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DE RUEHMU #2247/01 2832348
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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7859
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002247 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CEN FOR SCHIFFER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR
SUBJECT: MISKITO VOTE POTENTIAL OBSTACLE TO FSLN AMBITIONS 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador P. Trivelli for reasons 1.4b 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Despite the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front's (FSLN) significant campaign efforts in the remote 
North Atlantic Autonomous Zone (RAAN), the indigenous Miskito 
population remains staunchly anti-Sandinista.  In response, 
the FSLN-allied Yatama government has forced unelected 
leaders onto Miskito communities in violation of the law, 
creating civil unrest and low-grade violence.  The FSLN,s 
efforts may be part of larger plan to facilitate illicit 
trade on the Atlantic Coast.  END SUMMARY 
 
A Battle for Hearts and Minds 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The humble soft-spoken ex-resistance fighter, Osorno 
Coleman - aka "Commandante Blas" - is locked in a battle of 
ideals against the FSLN's powerful PR machinery in the RAAN. 
Coleman is urging his fellow Miskitos never to forget the 
past and the atrocities committed against the Miskito Indians 
in the 1980s by the Sandinistas.  Using disturbing video 
footage shot in the 1980s (from the Documentary "Nicaragua 
Was Our Home") featuring interviews with Miskitos, newspaper 
articles, and his own words, Coleman recently appeared on 
Channel 2's popular morning talk show "Primer Plano" to 
remind the nation about what happened to the Miskito people. 
 
¶3.  (C) Coleman, who was known as a fierce fighter during the 
1980s and is now running as a deputy for Montealegre,s 
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) party, is a leader in the 
Miskito counter-campaign against the FSLN.  With few 
resources and little logistical support, Coleman relies on 
the determined nature of the Miskito people and his own 
reputation to help resist the FSLN.  On Oct 4, Coleman sat 
down with Poloff to describe the FSLN,s campaign efforts on 
the Atlantic Coast. 
 
Yatama,s Alliance with the FSLN 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) In the May 4, 2006 regional elections in the RAAN, 
Yatama - the indigenous Miskito political party founded in 
the 1980s by anti-Sandinista fighters - won 13 seats, the 
FSLN won 16 seats, and the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) 
won 16 seats.  That same evening, Ortega announced an 
alliance with Brooklyn Rivera, president of Yatama, giving 
Ortega a majority 29-vote block in the Regional Council.  Ten 
days later, according to Coleman, 90% of the Yatama 
leadership denounced the alliance and joined the ALN.  Since 
the split, there has been growing tension between the two 
Yatama groups.  In a surprising move, Sandy Bay,s Yatama 
mayor, Elisabeth Henriquez, went so far as to dance on stage 
with Daniel Ortega during the July 19 celebration of the 
Sandinista Revolution. 
 
FSLN,s Proselytizating Efforts Fail 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Much of the FSLN,s campaign success in Nicaragua,s 
rural areas is due to its well-established party 
infrastructure, enabling them to go door-to-door with their 
campaign messages.  However, according to Coleman, this 
strategy has failed in the RAAN.  Every time an FSLN campaign 
caravan attempts to enter a Miskito village, hostile crowds 
throwing stones and food and waving anti-FSLN signs chase 
them away.  Coleman recounted one occasion where the FSLN 
visited a Miskito village with sodas and snacks and had them 
promptly thrown back at them by the villagers.  On another 
occasion, Brooklyn Rivera asked a local teacher if he could 
stay in the teacher,s house one evening instead of returning 
home.  The teacher responded that he could not allow it 
because the teacher would face physical harm from the 
villagers.  The FSLN have also tried using the prestige of an 
ex-combatant - known as Tiger 17, famous for wearing his 
pistols like a cowboy - to influence the Miskito villagers. 
This effort also failed because the Miskito,s view him as a 
traitor and drove him out of town with rocks. 
 
A Change in Tactics - Using the Airwaves 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) As a result, reports Coleman, the FSLN now uses the 
radio to spread their message.  Using Radio Caribe, La 
Portanisima, Radio Baca, and Radio Juvenil, the FSLN is 
bombarding the RAAN with campaign messages.  At a funding 
level of 7,000 Cordobas a month (approx. US$400), Coleman,s 
opposition group cannot compete with the FSLN.  Coleman 
claims, however, that most Miskitos, change stations or turn 
off their radios when they hear FSLN advertisements. 
 
Influencing the Influencers 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Coleman also revealed that the FSLN - through 
Brooklyn Rivera - has been replacing the local judges and 
coordinators with FSLN-allied personnel.  According to 
Coleman, these actions violate Law 445, which gives Miskito 
communities the legal right to elect their judges and 
coordinators.  Acting much like a mayor, the local 
coordinators are responsible for organizing civic events and 
village work projects such as communal harvests as well as 
allocating local government resources.  Coleman reports that 
Rivera has successfully over-ruled community decisions and 
imposed his own people in at least eight communities.  In 
many more, the people are embroiled in struggles to elect or 
keep their own candidates. 
 
¶8.  (C) This new tactic, explained Coleman, is much more 
dangerous than campaign propaganda because the judges and 
coordinators wield significant formal and informal authority 
in Miskito communities.  In the communities where Rivera has 
imposed his own people, the level of civil unrest and 
low-grade violence have increased.  Judges are ruling in 
favor of FSLN or pro-FSLN Yatama supporters and coordinators 
are using local resources to support the FSLN campaign. 
Aside from these abuses of formal power, Coleman warned, is 
the more insidious issue of informal influence.  Culturally, 
Miskito,s put a lot of faith in their leaders and are easily 
influenced by them. 
 
Money and Meat 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Coleman commented on two additional FSLN tactics used 
to influence voters.  The FSLN has been paying Miskito 
community leaders 150 Cordobas (US$8.50) to vote for the FSLN 
and to encourage others to do the same.  In addition, the 
FSLN has promised to slaughter hundreds of cattle the week 
before the election and distribute free meat to villagers in 
the RAAN.  These cattle have been in place near Miskito 
villages for the past several months in preparation for the 
elections.  Coleman reports that many village leaders have 
approached him for advice, asking whether they should accept 
the money and meat.  Coleman,s response:  "This is a small 
down payment on a very large debt.  Take the food and money 
and vote for someone else." 
 
PLC Sends Message of ALN-FSLN Alliance 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Coleman also mentioned that the Constitutional 
Liberal Party (PLC) is announcing that the ALN and FSLN have 
joined forces, using as evidence the recent defection from 
the ALN to the FSLN of Salvador Talavera, the president of 
the Nicaraguan Resistance Party (PRN), a key ALN ally. 
 
¶11.  COMMENT: (C) What happens in the RAAN will likely impact 
both in the elections and the next administration.  The 
FSLN,s interest in the RAAN and Atlantic Coast extends well 
beyond the elections.  According to Javier Williams-Slate, 
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and a Miskito from the RAAN, 
the FSLN, using Venezuelan financing, is buying up large 
tracts of land on the Atlantic Coast in order to facilitate 
illicit trade in timber, ore and narcotics.  The FSLN may 
also be interested in oil exploration off the Atlantic Coast. 
 An FSLN judge in the Atlantic South (RAAS) recently upheld a 
questionable injunction challenging the way in which offshore 
exploration rights were awarded to two U.S. firms. (NOTE: 
Embassy is working to remove the injunction. END NOTE)  An 
Ortega victory would help solidify FSLN and Venezuelan 
control of the Atlantic Coast.  If Ortega does not win, the 
FSLN still controls the RAAN Regional Counsel through the 
FSLN-Yatama 29-seat voting block achieved in May,s regional 
elections, and Ortega supporter Brooklyn Rivera is certain to 
obtain a National Asssembly seat.  Either way, the RAAN and 
entire Atlantic Coast may once again become a focus of 
internal conflict. 
TRIVELLI