VZCZCXRO6465
OO RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3946/01 2940632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210632Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7598
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003946 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SBU 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON PINR EAID IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: SCENE SETTER FOR SALAH AD DIN PROVINCE 
 
¶1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. 
 
¶2. (SBU) INTRODUCTION.  Salah ad Din province, best known as 
Saddam's homeland and the Sunni heartland of Iraq, is 
struggling to find a new political identity and economic 
vigor in a free Iraq.  Believing themselves to suffer 
unfairly from assumed associations with the past regime and 
to be victims of unfair de-Baathification policies, SaD 
residents are down in but not out of the political process. 
They still see themselves as the best educated and most 
experienced leaders in Iraq and have entered a "wait and see" 
mode to determine how they will be incorporated in the 
current political process. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Of the province's estimated 1.2 million residents, 
most are Sunnis living in the principal cities of Tikrit, 
Bayji, and Samarra.  There are two Shia enclaves in the 
southeast in Balad and ad Dujeel and a Kurdish and Turkoman 
area in the northeast around al Tuz.  With the dismantling of 
the former regime's security apparatus and the 
de-Baathification policies in place, unemployment in the 
province has soared, and the overall economic situation is 
worsening.  Although the province has great agricultural 
potential, it has not been tapped. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The provincial government's executive and 
legislative branches are active, but do not have well defined 
roles or a clear separation of power.  With SaD's vote 
against the constitution and the Sunni boycott of the 
previous election, the provincial government is neither 
representative nor respected.  The security situation is 
worsening and remains the single greatest obstacle to 
development.  Although the provincial government and the 
Iraqi security forces cooperate well with the Coalition 
Forces, the environment is generally non-permissive.  END 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Governance, Rule of Law, and the Political Situation 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Democratic political structures are nascent in SaD. 
Democratic principals and processes, with safeguards and 
checks and balances in the system, have not been fully 
embraced, resulting in the legislative branch's assumption of 
many executive branch powers, such as contracting and project 
execution.  While active, the executive branch does not have 
a clear role or a defined mandate. As the national 
constitution does little to clarify the duties and 
responsibilities of each branch and of elected officials, it 
is largely left to the officials themselves to define their 
offices.  This tips power into the hand of the more ruthless 
players who are able to assemble power by intimidation, and 
reinforces tribal and religious power bases of elected 
officials.  The Directorates General (DGs) of the ministries 
are functioning, but decentralization has caused confusion, 
mismanagement, and inefficiency.  Many of the DGs are also 
demoralized by the confusion within the provincial government 
that results in misuse or non-use of their experience and 
training.  The judicial branch, particularly the civil court 
system, is largely functional, but suffers from over-crowded 
jails, inefficient courtroom procedures, and insufficient 
security for judges. In addition, corruption is commonplace 
and expected. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Political parties lack structure and are largely 
personality driven.  Religious sheikhs and tribal leaders 
maintain significant influence.  Many of the province's 
former elites feel marginalized in the national political 
process, and this sense of disaffection has aided many 
insurgent elements in the province. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The leadership of the provincial government 
cooperates well, if sometime superficially, with the USG. 
Defining the independent roles of each branch of the 
provincial government, increasing transparency and 
accountability, and helping make elected leaders answerable 
to their constituents are the USG's principal governance 
objectives in SaD. 
 
---------------------- 
The Economic Situation 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Salah ad Din's once strong, but state-dependent 
economy is in decline.  Deteriorating infrastructure, 
 
BAGHDAD 00003946  002 OF 002 
 
 
inadequate banking systems, corruption, and a non-permissive 
legal framework have stifled both state-owned and private 
businesses.  Unemployment province-wide is an estimated 40 
percent and reaches as high as 70 percent in some cities. 
The once functional state-owned businesses are failing due to 
inefficiency and lack of necessary inputs, and the private 
industries do not have access to capital markets. The 
provincial government's institution of a fuel rationing 
system based on gas coupons, in cooperation with the GOI, 
recently provided a boost to the economy, particularly the 
agricultural sector where irrigation is managed through 
fuel-driven pumps.  This new system appears to have largely 
alleviated the previous gas shortages that resulted from 
extensive black market operations. 
 
¶9. (SBU) SaD's agricultural sector has great potential, but 
suffers from aging irrigation equipment as well as production 
and distribution problems.  According to local contacts, when 
the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Program began in the 
mid-nineties, Saddam discouraged food production, and 
agriculture production and development slowed significantly. 
The beneficiaries of the former regime's centrally-planned 
economy, many SaD residents see the province's economic 
development coming through state-owned companies, rather than 
through agricultural development or private businesses. 
 
¶10. (SBU) To date the USG and Coalition Forces have allocated 
over USD 975 million in reconstruction projects, principally 
in infrastructure, in SaD; however, the impact on the 
infrastructure and on the economy has not been significant. 
Encouraging growth in the agricultural and private business 
sectors, improving the business climate, and assisting 
establishment of a functional and sustainable infrastructure 
are the USG's principal economic objectives in the province. 
 
---------------------- 
The Security Situation 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The single greatest obstacle to political reform 
and economic growth is the poor security situation. 
Continued attacks on Iraqi security forces (ISF) and targeted 
assassinations and kidnappings of provincial leaders hamper 
efforts to increase participation in governance and improve 
business opportunities.  The Iraqi Army maintains a 
relatively good reputation throughout the province, while the 
Iraqi police are considered corrupt and biased.  Latent 
tensions, unemployment, and political frustration have 
contributed to insurgent activities in SaD.  Although both 
the Iraqi police and army cooperate well with the Coalition 
Forces, the environment remains generally non-permissive. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The reach of the central government to the 
provinces is not strong or uniform.  This is compounded by 
the fact that the authorities and responsibilities of the 
provinces have not yet been defined adequately, and therefore 
there is uncertainty over roles and direction at the 
provincial level.  As such, governance, economic, and 
security issues in SaD may not unfold as the central 
government anticipates.  This cable establishes a baseline 
assessment for where SaD is at present.  Septel reporting 
will analyze the situation and developments in these sectors 
in more detail.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶13. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad 
Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog: 
http://blogs.csp.sgov.gov/blojsom/blog/ salahaddin/. 
 
SPECKHARD