VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #2067/01 2651019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221019Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6884
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 2022
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002067 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): STATUS OF OPCW 
WORKSHOP IN ROME 
 
 
This is CWC-86-06. 
 
¶1.  (U) Ambassador Javits recently held extensive discussions 
with OPCW Director General Pfirter on the prospects for the 
workshop on the universality of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention to be held in Rome on October 25-27.  Pfirter said 
he had been reflecting on the value of the conference and 
recounted his personal efforts to make the workshop a 
success.  The DG had spoken to the Egyptian Foreign Minister 
three times in the last year, asking the Egyptian government 
for an invitation to visit Cairo.  He had also pressed Egypt 
to send an official representative to the workshop, rather 
than an NGO representative as Egypt had done in the past 
workshops in Malta and Cyprus.  Pfirter added that he had 
been reluctant to bypass the Egyptian Ambassador in The Hague 
in making these requests, as the Ambassador is reportedly 
close to the chief of cabinet of the Foreign Minister, is 
supportive of Egypt ultimately joining the CWC, and has been 
very cooperative and forthcoming.  The DG recounted this in 
order to be clear about how much emphasis he places on 
official Egyptian participation in Rome. 
 
¶2.  (U) Pfirter told Javits the result has been that Egypt 
has decided to attend the Conference of States Parties in 
December as observers for the first time.  However, Egypt has 
refused to send official representatives to Rome.  The 
Egyptian Ambassador urged the DG to invite the NGO 
representative of the Egyptian Council on Foreign Relations 
to attend. (This would probably be the same retired general 
who had attended the Malta and Cyprus events.)  The DG said 
he refused to do so, saying that he could not appear to 
legitimize Egypt's failure to send a high level government 
representative. 
 
¶3.  (U)  As for Syria, the DG said that Syria no longer had 
an Ambassador in The Hague, but only representation in 
Brussels.  However, the DG had met with the Syrian UN PermRep 
in New York and had spoken several times to the Syrian charge 
d'affairs in Brussels to press for an opportunity to be able 
to discuss this matter in Damascus, and have a high level 
representative in Rome.  The DG was told (apparently by 
Italian officials) that Syria is sending officials from the 
Foreign and Defense Ministries.  Pfirter noted that Italy had 
demarched both Syria and Lebanon in capitals and had been 
working intensively with their ambassadors in Rome.  The DG 
added that he had pressed the Syrian Ambassador (when he had 
been in The Hague) for Syrian accession to the CWC. 
 
¶4.  (U) The DG said that he had good relations with the 
Lebanese Ambassador in The Hague and had been working with 
him to get an invitation for the DG to go to Beirut.  Pfirter 
commented that the Lebanese Ambassador had told him before 
the summer fighting in Lebanon that Beirut was ready to 
accede to the CWC.  Since then he has heard nothing more on 
the topic.  The DG said Lebanon had agreed that one of its 
diplomats at its Embassy in Rome would attend the workshop, 
but Italy and the DG are working intensively to get them to 
raise the level of participation.  Pfirter commented that he 
preferred to get acceptance to attend and then try to raise 
the level of participation, rather than trying to garner 
agreement on the level of attendance from the outset. 
Finally, the DG said that Israel was most anxious for the 
workshop to proceed as they had informed the DG that they 
would send a strong delegation. 
 
¶5.  (U) Pfirter said he expected the Ambassadors of Israel, 
Syria and Lebanon to Italy would probably attend the opening 
ceremony of the Rome workshop and perhaps one or more might 
possibly stay for sidebar meetings beyond the opening event. 
Pfirter then commented on the suggestion that had been raised 
that he should intensify efforts by sending his senior staff 
(Deputy DG John Freeman or chief of cabinet Rafael Grossi) to 
capitals to press for the highest possible participation in 
Rome.  The DG said he could not "emasculate" the Ambassadors 
in The Hague by not going through them to seek an invitation 
for a meeting in capitals.  Nor could he just "parachute" his 
people in, as this would merely antagonize the ambassadors. 
The DG commented that on his trip to New York in about two 
 
weeks, he will attempt to get meetings with the high level 
representatives of Syria, Egypt and Lebanon at the UN. 
 
¶6.  (U)  The DG said that he had an opportunity recently to 
speak to Dr. Giulio Picheca, General Director of the Foreign 
Ministry and also head of the Italian National Authority, who 
is handling the workshop.  Picheca said the Italian 
government is intent on proceeding with the workshop. 
Pfirter had informed the official that he had no definitive 
information from the U.S. on proceeding with the conference 
or seeking a postponement.  He added that the U.S. was 
considering sending someone from Embassy Rome, rather than 
Amb. Javits.  The DG said that a final decision on whether to 
proceed or postpone would be taken toward the end of 
September, after consultations with the EU, Italians, 
invitees, OPCW staff and others. 
 
¶7.  (U)  The DG told Javits he envisioned the workshop as an 
opportunity to provide information about the OPCW and CWC, 
but, more importantly, exhort non-members to join.  He said 
it would be unfortunate if the U.S. would send only a 
representative from Embassy Rome, as it would be a missed 
opportunity and might be taken as a weakening of support for 
the OPCW.  The DG said that if this is the U.S. decision, he 
would not give anyone his impression of why the U.S. would 
not send its PermRep to the OPCW, but would refer people to 
Amb. Javits, especially as Javits had attended the Malta and 
Cyprus events. 
 
¶8.  (U) Malik Azhar Ellahi, head of the Government Relations 
and Political Affairs branch, which is making arrangements 
for the workshop, stated that the core program for Rome would 
be largely a repeat of that utilized in Malta and Cyprus.  In 
line with the DG's statement, there will be some reduction in 
presentations to allow more time for side-bar discussions, 
although there must be enough of a program so that people who 
are not in these unofficial talks "do not disappear."  Ellahi 
said there would be some other modifications.  They are 
working to get more participants from the chemical industry. 
There may be a representative from the Greek government to 
discuss the role the OPCW had played in assisting in security 
preparations for the Athens Olympics. 
 
¶9.  (U) Ellahi noted that, in all candor, he was not certain 
as of last week whether the workshop would even happen. 
However, the logistical arrangements are in order.  Ellahi 
concluded by noting that there would be a Sept. 28 
consultation at which the Technical Secretariat would go over 
plans for the Rome workshop.  At this time, it appears the 
plan is for a strong pitch that all participants and other 
SPs work to make Rome a success. 
 
¶10.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL