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DE RUEHMU #1977/01 2511737
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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T MANAGUA 001977 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: MONTEALEGRE: BEST SCENARIO IS RIZO/ALVARADO 
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY:  In his recent meeting with presidential 
candidate Eduardo Montealegre, the Ambassador touched on the 
crucial elements required to consolidate the campaign: convey 
a clear, concise, and consistent message; ensure financial 
and moral support to his campaigners throughout the country; 
listen to his professional campaign advisors' 
recommendations; and, put to rest the CENIs (debt bonds) 
issue.  Montealegre agreed with the Ambassador's assessment, 
remarking that the media firm supporting his campaign is not 
yet successfully conveying his messages to the Nicaraguan 
people.  Montealegre attributed the lack of tangible support 
for his campaign outside Managua to insufficient campaign 
funds, noting that Nicaragua's private sector continues to 
dole out its support in dribs and drabs and does not appear 
sufficiently alarmed over the specter of an Ortega victory. 
Opining that at this juncture a broad Liberal alliance is 
untenable, Montealegre remarked that the ideal scenario would 
be PLC candidate Rizo's withdrawal from the race.  Ambassador 
shared our efforts to achieve this goal.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) On September 6, presidential candidate Eduardo 
Montealegre and ALN campaign chief Adolfo Arguello met with 
Ambassador, DCM, and polcouns to discuss the status of his 
campaign and our perceptions regarding the crucial elements 
at play.  Rushing in from his three-hour walk-a-thon through 
a number of poor Managua barrios, Montealegre appeared 
determined, but preoccupied, with the status of his campaign. 
 He opined that walk-a-thons are more effective than massive 
campaign rallies in reaching out to voters, even though the 
ALN's August 27 rally had been a "resounding success" and 
demonstrated that the ALN indeed possesses party structure. 
Montealegre calculated that close to 100,000 supporters 
attended his rally (1,500 busses with an average of 60 each, 
plus Managua walk-ins) while according to police contacts 
present at Rizo's rally in Sebaco earlier in August, only 
45,000-60,000 attended - as opposed to the 300,000 claimed by 
the PLC.  (Comment: Likely both sides are exaggerating the 
turnout.) 
 
¶3.  (C) The ALN's rally was a success, better than expected, 
despite attempts by the PLC to derail it, continued 
Montealegre, who asserted that PLC campaign fundraiser 
Gilberto Wong had blocked a Taiwanese-run company's 
production of 50,000 shirts and caps with ALN logo shirts for 
the rally.  Instead, 2,000 all-white shirts, many with holes, 
and pink caps were delivered to ALN headquarters the day 
before the rally.  Arguello reported that the ALN scrambled 
overnight and procured red and white t-shirts, sans logo, for 
the event. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Ambassador recommended the following steps that 
would help the ALN improve its campaign: 
 
--Convey a clear, concise, and consistent message; 
 
--Provide financial and moral support to ALN candidates and 
others campaigning in departments and districts; 
 
--Heed the professional campaign advisors' recommendations; 
and, 
 
--Put to rest the CENIs (debt bonds) issue. 
 
¶5.  (C) Montealegre, who agreed with the Ambassador's 
assessment, remarked that the media firm supporting his 
campaign is failing thus far to effectively convey his 
messages to the Nicaraguan people.  He attributed the lack of 
tangible support to his campaign outside Managua in large 
part to insufficient campaign funds, remarking that 
Nicaragua's private sector continues to dole out its support 
in dribs and drabs and does not appear sufficiently alarmed 
over the specter of an Ortega victory.  Montealegre added 
that to help ALN National Assembly candidates effectively 
campaign, he has arranged personal loans of USD 15,000 each 
for 30 of his candidates.  He also acknowledged that public 
confusion over whether or not he will rejoin the PLC had 
harmed his efforts to consolidate the support of Nicaragua's 
largely anti FSLN-PLC pact independents. 
¶6.  (C) Regarding the CENIs charges, Montealegre reiterated 
that this is a joint PLC-FSLN cabal to discredit him and 
remove him from the race (Reftel), sharing that he had told 
the press just that (El Nuevo Diario picked up his comments 
in its September 7 edition).  He sought our help in 
dissuading the CENIs "truth commission" cabal, led by Carlos 
Ulvert,  Francisco Mayorga, Gilberto Wong, and Francisco 
 
Aguirre Sacasa to halt their smear campaign against him. 
(NOTE: We have evidence of their collusion through a 
disgruntled PLC member who was involved in the plan and who 
has drafted a statement denouncing them.) 
 
¶7.  (C) On the subject of Liberal unity, Montealegre 
discarded a PLC-ALN alliance as an option this late in the 
game.  Aleman's continuing control of the PLC and Rizo's 
double speak -- on the one hand calling for Liberal unity, 
and on the other, conspiring to smear Montealegre -- had 
killed any efforts to unite.  At this point, the best 
scenario would be for Rizo to admit that the CENIs campaign 
against Montealegre is a scam and for Rizo and VP candidate 
Jose Antonio Alvarado to resign and step off the political 
stage.  Ambassador said he conveyed a message to Rizo via one 
of his confidantes that Rizo should take the heroic step by 
withdrawing his candidacy, or else be held accountable if 
Ortega wins the election, and offered to talk, if necessary, 
to Ulvert and others engaged in maligning Montealegre. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
 
¶8.  (S) President Bolanos' senior political adviser Frank 
Arana has told us that some members of the Nicaragua's 
business elite, as well as the Taiwanese, may be prepared to 
offer Rizo an "incentive" to "sweeten" his departure. 
Regarding Alvarado, the Bolanos government possesses 
incriminating evidence that demonstrates Alvarado personally 
benefited from over half a million dollars in government 
funds when he served as FISE (Emergency Fund for Social 
Investment) director. 
TRIVELLI