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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2248/01 2840008
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110008Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7861
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002248 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2026 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR
SUBJECT: CODEL BURTON MEETS WITH EDMUNDO JARQUIN, FORMER 
CONTRAS, ELECTION OBSERVERS, AND PRESIDENT BOLANOS 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  This cable provides a readout of several 
meetings Congressman Dan Burton held with various members of 
the political class during his 22-24 September visit.  The 
congressman spoke with Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) 
candidate Edmundo Jarquin during which Jarquin reaffirmed his 
commitment to opposing Daniel Ortega.  The following day he 
met with several former Contras who are members of the 
Nicaraguan Resistance Party (PRN).  These former guerrillas 
eloquently discussed their support for Eduardo Montealegre 
and disdain for the political pact between Arnoldo Aleman and 
Ortega, which they see as having corroded Nicaragua's 
democracy.  Burton next met with representatives from the 
various organizations (i.e. USAID, OAS, IFES) who are helping 
to reinforce the electoral institutions here with an eye 
toward ensuring a clean and fair election.  The members said 
that while nothing could guarantee a clean election, it was 
possible to minimize the potential for fraud with sufficient 
planning, a strong observation effort, and a drive to bolster 
attendance at the polls.  Finally, Burton discussed the 
election with President Enrique Bolanos, who was optimistic 
about Montealegre's chances despite campaign funding 
problems.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
Edmundo Jarquin 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) Edmundo Jarquin began the meeting by talking about 
his FSLN roots, and said he had never really been a die-hard 
party member.  He acknowledged that he had been involved in 
the Sandinista government in various roles, but described 
these as more technical than political.  He described the 
progression of the MRS and its formation around Herty 
Lewites, and the way he has sought to carry on Herty's 
legacy, while at the same time stamping his own persona on 
the campaign.  He then talked about the broad mass of support 
his Sandinista Renovation Front (MRS) has developed from 
Sandinistas disenchanted with Daniel Ortega as well as that 
of independent voters.  While he did not provide a figure, he 
assured Burton that he was taking votes away from Ortega.  He 
said the MRS has developed a particular appeal to younger 
voters who are disillusioned with traditional parties and 
politics. 
 
¶3.  (C) Jarquin told Burton that the recent Greenberg poll - 
which had Ortega at (28%), Montealegre (24%), Jarquin (20%), 
and Rizo (14%)) is an indication that he and the MRS are 
still picking up more votes and thus have room to grow. 
Jarquin thought that some of this increase was the result of 
his performance in the CNN-sponsored debate between the 
candidates (which most analysts say he won hands down).  He 
indicated that he was surprised Montealegre's performance - 
which he characterized as positive - had not seemed to have 
much of an effect on his standings. 
 
¶4.  (C) When asked by Burton whether he was against Ortega, 
Jarquin said "absolutely" and that the FSLN would do 
everything they could to secure a first-round win because 
they know that he cannot win in a second round.  He said the 
broad mass of non-FSLN voters would swing to the strongest 
anti-Ortega candidate closer to the election.  He said that 
MRS voter analysis indicated that under such conditions, 80% 
of Montealegre supporters would swing toward him, and vice 
versa, because their motivation/inclination is predominantly 
anti-pact. 
 
¶5.  (C) Jarquin reported that he was surprised that Rizo had 
even maintained 14% at this point, because he has been so 
tarnished and clearly considered an Aleman pawn.  When asked 
by Burton if he would ever go into some kind of coalition 
with Ortega, he said "no way," and added that the majority of 
his supporters were anti-Ortega and would not stand for such 
an agreement.  In response to a question by Burton whether 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez was supporting the FSLN, he 
replied "of course" but that most Nicaraguans reject the 
Chavez connection.  Burton concluded the meeting by 
congratulating him for his battle against Ortega and wished 
him well in his campaign. 
 
 
Former Contras: Montealegre Strong, Rizo Weak, 
Ortega-Aleman Pact Dangerous 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) Congressman Burton, Ambassador, and Polcouns and met 
with four former Contra leaders who are now members of the 
Nicaraguan Resistance Party (PRN)  backing Eduardo 
Montealegre's Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) to discuss 
the strength of the ALN campaign and the political pact 
 
between Arnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega.  The PRN members 
present were Luis Fley (Comandante "Johnson"), Jose Angel 
Talavera ("Chacal"), Encarnacion Valdivia ("Tigrillo"), and 
Oscar Sobalvarro.  Talavera kicked off the meeting by 
Asserting that the PRN is one of the ALN's strongest 
components and noted that his brother's (Salvador Talavera) 
recent defection to the FSLN was part of a grand plan to 
embarrass the ALN.  He added that PRN leaders think Daniel 
Ortega is afraid of Montealegre and considers  him a threat 
to victory, which explains the underhanded tactics he is 
using against him. 
 
¶7.  (C) The former resistance fighters see Montealegre as the 
best solution to Nicaragua's problems.  While they 
acknowledge that he may not be able to solve all of 
Nicaragua's problems, he can be counted on to oppose the 
Ortega-Aleman pact and fight corruption.  They added that 
diversity of his alliance proves Montealegre has widespread 
backing.  The PRN members said that their organization 
provides a significant boost to the ALN, estimating that the 
PRN has about 6,000 grassroots supporters throughout the 
country.  Moreover, they discounted as myth the assumption 
that the PLC has a strong party machinery to fall back on. 
Fley asked rhetorically where that strength was when the PLC 
suffered such a large defeat in the 2004 municipal elections. 
 He said that the PLC lost 53 municipalities and now controls 
only two of the 17 Departments. 
 
¶8.  (C) Echoing this point, Talavera noted that the structure 
of the PLC has been disorganized while the ALN has made 
gains.  One PRN leader speculated that more PLC supporters 
are likely to weigh in behind Montealegre closer to the 
election if he continues to dominate the polls.  They noted, 
however, that a lack of resources is the biggest challenge to 
Montealegre's campaign.  They said that additional funding 
will become all the more of a necessity as the party puts 
itself in a position to fight back against the 'dirty 
campaign' launched by the PLC and FSLN to smear Montealegre's 
name. 
 
¶9.  (C)  In response to a question from Burton, Talavera 
insisted that  there was plenty of proof that Rizo is 
beholden to Aleman.  For instance, he (Rizo) was forced to 
accept Aleman's decisions over who would compose the party's 
slate of deputies, and he was only allowed to select one 
candidate.  He noted that Aleman did the same thing with 
Bolanos, keeping a tight control over the party apparatus by 
picking loyalists to fill the bulk of party positions.  Other 
PRN members opined that Rizo may not be happy with this 
arrangement, but lacks the strength to stand up to Aleman. 
 
¶10.  (C) All four PRN leaders expressed certainty that the 
Aleman-Ortega pact is not only still active, but is the most 
prevalent threat to democracy in Nicaragua.  They explained 
to Burton that this agreement stands at the very center of 
the ability of the PLC and FSLN to control the National 
Assembly, the courts, and other critical institutions. 
Talavera explained that Ortega and Aleman share the same 
motivations -- the desire to entrench their own personal 
power -- and noted that a victory by either the PLC or the 
FSLN in the election would be equally damaging.  One of the 
PRN members told his audience that the PLC and FSLN have an 
agreement to alternate periods in office, but that Ortega, if 
victorious, would back out of this deal, assert greater 
control over the government, and attempt to extend his time 
in office for as long as possible.  He pointed out that as 
long as Aleman is in jail, Ortega will have the upper hand in 
their relationship.  He has forced Aleman into making 
concessions by threatening to return him with stricter terms 
of confinement or with returning him to jail. 
 
Election Observers: Guardedly Pleased With Election Support 
Efforts 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11.  (C) Burton, the Ambassador, and Polcouns met with 
representatives from various organizations involved in 
bolstering the election process, including USAID, the OAS, 
and NGOs such as IRI, NDI, and IFES.  Burton  asked how, 
given partisan control over the Supreme Electoral Council 
(CSE), a clean election is possible.  The CEPPS partners 
responded that while nothing could guarantee a clean 
election, it was possible to minimize the potential for fraud 
with sufficient planning, a strong observation effort, and a 
drive to bolster attendance at the polls.  IFES is training 
CSE staff at the Departmental, Municipal, and poll levels to 
ensure electoral officials are properly trained to handle 
election day activities and the electoral complaint process. 
The CEPPS partners said that the ability of all parties to 
 
have one political party pollwatcher assigned to each JRV to 
protect party votes will also help to provide an extra layer 
of scrutiny over the process.  Attendees said that the 
domestic and international observer mission will be key to 
the success of the election, and USAID affirmed that the 
domestic observers will be mounting a comprehensive effort. 
 
¶12.  (C) A USAID representative noted that the national 
observation mission will be the second largest in history 
(second only to Indonesia), and the OAS international 
observer mission will be the longest OAS mission conducted to 
date.  The OAS noted that all this provides impartial 
observers with more opportunities to denounce fraud than was 
present in the 2001 elections.  The IRI representative 
reported that CSE complaints over efforts to educate poll 
watchers may well be a sign that their efforts are working. 
The OAS representative noted that his organization would be 
meeting with Ortega in order to discuss Ortega's recent 
criticism of the OAS efforts -- he has charged that the US is 
using the OAS mission as a tool to manipulate the results of 
the election. 
 
¶13.  (C) The Ambassador noted that voter turnout will be key; 
the larger the turnout, the harder it will be for Ortega to 
manipulate the outcome.  With this in mind, the Embassy is 
supporting an extensive 'get out the vote' campaign, with 
voter education drives (including in universities and high 
schools), rock concerts, t-shirts, media interviews, etc. 
There are some signs that these efforts are paying off. 
Since the beginning of the year, for instance, over 200,000 
cedulas (voter IDs) have been issued, and in recent months 
another 200,000 people have applied.  While these latter may 
not receive their cedulas ahead of the election, the CSE is 
in the process of distributing temporary cards with pictures 
that will allow the holders to participate in the national 
elections and a possible runoff.  Although the CSE cedula 
distribution efforts have been delayed -- according to an NDI 
study only about 18% of applicants have received their cards 
-- the OAS is recommending the CSE accept people's receipts 
from when they applied for the cedula as a backup for voters 
who do not receive documentation prior to election day.  The 
OAS noted that this solution was adopted earlier this year 
during the Atlantic Coast regional elections.  The voting 
population may have expanded considerably from previous 
years. 
 
¶14.  (C) To add pressure on the CSE to ensure that results 
are not significantly tampered with after they have been sent 
for tabulation, both the OAS and Ethics and Transparency, the 
local chapter of Transparency International, will be doing 
quick-counts.  This will provide an accurate idea of what the 
results should look like for the presidential race and a few 
legislative races within hours after polls close, serving as 
a deterrent against manipulation of electoral results. 
Burton concluded, saying that "this is very impressive" and 
that this ought to be "an example to the whole world for how 
to help an election." 
 
President Bolanos Urges Support for Montealegre and Pans 
Rizo 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
¶15.  (C)  Burton and the Ambassador met with President 
Enrique Bolanos to discuss the elections and Montealegre's 
candidacy.  Bolanos welcomed his visitors and started the 
meeting by lamenting the current problem of people falling 
victim to tainted alcohol.  (Comment:  In recent weeks 
criminals selling bootleg liquor laced with methanol have 
caused injury to over 700 people, predominantly in Leon.  End 
Comment.)  The President had spent much of the morning in 
Leon where he visited hospitals that are treating the 
victims.  Bolanos said that the death toll now stands at 50, 
and that he had met with the family of five children whose 
mother had just passed away. 
 
¶16.  (C) Moving on to the issue of the election, Burton 
queried Bolanos over the origins of the Aleman-Ortega pact. 
Bolanos replied that this history is somewhat murky, but 
pointed that relations between the two caudillos took a 
noticeable change in 2003 when Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo 
took a trip to Rome.  Bolanos said that during his absence, 
Sandinistas -- ordered by Lenin Cerna -- broke into the 
Cardinal's house, stole his safe, and photocopied its 
contents.  As the Cardinal had at the time been a close 
Aleman ally, it is suspected that the FSLN gained access to 
incriminating information that has enabled the party to 
dominate both Aleman and the Cardinal. 
 
¶17. (C) Discussing the strength of the PLC, Bolanos noted 
that the PLC still retains much of its former strength and 
enjoys a history, albeit brief, of being the dominant 
centrist party.  He said that many people, particularly in 
rural areas, think that Montealegre is still with the PLC, 
and will cast their vote for the PLC casilla, believing they 
are in fact voting for Montealegre.  Bolanos suggested that 
the best hope for defeating Ortega would be for some kind of 
deal that unites Rizo and Montealegre.  He said "I have been 
trying to help them get together" for some time, but that the 
difficulty was that one person would have to step down. 
Bolanos also noted that Rizo probably sees stepping down and 
away from the PLC as political suicide.  The chances of Rizo 
challenging Aleman are also remote as he has no strength 
within the party.  One of Bolanos's advisers who was present 
in the meeting noted that of the diehard PLC voter base (he 
estimated at 12% of the population) the vast majority remain 
loyal to Aleman while only a handful are attracted by Rizo or 
his running mate Jose Antonio Alvarado.  Bolanos noted that 
Rizo is weak.  "As my vice president he, in all his meetings 
with the Cabinet, never managed to carry across a point." 
 
¶18.  (C) Bolanos noted that Montealegre's biggest obstacle is 
raising enough money to sustain a strong campaign, 
speculating that Montealegre has only managed to raise about 
$5 million.  However, he remained optimistic of Montealegre's 
chances of winning in November.  Bolanos  appeared to base 
his optimism more on his own track record of having overcome 
significant political obstacles during his administration 
rather than on any real political evidence.  Bolanos said "I 
dream that we can beat both of them," referring to Aleman and 
Ortega and told Burton to "have faith," saying that "I have 
the support of only 9 out of 90 votes in the Congress, and 
nevertheless we managed to pass some legislation."  He noted 
that while the going has been tough, Bolanos and his team 
have managed to have some success in reducing some of the 
pacto ability to influence the election.  For example, 
recently his administration was able to push the CSE to adopt 
changes to the electoral procedure that theoretically makes 
it harder for polling places to negate ballots.  (Comment: 
Bolanos was probably referring to a recent change in which 
the CSE raised from one to two the number of signatures 
required by JRV members to nullify a ballot box.  End 
Comment.). 
 
¶19.  (C) Bolanos suggested to Burton that the United States 
take care to word its public messages in a more positive 
light.  For instance, rather than issuing a tough reminder of 
how bad Ortega would be, to instead offer how the two 
countries would have the opportunity with a democratic 
candidate, to move forward and consolidate the close 
friendship between the two countries.  Burton responded, 
saying "You are a very wise man."  Bolanos joked that while 
he was old, he was still capable.  He pointed out that upon 
taking office he was older than former President Ronald 
Reagan when he was elected. 
TRIVELLI