VZCZCXRO9615
RR RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHIHL RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLZ
DE RUEHAK #5786 2771436
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041436Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9200
INFO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0769
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1590
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0091
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 1409
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 1188

UNCLAS ANKARA 005786 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR FOR DAS BRYZA AND S/P FOR STEVE HELLMAN 
USDOE FOR CHARLES WASHINGTON 
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/CPD/CRUSNAK 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EPET EINV PREL TU IZ
SUBJECT:  TURKEY'S BOTAS BULLISH ON IRAQ GAS 
 
REF: A) ANKARA 5745 
B) ANKARA 5699 
C) ANKARA 5332 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified.  Please handle accordingly. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: In an October 2 meeting, BOTAS officials 
expressed support for Turkey's role as a transit country for 
bringing new sources of natural gas to European markets (Ref A). 
Echoing comments we have heard from the Ministry of Energy and the 
Turkish Oil Company (TPAO), BOTAS officials called for joint efforts 
for developing natural gas in northern Iraq for egress to Turkey. 
They cited detailed feasibility studies completed by Mitsubishi in 
1997 in support of a partnership between TPAO, BOTAS, Shell, ENI, 
and Gaz de France formed to develop a project near Kirkuk that was 
not implemented due to UN sanctions.  They stressed the potential 
for quick development of Iraqi gas exports, which could provide an 
important new income source for Iraq, as well as benefit European 
energy security.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) BOTAS acting DG Saltuk Duzyol and his colleagues urged a 
more active approach in developing natural gas production in 
northern Iraq.  Repeating comments we have heard at TPAO and the 
Ministry of Energy, Duzyol's advisor cited detailed feasibility work 
completed by Mitsubishi in 1997, but then abandoned under the UN 
sanctions program.   He said BOTAS had partnered with TPAO and 
Shell, in addition to ENI and Gaz de France - as operators - to 
develop the project.  The BOTAS official pointed out that former Oil 
Minister Thamer Ghadban had been the Iraqi point person for 
feasibility work and Shell was intimately familiar with the project 
and its potential. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The BOTAS officials asserted that the studies showed that 
non-associated gas reserves near Kirkuk could support 10 BCM per 
year production.  Moreover, they said that this gas was a "rich" gas 
with associated LPG and condensates.  Duzyol proposed that the Iraqi 
gas could be shipped out via a new pipeline on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline right-of-way, but the gas could be connected to the Turkish 
grid at Siirt, just 50 km north of the border, from where there was 
significant spare domestic grid capacity for transit.  This gas 
could provision Turkey's east, but more importantly it could feed 
potential LNG development at Ceyhan for the U.S. and other world 
markets.  Northern Iraq production could be supplemented by 
connecting to southern Iraq with 600-1000 km of pipeline to develop 
the 11 BCM per year of associated gas now flared off. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Duzyol said that Minister Guler had twice written his 
Iraqi counterpart to pursue these projects, but had received no 
reply.   The BOTAS officials lamented the lack of a viable 
counterpart in Iraq with which to develop these projects.  They 
recognized the need for development of the new hydrocarbon law and 
clarity on how to do oil and gas business in northern Iraq. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The previous work done on gas development in 
northern Iraq could be a logical starting point for Turkish-Iraqi 
discussions of Iraqi gas export potential (Ref C).   Understanding 
the political complications in Iraq, these discussions could take 
place between Turkish and Iraqi technical experts, perhaps 
facilitated by U.S. advisors. 
 
MCELDOWNEY