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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 002093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MARR OVIP KDEM NU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF RUMSFELD 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY: Post welcomes the Secretary of Defense, 
the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, to Nicaragua for attendance 
at the Seventh Defense Ministerial of the Americas.  In 
conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
the Minister of Defense of Nicaragua and the United States 
Defense Attachi Office, Managua, an agenda has been 
developed which addresses regional interests, especially as 
they pertain to regional security and stability, upcoming 
elections with major political parties, professionalization 
of the Nicaraguan Military and status of the Man Portable 
Air Defense Systems which the Nicaraguan Armed Forces 
currently maintain.  This scenesetter offers military 
political, and election 2006 overviews.  Planned SecDef 
activities and itineraries have been coordinated under 
separate cover.  This cable is organized as follows: 
 
- Military Background 
- Political Background 
- The 2006 Elections 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
Military Background 
 
¶2.  (U) Formed from the cadres of the 1970Qs revolutionary 
phase, the Nicaraguan Armed Forces are based in the 
Sandinista Revolution.  All of the senior military officers 
have their roots in this time period.  The last two Chiefs 
of the Armed Forces have focused their tenures on the 
professionalization of their forces.  The issue of 
Nicaraguan ownership of thousands of Man Portable Air 
Defense Systems (MANPADS) has been an overarching National 
Security issue with the USG in terms of limiting, reducing 
and, eventually, completely eliminating their stocks of 
these weapon systems.  While early progress was made with 
1000 being destroyed between May and November of 2004, the 
goal of achieving 80% reduction of these stocks by the end 
of 2005 has fallen woefully short, due in large part to the 
passage of Law 510 by the National Assembly that any 
further destructions must be initiated and approved by 2/3 
(supermajority) of the Nicaraguan National Assembly.  In 
March of 2005 progress was made in the form of an amendment 
to Article 139 of Law 510 which changed this vote from 2/3 
approval to one of a simple majority. 
 
¶3.  (U)  In 1979 the Sandinista National Reconstruction 
Government, with the approval of Violeta Chamorro and 
Daniel Ortega, expropriated in excess of 60 properties 
which were owned by citizens of the United States,  Many of 
these properties were turned over to the Nicaraguan Armed 
Forces for the military to use as they saw fit.  This usage 
ranged from office spaces to private homes for active and 
retired General Officers.  To date more than 20 properties 
have either been returned to their original owners, or the 
owners have been compensated in some manner for the 
property.  Approximately 36 properties remain under dispute 
and in the hands of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces. 
 
¶4.  (U) It is recommended that the following issues be 
raised both with Minister of Defense Avil Rammrez Valdivia 
and Army Chief (CHOD) General Moises Omar Halleslevens 
Acevedo: 
 
¶A.  Efforts to improve civilian-military relations and 
civilian control over the military are appreciated and are 
to be commended. 
 
¶B.  The USG looks forward to the next destruction of 
MANPADS.  The USG is pleased to note that the National 
Assembly, while requiring a vote to continue destruction, 
restructured the passage process to only require a simple 
majority (47 of 90 deputies) rather than a supermajority 
(56 of 90 deputies) of the Assembly. 
 
¶C.  The GON has presented its MANPADS destruction as a good 
faith effort towards regional arms limitation through SICA 
(the Central American Integration Secretariat).  USG 
supports this effort and applauds efforts to promote a 
Central American security strategy towards regional 
security threats, especially terrorism and illegal 
trafficking in persons and narcotics.  The USG realizes 
that these cooperative regional efforts will require 
continuing support from the United States. 
 
¶D.  The situation involving the property rights of more 
than 30 United States citizens whose properties were 
confiscated and are being held by the Nicaraguan Army 
continues to be of concern to the USG.  Steps must be taken 
to settle these claims as quickly and equitably as 
possible. 
 
¶5.  (U) It is expected that the Nicaraguans will raise the 
following issues: 
 
MANAGUA 00002093  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶A.  Greater U.S. financial assistance for the Nicaraguan 
military.  It is suggested that any answer be couched in 
terms of acknowledging the challenges facing the country 
and the region, but expecting the destruction of MANPADS to 
move forward (this last piece may be OBE if the National 
Assembly votes for destruction during the September 
meetings). 
 
¶B.  USG to exert pressure on the Government of Honduras to 
destroy its F-5 bomb racks as part of the SICA Arms 
Limitation Initiative, which would help Bolaqos maintain 
support for the destruction of NicaraguaQs MANPADS. 
 
¶C.  CFAC (Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas-Armed Force 
Conference) has been regarded as the mechanism for regional 
cooperation, but has limitations.  GON is concerned that it 
is a military organization and minimizes civilian 
participation, as well as the fact that it excludes Costa 
Rica, Belize, and Panama.  It is suggested that any 
response acknowledge the importance of CFAC as it pertains 
to regional stability and cooperation, understanding that 
civilian oversight and transparency with regional alliances 
is a relatively new concept which will take time, effort 
and patience to resolve.  The countries which are excluded 
are so owing to the fact that none of these countries have 
standing militaries, yet still face the same threats that 
menace the region as a whole, and as such these countries 
should be encouraged to participate. 
 
Political Background 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Since the inception of democratic rule in Nicaragua 
in 1990, political power has been contested between two 
majority forces: the Liberals on the right, and the 
Sandinistas on the left.  The civil war and economic 
mismanagement in the 1980s, and the Sandinista giveaway of 
government property to party leaders in 1990 (the 
"pinata"), turned a significant majority of the population 
against the Sandinista Front (FSLN), preventing the FSLN 
from winning national elections in 1990, 1996 and 2001. 
 
¶7.  (U) Nicaragua's opposition forces came together under 
the United National Opposition (UNO) to win the 1990 
elections, but soon splintered apart.  The Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC) emerged as the dominant Anti- 
Sandinista force. 
 
¶8.  (U) Discontent grew within the FSLN after the 1990 
"pinata" of FSLN leader Daniel Ortega and Ortega's 
continued electoral defeats during that decade.  Some 
leftist elements broke away from the FSLN during this 
period, most notably the Sandinista Renovation Movement 
(MRS) under the leadership of revolutionary activist Dora 
Maria Tellez. 
 
¶9.  (U) The PLC and Arnoldo Aleman emerged victorious in 
the 1996 national elections, but were unable to gain a 
supermajority in the National Assembly, which would have 
allowed the party to name Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) 
and Supreme Court (CSJ) magistrates without Sandinista 
votes.  This situation led to a political pact between the 
PLC and FSLN to divide control of the institutions of 
government between the two parties, which has continued to 
the present time. 
 
¶10.  (U) Before the 2001 election, the PLC was able to 
bring most of the smaller democratic parties into an 
alliance. Aleman personally selected Enrique Bolanos as the 
alliance's presidential candidate as well as many of the 
National Assembly and Central American Parliament deputy 
candidates. Bolanos won the election and instituted an 
anti-corruption campaign. 
 
¶11.  (U) In 2003, Aleman, who pilfered tens of millions of 
dollars from state coffers, was convicted of fraud and 
money laundering, stripped of his parliamentary immunity 
and sentenced to 20 years in prison.  This process caused a 
great upheaval in the Liberal ranks and when the dust 
settled, a small number of Liberal and Conservative 
deputies broke from the PLC alliance to form a new 
political caucus to support Bolanos, but the vast majority 
remained loyal to Aleman. The disaffected Conservatives and 
Liberals, unhappy with Aleman's continued influence in the 
PLC, formed the Alliance for the Republic (APRE), a party 
loyal to and supported by the Bolanos administration. 
 
¶12.  (U) Ortega manipulated the pact with the PLC and 
Sandinista control of the judiciary to allow greater 
degrees of freedom for Aleman in exchange for concessions 
to the FSLN in the CSE and CSJ.  He is now allowed to move 
about Managua freely under Qmedical paroleQ. 
 
MANAGUA 00002093  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶13.  (U) Having won comfortable majorities since 1990, the 
Liberals lost badly in the 2004 municipal elections.  The 
Sandinistas won 88 of 152 municipalities, the PLC 58, APRE 
five, and the PRN one.  The Sandinistas claimed victory 
with a plurality of the vote in most of their 88 
municipalities, with the PLC, APRE and other minor parties 
dividing the anti-Sandinista vote. 
 
The 2006 Elections 
------------------ 
 
¶14.  (U) Three candidates emerged in 2005 to challenge the 
Aleman-Ortega pact.  Excluded from the majority parties by 
the two caudillos, Sandinista dissident Herty Lewites broke 
from the FSLN to head the MRS ticket, and Liberal dissident 
Eduardo Montealegre formed the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance 
(ALN) out of PLC dissidents, the PC, PRN, and other small 
democratic parties.  PLC outcast and prominent Bolanos 
Administration official Jose Antonio Alvarado ran as the 
APRE candidate. 
 
¶15.  (U)  The Christian Alternative (AC) party left 
Lewites' alliance, changed its name to Alternative for 
Change and chose the erratic Eden Pastora as its 
presidential candidate.  Jose Antonio Alvarado became Jose 
Rizo's running mate in the PLC, but APRE joined the ALN. 
 
¶16.  (U) The political upheaval did not end in May -- MRS 
candidate Lewites died from heart complications in early 
July.  Lewites' running mate Edmundo Jarquin assumed the 
candidacy and MRS leadership convinced popular Sandinista 
revolutionary songwriter Carlos Mejia Godoy to accept the 
vice presidential nomination.  Despite predictions among 
some pundits that MRS votes would migrate to the FSLN, or 
perhaps the ALN, JarquinQs poll numbers remain similar to 
LewitesQ.  However, the shift of Liberal politicians back 
and forth between the PLC and ALN, depending on their 
calculation of personal benefit, continues 
 
¶17.  (U) The bad blood caused by the ongoing PLC smear 
campaign and RizoQs insistence on remaining a Presidential 
candidate, make a union of the liberal parties increasingly 
unlikely.  With the Sandinistas also divided into two 
parties, it appears there will be five candidates on 
November 5. 
 
¶18.  (U) The latest CID-Gallup-sponsored official poll 
released at the end of August showed the following results 
for the parties: 
 
FSLN:     29% 
ALN:      23% 
PLC:      14% 
MRS:      14% 
AC:        1% 
None:     19% 
 
¶19.  (U) As with earlier polls, the CID-Gallup poll showed 
that the FSLN would lose in a second round and the ALN 
would be the likely winner.  Thus the FSLN is focusing all 
its efforts on a first round victory by leveraging a pact- 
inspired change in the Electoral Law that enables a front- 
running candidate to win the election in the first round 
with only 35 percent if there is a five percent lead over 
the next most popular contender. 
 
¶20. (U) On September 13, CNN and Channel 2 co-sponsored a 
presidential debate featuring Montealegre, Rizo, Jarquin 
and Pastora.  Daniel Ortega did not participate, declaring 
the debate format "artificial."  According to M and R, 
113,000 households in Managua watched the debate and 
Jarquin was perceived as the winner, followed by 
Montealegre.  Jarquin, about whom there were initial doubts 
because he lacks LewitesQ charisma, continues to perform 
well and draw voters from both the FSLN and ALN. 
 
 
 
TRIVELLI