITERATES NEED TO SCRUTINIZE CANDIDATES' PAST 
RECORDS, CARDENAL MUTES HIS ENDORSEMENT OF ORTEGA 
- - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 
 
13.  (C) Drawing on the Catholic Church's August pastoral 
letter regarding the upcoming elections, Archbishop Leopoldo 
Brenes appealed to Nicaraguans to vote, and to "choose the 
ideal person to govern the country, the person who has 
principles, a person of God, sincere and transparent."  He 
also urged voters to look at the candidates' pasts and the 
programs they offer.  The local papers also highlighted Pope 
Benedict XVI's recent call for Catholic Church leaders to 
refrain from politicking.  Likely in response to the Pope's 
remarks, Cardenal Obando y Bravo -- who has appeared over the 
months with Daniel Ortega in clear endorsement of the FSLN 
presidential candidate -- attempted to justify his 
association with Ortega by asserting that he supports certain 
qualities and principles, not a particular candidate.  Since 
the Pope's statement, Obando has appeared less frequently 
with Ortega and has met with Arnoldo Aleman.  However, he 
continues to support candidates who call for "peace and 
reconciliation," Ortega's campaign motto. 
 
CONTACTS' PREDICTIONS RUN THE GAMUT, MOST POINT TO RUNOFF 
-  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
14.  (C) Several Embassy interlocutors have shared their 
predictions regarding Nicaragua's November 5 election 
outcome.  A sampling of predictions follows: 
 
--Nuncio Jean Paul Gobel believes that Ortega's victory is 
"possible but not probable," warning us that that popular 
support for the FSLN has grown in some areas of the country, 
including in traditionally Conservative Granada, where entire 
barrios now support the FSLN. 
 
--Foreign Minister Norman Caldera predicts that Montealegre 
can garner 35% of the vote in the first round.  According to 
Caldera, the polling organizations employ weighting models 
based on U.S. demographics that give similar weight to each 
age category, while the polls should use a "pyramid-shaped" 
demographic model that gives more weight to the younger age 
groups.  He also believes that poll participants are 
reluctant to reveal non-Ortega voting intentions to the young 
college students conducting the polls because the 
participants assume the students are Sandinistas. 
 
--Nicaraguan Minister of Defense Avil Ramirez is confident 
that Montealegre will win the presidential elections in the 
first round.  He claims that Montealegre has met with Army 
chief Gen. Omar Halleslevens and that the Army wants 
Montealegre to win because he would not threaten the Army's 
relationship with the USG.  (Comment: This information 
conflicts with reports that the Army has supported FSLN 
officials with transportation on the Atlantic Coast and other 
rural areas.) 
 
--Chief Police Commissioner Aminta Granera believes Ortega 
will likely win the elections given the divided Right and the 
fact that he requires only 35% to win on the first round if 
his nearest competitor trails by 5% or more. 
 
--FSLN dissident Alejandro Martinez Cuenca fears Daniel 
Ortega will win because Rizo and Montealegre will divide the 
Right and Sandinista dissident Jarquin has not been able to 
obtain much of the FSLN vote. 
 
--MRS Assembly candidate Dora Maria Tellez does not believe 
the FSLN can win fairly but is certain that the FSLN is 
prepared to commit fraud to steal the elections.  She told us 
recently that the MRS will warn the FSLN that if it steals 
the election, the MRS will "take to the streets," opining 
that this is the "only kind of message Ortega understands." 
 
--MFA International Organizations Director, Ambassador 
Mauricio Diaz, confided to us recently that Supreme Court 
Justice Payo Solis (FSLN) told him Ortega will probably win 
the November 5 election.  Moreover, Solis claimed that if 
Ortega falls short, the FSLN will steal the points required 
to win -- ensuring that a "Mexico scenario" does not occur, 
Solis said. 
 
--CSE Executive Director Rodrigo Barreto shared with us on 
October 24 that this time the Sandinistas are confident 
victory is in their reach, adding that while his family is 
anti-Ortega, this time they are debating between backing 
Montealegre or Rizo.  North's recent visit to Managua in 
support of Rizo has furthered confused some family members, 
he explained, although he is clear that the PLC is merely 
attempting to confuse non-Sandinista voters so that they 
consider voting for Rizo instead of Montealegre. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
15.  (C) As in previous elections, Nicaragua's 
independent/undecided voters will likely determine the 
outcome of the election.  If they rally around Montealegre, 
he could win the election, if not on the first round, in a 
runoff against Ortega.  However, if independents split their 
votes and/or Jarquin's share of the Sandinista vote declines, 
Ortega may win on the first round. 
TRIVELLI