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TO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0774
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002077 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV SOCI
SUBJECT: MARTINEZ CUENCA WORRIED ABOUT AN ORTEGA WIN 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During a meeting with Polcouns and 
emboffs on 11 September, Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (FSLN) dissident Alejandro Martinez Cuenca voiced his 
concern that savvy Sandinista campaigning and a weak and 
distracted center-right have strengthened Daniel Ortega's 
campaign.  The FSLN remains focused on espousing its social 
agenda and avoiding conflict with the other parties while 
opponents, particularly the Liberal Constitutional Party 
(PLC) and Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), bicker with 
each other.  Cuenca also commented that the lackluster 
organizational capacities of the ALN and MRS pose 
significant obstacles to competing with the larger and more 
established parties.  Although a committed Sandinista, 
Cuenca made clear his concerns that an Ortega victory would 
have a detrimental impact on Nicaragua's democracy, noting 
he is considering publicly calling on similar-minded 
Sandinistas to "cancel" their votes in November.  He 
estimates about 20% of FSLN supporters would consider not 
voting for Ortega.  Cuenca made clear that despite his 
distaste for Ortega, he would not back other candidates and 
does not consider the MRS a viable leftist alternative -- 
maintaining that the FSLN should remain the dominant 
leftist party.  Cuenca suggested that the United States can 
play a positive role in the political situation, but would 
do better to issue tough anti-Ortega messages in Washington 
rather than in Nicaragua, which would carry more weight, 
while diminishing accusations of foreign interference.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Ortega Running Strong; Opponents Divided and Weak 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C)  Polcouns and emboffs met on 11 September with FSLN 
dissident/reformer Alejandro Martinez Cuenca to sound out 
his views on the presidential race, and gauge his attitude 
toward Daniel Ortega's candidacy and management of his 
party.  According to Cuenca, the best hope for defeating 
Ortega is by unifying the PLC and ALN, but entrenched 
interests on both sides make this unlikely to happen. 
Moreover, commented Cuenca, the PLC and ALN are distracted 
by sniping at each other's campaigns, giving Ortega the 
opportunity to take the high-road.  Ortega's decision to 
run a campaign focusing on the party's social agenda rather 
than attacking opponents has kept him on-message and above 
the political fray.  Cuenca also stated that lack of strong 
party resources and organization make the ALN and Edmundo 
Jarquin's Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS) unlikely to win 
the presidency.  Cuenca opined that these parties do not 
possess the infrastructure necessary to challenge the 
dominant parties in a sustained national race.  Cuenca 
predicted that Ortega will exploit his party's clout in 
six departments (Matagalpa, Esteli, Jinotega, Ocotal, Rio 
San Juan, and Somoto) to manipulate the results.  He also 
asserted that, even if victorious, Montealegre will not 
secure enough deputies to have much influence in the 
National Assembly.  A Montealegre administration thusly 
handicapped would essentially make for a repeat of the 
Bolanos administration. 
 
 
Nicaragua's Democracy Too Frail to Withstand Ortega 
Radicalism 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Cuenca, who has been a longtime proponent for 
internal FSLN reform, is unhappy with the way Ortega is 
running the party.  A former Minister of Foreign Trade 
(1979-87) and Minister of Economic Planning and Budget 
(1988-90) during the Sandinista era, Cuenca first 
challenged Ortega in 2000 when he discouraged Ortega from 
running in the 2001 presidential elections and called for 
internal party primaries.  He has since been kept on the 
outskirts, but remains committed to the 
party.  During the meeting, he likened Ortega to a 
dictator, commenting that Ortega has told him "I am the 
party," that he will never relinquish his hold on the FSLN, 
and that he would run a fifth and sixth time if not elected 
in November.  Cuenca noted that Ortega's driving goal is to 
obtain power, and expressed frustration that Ortega's 
continued adherence to outdated radical ideology (i.e. 
Marxism, Stalinism) have no place in Nicaragua.  He warned 
that Nicaragua's democracy is not strong enough to sustain 
an Ortega presidency and that, if elected, Ortega will win 
enough votes to enact constitutional reforms to strengthen 
his hold on power within six months.  Cuenca is considering 
conducting a campaign to call on like-minded Sandinistas to 
turn in blank ballots or deface them in November to 
demonstrate their discontent with Ortega's radical bent. 
Cuenca estimates that about 20% of Sandinistas would 
consider not voting for Ortega.  He mentioned that he would 
need to be careful about which media outlets he 
reaches out to in order to avoid the perception of endorsing 
some other political movement.  Cuenca was emphatic that 
any announcement by him must not be construed as an 
endorsement for any other political movement.  Polcouns 
suggested that he grant interviews to other foreign media 
sources, including in Europe, to convey a more neutral 
position. 
 
MRS Not Fit To Be 'New Left' 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C)  While Cuenca holds a moderate leftist ideology, he 
remains committed to the FSLN and is not likely to support 
other movements or encourage others to do so.  Cuenca 
believes that Nicaragua needs a moderate left that respects 
core democratic principles, such as freedom of thought and 
expression, and sees a role for the FSLN in this process. 
He has previously told journalists that he thinks the FSLN 
should contribute to the development of institutions and 
democracy in Nicaragua.  Cuenca does not see the MRS as 
having the organizational capacity to mount a successful 
presidential campaign, much less the clout or historical 
recognition to vie with the FSLN for dominance as the 
leading leftist party.  He told poloffs that while he 
considers advocating that Sandinistas abstain in November, 
he would not recommend they support someone else.  He made 
it clear that voting for another party would be a betrayal 
of the FSLN. 
 
What Can the United States Do? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - 
 
¶5.  (C)  Cuenca pointed out that the United States can play 
a helpful role in preventing an Ortega victory, but stated 
that the U.S. would have to walk a fine line to avoid 
efforts that could set off domestic sensitivities.  He 
first recommended that the U.S. cease issuing direct 
attacks against Ortega.  These comments carry the most 
weight when issued by domestic sources (i.e. the other 
candidates), and that Ortega is good at spinning in his 
favor such messages from U.S. officials.  That said, strong 
anti-Ortega remarks from the United States would be 
helpful.  He noted that one possibility for influence is 
prompting the Nicaraguan expatriate community in the United 
States 
to warn their family members still in Nicaragua that an 
Ortega win could jeopardize the flow of remittances.  He 
noted that pursuing the case of Zoilamerica could in fact 
backfire because in the public's mind it has become 
politicized, although he acknowledged that Ortega's 
censureship of the Univision interview with her had drawn 
strong criticsm and attention to her case.  Cuenca pointed 
out that the issue of sexual abuse does not necessarily 
strike a nerve with most Nicaraguans.  According to Cuenca, 
local culture tends to favor working these sorts of crimes 
out within a family rather than involving 
the authorities.  Thinking aloud, Cuenca also mentioned the 
possibility of catching Ortega's wife and campaign manager 
Rosario Murillo off guard.  He noted that she is extremely 
superstitious, and may be provoked by comments or actions. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Bio information:  Rosario Murillo was educated in 
France and speaks French and English.  Cuenca noted that 
she is extremely bright, well-read, and articulate.  He 
also said that she is very superstitious.  He claims she 
once stopped a meeting until a priest could be summoned to 
consecrate the office it was being held in. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  Cuenca's assessment of how damaging the 
PLC-ALN bickering has been is right on the mark.  Not only 
does it distract both parties from striking out at Ortega 
and presenting their own agendas, but it grants Ortega the 
ability to espouse his platform virtually unchallenged. 
This, combined with his skillful handling of a 
socially-focused campaign could grant him an edge over his 
competitors in the long run.  Cuenca's estimation 
that 20% of Sandinistas might consider not voting for 
Ortega may be exaggerated.  Cuenca has overestimated 
resistance within the party to Ortega in the past.  He told 
the Embassy in 2001, for example, that Ortega could be 
induced to step down as his party's candidate for the 2001 
election.  Ortega in fact overrode opposition to his 
candidacy by marginalizing challengers, including Cuenca. 
End Comment. 
TRIVELLI