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DE RUEHMU #1960/01 2492232
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 062232Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7484
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T MANAGUA 001960 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: TAKE TWO ON NICARAGUA ELECTIONS  -- SCENARIOS, 
RISKS, AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0127 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY:  In January, post shared its assessment of 
Nicaragua's possible election scenarios, the risks entailed, 
and possible outcomes (Reftel).  Since then, a fifth 
presidential candidate entered the race, and Herty Lewites 
passed away, replaced by Edmundo Jarquin.  While 
approximately 70% of Nicaraguans reject Daniel Ortega, he 
could still win the November 5 election because a candidate 
can win with only 35% of the votes.  While we expect Jarquin 
to shave off some traditionally Sandinista voters, the 
difference might not suffice to prevent a first-round Ortega 
victory.  However, Ortega would likely lose a second round, 
except perhaps to Rizo.  At this juncture, reuniting the PLC 
and ALN might well prove counterproductive.  Further, if Rizo 
withdrew and actively campaigned for Montealegre, the ALN 
could lose more votes from the independents than it would 
gain from Rizo's support.  The ideal scenario (i.e., the one 
most likely to prevent a first-round Ortega win) would be 
Rizo's resignation and his withdrawal from the political 
scene.  Accomplishing this objective will require robust 
persuasion/dissuasion from Embassy and Washington, and in the 
end, our pressure might not be enough.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FIVE-WAY RACE IN THE CARDS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) Since post's previous assessment in January, a fifth 
presidential candidate, Eden Pastora, entered the race, and 
Edmundo Jarquin replaced candidate Herty Lewites. 
Nonetheless, the race remains in essence a four-way contest, 
as Pastora is expected to draw no more than 3% of the vote. 
(Note: Interlocutors tell us that Pastora may be the "Trojan 
pony" for Ortega, asserting that many of AC voting table 
(JRV) members actually belong to the FSLN and that Pastora 
has struck a deal with Ortega to support him if on election 
day disputes arise at the JRVs, in exchange for ensuring 
Pastora's party gains a few Assembly seats.)  Candidates in 
the race are the following: 
 
   -Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) candidate Jose Rizo 
 
   -Sandinista (FSLN) candidate Daniel Ortega 
 
   -FSLN dissident Edmundo Jarquin (replacing Herty Lewites), 
now MRS. 
 
   -PLC dissident Eduardo Montealegre (now ALN-PC) 
 
   -AC Candidate Eden Pastora 
 
BASIC PREMISES 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C) The following are our current premises concerning 
Nicaragua's political landscape: 
 
--Most Nicaraguans (polls indicate 65% to 70%) reject the 
current leadership of the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) 
and the Sandinista Party (FSLN).  However, while early polls 
pegged dissident PLC candidate Eduardo Montealegre (ALN-PC) 
and dissident FSLN member Herty Lewites as the clear 
front-runners, since then, Ortega has pulled ahead in the 
polls and Lewites passed away in early July. 
 
--While in previous presidential elections, voters had the 
binary option to vote for or against Ortega, this time voters 
must also chose between pro and anti-FSLN-PLC pact 
candidates, a political landscape that offers Nicaraguans a 
chance to choose a leader who will focus on strengthening 
Nicaragua's fragile democracy rather than consolidating 
personal power or the party's control over Nicaragua and its 
resources. 
 
--Historically, Nicaragua's independent voters have 
determined the outcome of presidential elections, and in this 
election they will also play a crucial role.  Current polls 
suggest that approximately 20% to 30% of the population is 
independent and/or undecided. 
 
-- Given the possibility of a candidate's winning with 35% of 
the vote and a 5% margin over his closest competitor, Ortega 
-- who now polls around 30% -- could steal the remaining 
points required to win, unless his closest competitor, 
Eduardo Montealegre (currently trailing by an average margin 
 
of seven points) narrows the margin between them.  (Note: 
Since the post's previous cable, Ortega has gained in the 
polls and now ranks first (27% -31%), followed by Montealegre 
(21% - 28%).  Rizo and Jarquin vie for third place (12%-17%) 
and Pastora trails far behind (1%-2%). 
 
--Ortega is unlikely to win a runoff, except possibly against 
Rizo (Pastora is not expected to place second). 
 
--The PLC will not reform and shift into the democratic, 
anti-caudillo column before the election largely because 
Aleman will not loosen his hold on the party apparatus and 
much of the PLC leadership remains beholden to him. 
 
--Montealegre cannot afford to affiliate with the PLC as long 
as the PLC remains under Aleman's control, as he would lose 
all of his credibility and much of his support. 
 
--Montealegre must gain more support from independents and 
solidify the support he enjoys from this sector thus far.  He 
must also be more decisive vis a vis the CENIs (debt bonds to 
shore up bank failures in 2000) issue. 
 
--It remains uncertain whether Jarquin will be able to 
whittle away enough points from Ortega to prevent an Ortega 
victory on the first round. 
 
-- Low voter turnout will favor Ortega; high turnout is more 
likely to favor the anti-Sandinista vote, and the 
anti-caudillo vote more generally. 
 
--Vigorous international monitoring is crucial to minimizing 
fraud and ensuring Nicaraguans their votes will count before 
and during election day. 
 
RISKS AND SETBACKS 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C) Among the risks and possible setbacks of a five-way 
race: 
 
     -Voter fraud could be easier to commit and more 
prevalent due to non-traditional circumstances (the Supreme 
Electoral Council (CSE) remains in the hands of the "pacted" 
FSLN and PLC, with the FSLN enjoying the upper hand, while 
other parties currently have no representation). 
 
     -One or both of the dissident candidates could fail to 
develop an organization capable of transforming popular 
support into sufficient votes and defending the vote against 
fraud perpetrated by the majority parties; or, 
 
      -Jarquin and Rizo could draw enough votes from 
Montealegre to allow Ortega to win on the first round. 
 
POLLS - WHAT MORE WE NEED TO KNOW 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Although the polls tell us much, gaps remain in the 
information available, specifically in the following areas: 
 
      -Which candidate respondents believe is best poised to 
beat Ortega. 
 
      -A clearer picture of the inclinations of independent 
voters. 
 
     -regional preferences to improve message targeting. 
 
     -impact, if any, of U.S. on voter choice in urban, 
semi-urban, and rural  areas. 
 
Focus groups would help clarify these points. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
- - - - - 
 
¶6.  (S) Efforts thus far to sideline Aleman, reform the PLC, 
and reunite the PLC and ALN have failed, and at this juncture 
are probably counterproductive.  Montealegre's rejoining the 
PLC would not guarantee a PLC victory, as the votes of many 
current Montealegre supporters would migrate elsewhere. 
Further, if Rizo withdrew and actively campaigned for 
Montealegre, the ALN could lose more votes from the 
independents than it would gain from Rizo's support.  The 
ideal scenario to avoid a possible (but not yet probable) 
first-round Ortega win would be Rizo's resignation and his 
 
withdrawal from the political scene.  Accomplishing this 
objective will require robust persuasion/dissuasion from 
Embassy and Washington -- and in the end, our pressure might 
not be enough. 
TRIVELLI