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C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002097 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2026 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: GANARAM: ENCOURAGING PLC MEMBERS TO VOTE 
MONTEALEGRE 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Polcouns and Emboffs met with Eugenio 
Rodriguez, a Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) member 
who is part of GANARAM, a movement calling on PLC members 
to vote for Eduardo Montealegre.  Instead of 
advocating a break with the PLC, GANARAM is  encouraging 
PLC voters to support Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) 
candidate Eduardo Montealegre, whom GANARAM members view as a "true Liberal." Rodriguez, frustrated with the PLC leadership -- he 
characterized them as a "mafia" -- sees Montealegre as the 
perfect Liberal candidate: young, professional, and with a 
clean reputation.  Rodriguez first began supporting 
Montealegre when the latter was still in the PLC and a member 
of the Bolanos Cabinet.  Rodriguez, and other mid-level PLC 
members have grown increasingly disgusted with the party 
leadership's continued adherence to the political pact 
("pacto") with the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN), poor party performance in the 2004 municipal elections, and 
the decision to boot Montealegre from the party.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On 20 September Polcouns and Emboffs met with 
Eugenio Rodriguez, a longtime PLC member who is encouraging 
PLC members to vote in favor of Eduardo Montealegre. 
Rodriguez is President of an organization called the National Action 
Group in Favor of Rizo Supporting Montealegre 
(GANARAM in its Spanish initials), whose members are committed 
PLC members who advocate voting for Montealegre because they 
are frustrated with PLC leadership and view Jose Rizo as a weak 
candidate chosen by a corrupt party leader -- Arnoldo Aleman. 
 
Rodriguez himself is a PLC member of Matagalpa's municipal 
council and a longtime PLC official, having served the party 
in several capacities at the municipal level and also as a 
party representative at the polls in previous elections. 
(Comment:  Matagalpa itself is run by a FSLN mayors, and 
the FSLN also dominates the council, which includes members 
from other parties, such as Rodriguez. End Comment.) 
 
¶3.  According to its mission statement, GANARAM lists the 
following eight points as reasons for its positions: 
 
--All polls to date show that Montealegre is the clear 
preference for democratic voters. 
--These polls reveal that the sum of Montealegre and Rizo 
votes would guarantee the triumph of center-right 
candidate. 
--Montealegre is the only Liberal who can defeat Ortega. 
--Montealegre is a "genuine" and accomplished Liberal. 
--While Rizo is a good person, supporting him will only 
serve to divide the right. 
--The division of the center-right will only result in an 
FSLN victory and a return to the poor conditions of 
Sandinista rule. 
--Liberals are obligated to do everything possible to avoid 
a FSLN win. 
--Montealegre should lead a united Liberal front in order 
to prevent a FSLN victory. 
 
ALN-PLC Divide Could Prove Disastrous 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C)  Rodriguez warned that the existence of two Liberal 
candidates divides the center-right to the point that 
Ortega could come out with a win.  He noted that the 
Sandinistas could  win in November because historically there 
has not been a large difference between PLC and FSLN 
vote counts, and that difference is likely to shrink further 
given the other candidacies voters have to choose from. 
Reflecting on the 2001 elections, Rodriguez recalled that 
the PLC won with about 1.3 million votes compared to 900,000 
of the FSLN -- a difference of about 400,000 votes.  This 
time around, the ALN and the MRS are cutting into this 
cushion, making it all the more likely that Ortega could win. 
 
¶5.  (C)  On the opposite side of the coin, the 
Sandinistas are running unopposed and making use 
of substantial resources, to a great extent made 
possible by their strong showing in the 2004 elections. 
Rodriguez expressed frustration that the budget of 
Sandinista-controlled Matagalpa is 153 million Cordobas, 
but that the FSLN was using much of it to fill their 
campaign coffers.  (Comment:  Rodriguez did not address 
 
the impact of the MRS campaign on the Sandinistas, which we 
think is capable of siphoning off some of the FSLN vote.  MRS 
officials have told us they think that they can steal at least 
5 points of the FSLN vote, perhaps more.  End Comment.) 
 
Eduardo the Ideal Liberal 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) Rodriguez first began supporting Montealegre when 
the latter was still in the PLC and a member of President 
Enrique Bolanos' Cabinet.  He said that back then he and 
others saw Montealegre as the perfect Liberal candidate: 
young, professional, and with a clean reputation.  Near the 
end of 2003, Rodriguez  visited Montealegre when he 
was serving as Minister of Finance  and expressed 
interest in backing Montealegre for the PLC's presidential 
nomination.  Montealegre agreed to the support, and 
Rodriguez then joined the 'Vamos Con Eduardo' movement that 
in effect launched Montealegre to national status. 
Rodgriguez made clear he and  similar-minded PLC members 
launched the initiative with the hope that Montealegre would 
become the PLC candidate.  Rodriguez said 
that even though Montealegre has formed a new political 
movement, he remains a Liberal in terms of his politics and 
ideology. 
 
PLC Worth Saving 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C)  Despite his support for Montealegre, Rodriguez 
remains committed to the PLC.  Instead of resigning from 
the party and following Montealegre to his Nicaraguan 
Liberal Alliance (ALN), Rodriguez said that he and others 
have decided to stay in the PLC in hopes of fixing the party 
from within.  Rodriguez still sees the party as having a 
valuable infrastructure, and directs his ire solely toward 
the senior leadership strata.  He noted that the PLC 
maintains  an extremely loyal rural party base, which in fact could prove challenging in the election.  He noted that many people in 
rural areas, who are not well informed on the detrimental 
effects of the pacto, are committed to the PLC and see the 
party as the only vehicle capable of defeating the 
Sandinistas -- because these people have always voted 
Liberal, they will do so again. 
 
The Pacto Lives 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C)  Rodriguez's disdain for PLC leadership stems 
largely from the pacto's negative impact  on 
the party.  He blames this agreement for weakening the PLC 
while at the same time strengthening their longtime 
enemies, the Sandinistas.  His unease and dissatisfaction 
reached the boiling point shortly after the 2004 municipal 
elections, when it became clear that the PLC had 
surrendered several municipalities not based on results at 
the ballot box, but negotiated with the FSLN behind closed 
doors.  He was especially frustrated in 2004 because the 
PLC did not reconvene following its defeat to discuss 
what went wrong.  Rodriguez said that many in the party had 
expected greater introspection and drew upon the analogy 
that any respectable sports team would do the same 
following a loss.  Instead, the party said that it was 
better to "move on."  Rodriguez claims that the pacto is 
alive and well today and that the agreement has prompted 
Arnoldo Aleman to purposefully run a weak presidential 
campaign. 
 
¶9.  (C) Rodriguez also reported  that he heard from a Manuel 
Zuniga, a former Sandinista mayor of La Dalia, that Aleman 
in the summer of 2005 agreed with Ortega that Ortega would 
win November's election in return for Aleman's freedom and 
a promise that the Liberals would take office in 2012.  He 
claimed  that Jaime Morales Carazo's decision to become 
Ortega's running mate is part of the deal.  Rodriguez asserted 
that Ortega made Aleman choose a weak presidential 
candidate (i.e. Rizo) who could be easily beaten, and 
required 
an Aleman ally to join his campaign to appeal to non FSLN 
voters and 
demonstrate his moderate leanings and strengthen his own 
campaign. 
 
¶10.  (C) Rodriguez opined that Ortega maintains  the 
upper hand in the pacto because his control over the 
judiciary gives him control over the keys to Aleman's 
freedom or imprisonment.  Rodriguez speculated that if 
 
Ortega wins, contrary to Aleman's expectations, Ortega will 
probably further marginalize Aleman rather than liberate him. 
To reduce the international scrutiny that is bound to become 
focused on a Sandinista government, Ortega will attempt to 
improve his image -- and solidify his position -- by further 
prosecuting Aleman, returning him to prison, perhaps even 
sending him to Panama to face trial there.  This move would 
enable him to burnish anti-corruption credentials. 
 
Frustrated By PLC "Mafia" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11.  (C) Rodriguez likened the PLC to a mafia, and said 
that a common sentiment among party leaders is 'either you 
are with us or against us.'  Following the 2004 elections 
he was told to "forget about it and move on."  When asked how 
Aleman has managed to retain so much influence over the 
party, Rodriguez replied that  Aleman draws much of his 
power from having been responsible for putting so many 
people into their positions.  These people remain loyal to 
Aleman knowing that he could break them as well -- it is a 
loyalty born of the perceived threat of retribution if one 
steps out of line.  He told Emboffs that because of his 
opposition to the party leadership he has been threatened. 
Rodriquez has subsequently begun adopting a greater awareness 
over 
his personal security, particularly while traveling.  He 
now prefers to take buses or taxis to his destinations and 
minimizes motorcycle travel because he feels too 
vulnerable. 
 
GANARAM Stretching its Wings 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12.  (C) Rodriguez reported that GANARAM is gaining momentum 
and has representatives in 127 of Nicaragua's 153 
municipalities.  He said that while the movement is strongest 
in Matagalpa department, members  are also present in Esteli, 
Nueva Segovia, Managua and its surroundings, and Jinotega. 
The group appears to enjoy  the support of disparate 
former and current political officials  -- including mayors, 
vice mayors, municipal council members, and other party 
representatives.  He noted that GANARAM has contact with 
the ALN, including with Montealegre himself, Edmundo  Leal 
(Montealegre's chief of staff) and other campaign figures. 
GANARAM appears to have at least some financial resources, 
as Rodriguez told Emboffs that the movement had recently 
paid for a television advertisement featuring Rodriguez. 
According to Rodriguez, the spot begins with him garbed in 
PLC colors expressing his disgust that the party leadership 
has become so far removed from party values.  The bit ends 
with Rodriguez decked out in pro-Montealegre garb making 
the case for Liberals to vote for Montealegre, who embodies 
true Liberal politics.  Rodriguez then concludes with the 
catchy Spanish equivalent of: "He who fools me once has no 
shame; he who fools me twice shames me." 
 
¶13.  (C) Comment:  Emboffs  plan further meetings with 
Rodriguez and other GANARAM adherents to explore their strength, reach, and overall plan.  On the surface, the idea of committed and 
recognizable PLC members campaigning in their localities in 
favor of a pro-Montealegre vote may have more traction than 
similar efforts by the ALN, the Embassy, or any other 
organizations.  End Comment. 
TRIVELLI