VZCZCXRO1689
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2376/01 2701033
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271033Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4745
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002376 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
USAID FOR DCHA/FFP/EP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO AND REDSO/RFFP 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  DARFURQA DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT FOR FOOD AID 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  From August 29 - 31, USAID staff members visited El 
Fasher, North Darfur, to follow up on reports that food 
aid commodities were for sale in El Fasher markets and 
to discuss the food aid program with the UN World Food 
Program (WFP).  WFP indicated that problems with ration 
sales, concern for fraud with ration cards, excess 
commodities not returned to the stock after 
distributions, and the acceptability of and taste 
preference for commodities were current issues they are 
working on resolving.  End summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2.  In early 2005, representatives of the European 
Commission (EC), the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), WFP, and USAIDQs Office of Food for 
Peace jointly decided to raise the monthly cereal ration 
for internally displaced persons (IDPs) from 13.5 kg per 
person to 15.0 kg per person in an attempt to inject 
cereals into the markets at a time when cereals were 
scarce.  IDPs were expected to sell some of their 
rations in order to buy other ingredients, condiments, 
and other household items.  Such sales still occur 
despite the reduction in cereal ration to the normal 
monthly amount of 13.5 kg per person, which occurred at 
the beginning of 2006. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Weaknesses in Food Aid Management 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  The team discussed the findings with WFP in El 
Fasher, which was aware that significant amounts of food 
aid were regularly found on the market and openly 
admitted that these findings corresponded with the 
results of the post-distribution monitoring interviews 
conducted in the IDP camps.  In these interviews, WFP 
learned that IDPs, on average, sell between 10 percent 
and 15 percent of their food ration to obtain other 
items.  Given that 2,000 metric tons (MT) of food aid 
are distributed every month to IDPs living in camps as 
well as IDPs living in El Fasher town, one could expect 
a monthly turnover of between 200 MT and 300 MT of food 
aid on the market.  It is worth noting that even after a 
missed monthly distribution in June, food aid on the 
market did not noticeably diminish, according to El 
Fasher-based WFP staff.  Reportedly, wheat is not a 
preferred commodity in El Fasher, as are millet and 
sorghum, and is being sold at a price between SD 1,200 
to SD 1,500 (approximately USD 5.70 to USD 7.14) per 50 
kg bag. 
 
¶4.  A camp management agency reported that IDPs would 
not permit WFP cooperating partners to depart from a 
camp after the completion of a food distribution with 
excess commodities.  WFP stated that this would cause a 
riot, and that the current practice is to distribute all 
commodities brought to the camp to avoid confrontation. 
However, the camp management agency noted that IDPs 
would allow a WFP truck to depart with excess 
commodities, since WFP is trusted to return the balance 
to the warehouse.  This problem has resulted in the 
distribution of excess food commodities and opens 
another avenue for food aid to be taken to market. 
Potentially, this opportunity to sell excess commodities 
could encourage an oversupply to the camp or under- 
distribution to beneficiaries and create surplus for 
sale after distribution is completed. 
 
¶5.  Another reported weakness in food aid management 
procedures is that some community leaders arrive at the 
distribution site with a handful of ration cards that 
they then distribute to certain individuals.  WFP staff 
commented that it is unclear whether the leaders 
 
KHARTOUM 00002376  002 OF 003 
 
 
safeguard the cards from month to month or whether this 
is a scam orchestrated by the leader to receive several 
rations by sending individuals to collect the food.  WFP 
staff who are present during distributions need to 
better monitor the origins of the cards and the end 
recipient. 
 
¶6.  Corn-Soy Blend (CSB) reportedly is not appreciated 
by the IDPs in North Darfur.  Rumors of CSB being used 
as animal feed circulate in El Fasher and Khartoum.  CSB 
can be found for sale in El Fasher at the price of SD 
600 to SD 700 for a 25 kg bag (approximately USD 2.86 to 
USD 3.33).  WFP noted that in some parts of Darfur, 
cooking demonstrations have resulted in acceptance and 
utilization of the commodity.  These demonstrations 
should stress the value of using the commodity as an 
ingredient in the daily meal for its micronutrient 
content rather than as a separate dish once in a while. 
 
¶7.  The general ration distribution to IDPs living in El 
Fasher town has been a point of contention between WFP 
and the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC).  WFP 
attempted to terminate the program after an initial 
phase, but HAC officials were adamant that the program 
continue.  A compromise was found in the distribution of 
a half-ration to urban populations.  A switch to 
targeted programs for this population group would be 
preferable.  In a briefing following the field visit, 
WFP staff in Khartoum noted that in the current tense 
climate in Darfur it would be counterproductive to 
attempt such program changes.  The visiting team agreed 
and suggested the option be kept open for future 
discussions. 
 
¶8.  Reportedly, truckers have found it profitable to 
load WFP wheat from a storage hub in Sudan and sell it 
on the market in Khartoum where 90 kg generate SD 12,000 
(USD 57.14).  Instead of the wheat, cement is 
transported to El Fasher, where it attains a high price. 
Truckers claim that cement transport is less prone to 
highway attacks and is considered safer.  The trucker 
then buys the appropriate amount of wheat on the El 
Fasher market and delivers it according to the WFP 
waybill.  WFP in Khartoum confirmed that it has 
investigated this scam.  The value of the misused food 
aid is being subtracted from the trucking company's 
invoices to recover the loss. 
 
------------------------------ 
WFP Responses to Issues Raised 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  On September 5, USAID staff briefed WFP 
representatives in Khartoum on the findings from El 
Fasher.  WFP confirmed that the presented findings were 
well-known and were being addressed in partnership with 
WFP headquarters in Rome.  Many of the issues reported 
on above were revealed in the Joint Food Security Report 
of 2005.  WFP pointed out that in the initial phase of 
the crisis the focus was on "getting the food to the 
people" at the expense of not having ideal control 
mechanisms in place.  The WFP official noted that the 
crisis was so immense that expedience in moving food to 
the beneficiaries came at the cost of accountability. 
WFP agreed that it is time to strengthen program 
accountability measures and control mechanisms. 
However, WFP reiterated that the current tense relations 
between the UN and the GNU make it exceedingly difficult 
to negotiate changes to the food aid program.  WFP made 
the following points: 
 
-- The misuse of CSB was of particular concern to WFP 
because of its high cost.  WFP will ask the 
nutritionists to assess the need for CSB in the general 
rations prior to formulating the 2007 program plan and 
may opt to restrict its use to the supplementary and 
therapeutic feeding programs; 
 
-- WFP will resume market monitoring to investigate the 
source of the food aid on the El Fasher market and 
 
KHARTOUM 00002376  003 OF 003 
 
 
identify ways to address the problem.  (Note:  The same 
subject was discussed with the Humanitarian Aid 
Department of the European Commission (ECHO).  The ECHO 
representative strongly defended the marketing of some 
of the food rations as a means of coping with the wider 
consequences of displacement.  The representative 
considered the argument that it is uncertain whether the 
beneficiary household ultimately receives its fair share 
an intrinsic risk.  End note.); and 
 
-- Ration card fraud is a common problem particularly in 
programs with general food rations.  WFP noted that the 
earlier re-registration of IDPs in camps greatly 
improved the credibility of beneficiary numbers. 
 
---------------------------- 
Analysis and Recommendations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  WFP operates a very large program in Darfur with 
more than 2.8 million targeted beneficiaries for general 
food rations, of whom 96 percent were reached in July as 
reported by WFP.  USAID staff note that WFP recognizes 
the weaknesses in its food aid procedures and has taken 
corrective measures where they are possible.  Given that 
major changes to the food aid program are particularly 
difficult to negotiate, when the relationship between 
the UN and the Government of National Unity (GNU) is 
strained, it would be counterproductive for WFP to press 
HAC too hard for changes until the present impasse 
between the UN and the GNU has been overcome.  WFP 
offices in North Darfur and Khartoum are open and frank 
about the weaknesses and are actively engaged in 
improving the situation where it is possible.  USAID 
will monitor the anticipated improvements on an ongoing 
basis. 
 
HUME