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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2061, MEETING WITH ARCHBISHOP BRENES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA2061 2006-09-19 19:43 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2061/01 2621943
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191943Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7613
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0769
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002061 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2026 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ARCHBISHOP BRENES 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Archbishop Leopoldo Brenes recently told 
visiting WHA/CEN director and emboffs that better 
organization and a clearer message appear to be giving 
Daniel Ortega's Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 
an edge in the race.  He believes that Edmundo Jarquin and 
Eduardo Montealegre face stiff challenges associated with 
their more limited organizational capacities.  Brenes noted 
that while polls are unreliable, the division of the 
center-right, plus a solid base of about 31-34%, give 
Ortega a chance of winning in the first round.  Brenes, who 
has instructed Church officials to remain above the fray of 
partisan politics, seeks to place the Catholic Church in a 
neutral position, although he personally appears to favor 
Montealegre.  Complicating the Church's efforts to remain 
neutral is the FSLN's advertising its connections to the 
Church in departments run by FSLN mayors.  Brenes noted 
that he supports international and domestic election 
observer missions, noting that the Church would like to 
field 1,500 of its own observers if it finds the funds to 
do so.  End Summary. 
 
Brenes:  Superior Tactics Give Ortega an Edge 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) Archbishop Leopoldo Brenes discussed his views on 
the elections, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
campaigns, and the role of the Catholic Church in the 
election process during a meeting on 12 September with 
visiting WHA/CEN Director John Feeley, WHA Nicaragua Desk 
Officer Gregory Schiffer, and Polcouns.  Brenes kicked off 
the meeting characterizing the election race as a new 
experience for the country given the intense competition 
among the four strongest campaigns.  He noted that overall 
Ortega's FSLN appears to be the most organized party thanks 
in part to its discliplined supporters, considerable 
political machinery, and savvy campaign strategy.  Brenes 
also attributed some of the FSLN success to the party's 
having given their campaign a personal touch through 
supporters' efforts to go door-to-door in Nicaragua's 17 
departments.  He added that campaign members are constantly 
active and have dedicated their weekends to travelling 
around the country. 
 
3.  (C) Brenes saw both Jarquin and Montealegre as 
struggling.  He assessed that the MRS was stronger under 
Herty Lewites, noting that Jarquin lacks his predecessor's 
notable charisma.  When Feeley pointed out that local polls 
suggest that Jarquin appears to have sustained much of the 
party's support, Brenes responded that Jarquin may have 
managed to retain much of the support Lewites had 
accumulated, but that he will be challenged to expand his 
base.  While many people knew of Lewites's accomplishments 
as mayor of Managua, Brenes pointed out that most people 
view Jarquin as an outsider given that he has spent so much 
time away from Nicaragua.  (Comment: Jarquin's position in 
favor of the use of therapeutic abortion as per current 
Nicaraguan law and the fact that Jarquin divorced and 
remarried 
may partially explain Brenes' negative assessment of 
him. End comment.).  Brenes said, however, that Jarquin's 
running mate, 
Carlos Mejia Godoy, is an asset.  Mejia Godoy's 
iconic image has had a positive impact on the campaign in 
that he provides name recognition as well as a solid 
reputation.  The Archbishop added that people respect the 
prospective vice president not for his music but also his 
simple lifestyle -- he does not appear wealthy and comes 
across as down-to-earth.  Brenes characterized Montealegre 
as facing an uphill battle as a young, relatively 
inexperienced, candidate leading a new party.  On the 
positive side, Brenes noted that Montealegre's image of 
leading a healthy family life may resonate with some 
voters. 
 
"The Best Poll Will be On 5 November" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (C)   Feeley sounded out the Archbishop's assessment of 
how Ortega would fare in the elections when local polls 
have consistently indicated that 60% of the population 
reject him.  Brenes replied that the FSLN could indeed pull 
off a win given that the party maintains a solid base of 
between 31-34%.  Brenes commented that the polls can be 
unreliable and that November 5 will provide the most 
accurate assessment of whom Nicaraguans favor. 
 
Aleman and Ortega Addicted to Power 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5.  (C) Brenes likened Ortega and Aleman to drug or alcohol 
addicts, saying that they are hooked on obtaining as much 
personal power as possible.  Continuing with the metaphor, 
Brenes said that the two caudillos react the same way as 
other addicts when the subject of their dependency is taken 
away -- they attempt to seize more of it.  When confronted 
by disenchanted party members, Ortega and Aleman strengthen 
their grips and lash out at those who seek to limit their 
authority.  Brenes noted that despite PLC attempts to play 
down the fact, Aleman continues at the helm of the PLC and the 
party lacks strong leaders capable of forcing him out. 
 
Urging Church to Remain Above the Fray 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) Brenes wants the Church to be seen as a neutral 
entity but recognizes that the competitive political 
environment challenges this objective.  Brenes said he had 
recently told La Prensa (one of the leading dailies) that 
neither bishiops nor local priests should demonstrate their 
partisan leanings.  To demonstrate the Church's apolitical 
stance, Brenes related that he will preside over a mass 
celebrating the political process and all the parties on 
the Thursday before the election (29 October).  The Church 
will host the traditional mass celebrating the victor of 
the election only after the CSE issues the final results. 
Brenes said he has instructed the country's bishops to 
follow suit to avoid the image of the church favoring a 
particular candidate.  Nevertheless, Brenes admitted that 
the FSLN is likely to continue professing close ties to the 
church.  He noted that FSLN-controlled municipalities had 
donated a great deal to local parishes, eliciting the 
sympathies of many local priests.  (Comment:  Ortega 
himself has orchestrated several well-publicized 
appearances with former Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo in 
an effort to tout his ties to the Church.) 
 
7.  (C) While Brenes attempted to avoid the perception of 
favoring a particular party, he does not necessarily mean 
to renounce political involvement altogether.  When queried 
about his stance on observers, Brenes replied that 
observers -- as long as they are independent -- would be an 
asset as they would help to ensure the credibility of the 
process.  He added that the church planned to field 1,500 
of their own observers.  He noted that these people will be 
uncompensated volunteers, except for hats which they will 
be issued for identification purposes. 
 
8.  (C) Comment:  Brenes's determination to keep the Church 
from supporting any one candidate will hold at the national 
level, but his efforts to encourage the same of regional 
Church officials are unlikely to be sufficient.  Further, 
Obando y Bravo continues his open support for Ortega, while 
the Vatican looks the other way.  Nor is Ortega limiting 
his religious outreach efforts to the Catholic Church.  He 
recently attended a meeting of over 500 figures from the 
evangelical movement during which he garnered praise for 
taking an anti-abortion stance and signed an accord 
promisiong his opposition to abortion -- even though his 
National Assembly deputies have openly endorsed maintaining 
therapeutic abortion in accordance with Nicaragua's current 
criminal code. 
 
9.  (U) Atmospherics:  Brenes was a gracious host.  He was 
softspoken and informal -- wearing his trademark blue jeans 
under his official robes. 
TRIVELLI