VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #2049/01 2630727
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200727Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6865
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): DISCUSSIONS 
WITH THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT ON SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS 
DURING SCHEDULE 2 INSPECTIONS 
 
REF: STATE 145877 
 
This is CWC-81-06. 
 
¶1. (U) Background: In December 2005, the Technical 
Secretariat (TS) announced its intention to begin sampling 
 
SIPDIS 
and analysis (S&A) (on a limited basis) during subsequent 
inspections of Schedule 2 facilities beginning in the third 
quarter of 2006.  This will be done on a trial basis for 
approximately 18 months so that the Secretariat can build up 
its experience with this tool and evaluate further use. 
Plans currently call for S&A during 13 Schedule 2 inspections 
in 13 different States Parties, one of which will be the 
United States, expected sometime in 2007.  The TS invited the 
U.S. to see the S&A-equipment and to discuss procedural, 
logistical, and technical issues associated with S&A in the 
U.S. 
 
¶2. (U) Subject discussions were held in accordance with 
guidance (REF) with the Technical Secretariat on 11-12 
September 2006, in The Hague with the goal of how to make S&A 
work in the United States.  U.S. objectives were to (a) 
understand how the TS intends to proceed, (b) understand the 
logistical requirements, (c) outline the U.S. position that 
S&A should be conducted in a realistic manner including a 
sound basis for using this inspection tool, (d) understand 
the technical details attendant to S&A, and (e) reach a 
"cooperative arrangement" with the TS on how S&A would be 
conducted in the U.S. 
 
¶3.  (U) The U.S. team consisted of Rick D'Andrea (DOS), Beth 
Scott and Hung Ly (DOC), and Larry Denyer (Del).  Per Runn 
headed the TS side with 12 others from the Policy Review 
Branch, Industry Verification Branch, Technical Support 
Branch and the Inspection Division.  Following introductions 
on both sides Rick D'Andrea began the discussions by 
outlining the U.S. goal and objectives for these talks and 
handed over an informal outline (that had served as the basis 
for a prior STATE/COMMERCE planning meeting) that included 
topics to be discussed and elements of the "cooperative 
arrangement."  He stated the U.S. position (per paragraph 5 
reftel) that S&A be conducted in a realistic manner, taking 
into account appropriate Convention provisions and U.S. 
regulations.  Next, Bill Kane (Chief of IVB) gave a 
presentation on the evolution of S&A in the Secretariat (U.S. 
team has hard copy).  Bill stated that in 1997, when the CWC 
entered into force, the TS was not ready to do S&A.  In 2005 
the TS announced that they were prepared to do S&A and 
planned an 18 month trial during which S&A would be done at 
about 13 subsequent Schedule 2 inspections in 13 different 
States Parties.  The balance of the presentation detailed how 
the TS arrived at this decision.  Mr. Sokolowski, Acting Head 
of the OPCW Laboratory, next gave a presentation on "Tasks 
and the Role of the Lab in Analytical Verification Activities 
of the Secretariat" (U.S. team has hard copy).  The U.S. team 
was mainly in listening mode.  Further discussion would later 
occur during the visit to the laboratory (see paragraph 5). 
 
¶4. (U) Details, Details, Details.  What follows are a number 
of details the U.S. learned during the discussions and an 
outline of several unresolved issues: 
 
¶A. Concerning the basis for S&A, Per Runn pointed out that 
S&A provides a unique set of information that directly gets 
at whether there are undeclared scheduled chemicals present. 
This unique data can then be combined with the information 
from previous inspection(s) at the declared facility to get a 
clearer picture of inspection-relevant features of the 
facility.  The U.S. team reiterated its desire to have a 
rationale for the sampling request as part of the written 
request from the inspection team. 
 
¶B. Inspection team size will be five inspectors vice the 
three inspectors normally used for subsequent Schedule 2 
inspections, and the notification period will be five days 
vice two. 
 
¶C. Concerning the increased time required for the Technical 
 
 
Equipment Inspection (TEI) of the S&A equipment and the 
impact that will have on meeting the CWC requirement to get 
the inspection team to the inspection site within 12 hours of 
arrival, it was agreed that (a) the TEI would start as soon 
as the inspection mandate was handed over, (b) the words 
"inspection team" mean all of the inspectors and not their 
equipment, and (c) if the inspected state party made every 
reasonable effort to get the "inspection team" to the site 
and it took longer than 12 hours, that fact would be 
documented in the inspection report and have no practical 
consequence.  Unresolved was whether the pre-inspection 
briefing and beginning the period of inspection could occur 
prior to arrival of the S&A equipment.  The TS strongly 
prefers that these events wait until after equipment arrival. 
 
¶D. S&A will be included in the inspection mandate as a work 
instruction. 
 
¶E. If the inspection team is unable to do S&A because of 
equipment malfunction, they will not/not seek alternative S&A 
methods (e.g., use of the site's analytical equipment) during 
the trial period. 
 
¶F. Concerning support the inspection team will need from the 
U.S., the TS referred to Note S/548/2006 dated 10 February 
2006 and explained that the space they needed for the S&A 
equipment was about five meters of counter space and room for 
a fume hood.  Mr. D'Andrea asked whether the inspection team 
could set up on a loading dock or in a truck?  The response 
was yes, provided temperature, humidity, electrical power, 
water, etc., were conducive to S&A operations.  Ideally, what 
is needed is access to lab bench space with a fume hood. 
 
¶G. The Fume Hood.  The TS is working toward getting a fume 
hood that meets U.S. technical and safety specifications 
prior to S&A in the U.S.  Should they fail to do so, the U.S. 
would have to be willing to provide a fume hood in order for 
S&A to occur.  Strong preferences were expressed on both 
sides that the fume hood issue be resolved before S&A takes 
place in the U.S. 
 
¶H. Securing the S&A equipment: In the event that a separate 
lockable room is not available at the site, the sides 
discussed several possible methods of securing the S&A 
equipment and did not reach a useful conclusion.  The TS 
agreed to work on this issue further with the aim of having a 
workable method prior to S&A in the U.S. 
 
¶I. The TS estimates that it will take them two to four hours 
to set up the S&A equipment and another four to six hours to 
have it operational. 
 
¶J. Get it in writing.  The U.S. team pointed out that 22 CFR 
Part 103 sets a number of conditions that must be met for S&A 
to occur, and that requests for the taking of samples must be 
in writing.  The team handed over a copy of this regulation. 
 
¶K. Costs: The TS estimates that doing S&A will add roughly 
$15K to the cost of a Schedule 2 inspection.  The TS agreed 
to reimburse the U.S. for "billable" expenses.  Privately, 
Commerce team members expressed concerns that their office 
would expend funds for shipping, truck rental, etc., and 
would not be reimbursed because the TS money would go to the 
U.S. general fund.  (This reimbursement mechanism is the same 
as at present, but the costs would be significantly higher.) 
Consequently, Commerce may be unable to afford more than one 
S&A inspection in 2007. 
 
¶5. (U) Analysis Mode: The U.S. team visited the OPCW 
Laboratory and was shown sample analyses by two gas 
chromatograph/mass spectrophotometer (GC/MS) instruments, one 
operating in OPEN mode and one operating in BLINDED mode. 
The controlling software in both cases is AMDIS (Automated 
Mass Spectra Deconvolution Identification System).  Both 
modes display the same analytical result, however, in OPEN 
mode the analyst has a number of additional data access 
options available upon request.  Use of one or more of these 
options would be needed to resolve an ambiguous analysis.  If 
 
 
AMDIS BLINDED mode is selected the GC/MS wipes the OPEN mode 
additional analytical options off the hard drive.  Resolution 
of ambiguous analysis results would then require installation 
of a replacement hard drive containing the other software 
configuration, a procedure that takes at least two hours. 
The TS strongly favors operating in OPEN mode.  This issue 
remains unresolved. 
 
¶6. (U) Overall, the discussions were cordial and highly 
productive in terms of understanding operational details. 
Issues remain, but they should be resolved as both sides gain 
experience in S&A at Schedule 2 inspections during the trial 
period. 
 
¶7.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL