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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2254, DARFUR - NORTH DARFUR SITUATION REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2254 2006-09-17 13:17 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5332
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2254/01 2601317
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171317Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4579
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002254 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF ASEC PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR - NORTH DARFUR SITUATION REPORT 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1982 
 
KHARTOUM 00002254  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) Beginning in May 2006, inaccessibility sharply increased in 
much of North Darfur for humanitarian workers.  The UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has estimated that 
fighting and insecurity have displaced approximately 25,000 
individuals since June.  USAID reports that all humanitarian 
assistance programs have been affected by insecurity.  However, many 
USAID partners persist in their efforts to provide life-saving 
services in conflict-affected areas.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Operating Environment 
--------------------- 
 
2. (U) Since late July 2006, many locations have become completely 
inaccessible, including Saraf Omra and surrounding villages; rural 
Kabkabiya; Tawila town and surrounding areas; and Dar Zagawa, which 
is the area stretching from Kulkul to the border with Chad and 
Libya.  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) reported that 
locations with sporadic access include Fata Borno, Kassab IDP camp, 
Hashaba area, Korma, and Kafod.  USAID reports that shelter, water, 
and sanitation sectors have been severely affected by 
inaccessibility.  Due to the lack of humanitarian services, USAID's 
Darfur Field Office (USAID/DFO) staff report that populations in 
Tawila, Mellit, and Sayeh locations are likely to be the most 
vulnerable. 
 
3. (U) According to UN sources, 16 humanitarian vehicles were 
hijacked and 10 Sudanese NGO staff killed since May 2006 in Darfur. 
By contrast, from January to April of 2006, there were no aid 
workers killed in North Darfur.  This disturbing trend has impacted 
NGO staff movements, staff morale, and relationships with internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and communities within which the 
humanitarian community works. 
 
4. (U) OCHA has reported that many IDPs increasingly perceive the 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to be aligned with the 
Sudanese government, which complicates the relationship between AMIS 
and humanitarian agencies. 
 
5. (SBU) UN sources communicate daily with the armed groups 
operating in North Darfur and use the information to provide 
security briefs for the humanitarian community, including the status 
of "Go" and "No Go" zones.  USAID staff observe that the UN 
briefings provide NGOs with accurate, relevant information, which 
has for the most part prevented NGOs from being accidentally caught 
in fighting.  To negotiate humanitarian access, NGOs must now 
contact four Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) groups, the National 
Redemption Front (NRF), the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and 
several other smaller factions.  Back in May 2006, NGOs only needed 
security guarantees from one SLA group and the HAC. 
 
6. (SBU) Due to the growing presence of armed combatants in the 
camps, NGOS have received increased reports of sexual assaults, 
attacks, and shootings.  Additionally, NGOs have reported increased 
evidence that the IDP camps where they work are becoming havens for 
former combatants. 
 
------------------------ 
Status of USAID Programs 
------------------------ 
 
7. (U) As a result of increased insecurity, all USAID implementing 
partners have suspended at least one activity in North Darfur. 
However, Sudanese staff have maintained essential health, food, and 
nutrition programs in remote locations even when expatriate staff 
have been relocated to El Fasher. 
 
8. (SBU) The Tawila health center, operated by Relief International 
(RI) with USAID funding, continues to serve the needs of the Tawila 
community despite significant fighting in the area.  As part of RI's 
capacity building programs, they trained staff from Tawila in basic 
health provider skills.  While RI expatriate staff have been unable 
to travel to Tawila since August 2006, inhibiting program 
monitoring, basic level health services continue. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00002254  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
9. (SBU) The area surrounding Kutum town, located northwest of El 
Fasher, has been the site of heavy fighting in late August and early 
September 2006.  NGOs are unable to travel by road to reach Kutum 
and instead rely on helicopter transport to move staff and supplies. 
 Persevering under difficult security conditions, USAID partner GOAL 
continues to deliver basic health services.  When security 
deteriorated, GOAL relocated international staff to El Fasher and 
restricted vehicle movement to inside the city limits.  By using 
helicopter transport and a community-based approach to program 
delivery, GOAL has been able to continue providing basic 
humanitarian services in rural locations, even in close proximity to 
fighting.  GOAL staff noted that negotiating access to areas under 
control of armed groups becomes more complex as additional players 
are added to the mix. 
 
10. (SBU) Throughout July and August 2006, USAID partner 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) has maintained water and 
sanitation programs for more than 35,000 beneficiaries in Kutum and 
Kassab IDP camp.  Like RI, the IRC-managed clinics in Hashaba, a 
village located north of El Fasher, are now run by trained community 
volunteers, with minimal support from IRC staff based in El Fasher. 
IRC continues to operate a health clinic in Abu Shouk camp, a 
justice center in Zam Zam camp, and a women's center, also in Zam 
Zam camp.  IRC will assume the camp coordination role for As Salaam 
camp and currently operates a 24-hour health clinic there.  These 
services are ongoing, though have been scaled back in non-urban 
areas. 
 
11. (SBU) As a result of insecurity, USAID partner CHF International 
reported that its activities in the western part of North Darfur are 
now limited to Kabkabiya town, forcing it to cut back activities in 
other areas.  In Zam Zam IDP camp, south of El Fasher, CHF 
International has been able to provide farmers with agricultural 
tools and seeds. 
 
12. (U) The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) continues to work with 
Government of National Unity (GNU) institutions such as the Office 
of Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) and the State Ministry 
of Health (SMOH) to implement programs in remote areas including 
Wadaa, Dar Salaam, Muzbat, and Birmaza.  UNICEF continues to work in 
areas where fighting has occurred.  UNICEF reported that their 
implementing partners continue to effectively provide assistance in 
repairing water pumps, training water committees, rebuilding and 
equipping health centers, even in non-GNU held areas.  USAID/DFO 
staff note that UNICEF's work is now carried out with less 
monitoring, but appears to be effective and provides indispensable 
services to affected communities. 
 
13. (U) The UN World Food Program (WFP) reported that while enough 
food aid commodities are stocked in warehouses, agencies have been 
unable to distribute it due to insecurity in Dar Zaghawa and Kutum 
districts since May 2006. 
 
-------- 
Comments 
-------- 
 
14. (U) In USAID's estimation, the humanitarian response for the 
25,000 newly displaced IDPs in July was adequate and demonstrated 
the ability of the humanitarian community to quickly and efficiently 
mount a response. 
 
15. (U) USAID/DFO staff note that implementing partners are limited 
in their ability to monitor programs outside of El Fasher and some 
activities have been scaled back.  However, the activities continue 
to serve vulnerable populations under challenging security 
situations. 
 
16. (U) The humanitarian community in North Darfur remains poised to 
offer humanitarian assistance in as many areas as possible for as 
long as the security situation allows.  USAID staff note that the 
current NGOs in Darfur have sufficient capacity at the moment to 
respond to the current needs for new IDPs. 
 
HUME