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OO RUEHAST
DE RUCNDT #1860/01 2691605
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261605Z SEP 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0273
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001860 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO KPAL IS LE
SUBJECT: LUKEWARM UNSC RESPONSE TO ANNAN'S 30 DAY REPORT ON 
LEBANON AND ISRAEL 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001860  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  During closed UNSC consultations on 
September 18, UN Secretary-General Annan outlined his 
one-month report on the implementation of UNSCR 1701, which 
led to a cessation of hostilities between Israel and 
Hizballah, and reviewed the results of his recent visit to 
the region.  Praising progress achieved on the implementation 
of the resolution as "historic," Annan welcomed the 
deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces to southern Lebanon and 
said he expected Israel would withdraw completely once UNIFIL 
reaches a "credible" troop strength of 5,000 by the end of 
September.  Drawing attention to the problem of unexploded 
ordinance, he called on Israel to hand over all maps of land 
mines in its possession.  He said he was doing "all possible" 
to secure the release of the abducted Israeli soldiers, 
including the appointment of a facilitator. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary, cont,d.  Turning to the request made of 
him by UNSCR 1701 to develop specific proposals to implement 
provisions of the Ta'if Accords and UNSCRs 1559 and 1680, 
Annan asserted that disarmament of Hizballah could only be 
achieved through an internal Lebanese political dialogue.  He 
expressed hope that neighboring states would cooperate in 
this regard and respect the arms embargo established in 1701, 
but offered no details.  Annan reported that SARG President 
Asad had informed him of Syria's intention to go ahead with 
the delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border.  In closing, 
Annan argued that long-term peace in the Middle East could 
only be achieved by addressing all tracks, including the 
Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Syrian conflicts.  In 
response to requests by member states for more specific 
suggestions on next steps and timelines for implementation of 
1701, Annan deferred to the concerned parties, including 
Israel, on issues related to disputed borders.  With regard 
to implementation of the arms embargo, Annan suggested -- in 
a move pre-cooked with the French -- that the UNSC consider 
establishing a committee of experts to monitor compliance 
with 1701's arms embargo, and added a "general appeal" to all 
member states to comply with the resolution. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Summary, cont'd.  Although Qatar and Russia welcomed 
the SYG's report and his presentation to the Council, most 
other delegations joined P-3 delegations in asking tough 
questions about the report and emphasizing the need for an 
action plan to ensure implementation of its provisions. 
Harkening back to the Hizballah cross-border raid that 
precipitated the crisis, Ambassador Bolton underscored the 
need for disarmament and strict respect for 1701's arms 
embargo.  Turning to Sheba'a Farms, he read aloud from the 
UNSC's  Presidential Statement of June 18, 2000 to emphasize 
that the Council had already determined that Israel had 
withdrawn from all of Lebanon.  French PR de la Sabliere 
asked for a timetable for the steps necessary for Syria and 
Lebanon to delineate their common border, including Sheba'a 
Farms, and to establish diplomatic relations.  He also asked 
about a plan for disarmament of militias, including 
Palestinian militias in Lebanon.  The French and British PRs 
expressed hope that the proposals requested of the SYG in OP 
10 -- relating to Ta'if and UNSCR 1559 and 1680 
implementation -- would be forthcoming in the SYG's next 
report on the implementation of UNSCR 1559 (due on October 
19, 2006).  Several other delegations, including China, 
Denmark, Japan, and Argentina, echoed the need for a timeline 
for the implementation of UNSCR 1701.  End Summary. 
 
Annan Briefs the Council 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Reviewing his report on the implementation of UNSCR 
1701 after one month and his recent visit to the region, SYG 
Annan welcomed the continuing cessation of hostilities and 
praised the deployment of LAF to southern Lebanon as 
"historic."  Noting that UNIFIL would comprise 5,000 troops 
by the end of September, Annan stated his expectation that 
this "credible" force would allow the IDF to withdraw 
completely from Lebanon per his understanding with Israeli PM 
Olmert.  Praising tripartite cooperation, he suggested that 
UNIFIL, IDF, and LAF might raise the level of representation 
at future tripartite meetings to the top military leaders on 
all sides.  Annan expressed satisfaction that measures to 
improve the security of Lebanon's borders, including the 
creation of an interim UNIFIL maritime task force and 
deployment of German experts to the Beirut airport, had 
enabled Israel to lift its blockade of Lebanon.  In order to 
achieve a full return to normalcy, however, Annan called on 
Israel to hand over all maps of landmines and other 
unexploded ordnance in Lebanon.  He also welcomed the support 
of the international community for Lebanon's recovery.  He 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001860  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
said he was doing "all possible" to secure the release of 
abducted IDF soldiers, including appointing a facilitator to 
work with both sides, but also noted that his interlocutors 
in the region had emphasized the need to resolve the 
situation of Lebanese prisoners in Israel. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Turning to the tasks assigned him by UNSCR 1701, SYG 
Annan argued that agreement in principle by Israel and 
Lebanon to the elements in OP 8 of the resolution had to be 
consolidated, and pledged to report back to the Council "in 
due course" on this issue.  On the request in OP 10 that the 
SYG develop proposals to implement the relevant provisions of 
the Ta'if Accords and UNSCRs 1559 and 1680, Annan asserted 
that disarmament of Hizballah could only be accomplished 
through an internal Lebanese political dialogue.  He 
expressed hope that Lebanon would address this issue "soon" 
and that neighboring states would cooperate in this regard, 
but offered no further details.   Annan urged all member 
states to comply with the arms embargo established under OP 
15, and noted that UNIFIL had set up a maritime task force to 
help secure Lebanon's coast at the GOL's request.  Turning 
last but with emphasis to the need to secure a broader peace 
in the Middle East, Annan argued that long-term peace would 
only be possible after the issue of occupied Palestinian 
territories and the Golan Heights is addressed.  It is now 
time, he said, to focus intently on getting the Israelis and 
Palestinians back to the negotiating table. 
 
¶6. (SBU) During his summary and his subsequent response to P5 
interventions, Annan addressed the issue of disputed borders. 
 He reported that during his recent visit to Syria, Assad had 
informed him that Syria is prepared to go ahead with 
delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border (but provided no 
calendar for such action).  On the issue of Sheba'a Farms, he 
acknowledged prior determination that Israel had fully 
withdrawn from Lebanon, but noted that Syria and Lebanon are 
free to make new arrangements.  In this regard, he recalled 
Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora's Seven-Point Plan, which 
calls for Sheba'a Farms to be placed under UN trusteeship 
until the sovereignty of the territory is conclusively 
defined.  He said the UN is carefully studying all "paths" to 
resolution of this conflict, as well as their implications. 
 
Russia and Qatar Generally Satisfied 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Qatar and Russia welcomed the SYG's report on 1701 
implementation and endorsed many of its conclusions. 
Characterizing the report as "excellent and comprehensive," 
the Qatari delegate objected to the continued presence of 
Israeli forces inside Lebanon and IAF overflights of Lebanese 
territory as "clear violations" of the Blue Line.  He echoed 
the SYG's sentiments that disarmament of Hizballah could only 
take place through an internal Lebanese political process, 
but added that this process must conclude with Lebanon 
regaining full sovereignty over all of its land, including 
Sheba'a Farms.  The Qatari delegate cautioned that a full 
cease-fire could only take hold once Israel hands over to the 
UN all maps of land mines in south Lebanon that it possesses. 
 He characterized diplomatic relations between Lebanon and 
Syria as an issue of sovereignty that must be left to the two 
countries, and suggested that the issue of Lebanese and 
Israeli prisoners be dealt with through the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.  Russian PR Churkin averred that 
the SYG's analysis "is to a great extent in line with 
Russia's," and lamented the "paralysis of the peace process" 
and the absence of a "balanced, comprehensive" approach to 
the Middle East.  He expressed support for the GOL's 
intention to address disarmament of Hizballah through 
political dialogue, and praised GOL PM Siniora's idea that 
Sheba'a Farms be placed under UN trusteeship until its status 
is determined, even suggesting that this approach could be 
used to resolve the issue of the Golan Heights.  Churkin 
observed that Lebanon and Syria could only improve their 
bilateral relationship without "unjustified" outside pressure. 
 
Others Offer Lukewarm Praise and Tough Questions 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Noting that President Bush would address the issue 
of Lebanon during his speech to the UNGA, Ambassador Bolton 
limited his remarks to four main points.  First, he observed 
that the conflict had begun because Hizballah had crossed the 
Blue Line without provocation to kill and abduct Israeli 
soldiers.  Second, Ambassador Bolton averred that Hizballah's 
status as a state within a state would continue to pose a 
threat to Israeli and Lebanese security until the terrorist 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001860  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
group is disarmed.  Third, he emphasized that all member 
states must take seriously UNSCR 1701's requirement that 
Hizballah not be re-armed by strictly adhering to the arms 
embargo created by the resolution.  Fourth, observing that 
comments about Sheba'a Farms were taking on a "Lewis 
Carroll"-type quality, the Ambassador read aloud the section 
of the UNSC's June 18, 2000 Presidential Statement (PRST) 
that "endorsed the work done by the UN... including the SYG's 
conclusion that as of 16 June 2000 Israel has withdrawn its 
forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425..." 
The Council had repeatedly reaffirmed this PRST in subsequent 
SC resolutions, Ambassador Bolton recalled, and could not 
simply ignore the statement now when dealing with the Sheba'a 
Farms issue. 
 
¶9. (SBU) While commending the efforts of SYG Annan and the 
Secretariat to secure the cessation of hostilities and 
 
SIPDIS 
expeditiously establish the expanded UNIFIL force, France and 
the UK joined the USG in offering only lukewarm praise for 
the report and asking the SYG specific questions about how to 
ensure implementation of the key provisions of UNSCR 1701. 
French PR de la Sabliere asked for a timetable for the steps 
necessary for Syria and Lebanon to delineate their common 
border and establish diplomatic relations.  In a set piece 
pre-arranged with the SYG, de la Sabliere asked Annan whether 
there should be a follow-up to ensure implementation of the 
arms embargo established in UNSCR 1701 (to which Annan later 
replied that the SC could consider setting up a committee of 
experts to monitor implementation of the arms embargo).  The 
French PR also expressed hope that the proposals requested of 
the SYG in OP 10 -- relating to Ta'if and UNSCR 1559 and 1680 
implementation, including resolution of the Sheba'a Farms 
issue -- would be forthcoming in the SYG's next report on the 
implementation of UNSCR 1559 (due on October 19, 2006). 
British PR Jones-Parry agreed that the international 
community had registered a "huge achievement" in terms of 
progress on 1701 implementation but emphasized that much 
remains to be done.  Singling out the arms embargo and the 
importance of securing Lebanon's land border with Syria, 
Jones-Parry said he looked forward to the SYG's 
recommendations per OP 10 of 1701. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Several other delegations echoed many of the points 
raised by the P-3.  While calling on the international 
community to strengthen UNIFIL's deployment and urging Israel 
to withdraw completely from south Lebanon, China also said it 
shared France's view that UNSCR 1701 implementation requires 
a timetable.  Seizing on the SYG's statement that "almost 
all" of Lebanon's neighbors had offered to cooperate in 
implementing 1701, Denmark asked which countries had not 
cooperated.  Arguing that Syria and Lebanon must establish 
diplomatic relations, the Danish PR also expressed hope that 
GOL PM Siniora and SARG President Asad would soon meet.  She 
also called on Iran and Syria to live up to their commitments 
to respect the arms embargo under 1701.  Noting that the 
SYG's report did not contain much detail, Argentina expressed 
hope the 1559 report would present specific recommendations 
to deal with Sheba'a Farms, disarmament, and respect for the 
arms embargo and the Blue Line.  Japan and Slovakia agreed 
that timelines were needed for disarmament and Sheba'a Farms. 
 Both delegations also underscored the importance of the 
immediate release of the abducted Israeli soldiers. 
 
Annan Offers Little in Response 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Taking the floor again after Qatar, France, China, 
Russia and the U.S. had spoken (given his commitments 
elsewhere during the General Debate), Annan promised to 
report to the Council if further progress on 1701 
implementation is achieved.  But he added that on certain 
issues -- such as Sheba'a Farms and border delineation -- 
progress depends on Lebanon, Syria, and Israel.  Referring to 
his report to the Council endorsed in the June 18, 2000 PRST, 
SYG Annan said the delineation of the Blue Line did not 
preclude other arrangements between Syria and Lebanon that 
might change the status of Sheba'a Farms.  Israel had a role 
to play in this process as well, he noted, because it still 
occupies the area but has laid no permanent territorial claim 
to it.  If Sheba'a becomes Lebanese, Annan suggested, the 
UNSC would have to review the situation again. 
 
¶12. (SBU) On disarmament, Annan argued that the Lebanese must 
agree to a process that accomplishes more than the National 
Dialogue, given that the National Dialogue consensus on 
disarming Palestinian groups outside the camps had yet to be 
fulfilled.  He noted that the Lebanese and Syrians had put 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001860  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
forward no calendar to address issues in their bilateral 
relationship, but recalled that Asad had made a commitment in 
principle to meet Siniora.  Annan also noted Asad's 
announcement that he would deploy an additional battalion of 
Syrian soldiers to police the Lebanese border and would 
accept German assistance to ensure its security. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Responding to French PR de la Sabliere's question 
about follow-up mechanisms to ensure implementation of the 
arms embargo, Annan noted that the UNSC has often created 
panels of experts and sent them to visit the countries in 
question to monitor adherence to sanctions regimes.  Aside 
from issuing a general call to member states to respect their 
obligations under 1701, Annan opined that creating a panel of 
experts was an option for the Council.  (Note:  UNSC 
committees work on the basis of consensus.  Qatar, for 
example, would therefore have an effective veto over the work 
of a panel of experts even though it lacks that veto in the 
broader Council.  End Note.) 
 
¶14. (SBU) Responding to member state interventions after SYG 
Annan left, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Jean-Marie Guehenno clarified that Annan's said that "almost 
all" of Lebanon's neighbors had offered to cooperate in 
implementing 1701 because not all had publicly and explicitly 
affirmed their commitments.  Guehenno stressed that all 
neighbors had privately assured the SYG of their support, 
however.  Guehenno also noted that the Secretariat could 
propose no timeline for Hizballah's disarmament because the 
process must be driven by the Lebanese. 
BOLTON