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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 002245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY - CHANGED PARA 13 TEXT. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A FEW OBSERVATIONS 
ON FOREIGN POLICY AS A LONG CAMPAIGN WINDS DOWN 
 
 
BRASILIA 00002245  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Brazilian voters go to the polls on 29 
October to select either incumbent Lula da Silva (Workers 
Party - PT) or challenger Geraldo Alckmin (Social Democratic 
Party - PSDB) for their president, with current polls 
indicating a wide lead for Lula.  As in past national 
campaigns, foreign affairs have not been a major issue, but 
as this year's presidential campaign winds down, we offer 
herewith some observations on comparative foreign policy 
perspectives of the candidates, based on the televised 
debates, media articles, and conversations with knowledgeable 
insiders, especially in the opposition Social Democratic 
Party (PSDB).  Throughout the campaign, Lula da Silva has 
clearly reiterated his government's commitment to a foreign 
policy that stresses regional integration and south-south 
ties, even as PSDB challenger Geraldo Alckmin has repeatedly 
criticized Lula for sacrificing Brazilian interests in the 
name of ideological priorities, and emphasized the importance 
of relations with the developed world, especially the United 
States.  It clearly appears an Alckmin foreign policy would 
be distinctly more traditional and U.S.-oriented.  While we 
may be able to develop specific areas of enhanced bilateral 
cooperation in a second Lula mandate -- e.g., on bio-fuels 
policy, business and investment, and programs for Brazil's 
poor northeast -- we can see no compelling current indication 
that Lula,s policy would shift dramatically in a different 
direction in a second term.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In all three televised campaign debates this month, 
PSDB challenger Geraldo Alckmin has aggressively criticized 
Lula's foreign policy, citing its failures in producing a 
permanent seat for Brazil in the UNSC or leadership spots in 
other international organizations, its weak response to 
Bolivia's nationalization of Petrobras assets, the decision 
to declare China a market economy and the subsequent flooding 
of Brazil's market with finished Chinese goods that compete 
with Brazilian products, and the south-south orientation that 
has placed priority on partnering with developing nations at 
the expense of traditional relations with the U.S. and EU. 
In that sense, Alckmin and the PSDB echo the critical views 
that have taken hold throughout much of Brazil's educated 
classes and are reflected widely in the media. Clearly, an 
Alckmin government would immediately seek to distance itself 
from Lula's foreign policy, in substance and in form. 
 
¶3. (C) The PSDB has a deep bench of foreign policy experts -- 
former Foreign Minister Celso Laffer, former ambassadors 
Rubens Barbosa and Sergio Amaral; even the PSDB's Senate 
Leader, Arthur Virgilio, is a diplomat.  They have advised 
Alckmin and published op-ed columns throughout the campaign. 
All view Lula's foreign policy as a fiasco, an 
ideologically-driven, strategically unsound and incompetently 
managed enterprise that has damaged national interests and 
yielded few successes.  In recent conversations with the 
Ambassador, Amaral offered a concise critique of Lula,s 
policy, while Barbosa outlined likely Alckmin positions in 
both a recent op-ed column and a private meeting with the 
Ambassador earlier in the month. 
 
SERGIO AMARAL 
 
¶4. (C) Retired diplomat Sergio Amaral, who held senior 
positions in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) government 
and is the odds-on favorite to be Foreign Minister if Alckmin 
is elected, discussed foreign affairs with Ambassador on 16 
October in Sao Paulo.  Amaral noted the stark difference 
between the foreign policy visions of Alckmin and Lula. 
Brazil,s foreign policy has historically been bipartisan, 
but the Lula administration has been implementing a Workers 
Party (PT) foreign policy.  Brazil under FHC played a 
 
BRASILIA 00002245  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
moderating role in South America, said Amaral, but Lula,s 
active, militant foreign policy is choosing sides between two 
currents.  It is supporting Chavez, Morales, and Kirchner. 
The foreign policy also has a third-world flavor, as 
evidenced by the opening of so many embassies in Africa. 
 
¶5. (C) Amaral noted that he didn,t know whether Celso Amorim 
would continue as Foreign Minister if Lula is re-elected. 
Foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia would like the 
job, but his name would probably not be well received. 
Regardless, he will retain a strong position in defining 
foreign policy.  The ideological, leftist foreign policy is 
designed to counter-balance the government's more orthodox 
economic policy and appease the left wing of the PT.  It has 
led to bad policies, such as Brazil,s agreeing to 
Venezuela's entry into Mercosul.  It is behind the GOB,s 
unwillingness to move forward on FTAA.  Foreign Ministry 
(MRE) Secretary-General Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes has always 
opposed FTAA, and Lula himself has complained that the 
negotiation is one-sided and dominated by the U.S.  The 
GoB,s unwillingness to accept FTAA has the symbolic value of 
placing it in opposition to the United States and standing up 
for the less powerful. 
 
¶6. C) However, Amaral said, despite a great deal of rhetoric, 
Lula and his foreign policy team have achieved no results. 
Brazil does not have a single meaningful bilateral trade 
agreement, largely because Amorim has little or no experience 
in bilateral negotiations.  As a result, Brazil is losing its 
influence in South America, which is increasingly fragmented. 
 Amaral had originally expected Lula to move towards a more 
centrist foreign policy in a second term, but there had been 
so much polarization in the campaign that this now appears 
unlikely.  Lula will be looking to protect his legacy as a 
defender of the poor, and a leftist foreign policy will be 
part of that effort. 
 
¶7. (C) Unlike his foreign policy team, however, Lula himself 
is more pragmatic than ideological because of his years as a 
union leader negotiating deals.  Amaral urged the Ambassador 
to continue to engage him, using trade and investment as a 
building block.  Instead of pushing or pressuring him, which 
would likely be counter-productive, the U.S. should put Lula 
and his foreign policy team on the spot, asking what they 
want, and see what the response is and what kind of dialogue 
it provokes. 
 
RUBENS BARBOSA 
 
¶8. (U) In a widely-published op-ed column on 10 October, 
former Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S. and PSDB advisor 
Rubens Barbosa outlined some basic tendencies of foreign 
policy in an Alckmin presidency: 
 
¶9. (U) Foreign policy would return to its natural role, 
seeking to be consensual and non-partisan, Barbosa wrote.  In 
Alckmin government, foreign policy would be treated as a 
policy of the state, within both medium and long term 
perspectives, in which the national interest is above visions 
that are ideological or passing governments. 
 
¶10. (U) Barbosa wrote that an Alckmin foreign policy would 
continue a strong regional  focus, based on reciprocal 
interests, and integration, but with an emphasis on national 
interests, without ideology.  Alckmin would also seek to 
again intensify relations with the most dynamic centers of 
the global economy and re-establish as a priority relations 
with developed nations. 
 
¶11. (C) Barbosa,s published views on the general principles 
of an Alckmin foreign policy track closely with his comments 
 
BRASILIA 00002245  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
to Ambassador Sobel in their meeting in Sao Paulo earlier in 
October.  On more specific points, Barbosa made these 
additional observations to Ambassador: 
 
--South-South relations: Alckmin would not repudiate this 
outright, but would return central focus to relations with 
the U.S., EU, Japan and other developed partners. 
 
--U.S.-Brazil relations:  These would return to the forefront 
of foreign policy, and Alckmin would look at intensified 
cooperation in bio-fuels, defense, and other areas identified 
already by the two governments for working group activities. 
 
--Free Trade:  Alckmin could re-engage on this, but in an 
approach that resembles the "FTAA-light" model, not a more 
comprehensive NAFTA-type accord.  On Doha, Alckmin would not 
be constrained by the G-20 and will look first and foremost 
to defending Brazilian national interests. 
 
--Chavez:  There would be no relationship beyond formalities 
and necessity, as Alckmin has no interest in doing anything 
with Chavez.  Alckmin takes a dim view of Chavez,s 
participation in Mercosul, and Barbosa noted, with no further 
comments,  that Venezuelan full membership is still pending 
formal approval in Brazil,s congress.  Similarly, Alckmin 
has no interest in close relations with Castro, and would 
take only a correct diplomatic approach to Cuba. 
 
--Bolivia:  Alckmin would take a harder line with Morales on 
Petrobras and Brazilian equities in Bolivia, but Barbosa did 
not elaborate. 
 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS 
 
¶12. (C) In a 19 October private meeting with Ambassador and 
PolCouns, Senator Tasso Jereissati, PSDB national president, 
and Senator Arthur Virgilio, PSDB leader in the Senate, both 
expressed concern that Lula's rhetoric may turn toward 
populism in a second term, and this will be true in foreign 
relations as well.  Jereissati said the likely state of 
legislative gridlock in domestic politics in a Lula second 
term and continued trouble with corruption allegations will 
lead Lula down a populist track.  In foreign affairs, that 
could mean rhetorical distancing from the U.S. in trade 
issues and other foreign policy questions, though Jereissati 
opined Lula will try to retain amiable contact with the USG 
"behind closed doors."  In the context of a weak political 
situation overall, Lula could use leftist-populist rhetoric 
on foreign affairs, Jereissati said, as a means to shore up 
his fragile support on the far left. 
 
¶13. (C) Comment:  In recent days, as polls have indicated a 
widening lead for Lula over Alckmin, a tantalizing article in 
respected daily newspaper "Valor Economico" reported that 
Lula government insiders were promising a tilt back toward 
stronger relations with the U.S., and away from south-south 
priorities, in a Lula second term.  On the evidence we see, 
that appears to be a planted canard intended to ameliorate 
Alckmin's incisive attacks on Lula's foreign policy, not a 
harbinger of a real change.  During the television debates, 
Lula defended his foreign policy vision, with no hint of a 
shift in direction.  At the top of the powerful Foreign 
Ministry, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim -- Lula's obedient 
servant -- and Secretary General Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes -- 
a leftist ideologue viewed widely as an anti-American quack 
even by many in his institution -- are both intent on staying 
in their positions in a second term, according to our 
high-level sources in their personal staffs.  And we see no 
evidence of a waning in the influence over Lula of Marco 
Aurelio Garcia, Lula's foreign policy advisor and 
decidedly a leftist in his orientation.  We do think the GOB 
 
BRASILIA 00002245  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
will focus on some specific and promising areas for increased 
cooperation with us -- notably in bio-fuels policy, as Amorim 
has stated to the Ambassador, and as we have reported in 
septels.  Working with the GOB on enhancing business and 
investment, and on development programs for Brazil's 
impoverished northeast also offer some potential for 
enhancing bilateral cooperation.  We also are not persuaded 
at present that Lula's rhetoric on international issues will 
head down the negative populist path that Jereissati foresees 
-- we believe Lula prizes his self-image as influential 
regional moderate, and we should encourage him in that role. 
But, overall, we have to anticipate more of the same in 
Lula's foreign policy in terms of its essentially south-south 
orientation, come the second term that looks likely now, 
three days away from the election.  A real sea change, with 
the tide flowing in our direction, would require an Alckmin 
victory --  a long shot, at this point. 
 
¶14. (U) AmConGen Sao Paulo contributed to this cable. 
 
SOBEL 
 
 
 
 
Sobel