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C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2026 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: ISRAEL LEWITES OPTIMISTIC OF MRS CHANCES 
 
(C) Summary:  Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) spokesman 
Israel 
Lewites is convinced  that both the FSLN 
and the ALN have reached the peak of their support and that 
their poll numbers may decline, a phenomenon that would 
provide the MRS with an opportunity to gain ground on, and 
potentially surpass, Montealegre.  He speculated that 
Montealegre's numbers could fall due to problems 
articulating his message and the CENIS smear campaign 
orchestrated by his opponents.  Lewites also noted that 
the divide between the center right is likely to remain 
protracted because polls have undercounted the rural vote, 
thus PLC numbers are likely to increase in the runup to the 
elections.  Lewites speculated that Ortega's numbers will 
decline somewhat because some stated Sandinista National 
Liberation 
Front (FSLN) supporters may only be 
professing their allegiance to avoid antagonizing local 
party members.  In the meantime, Jarquin's 
strong speaking skills, straight-forward message, and 
dedicated campaign team could be sufficient to propel 
Jarquin forward in the polls.  The MRS is working especially 
hard to 
increase its support in urban areas and among students. 
End summary. 
 
 
Lewites:  MRS Gaining Traction 
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¶2.  (C) Emboffs met on 19 September with Israel Lewites -- 
nephew of Herty Lewites -- to discuss his views on his 
Sandinista Renovation Movement's (MRS) campaign and the 
election in general.  Lewites noted that the campaign 
remains highly focused on its goals and charged with a 
positive attitude.  While fundraising remains an uphill 
battle, Lewites asserted that Edmundo Jarquin's strong 
performance in last week's CNN debate has prompted several 
small and medium-sized donors to come forward with 
contributions between $20,000 to $30,000.  That said, the 
party has yet to receive any significant support from 
Nicaragua's "big capital" private sector financiers. 
Instead, the campaign is concentrating on the 
small-medium donors, as part of its house-to-house 
campaign.  He noted that although the MRS probably enjoys 
only 
one quarter the resources of Eduardo Montealegre's 
campaign, a poll commissioned by the party with Greenberg 
and Associates showed that the MRS has managed to reach 85% 
of its target audience, compared to 95% for the ALN.  He 
said that the poll, which he later  shared  with 
the Embassy, places Daniel Ortega in the lead with 32%, 
followed by Montealegre (28%), Jarquin (20%), and Jose Rizo 
(18%). 
 
¶3.  (C) Lewites believes that both the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) and the ALN have reached the peak 
of their support and that their poll numbers may even 
decline --  providing the MRS with an opportunity 
to gain ground on, and potentially surpass, Montealegre.  He 
speculated that Montealegre's numbers could fall due to 
problems articulating his message and the CENIS smear 
campaign his opponents have  orchestrated against him. 
Lewites also claimed that the gap between Rizo's Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party (PLC) and Montealegre's Nicaraguan 
Liberal Alliance (ALN) is likely to diminish with time 
because of PLC efforts to mobilize their rural support 
base.  He predicted that PLC numbers are likely to surge in 
the 
run-up to the elections as polls have undercounted the 
party's rural support.  A more evenly divided center-right 
would provide Jarquin with an opportunity to move ahead by 
presenting himself as the one true candidate offering a 
different path. 
 
¶4.  (C) Moreover, continued Lewites, Montealegre 
faces some stiff challenges ahead that could deflate some 
of his strength at the polls.  Lewites opined that 
 Montealegre has not done enough to defend himself on the 
Negotiable 
Indemnization  Certificates (CENI) financial scandal, and 
that people have the impression that he has something to 
hide (Comment:  Embassy officers have heard similar claims 
from other contacts who do not have ties to the MRS.  They 
say that Montealegre's failure to take a sufficiently 
strong stand against the allegations makes him appear 
guilty.  We suspect that these accusations could become 
more damaging over time because the PLC and FSLN will 
almost certainly use their influence in the legislative and 
judicial branches to intensify such efforts closer to the 
elections -- when it will have maximum political impact. 
End Comment.). 
 
The MRS is a United Front With A Strong Message 
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¶5.  (C) When asked if he was concerned by speculation that 
the FSLN has infiltrated the MRS, or be able to pry away 
members (such as happened with to the ALN with 
Salvador Talavera's recent defection), Lewites thought it 
unlikely.  He expressed his confidence in the loyalty of 
party members 
and deputy candidates.  He noted that the majority of party 
members joined the campaign for ideological reasons to which 
they remain committed and that they are unlikely to be 
lured away, as they have known from the beginning that 
they joined a party with limited financial resources and so 
have no expectations for personal gain.  Lewites commented 
that Talavera's turncoat decision hurts not only the ALN, 
but further tarnishes the image of the entire Nicaraguan 
political scene.  Calling the move an act of political 
prostitution, he felt that it further undermines popular 
faith in Nicaraguan politics. 
 
¶6.  (C) Lewites put great stock in the strength of the MRS 
campaign platform, noting that the other candidates have 
not been as clear, or as honest, as Jarquin.  Jarquin and 
his party are tackling difficult issues that face many 
Nicaraguans.  For example, he said that the MRS has been 
unique in its recognition of domestic violence as a 
critical social problem --  the 
number one cause of death for women in the country.  The party 
has incorporated this theme into the campaign by criticizing 
existing 
laws and procedures.  For example, Lewites pointed out that 
when 
investigating cases of spousal abuse, authorities require 
that the victim 
(often an abused wife) confront her abuser (often her 
husband) during a mediation/arbitration session. 
Obviously, said Lewites, a victim of crime and intimidation 
is unlikely to be able to summon the courage to do this, 
and thus many abusers go free.  Lewites also played up his 
party's commitment to depoliticizing public institutions, 
cutting wasteful expenditures, and combating corruption. 
 
MRS Shooting For 30 Assembly Deputies 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) Lewites commented that the MRS aims to win 30 
deputy positions in the National Assembly, but said 
realistically that this would be hard to achieve; he would 
be happy to secure 20-25 seats.  Their goals in the Assembly 
include 
a reduction in the number of deputies and their 
salaries, prohibiting presidential re-election (which the 
MRS sees as critical to undermining the PLC-FSLN pacto and 
undermining Ortega's hold over his party), cutting the 
salaries of the President and Vice President, and reducing 
the number of Supreme Court justices from 16 to 7.  He 
noted that these cost-saving measures would enable the 
government to increase teacher salaries by 50%, which in 
turn would help alleviate some of the country's pressing 
social problems.  The MRS also proposes to overhaul the tax 
code. 
 
¶8.  (C) Lewites remarked that there are too many tax 
exemptions 
for the rich, putting an undue burden on the poorest 
segment of the population.  He noted that this platform 
item is a holdover from Herty's influence; 
when Mayor of Managua, Herty cracked down on tax evasion. 
For example, when Herty first took office Carlos Pellas was 
paying only about $400 a year in taxes; when Herty left 
office that had increased to $120,000.  Lewites clarified 
that the point is not to target businesses with excessive 
taxation or seek political bribes, but to hold businesses 
and the wealthy accountable to what the law says they 
should pay by reducing the number of legal loopholes. 
 
FSLN Using Scare Tactics and Corruption, But Weaker Than 
Polls Suggest 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (C) Lewites asserted that Ortega's campaign has been 
based 
on fear and bribery, and that the Sandinistas may actually 
be slightly weaker than polls would indicate.  He thinks 
that as much as 4-5% of professed Ortega supporters could 
decide to vote for someone else on election day.  Lewites 
postulated that many people professing support for the 
Sandinistas are doing so because they are scared that 
demonstrating support for other candidates could provoke 
the ire of local Sandinista officials or thugs.  Instead, 
he thinks that come election day, many will instead vote 
for the MRS.  By way of example, he reported that while 
recently campaigning in Esteli, he came upon a family 
holding pro-Sandinista placards.  When he approached and 
questioned one family member as to why they were planning 
to vote for Ortega, she responded that they were 
demonstrating in favor of Ortega in order to avoid becoming 
a target for criticism.  She said, however, 
that on election day they would cast their ballots for the 
MRS. 
 
¶10.  (C) Lewites asserted that the FSLN is using dirty 
tactics 
to strengthen themselves ahead of the elections.  For 
instance, he said that while in Somoto, he heard that one 
local judge had threatened a local MRS candidate with 
losing his house if he did not support Ortega.  Lewites 
also mentioned that he had overheard the girlfriend of one 
of Ortega's sons say that Ortega's family has been holding 
weekend family gatherings with the family of Supreme 
Electoral Council (CSE) President Roberto Rivas.  The 
girlfriend also insinuated that Ortega's links to Rivas and 
influence over the CSE  make victory almost certain. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Lewites also warned that FSLN influence on the 
committees responsible for overseeing the results of local 
polling places could be enough to tilt the election in 
their favor.  He pointed out that of the three seats in 
each JRV (voting center), the FSLN and PLC will obtain two, 
leaving a third spot to be doled out to smaller parties. 
He noted that the Alternative for Change (AC) could be able 
to fill up to 53% of the remaining spots, thus granting 
the tiny party undue representation -- he half jokingly 
pointed out that 
the AC may have more fiscales in the JRVs than it will 
votes on election day.  He said that the high number of AC 
members would stack the odds in favor of the Sandinistas as 
the two parties are closely linked.  Holding a very low 
opinion of the AC, Lewites claimed the party is likely to 
back 
Ortega during the elections.  He said that Herty had at one 
time considered running under an AC banner, but that he had 
been persuaded not to because of concerns that AC leader 
Orlando Tardencilla would eventually sell out to the 
Sandinistas. 
Shortly after Herty decided to run with the MRS, 
Tardencilla announced his decision to support Ortega, 
prompting the AC to split. 
 
Ortega Win Could Spark "Chaos" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12.  (C) Lewites recognized that Ortega's loyal support base 
and potential for fraudulently swaying the vote could hand 
him a first-round victory.  However, given widespread 
anti-Ortega sentiment, Lewites speculated that  popular unrest 
could erupt if Ortega were to win.  He pointed out 
that many former Contras have already expressed interest in 
opposing such a government.  When asked to identify 
potential key figures in a Sandinista government, Lewites 
cited the usual names (i.e. Lenin Cerna, Bayardo Arce), but 
also pointed out that vice presidential candidate Jaime 
Morales Carazo would probably wield significant clout on 
economic matters.  He noted that the government rosters 
would become bloated, however, because of Ortega's promises 
to dole out jobs to supporters.  Under Ortega, Lewites said 
foreign investment would decline almost 
immediately, and that Nicaragua would become part of the 
Chavez-Castro axis.  Ortega would then pit Nicaragua 
against the United States on many international issues, to 
the further detriment of the country (i.e. capital flight, 
decline in remittances).  Saying "imagine how strong Ortega 
is now when he is not in power," Lewites fears Ortega would 
further entrench his hold on key institutions, including 
the military. 
 
Edmundo Jarquin "A Nice Guy", Not a "Political Animal" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (C) Asked to describe Jarquin, Lewites noted that the 
MRS candidate is very likeable and that he possesses a good 
sense of humor.  He related an anecdote of when a foreign 
journalist approached Jarquin saying, "I know that 'El Feo' 
is your campaign slogan, but you really are ugly."  While 
Lewites cringed at the approach, Jarquin responded by 
bursting out laughing and embraced the journalist. 
Nevertheless, Lewites described Jarquin as extremely 
competent, someone with a methodical personality who 
feels compelled to put things in order.  Jarquin is a 
perfectionist and a workaholic, who Lewites estimates gets 
only about four hours of sleep a night.  He often stays up 
late at night reviewing the days accomplishments and 
planning for the next, including the study of upcoming 
speeches.  Despite the demands of the campaign, Jarquin is 
energetic and physically able, known for walking many 
kilometers in a day while campaigning around the country. 
 
¶14.  (C) Lewites noted, however, that Jarquin is not a 
natural 
politician, which can be refreshing, but has also landed 
him in trouble.  Lewites joked that unlike career 
politicians, Jarquin is not sufficiently hypocritical and 
often says what he thinks.  It was this directness that 
prompted him 
to take a clear position in favor of therapeutic abortion 
(defined in Nicaragua as abortion in cases where the life 
of the mother is at risk), which subsequently provoked 
widespread criticism from other candidates and religious 
groups.  In addition, although personable, Jarquin is not 
press savvy.  Lewites recalled one time when journalists 
had come by to interview MRS campaign members and saw 
Jarquin walking by in the background.  Lewites called to 
Jarquin, but the candidate did not come over.  Lewites 
later asked Jarquin why he had not stopped to talk to the 
reporters, and Jarquin looked surprised, apologized, and 
said that he had simply not been paying attention and had 
been pondering other campaign details.  Lewites contrasted 
this style with that of Herty's, who had a sixth sense when 
it came to dealing with press.  Unlike Herty, Jarquin does 
not always realize the importance of cultivating friendly 
press relations. 
 
¶15.  (C) Although Jarquin stays very involved in campaign 
strategizing, his staff works to ensure that he does not 
become bogged down with the day-to-day details of the 
campaign.  Lewites reported that the candidate is surrounded 
by 
a core group of supporters who hold regular strategy 
sessions.  In addition to Jarquin, the group includes his 
wife (who Lewites says carries a great deal of influence on 
her husband), campaign manager Luis Carrion, President of 
the MRS Dora Maria Tellez, Victor Hugo Tinoco (who brings 
to the table a wide network of contacts, political 
expertise, and diplomatic skill), Alberto Cortes, members 
of the Greenberg consulting firm, and Lewites himself. 
Lewites characterized the team as having somewhat of a 
collegial quality rather than a vertical hierarchy of 
authority.  He said, for example, that while Carrion is 
campaign manager and oversees the budget, he does not 
micromanage affairs and thus the entire team provides input 
into 
discussions.  MRS meetings are frequently free-flowing 
affairs, conducted informally, and to which members of the 
press are occasionally invited.  Lewites noted that this 
stands in stark contrast to the campaigns of other 
candidates, which he said often meet in confined locations 
and restrict press access. 
 
MRS Counting on Voter Indecision, "Bohemian" Urbanites, and 
Students 
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¶16.  (C) Lewites opined that both the PLC and FSLN retain 
their groups of diehard supporters, but that most 
Nicaraguans are ready for change and hold to no particular 
ideology.  He estimated that about 65-70% of the population 
hold non-dogmatic views and would be open to shifting their 
vote right up until the last days of the campaign.  Lewites 
says he has noticed during his campaign travels that many 
Nicaraguans are initially apathetic towards the elections, 
and that they can be malleable early on.  He 
 
pointed to several conversations he has had in which voters 
have initially expressed a pro-FSLN or PLC disposition, but 
when confronted with those parties' history of 
mismanagement and corruption, the voters quickly come 
around to voicing their support for the newer movements, 
such as the MRS.  Lewites said that the most committed 
anti-PLC or FSLN vote comes from the educated urban sector, 
which has become the primary battleground for the ALN and 
MRS.  Among this group, Lewites says the MRS counts on the 
support of academics, artists, and other "bohemians," while 
Montealegre enjoys the support of much of the business 
community. 
 
¶17.  (C) Although the FSLN lays claim to the most vocal of 
student groups (the student body unions), Lewites argued that 
the vast majority of students do not support the 
FSLN.  He pointed out that pro-FSLN student leaders, 
such as Jasser Martinez, are professional 
protestors/paid henchmen and do not reflect the 
sentiments of the average student.  Indeed, the union's 
strident activism for their biggest cause -- ensuring that 
the universities receive the constitutionally-mandated 6% 
of the budget -- is largely motivated by self interest. 
Much of the 6% in reality goes to support these groups, 
which are essentially protest arms of the FSLN. 
Lewites, who maintains personal and professional ties to the 
universities said that he has heard from student contacts 
that following a prolonged student protest, Martinez was 
rewarded by the FSLN with a trip to Argentina for his role 
in instigating unrest.  Other student leaders receive 
personal credit cards and hold large parties with their 
funds. 
 
¶18.  (C) Lewites speculated that about 60% of students in 
public universities support the MRS, while Montealegre 
enjoys about the same amount of support from students in 
private institutions.  Montealegre's stiff image has hurt 
him with some students, according to Lewites.  He mentioned 
that the marketing program at the Central American 
University (UCA) conducted an internal poll in which 
Montealegre received around 60% of the vote, followed by a 
substantial number of undecided, with Jarquin trailing 
behind.  The program then invited the MRS and ALN to speak 
to the students.  Dressed casually, Lewites showed up on 
behalf of the MRS and presented the party's platform in an 
informal discussion with the students.  A subsequent poll 
revealed that Jarquin had surpassed Montealegre. 
Montealegre and his campaign arrived at a later date at UCA 
dressed in suits, surrounded by body guards, and seemingly 
aloof.  Montealegre delivered a very formal 
presentation, and while Lewites was originally concerned 
that Montealegre's appearance may have swayed the students 
back his way, a third poll revealed that following 
Montealegre's presentation, even more of the student body 
supported the MRS. 
 
The Religious Vote 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶19.  (C) Jarquin has faced sharp criticism from fellow 
candidates, the Catholic church, and the evangelical 
community for his comments in favor of therapeutic 
abortion.  Lewites noted that, in typical Jarquin fashion, 
Jarquin responded to journalists questions about his 
position on the delicate subject with a direct answer. 
While other candidates either outrightly oppose therapeutic 
abortion, others tiptoe around the subject with vague 
answers.  In contrast, Jarquin has been the only candidate 
to state firmly his support for the measure.  Lewites 
admitted that upon hearing this, he took Jarquin aside and 
said "You have made it that much harder to win."  Since 
then, however, several things have changed his opinion. 
First, according to the Greenberg poll, about 70% of the 
population favors therapeutic abortion.  Moreover, 
employment is the number one priority to most voters, while 
abortion ranks last (again Lewites cited the Greenberg 
poll). 
 
¶20.  (C) Comment:  Despite his newness to the 
political arena, Jarquin has demonstrated strong 
communication skills, particularly during the recent CNN 
debate, and he appears to be quickly assuming the trappings 
of a more seasoned politician.  During the debate, 
he came across as a strong speaker, articulate, and with a 
clearly defined platform. 
Many local pundits say he gave the strongest performance. 
Jarquin's public speaking skills and forthright image have 
helped to 
sustain the momentum of the MRS in the wake of Herty's 
death.  In public Jarquin comes across as principled and 
someone who is willing to speak his mind.  For example, he 
has several times in recent weeks publicly challenged 
Ortega to a debate -- Jarquin says Ortega can pick the 
time, place, and rules for the event.  These 
characteristics suggest that Jarquin may well be able to 
remain a key factor in the elections through November. 
Nevertheless, the MRS will also face an uphill battle, 
particularly if they continue to struggle to accumulate 
significant funding.  We also suspect that Jarquin will 
face a pacto-inspired smear campaign closer to election 
day.  End Comment. 
TRIVELLI