VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2277/01 2862130
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 132130Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7891
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002277 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2026 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR
SUBJECT: DETAILS ON THE PROCESS OF THE ELECTRONIC 
TRANSMISSION OF VOTE RESULTS 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  POL TDYer recently met with officials from 
the local phone company (Enitel) and the Supreme Electoral 
Council (CSE) to seek clarification on the process whereby 
the vote tallies will be electronically submitted to the CSE 
on election day.  Each of Nicaragua's 158 municiaplities will 
host a Municipal Counting Center (CCM) staffed by Enitel 
technicians who will electronically scan the official tally 
sheets and send the results to a central CSE processing 
center in Managua.  Enitel is closely collaborating with the 
CSE and will mobilize over 80% of its workforce to ensure a 
smooth process.  In addition to allowing many of its branch 
offices to serve as CCMs, Enitel will also field teams of 
technicians across the country who can be called in to help 
solve any technical problems that might arise.  Both Enitel 
and the CSE are confident that sufficient checks and balances 
within the system will minimize the chances of manipulation 
of the vote during this component of the process.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) POL TDYer met with a member of the Supreme Electoral 
Council (CSE) and executives with the local telephone 
company, Enitel, to better understand the process by which 
the final election tallies from each voting table (JRV) will 
be electronically transmitted to the CSE on election day. 
This critical component of the electoral process has not 
received much attention in the press, although local 
editorialists and other pundits appear skeptical on the 
transparency of the process.  A few contacts have warned 
Emboffs that this process is vulnerable to disruption either 
intentionally (i.e. via sabotage or partisan manipulation) or 
accidentally (i.e. power outages).  To shed some light on 
these issues POL TDYer met with Enitel's Chief Country 
Executive David Ibarra (on 2 October), Enitel Director of 
Operations Luis Perey (3 October), and with CSE Chief of 
Staff Rodrigo Barreto (4 October). 
 
 
A WORD ON GENERAL CSE PREPARATIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Barreto provided an overview of the CSE's 
preparations for transporting electoral materials and 
personnel on election day.  He confirmed that there will be a 
total of 11,274 voting tables (JRVs) in 4,296 voting centers 
around the country.  Barreto reported that the number of JRVs 
is high because the CSE has worked to ensure that no 
Nicaraguan will have to travel more than 5 kilometers from 
home to cast their vote.  He noted that this coverage has 
been difficult and expensive to manage, but that the CSE has 
been largely successful in coordinating, in conjunction with 
the military, a wide transportation network to support the 
process.  According to a statistical chart provided by 
Barreto, the huge vehicle fleet includes 665 large trucks, 
785 light trucks, 645 buses, and 112 mini-buses.  To ensure 
that materials can be adequately delivered to hard-to-reach 
locales, the CSE reported that it will employ 33 helicopters, 
107 canoes, and 1,991 beasts of burden (i.e. mules). 
(COMMENT: It is unclear how the CSE will employ 33 
helicopters when, according to to DAO and RSO, respectively, 
the Nicaraguan military has approximately 24 helicopters of 
which only 40-50% are operational and the police have no 
helicopters.  END COMMENT.) The CSE will begin packaging 
election materials between 16 and 22 October, and distributed 
using the various transportation means between 27 and 30 
October.  While the results from each JRV will be 
electronically sent to the CSE, the vehicles will also be 
responsible for transporting the hardcopy ballots and 
associated paperwork back to the CSE. 
 
 
PREPARING RESULTS FOR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Upon the completion of the voting process, each JRV 
will begin counting the results.  A step-by-step guide (Paso 
a Paso) of JRV procedures published by the CSE establishes 
clear guidelines for how the final tallies are registered and 
transmitted to the central CSE processing center in Managua. 
According to the guide, once all the ballots have been 
counted by the JRV, the valid, annulled, and unused ballots 
are packaged separately, sealed, and labeled.  These are then 
placed in a bag marked "electoral packet," which is in turn 
sealed.  On the outside of the bag is affixed a copy of the 
official tally sheet (or acta).  Once the ballots have been 
sealed, the JRV president is responsible for personally 
delivering the official acta to the Municipal Computing 
Center (CCM) where it will be scanned and electronically 
transmitted to the CSE.  While Post was originally told by an 
OAS contact that only the ballots for the presidential 
 
election were to undergo this process, Barreto and Perey 
reported that all the final tallies from each of the four 
races (president, national-level National Assembly 
candidates, regional Assembly candidates, and members of the 
Central American Parliament) will be submitted this way. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Barreto explained that the JRV President will be 
accompanied to the CCM by the other members of the JRV and 
the fiscales.  Barreto and the Enitel officials commented 
wryly that this is often a humorous sight as all of these 
officials - seven or eight of them - typically insist on 
riding in the same vehicle.  Once at the CCM, however, only 
the JRV President will be allowed inside.  He will then turn 
the acta over to an Enitel technician who will then, in the 
presence of the JRV President, scan the document and transmit 
it to the CSE.  Ibarra and Perey noted that admittance to the 
office (which in most cases will be one of Enitel's regional 
offices) is restricted to the JRV leader in order to ensure 
that order is maintained. 
 
¶6.  (C) POL TDYer queried both Barreto and Perey whether it 
would be possible for the JRV president to swap out the 
official acta for a manipulated one while temporarily out of 
sight from the rest of the JRV.  Both officials thought this 
unlikely and Barreto explained that there is a control in 
place to prevent this from happening.  He noted that after 
sending the acta over the wire, the technician will print and 
give to the JRV President a confirmation copy of the document 
that was sent.  The other JRV members and fiscales will be 
able to demand to see this once the JRV president leaves the 
CCM.  These officials will be able to check to make sure the 
numbers and signatures match up to the original sheet. 
 
 
MUNICIPAL COMPUTING CENTERS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Each of the country's 158 municipalities will have 
a CCM.  Most are located in the local Enitel office, with the 
exception of some 60 municipalities where Enitel has no 
presence.  In these locations, the transmission hardware 
(i.e. computers, scanners, or faxes) will be installed in one 
of the local voting centers.  Enitel technicians will be on 
hand at all 158 centers and will be responsible for scanning 
and submitting the results.  Ibarra and Perey assured POL 
TDYer that their personnel will be equipped to deal with any 
equipment problems that may arise.  In addition, those CCMs 
located in Enitel offices will have independent sources of 
electricity (i.e. generators) that will enable them to send 
the information in the event of a power outage.  Perey noted 
that the phone connection at all of the CCMs has already been 
tested three times to ensure they are functioning, and that 
the sites will be retested a couple days before the election. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Most of the actas will be scanned and then sent via 
encrypted channels to the CSE where they will be un-encoded 
and processed.  Perey noted, however, that a few of the CCMs 
will use a fax instead because logistical challenges 
associated with operating the more complicated scanning 
hardware in some areas.  Perey enthusiastically claimed that 
use of the scanners in the majority of the locations will 
improve the overall electoral process.  He noted that in 
previous elections the primary means of transmission was via 
fax, which can occasionally be problematic because some 
documents inevitably arrive with smudges or formatting 
irregularities.  A scanned document on the other hand, 
provides a clean and clear image - which will prove useful by 
those scrutinizing the process (i.e. checking signatures and 
reading handwritten numbers). 
 
 
THE ACTA 
- - - - - 
 
¶9.  (U) Barreto gave POL TDYer a copy of the actas that will 
be scanned and transmitted on election day.  It is a 
single-sided sheet on paper slightly larger than a legal pad. 
 There are four separate tables for each of the four races on 
the page.  Each of these charts allot spaces to record the 
number of votes received by the political parties.  There is 
also a specified area to register how many votes from each 
party were annulled or challenged.  At the bottom of the page 
are spaces for the three JRV members and five fiscales (one 
from each party) to print their names, identification 
(cedula) numbers, and signatures.  By signing the document 
these members signify their agreement with the results. 
 
 
ENITEL MOBILIZING PERSONNEL, MATERIALS TO SUPPORT ELECTION 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Perey noted that Enitel is mobilizing 600 
employees around the country to help with the elections - 
some 80% of the total Enitel workforce.  In addition, the 
company will have mobile technical teams around the country 
that will be able to handle technical or mechanical problems 
beyond the means of the CCM Enitel technicians.  These teams 
can provide backup generators or shore up missing telephone 
wires.  In the event that telephone wires are missing (i.e. 
stolen) or damaged, these teams will be able to install new 
wire, or create a temporary patch that would enable the 
connection to be made.  Ibarra said these teams should be 
able to respond to calls in a matter of hours. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Some contacts have speculated to Emboffs that the 
election could be disrupted by the theft of telephone wires, 
but it appears that Enitel and the CSE are aware of this 
problem and taking steps to head it off.  Ibarra acknowledged 
that cable theft has spiked in the last few months because 
international copper prices have increased by over 300% -- 
thieves are cutting down telephone wires and removing the 
copper elements for sale on the black market.  He expressed 
frustration that the judicial sector was not imposing 
sufficiently stiff penalties for the crime and noted that in 
August there were 500 cases of wire theft; while 300 suspects 
were apprehended, they are all back on the street.  Enitel 
has asked the government to talk judges into holding cable 
thieves at least until after the election.  Barreto reported 
that police and/or military officials will be providing 
security in the areas around the CCMs, which could help to 
decrease the likelihood of these thefts impacting the CCM. 
 
 
ELECTRICITY ISSUES STILL A CHALLENGE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12.  (C) While many of the CCMs will be able to function in 
the event of a power outage thanks to backup generators, 
Barreto said he is still concerned that a lack of electricity 
could still complicate matters.  Those CCMs not located in 
Enitel offices may not have generators to send in the 
results, not to mention guaranteed lighting.  Barreto 
strongly criticized President Enrique Bolanos whom he said 
had told him in a recent meeting that he (the President) 
could not guarantee continuous power on election day. 
Barreto said that the CSE is doing its utmost to offset this 
potential problem, including providing candles or lanterns to 
some centers. 
 
 
MANAGUA STADIUM PLAN DRAWING COMPLAINTS FROM ALN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (C) The CSE has announced that the National stadium 
located in Managua will be used as a CCM for JRVs in the city 
that do not have capabilities to send the data on their own. 
Perey noted that thirty computers will be set up in the 
stadium and said the process will look much the same as it 
does elsewhere, with JRV presidents arriving to send the 
final actas.  The ALN, however, has expressed concern that 
because there are over 4,000 JRVs in Managua, use of the 
stadium as a focal point for so many voting tables could 
result in disorder, which, in turn, could lead to errors or 
other problems. 
 
 
CSE TO STICK TO THE LETTER OF THE LAW 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶14.  (C) Barreto expressed frustration that the CSE is put in 
a difficult position of having to follow an electoral code 
that is admittedly deficient and partisan.  He is tired, 
however, of the CSE being made out by the press as 
incompetent, or worse, corrupt.  Barreto argued that the CSE 
is often criticized for backing the stronger political 
parties (i.e. the PLC or FSLN), but that in reality the CSE 
has no choice but to enforce the laws and rules, many of 
which were established by those very parties.  For instance, 
he characterized as unfounded recent MRS claims that the CSE 
was acting illegally by not distributing the third member of 
the JRV positions equally among the remaining political 
parties (the top two slots go to the parties that led the 
previous elections).  He asserted that the law does not state 
that the distribution has to be even (COMMENT: It does not 
stipulate that it should be uneven, either. END COMMENT.). 
 
¶15.  (C) Barreto made no attempt to justify the existing 
rules and admitted that some are unfair.  That said, he 
 
criticized the MRS for being too "weak" and said that parties 
that are unable to field observers or fiscales to all of the 
voting sites have no right to complain about potential fraud. 
 He pointed out that the MRS was only able to nominate 
candidates for about 50% of the slots open to political 
parties (i.e. fiscales, JRV members, and suplentes). 
Interestingly, he added that this was the first election in 
which the PLC has been unable to field members in all of the 
positions available to them.  Barreto characterized the FSLN 
as the most prepared and organized of the political parties. 
 
 
FSLN TO RELY ON DIRTY BUT LEGAL TACTICS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶16.  (C) Barreto was confident that the CSE has constructed a 
very tight procedure that makes fraud difficult.  That said, 
he noted that the better prepared political parties - he 
referred specifically to the FSLN - would be able to take 
advantage of deficiencies or loopholes within the law to 
manipulate a favorable outcome.  He said the Sandinistas know 
the legalities of the code inside and out because they have 
used their influence in the electoral council to create the 
laws.  He claimed the Sandinistas already have teams of 
lawyers ready to jump into action immediately after the vote 
to influence the challenge-resolution process, as evidenced 
by the FSLN's ability to win Granada in the 2004 municipal 
elections.  Barreto noted that the Sandinistas have succeeded 
with this strategy in the past and he expects the FSLN will 
employ these tactics in November.  Thus, his concern was not 
that the FSLN would 'steal' the election, but that it could 
manipulate the results in its favor using entirely legal 
means. 
 
 
¶17.  (C) COMMENT:  While these meetings did not yield 
definitive proof that the electronic transmission process 
will be free of manipulation, it appears that there are 
several checks and balances in place. END COMMENT. 
TRIVELLI