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Viewing cable 06AITTAIPEI3488, MEDIA REACTION: DPRK NUCLEAR TEST

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06AITTAIPEI3488 2006-10-12 08:16 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #3488 2850816
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 120816Z OCT 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2538
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5760
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6973
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 003488 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - DAVID FIRESTEIN 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: DPRK NUCLEAR TEST 
 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies continued to 
focus on October 12 on the role of Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou in 
dealing with the high-profile parade and siege of the Presidential 
Office on Double Ten National Day, which was launched by former DPP 
Chairman Shih Ming-teh's "Oust Bian" campaign; on the second attempt 
in the Legislative Yuan to recall President Chen Shui-bian; and on a 
Taipei District Court ruling demanding that an AIDS shelter in 
Taipei move out of the community.  The pro-status quo "China Times" 
front-paged its latest survey, which showed that 54 percent of those 
polled believe that the "Oust Bian" campaign should come to an end, 
while 32 percent insisted that it should persist. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, a "China Times" opinion 
piece analyzed the possible negative consequences for China and 
Taiwan in the wake of North Korea's nuclear test.  End summary. 
 
"North Korea's Nuclear Test Unfavorable for Both Sides [of the 
Taiwan Strait]" 
 
Chang Kuo-cheng, a Ph. D. candidate in Political Science at 
Australia's University of New South Wales, opined in the pro-status 
quo "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] (10/12): 
 
"... For the Chinese side, the nuclear test in North Korea has again 
demonstrated that Beijing has a very limited influence on Pyongyang, 
because it is a well-known fact that China is opposed to North 
Korea's possession of nuclear weapons.  The nuclear test also 
indicated that the Six-Party Talks are totally ineffective, and that 
the chances are slim for the Six-Party Talks to continue in the 
future.  It is in China's fundamental interest to promote 
multilateral rather than bilateral consultations, as it will be 
difficult for China to manipulate in between if Pyongyang negotiates 
directly with Washington and Tokyo.  Likewise, no one can guarantee 
that Pyongyang will not reach an agreement with the United States 
and Japan, which will endanger China's interests. 
 
"The collapse of the Six-Party Talks showed that the first attempt 
at collective security in this region has been a total failure, and 
it has, without a doubt, proved in one way or another that bilateral 
military alliances such as the U.S.-Japan security treaty are the 
real guarantee for regional security.  In the future, the United 
States will have a more powerful strategic say in this region, and 
Japan and South Korea will surely be more interested in 
consolidating their strategic alliances with the United States and 
working in line with the United States' strategic guidance.  The 
second disadvantage of Pyongyang's nuclear test for China is that 
the move will naturally prompt Japan to strengthen its construction 
of a missile defense system.  This is something that China dislikes 
and has opposed for a long time. ... 
 
"As for Taiwan, even though Pyongyang's nuclear test has damaged 
China's position in the eyes of the United States and Japan, 
Beijing's 'loss' cannot be transformed into 'gains' for Taiwan, 
because Taiwan cannot affect Pyongyang's behavior, either.  Besides, 
Washington will not punish Beijing right now simply because the 
latter has no influence over Pyongyang, as it would not help the 
situation. 
 
"By comparison, Washington previously could maintain a vague 
position with regard to whether it should take the initiative in 
using force to extract Pyongyang's nuclear weapons, since Pyongyang 
had not revealed whether it possessed nuclear weapons.  Beijing's 
importance was limited then, since Washington was not in a hurry to 
take action.  But now everything is clearly laid out in the sun, and 
the whole world is watching whether the United States will take 
military action [against Pyongyang].  Whether Beijing will keep a 
hands-off attitude or provide certain assistance to the United 
States due to its geographical advantage and long-time exchanges 
with North Korea (for example providing Washington with the 
information it needs, such as Pyongyang's military deployment and 
relevant facilities) will have a critical influence on the success 
of the [U.S.] military action.  Should this be the case, Taiwan's 
interests will likely be sacrificed again. ..." 
 
YOUNG