VZCZCXRO1795
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH
DE RUEHHM #1144/01 2790725
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060725Z OCT 06
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1570
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 1113
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1657

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 001144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM SOCI PREL PINR PGOV VM
SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S TIGHTER GRIP ON THE INTERNET 
 
REF: HCMC 412 B) HCMC 1012 AND PREVIOUS 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001144  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: The Party and the GVN have introduced new 
legal and technical measures to strengthen controls over the 
Internet.  Much of the focus is centered on bolstering 
firewalls, preventing search engines from displaying unwanted 
content and centralizing Internet monitoring in Vietnam's 
state-controlled internet service providers.  The arrests in 
HCMC of American citizen political activist Do Cong Thanh and 
six other Vietnamese activists indicate that police have the 
ability to target the dissident community in the south even as 
dissidents harness new technologies to get out their message of 
political change.   End Summary. 
 
TIGHTENING INTERNET REGULATIONS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In his keynote speech during the April Party Congress, 
Phan Dien, outgoing Standing Member of the Party Secretariat, 
underscored the threat to Party rule from uncontrolled usage of 
the Internet and the urgent need of the Party to respond.  Two 
months later, the National Assembly passed a new Information 
Technology Law, which, among other issues, further regulates 
Internet use.  Article 12 prohibits "the provision, exchange, 
storage and usage of electronic data to oppose the government, 
sabotage "national unity," instigate violence, or foment racial 
hatred. 
 
¶3. (U) The new law holds Internet Service Providers and owners 
of individual Internet kiosks accountable for customer 
violations.  Article 16 stipulates that internet kiosks "have 
the responsibility, at requests of relevant agencies, to take 
timely and necessary measures to prevent access to illegal 
electronic contents."  Article 19 requires that ISPs and 
Internet kiosk owners stop providing Internet search tools that 
provide access to illegal content. 
 
¶4. (SBU) According to a contact in an HCMC-based ISP, a new 
version of the Internet Regulation was sent to all ISPs in July, 
requiring them to "provide physical space and to facilitate 
technical support" for the Ministry of Public Security to carry 
out missions of national security.  The regulation requires ISPs 
to immediately stop internet access to those who "abuse the 
internet" to oppose the government. 
 
Control Goes High-Tech 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to HCMC press reports, in July, the Ministry 
of Posts and Telematics (MPT) instructed all ISPs to install new 
control and monitoring software in ISP-owned Internet kiosks. 
The software is designed to record information on users and 
their Internet behavior.  The acquired data will be stored on 
centralized servers in the ISPs' headquarters for at least one 
year.  Registration controls at Internet kiosks also were 
stiffened.  Thus far, two major ISPs -- state-owned Vietnam Data 
Communication Company and military-owned VietTel -- have started 
to install the required software in their Internet kiosks. 
Other ISPs such as Saigon Postel and FPT reportedly also are 
following suit. 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to a contact at one of Vietnam's most 
prominent telecom companies that owns and operates Vietnam's 
internet backbone, at a typical Internet kiosk, an additional 
gateway computer is set up between the Local Area Network (LAN) 
and the Internet modem.  This computer records the cyber 
activity of any computer within the LAN; suspicious Internet 
surfing is reported automatically back to a "policy server" at 
the ISP level.  This contact told us that these "policy servers" 
update "blacklists" based on URL's and keywords, and are under 
the control of "relevant government authorities." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Thus far, only public Internet kiosks are required to 
have these controls in place.  Government and private business 
and household Internet access are not yet covered.  Contacts in 
the industry told us that equipment at the ISP level can monitor 
and identify individual home subscriber Internet usage 
"violations."  Dial-up connection phone numbers also can be 
easily tracked.  At least some home ADSL Internet subscribers 
have their Internet usage monitored by newly installed software 
and hardware systems. 
 
Actual Compliance Still Lax 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) An admittedly unscientific sampling at various Internet 
kiosks in three provinces (HCMC, An Giang and Phu Yen) within 
HCMC's consular district in September showed that compliance 
with new access requirements remains lax.  None of the kiosk 
administrators asked us or local Vietnamese patrons for 
identification, nor did we need a special username or password 
from an ISP as specified in the regulations.  Only a few kiosks 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001144  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
in HCMC displayed the new internet regulations on their walls. 
 
Differing Degrees Filtering 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) We also ran a series of firewall tests at four 
different Internet kiosks in different districts in HCMC.  One 
was affiliated with FPT, one with Saigon Net and two with 
VVN/Net Soft.  The local and U.S. versions of "Google" were 
available at all four locations.  Search results at all four 
locations showed the existence of major dissident websites as 
well as Radio Free Asia, but the links were non-functional. 
Only one service provider -- Net Soft -- gave access to the 
Voice of America web site. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Overall the FTP kiosk had the most robust Internet 
controls.  Results from keyword searches such as "democracy" and 
"religious freedom" were blocked both in English and Vietnamese. 
 The Saigon Net-run kiosk was much more porous; it was possible 
to pull up the website of the IBIB, the overseas arm of the 
banned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam. 
 
¶11. (SBU) It was possible to pull up information on proxy 
servers and how to break firewall restrictions at all four 
locations.  "Skype" was available at all four kiosks but 
"PalTalk" was blocked on the FTP kiosk.  Interestingly, it also 
was possible to access overseas information at all four kiosks 
on AmCit political activist Do Cong Thanh.  This suggests that 
firewall administrators had not yet updated the sites to block 
information on Thanh, even though news about his controversial 
arrest and subsequent expulsion from Vietnam was over a month 
old. 
 
Government and Dissidents: Cat and Mouse 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Many dissident websites -- all hosted outside Vietnam 
-- post instructions on how to bypass GVN firewalls and use 
proxy servers to hide users' identities.  The younger, 
tech-savvy dissidents look for new techniques to avoid 
monitoring and detection.  Contacts in the dissident community 
tell us that many now use "Skype" and other Voice Over Internet 
Protocol tools to stay in touch with each other and with 
overseas contacts.  Dissidents believe that -- at least for the 
moment -- it is hard for the police to identify and pinpoint 
Skype users, and to record their conversations to be used as 
"evidence" against them. 
 
¶13. (SBU) HCMC-based political activist and founder of the "8406 
Block" Do Nam Hai (aka Phuong Nam) told us that his home 
Internet service has been cut at least three times since 
December 2005.  As a stopgap measure, Hai used Internet kiosks, 
but faced highly intrusive police surveillance; in some cases, 
plainclothes police often stood immediately behind him to read 
his e-mail despite his frequent protests.  Hai said that, in 
response to these government efforts, he has begun to use a new 
service provided by the ISP of Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) that 
enables Internet access via cell phone to use Voice Over 
Internet programs and to send e-mail. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Internet is a vital communications tool for the 
banned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV).  For example, 
UBCV contacts tell us that many of the aides to UBCV leaders 
Thich Quang Do and Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang are computer and 
Internet literate and maintain their own Internet subscriptions. 
 Thich Thien Hanh, the senior-most UBCV leader in Hue, has 
access to the Internet through a connection in one of the UBCV 
pagodas in the city.  Thich Vien Dinh, a member of the UBCV 
national executive, has an active Internet connection at the 
UBCV's Giac Hoa pagoda in HCMC.  He told us that, in the past, a 
dial-up connection rented from ISP provider VNPT was cut, but 
subsequently he was able to secure an ADSL line through the 
military-owned VietTel ISP.  This connection has been untouched 
since its inception.  In late September, Thich Quang Do 
reportedly obtained an Internet connection at his Thanh Minh Zen 
Monastery where he lives under quasi "pagoda arrest."  He 
apparently registered the connection through a nun who also 
resides at the Pagoda. 
 
GVN Does Not Sit Idly By 
------------------------ 
 
¶15. (SBU) The MPS is responding.  In August and September, MPS 
officers arrested Do Cong Thanh, a computer specialist, and at 
least six other Vietnamese-citizen activists of the People's 
Democracy Party of Vietnam (PDP-VN).  Like other dissident 
groups, the PDP-VN used overseas-based servers to host websites 
that exposed corruption and malfeasance within the GVN and 
Communist Party and advocated for multi-party democracy and 
peaceful political change.  In an interview given in the United 
States after his release and expulsion from Vietnam, Do 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001144  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
concluded that the police's ability to intercept and read his 
personal e-mails helped the authorities track him and his PDP 
colleagues.  Do and other PDP members used pseudonyms when 
posting articles on the Internet. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) The Party is moving ahead to address "weaknesses" in 
Internet controls identified during the Party Congress. 
Although there is significant variation in the robustness of 
Internet firewalls between the different ISPs that we sampled, 
our sense is that the more restrictive access on the FTP site is 
the harbinger of the future.  Other, smaller ISPs will follow 
FTP's lead in bolstering firewalls, preventing search engines 
from displaying unwanted content and centralizing Internet 
monitoring within Vietnam's ISPs.  Moreover, the recent arrest 
of the PDP activists and the earlier arrests of the "PalTalk" 
group (Ref B) suggest that the MPS has at least some ability to 
trace critical targets. 
 
¶17. (SBU) The UBCV's current unmolested use of the Internet 
suggests that the MPS -- for the moment -- finds it advisable to 
try and monitor what the UBCV is saying to its overseas contacts 
rather than forcing its leadership to communicate through 
cut-outs.  Meanwhile, the dissident community is trying to stay 
one step ahead using new technological innovations (such as USB 
microdrives) to transmit information and defeat Internet 
controls in an attempt to reach Vietnam's rapidly growing 
Internet-literate population.  End comment. 
Winnick