VZCZCXRO3915
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLG #0914/01 2920945
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190945Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3404
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC 0472
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LILONGWE 000914 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/S, AF/EPS, INR/AA 
USAID FOR AFR/SA 
TREASURY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS/AFRICA 
PRETORIA FOR USTDA 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAID EWWT ELTN KMCA PGOV MI
SUBJECT: The Shire-Zambezi Waterway: God's Highway or Bingu's 
Folly? 
 
 
LILONGWE 00000914  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: President Bingu wa Mutharika is strongly pushing the 
idea of re-opening the Shire and Zambezi rivers to commercial 
navigation, to help address Malawi's serious problem of limited and 
expensive transportation links to global markets.  A recent 
EU-funded pre-feasibility study offers possible options for use of 
the waterway, but also raises serious doubts about its economic 
viability.  The scheme is highly political, and not without 
controversy in Malawi.  It is unclear whether the project would 
actually attract paying customers.  End summary. 
 
Malawi's Transport Problem 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Soon after taking office in 2004, President Mutharika began 
to promote the idea of re-opening a water route from Malawi to the 
Indian Ocean, as an alternative transportation corridor to access 
global markets.  High transportation costs are Malawi's single 
biggest investment constraint, and the number-one complaint of both 
importers and exporters.  Transportation adds at least fifty percent 
to the cost of most imports, and for exporters, Malawi's advantage 
as a low-cost producer is offset by the very high expense of getting 
goods out of the country.  President Mutharika's economic growth 
plan centers around stimulating exports, but that will remain a 
distant goal if Malawi cannot improve its transportation links. 
 
¶3. (U) Malawi's two former rail links to the outside world were 
destroyed in the Mozambican civil war, and only one line-- the 
Nacala Corridor-- has recently begun to operate again at limited 
capacity.  The vast majority of the country's goods move by truck to 
and from the ports of Beira, Durban and Dar es Salaam.  While highly 
flexible and reliable, trucking is the most costly transport option, 
and recent world oil price increases have made it even more so.  The 
country's limited trucking fleet cannot cope with the seasonal 
demands of large agricultural exporters such as the tobacco 
industry, and shippers often complain of delays because not enough 
trucks are available during peak times.  The shortage of trucks, 
along with regulation that protects local truckers from foreign 
competition, combine to give Malawi the highest transportation costs 
in the southern African region. 
 
A Natural Route 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (U) President Mutharika's answer to this problem is the 
Shire-Zambezi Waterway, a route by which export goods would move 
from the town of Nsanje in far southern Malawi down the Shire River 
into Mozambique, then into the Zambezi River and down to the Indian 
Ocean.  The distance from Nsanje to the mouth of the Zambezi at 
Chinde, Mozambique is 325 kilometers, making the waterway Malawi's 
closest connection to the Indian Ocean. 
 
¶5. (U) British explorer and missionary David Livingstone used the 
Shire-Zambezi route on his explorations of the region in the 1850s, 
calling it "God's Highway into Africa."  In the early 20th century, 
British colonials plied the route with shallow-draft paddle steamers 
which remained in operation until the 1950s.  Up to the late 1980s, 
small barges were used to export molasses from a large 
government-owned sugar estate in southern Malawi.  Like many of 
Malawi's ailing parastatal companies, that estate virtually 
collapsed in the early 1990s, and the river shipments ceased.  The 
estate was later privatized and sold to South African sugar giant 
Illovo, which today ships its product by road and rail. 
 
An Intriguing Idea, but Many Problems 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) A recently released pre-feasibility study funded by the 
European Union expresses some serious reservations about the project 
and calls for more extensive research, but recommends two possible 
options for use of the waterway.  The more modest of the two options 
advocates the use of pontoon barges that could carry up to sixty 
20-foot containers between Nsanje and Chinde, at the mouth of the 
Zambezi on the Indian Ocean.  This option would require construction 
of a small port at Chinde so that containers could be transferred 
from the pontoons to larger ships that would carry the cargo to 
Beira or Durban.  Dredging would be required at certain points in 
the Shire and near the Zambezi mouth in order to make the route 
passable.  The estimated startup cost for this option is 
approximately US$17 million. 
 
¶7. (U) The second option recommends the use of larger coastal 
vessels that could carry 150 containers through the waterway and 
down the Indian Ocean coast all the way to Beira, which lies 
 
LILONGWE 00000914  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
approximately 200 km south of the Zambezi mouth.  From Beira the 
cargo would be transferred to larger vessels that would carry it to 
Durban.  This option would require US$36 million to start, in 
addition to several million dollars annually of dredging to keep the 
channel navigable for the larger vessels. 
 
¶8. (U) Both scenarios present some significant administrative and 
logistical problems.  Since most of the waterway lies within 
Mozambique, that government's cooperation in the project is 
essential.  Aside from the construction of a port at Chinde for the 
first option, both options envision significant dredging operations 
and ongoing administration of the waterway.  Although Malawian 
officials have discussed the plan with their Mozambican 
counterparts, the latter have not strongly endorsed the idea.  On 
the contrary, Mozambican officials appear to be much more interested 
in promoting rail and road corridors, in particular the Sena rail 
line that runs from the Moatize coal fields near Malawi's southern 
border down to the port of Beira. 
 
¶9. (U) Another problem is the isolation of Nsanje, the tiny town 
that would serve as the northern terminus of the waterway.  Nsanje 
lies about three hours south by road from Malawi's commercial 
capital Blantyre.  About 100 km of that road is rough unpaved 
surface, and would require upgrading to handle cargo to and from the 
Nsanje port.  The rail link with Nsanje was cut several years ago 
after a flood that shifted the course of the Shire River and washed 
away large sections of track.  Much of the line has not been used 
since the late 1990s, and over 60 km would require rehabilitation. 
The entire Lower Shire Valley area north of Nsanje is prone to 
significant flooding every rainy season, and the town is sometimes 
cut off from the rest of the country.  On top of that, the Shire 
River is prone to significant variations in water level, due to 
seismic activity in Lake Malawi, which sits directly in the East 
African Great Rift Valley.  During one period in the 1920s the river 
level dropped precipitously and the Shire actually dried up in 
various locations for a period of several years.  While unusual, 
such an event cannot be ruled out in the future. 
 
¶10. (U) In addition to Mother Nature's challenges, there are also 
man-made difficulties.  Malawi has suffered serious deforestation in 
the past 15 years, and the resulting siltation of its rivers, 
including the Shire, will likely require ever-increasing amounts of 
dredging to keep navigation channels open.  Local agricultural 
experts often remark that Malawi's largest export is its soil, much 
of which is washing down the Shire.  That problem is not likely to 
improve soon. 
 
¶11. (U) Finally, the inter-modal concept of the scheme, in which 
cargo would be containerized and moved by road or rail to Nsanje for 
transfer to watercraft, will be naturally more expensive and prone 
to delay than single-mode transport such as rail or truck. 
 
Full Steam Ahead, Despite Doubts 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Despite these clear drawbacks, President Mutharika is 
determined to forge ahead with the project.  In October 2005 he held 
a groundbreaking ceremony at Nsanje and ordered the initial 
excavation of three large pits next to the river that may eventually 
serve as berths for river craft (photos of the site may be seen on 
the Mission Lilongwe State/USAID intranet website at 
http://web.lilongwe.state.gov/shirezambezi.ht m).  Since that time, 
Mutharika has mentioned the waterway in virtually every public 
speech, no matter what the occasion.  The GOM held a "sensitization" 
workshop in June, and has promised to organize a donor conference to 
solicit aid for the project. 
 
¶13. (U) Mutharika is working hard to sell the idea to his African 
colleagues, having presented a concept paper to an African Union 
forum in April 2005, and also to NEPAD for inclusion in its 
Framework for Sustainable Regional Development.  Mutharika last week 
took visiting AU Chairman Konare by helicopter to Nsanje to visit 
the site of the port.  The president pitched the project to the 
Japanese government during an official visit to Tokyo earlier this 
year, and he has garnered limited financial support from the EU to 
study the idea.  At this point no other donors have shown interest. 
The GOM hopes to attract private investment as well, but the 
business community is taking a wait-and-see attitude. 
 
¶14. (U) The project has generated some controversy.  Earlier this 
month civil society organizations, the media and some politicians 
sharply criticized Mutharika for diverting funds to the waterway 
project that had been previously earmarked for construction of a 
 
LILONGWE 00000914  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
road in the northern region.  Mutharika faces an uphill battle 
convincing the public to invest Malawi's limited resources on a 
project of uncertain value such as the waterway, compared to the 
paving of a road which has a clear and immediate benefit. 
 
If He Builds It, Will They Come? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) Even if Mutharika secures the necessary donor funding for 
this project (very much an open question), the GOM runs the risk of 
creating a white elephant.  Government statements since the release 
of the pre-feasibility study have glossed over the significant 
reservations raised in the report, which is peppered with 
expressions of doubt about the project's viability.  The 
introduction says that "freight rates necessary for a sustainable 
development of a dedicated shipping venture would tend to be 
unattractive to potential clients in comparison to present-day 
trucking."  The report quotes a 2004 study by an American consulting 
firm that "river transportation for Malawi traffic of sugar, tobacco 
and cotton in any reasonable quantity would be considered less 
attractive than either rail or road transportation... river 
transportation is likely to be uncompetitive." 
 
¶16. (U) The waterway will face direct competition from a project to 
rehabilitate the Sena railway line in Mozambique, which runs from 
near Malawi's southern border down to the port of Beira.  The Sena 
line is currently being renovated by an Indian consortium with 
funding from the World Bank, and the project will also have private 
sector investment from Brazilian mining firm CVRD, which will use 
the line to move coal from its concession at Moatize near Tete in 
northwestern Mozambique.  It would be a fairly straightforward 
project to extend the Sena line into Malawi, giving the country a 
direct rail link to Beira that would be faster and cheaper than the 
waterway. 
 
¶17. (U) It appears that the GOM has not surveyed the local market to 
determine who might actually use the waterway.  Most business people 
with whom we have spoken have a vague awareness of the project, but 
are decidedly skeptical about the government's ability to deliver. 
A recent visit with managers of the Illovo sugar estate north of 
Nsanje (the project's largest potential customer) revealed that no 
one from the government has approached the company about using the 
waterway.  Illovo is interested in the project, but would prefer to 
use the Sena line to ship directly to Beira by rail, if that 
extension were built.  The waterway will face a tough challenge in 
convincing shippers to change their current modes of transport.  The 
American-owned operators of the Nacala Corridor rail line, Central 
East Africa Railways, have struggled to gain new customers because 
of fears over reliability, even though the cost of shipping by rail 
is less than by truck. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The Shire-Zambezi Waterway is clearly a project that is 
close to President Mutharika's heart, and he sees it as an important 
legacy of his presidency.  Like many of his other reforms, Mutharika 
is promoting the resurrection of the waterway as a return to what 
worked in the past, during Malawi's perceived era of prosperity and 
efficiency.  Mutharika may succeed in realizing his dream of 
rebuilding "God's Highway," but the reality of the market will 
decide if his investment will pay off. 
 
EASTHAM