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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2343, CSE PRESIDENT CLAIMS ELECTIONS WILL BE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA2343 2006-10-23 18:57 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0040
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2343/01 2961857
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231857Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7971
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002343 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, USAID FOR LAC MARK SILVERMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NU
SUBJECT: CSE PRESIDENT CLAIMS ELECTIONS WILL BE 
TRANSPARENT, COMPLAINS ABOUT QUICK COUNT 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador and the magistrates of Nicaragua's 
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) exchanged concerns regarding 
the November 5 national elections during a recent meeting at 
CSE headquarters.  Ambassador urged the magistrates to assure 
that eligible voters can obtain the necessary voting 
documents before election day, allow international and 
national observers access to all key locations, and oppose 
any self-declaration of candidates before the official 
release of vote results.  Ambassador also expressed concern 
regarding the apparently inequitable distribution of voting 
station official slots to the different political parties. 
The magistrates complained about Etica y Transparencia's plan 
to conduct a quick count, claiming that Etica is not 
impartial towards the CSE and any alternative tabulation of 
the vote could result in civil disturbances.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador and emboffs met with CSE magistrates on 
October 19 to discuss issues related to the November 5 
national elections.  The magistrates came to the meeting 
sporting casual clothing and CSE observation vests -- no 
doubt to show their dedication to performing the grubby field 
work necessary to ensure fair elections.  In addition to CSE 
president Roberto Rivas, FSLN-affiliated magistrate Emmet 
Lang (seated at Rivas' right hand), and PLC magistrates Luis 
Benavides and Rene Herrera were present, among others. 
(Comment: At one point during the conversation, CSE chief of 
staff Rodrigo Barreto delivered a folded message to Rivas. 
Lang took the message from the table in front of Rivas, 
opened and read it in full view of the group.  Lang's actions 
clearly demonstrated who really controls the CSE.  End 
Comment.)  In general, the meeting was cordial, and Barreto 
delivered our observation credentials after the discussion 
concluded. 
 
Distribution of Voting Documents 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3. (C) Ambassador commented that the elections can be judged 
free and fair only if voters are able to obtain the 
appropriate documents and exercise their suffrage.  He asked 
Rivas if the CSE plans to use a bus and motorcycles provided 
by IFES to deliver voter/national ID cards (cedulas) and 
supplementary documents to voters in remote areas.  Rivas 
equivocated, answering only that the CSE plans to open up 
municipal distribution centers on October 26-29 to facilitate 
the distribution of cedulas and supplementary documents.  He 
commented that the magistrates had discussed shipping 
unretrieved cedulas and supplementary documents to the 
appropriate voting stations on election day, but that plan 
was judged impractical due to security considerations.  Rivas 
stated that voters would not be able to use a colilla 
(receipt given by the CSE when a voter applied for a cedula) 
because colillas do not have adequate anti-fraud features. 
 
4. (C) Ambassador asked how the CSE plans to publicize its 
special weekend to facilitate cedula/supplementary document 
retrieval for voters.  Rivas responded by asking for 
additional resources for a publicity campaign.  Ambassador 
answered that IFES prepared a publicity campaign over two 
months ago, but the CSE has failed to approve it.  Rivas 
became flustered, snapping at Rodrigo Barreto, and offered a 
lame excuse that the IFES campaign stressing cedulas is not 
really appropriate for that project. 
 
Observer Access 
- - - - - - - - 
 
5. (C) Ambassador urged the magistrates to allow 
international and national observers access to all key 
locations, including the vote tabulation center.  Rivas 
responded that the CSE has accredited over 16,000 national 
observers and 600 international observers.  He claimed that 
"these elections are completely open, the CSE has nothing to 
hide."  The vote tabulation computer center is a small place, 
Rivas explained, although the CSE will permit access to a 
limited number of international and national observers as 
well as official party poll watchers (fiscales).  (Comment: 
Apparently Rivas has finally acquiesced to pressure from the 
OAS, European Union, USG and others to permit limited access 
to national observers to the vote tabulation center.  End 
Comment.) 
 
Self-Declarations of Victory on Election Day/Reporting Results 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- 
 
 
6. (C) In response to rumors that FSLN candidate Daniel 
Ortega may use early vote results (expected to favor his 
party) to proclaim himself the victor, Ambassador asked the 
magistrates not to give credence to any such declarations. 
Rivas stated that the CSE does not have any authority to 
affirm a candidate's victory until the official results are 
determined.  (Note: Benavides told the media late last week 
that "Nicaragua will have a new president in the morning" on 
November 6.  End Note.) 
 
7. (C) Rivas commented that the CSE will post incoming vote 
tallies on its web site, and that 85 percent should be 
reported by 10:00 a.m. on November 6.  Regarding the process 
of official challenges ("impugnaciones") by party poll 
watchers, Rivas stated that he expects only about 140-150 
voting stations (JRVs) out of over 11,000 will face 
impugnaciones.  According to Rivas, most of the impugnaciones 
will be "stupid complaints," (e.g., a red car was parked 
outside the JRV) and only about 15-20 will be serious cases 
requiring resolution at the national level. 
 
JRV Member Allocations 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (C) Ambassador noted that the distribution of official 
positions at the JRVs does not appear equitable and asked if 
the parties have any way to appeal the decisions.  (Note: 
Each JRV is comprised of three members: a president, first 
member, and second members.  Typically, the president and 
first member positions are allocated to designees from the 
two traditional parties (PLC and FSLN), while the second 
member positions are split between the "minority parties." 
The Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) has protested the 
allocation of second member seats, claiming that 40 percent 
were given to the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), 40 
percent to the Alternative for Change (AC), and only 20 
percent to the MRS.  End Note.) 
 
9. (C) Rivas responded that the Departmental Electoral 
Councils (CEDs) appoint the members of the Municipal 
Electoral Councils (CEMs), which in turn appoint the JRV 
officials.  According to Rivas, the parties cannot appeal 
this "complicated procedure," although he claimed that the 
MRS simply did not nominate officials in areas where the 
party does not have a strong presence. 
 
10. (C) Ambassador asked Rivas if the CSE will also train the 
alternate JRV officials, and he answered that he hopes the 
proprietary members will share their training with their 
alternates.  Rivas claimed that JRV officials in Colombia do 
not receive any training at all, only instruction manuals. 
 
Magistrates Rail Against EyT Quick Count 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11. (C) Rivas, Lang, and Herrera all strongly criticized 
plans by Etica y Transparencia (EyT) to conduct a quick count 
for the presidential election on November 5.  Rivas commented 
that the quick count plan "bothers" him and worried that the 
results could be inaccurate.  Herrera warned that if the 
"real" election results do "not match people's expectations" 
but the quick count does, the conflicting information could 
"create a dangerous situation."  Lang bluntly stated that the 
CSE does not trust EyT due to a history of conflict between 
the two institutions and "biased" reports released by EyT in 
the past.  Lang claimed that EyT published a quick count 
after the 2001 elections that was eight points off the actual 
results.  The magistrates did not respond to repeated offers 
to have EyT electoral experts explain the quick count 
methodology. 
 
12. (C) Comment: Lang is mistaken.  The EyT 2001 quick count 
results were only .02 percent different from the final vote 
tally, and the CSE actually requested that EyT release the 
quick count results before the release of the official vote 
tally to validate their own findings.  The FSLN and PLC will 
have an unfair advantage in that they will know, through 
their hacks in the CSE, the results of the quick count before 
the other parties since EyT is legally bound to share the 
results with the CSE before any release.  Local IFES director 
Rafael Lopez Pintor, who has been providing technical 
assistance to the CSE for almost a year, earlier told emboffs 
that the magistrates are behaving in an obstructionist manner 
because they are afraid that the pact parties (PLC and FSLN) 
will lose the elections and they will be replaced -- losing 
their obscenely bloated salary packages and benefits. 
 
Without the constant vigilance of the donor/observer 
community and Nicaraguan civil society groups, the utterly 
politicized CSE would surely have made far less than the 
already minimal efforts to ensure free, fair, and transparent 
elections. 
TRIVELLI