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Viewing cable 06KABUL5279, REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH AFGHAN HAJJ FLIGHT SLOTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL5279 2006-10-31 01:42 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4614
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5279/01 3040142
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 310142Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3832
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4239
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC PRIORITY 0100
RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005279 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EB/OTP, EB/TRA/AN 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A 
COMMERCE FOR ITA/SHAMROCK 
FAA FOR JHANCOCK AND RSMITH 
RIYADH FOR ECON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR PGOV ECON AF
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH AFGHAN HAJJ FLIGHT SLOTS 
 
This message is sensitive but unclassified--not for Internet 
distribution. 
 
-------------------------- 
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST 
-------------------------- 
 
1. (SBU) President Karzai yesterday informed the Ambassador that the 
Saudi Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has not yet granted 
arrival/departure slots for Afghanistan's Hajj flights.  The GoA is 
in the process of engaging the Saudi government at a high level to 
get these assignments quickly.  Given the extreme political 
sensitivity of Hajj operations in Afghanistan, Embassy requests that 
Washington instruct Embassy Riyadh to demarche the Saudis to give 
high priority to Afghan slot assignments and, as a related issue, to 
prioritize inspections of older aircraft leased or chartered by the 
Afghan airlines; see paragraph 5.  END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. 
 
--------------------------------- 
INCREASING NERVOUSNESS OVER SLOTS 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The highest levels of the Karzai government are growing 
increasingly nervous over the issuance of arrival and departure 
slots for this year's Hajj flights to and from Saudi Arabia. 
Although the planning for this year's Hajj is generally going well, 
much of the detailed planning going forward depends on knowing when 
the flights will depart and return.  This, in turn, depends on the 
Saudi CAA's slot assignments.  Both Afghan airlines (Ariana and 
Kamair) report that they applied for slots well in advance of the 
early October deadline, but as yet no slots have been assigned.  The 
GoA is finally--albeit slowly and under our suggestion--engaging at 
a high level to get the slots: Foreign Minister Rangeen Spanta has 
talked with the Saudi Ambassador here but has yet to speak with 
Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal.  The deputy minister of 
transportation, who knows the head of the Saudi CAA well, has spoken 
to him but has not reached closure on the issue.  The GoA intends to 
send a delegation of government and airline officials to Riyadh 
within the next few days. 
 
3. (SBU) Another possible hitch in the GoA's and airlines' planning 
is that some of the leased/chartered aircraft are over 25 years old. 
 In itself, this would not be a problem, but this year the Saudi CAA 
ruled that aircraft over 25 years old must be inspected before they 
can be approved to fly into Saudi Arabia.  At this writing, only one 
of the older aircraft has been approved.  Complicating this picture 
even further, the Afghans fear that the presence of Ariana on the 
EU's blacklist may make the Saudis reluctant to grant an otherwise 
routine waiver to Ariana. 
 
4. (SBU) The Afghans have asked us to help with the Saudis, and the 
Dutch and UK Ambassadors have agreed to weigh in with Riyadh.  The 
GoA is also reportedly asking ISAF to be prepared to fly the Hajjis 
in case their planning falls through utterly.  If this last 
contingency plan were to be exercised, quite apart from the 
political issues it could raise in Saudi Arabia, ISAF would need 
arrival and departure slots from the Saudis. 
 
-------------------------- 
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) While the planning and preparation for the 1385 Hajj have 
gone reasonably well, failure to get arrival and departure slots 
soon could seriously disrupt the operation.  In the current 
political climate here, the Hajj is an extremely sensitive 
operation, with potential for violence and political upset.  Though 
the GoA should have engaged the Saudis earlier and on a higher 
level, we should lend whatever support is necessary to make the Hajj 
work as well as it can.  To that end, we request Washington to 
instruct Embassy Riyadh to demarche the Saudis at a senior level on 
expediting assignment of arrival/departure slots for Afghanistan, as 
well as the related issue of inspection/approval of 
(leased/chartered) Afghan aircraft needing waivers to the 25-year 
rule. 
 
 
KABUL 00005279  002 OF 002 
 
 
NEUMANN